IMRA'S WEEKLY COMMENTARY - 23 October 2003

Aaron Lerner Date: 23 October 2003

Since Yossi Beilin's "Geneva Initiative" (a.k.a. "Geneva Accord" came out it
has enjoyed considerable media coverage. Coverage yes. But analysis of the
actual document? Almost non-existent. It would appear that we are suffering
from the same laziness that was the hallmark of the Oslo decade, when
politicians and journalists alike tended to rely on frequently inaccurate
self-serving executive summaries rather than spend the time to actually read
and understand the various Oslo documents.

There are those who recommend that it is best to ignore Beilin's latest
product and simply wait for it to die a natural death.

But the "Geneva Initiative" isn't the product of a bunch of harmless
academics. It is being marketed by political figures who, though not
particularly popular today, have every hope and intention to vie for the
leadership of Israel in the future.

And the document that they endorse today serves as a measure, and in turn
warning, of their reckless incompetence.

Here are just a few highlights:

#1 Cavalier Attitude Towards Existing Terror Infrastructure

While there will be a schedule for Israeli withdrawals, with the first
withdrawal "immediately upon entry into force of this Agreement (Article 5,
Paragraph 7(b)) no time element is associated with the disbanding of
"irregular forces or armed bands" (Article 5, Paragraph 1(b)iv).

There is no provision for clearing out weapons present in the area of the
Palestinian state that are prohibited by the "Initiative".

#2 Arming of Palestinian State Set By Others

While the "Initiative" would detail the weapons the "non-militarized"
Palestinian state's Palestinian Security Force could posses is the yet to be
written Appendix X, this list can be changed at any time without Israel's
consent. ["Any proposed changes to Annex X shall be considered by a
trilateral committee composed of the two Parties and the MF (AL:
Multinational Force) If no agreement is reached in the trilateral committee,
the IVG (AL: Implementation and Verification Group composed of the US,
Russian Federation, EU, UN and others) may make its own recommendations."
(Article 5 Paragraph 3(b))

#3 Formula For Crises: Defense Pacts Allowed

The Palestinian state can enter into defense pacts with even the most
radical state as long as the stated objective of the pact does not
explicitly includes "launching aggression or other acts of hostility "
against Israel (Article 4 Paragraph 1(b)iii).

These pacts, combined with the presence of the Multinational Force (Article
5, Paragraph 6(d)ii) would make it considerably more difficult, costly and
dangerous for Israel to carry out defensive operations within the territory
of the Palestinian state when the agreement isn't honored.

#4 Short Lived Security Provisions

Monitoring of international entry points into the Palestinian state can be
terminated by the Implementation and Verification Group composed of the US,
Russian Federation, EU, UN and others after 5 years.

Israel is limited to a "small military presence in the Jordan Valley under
the authority of the Multinational Force and that presence is only
guaranteed for 5.5 years (Article 5, Paragraph 7(f)).

The two Early Warning Stations provided for Israel under the "Initiative"
are guaranteed for only a period of ten years. (Article 5, Paragraph 8(f)).

#5 Jerusalem Outside Of Israel's Air Defense Envelope

The West Bank, including parts of Jerusalem, are carved out of Israel's air
defense envelope with the IDF barred from patrolling the airspace (Article
4, Paragraph 1(a), essentially leaving the IAF to defend the Jewish State
from the coastline.

#6 Imposed Third Party Arbitration

All disputes between Israel and the Palestinian state are ultimately subject
to imposed third party arbitration (Article 17 Paragraph 4).

#7 Formula For Crises: Monetary Compensation of Refugees

While "The Parties recognize the right of states that have hosted
Palestinian refugees to remuneration"(Article 7 Paragraph 3(b)), there is no
reference to the possibility of offsetting the value of Palestinian property
"at the time of displacement" against the value of lost Jewish property in
Arab countries. And since "No further claims related to events prior to
this Agreement may be raised by either Party." (Article 1, Paragraph 2), it
appears that the "Accord" would forfeit that right.

Israel is to pay a "lump sum" covering the aggregate value of "Palestinians'
property at the time of displacement". This property was not identified as
"Palestinian refugee" property but as "Palestinians' property", opening the
possibility that land that Israeli Arabs may also claim would be included in
the calculation. A third party will determine the size of the "lump sum",
thus exposing Israel to the possibility that an unworkable figure is set
(Article 7 Paragraph 9).

#8 Jewish Religious Rights Forfeited

The Waqf may bar Jewish visitors to the Temple Mount on the grounds that it
disrupts religious worship or decorum on the site (Article 6 Paragraph
5(b)iii.)

While the Oslo Interim Agreement refers to respecting "the ways of worship"
and "religious rights of Jews. . ." at religious sites (Annex III, Appendix
1, Article 32) the "Initiative" only refers to "access". (Article 10). It
should be noted that it is the position of the PA appointed Mufti of
Jerusalem as well as the other Palestinian religious officials that while
Jews may have "access" to such holy sites as the Tomb of the Patriarchs in
Hebron and Rachel's Tomb in Bethlehem that it is blasphemy for Jews and
other infidels to pray at these sites as they are also considered mosques.

And there's more.

The public should know that the politicians who drafted and endorsed the
"Initiative" drafted and endorsed a botched job.

Incompetence should not be ignored - it should be exposed.

Dr. Aaron Lerner, Director IMRA (Independent Media Review & Analysis)
(mail POB 982 Kfar Sava)
Tel 972-9-7604719/Fax 972-3-7255730
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