4 July 2004
PRESS RELEASE
Palestinian Public Opinion Poll

IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SHARON DISENGAGEMENT PLAN, WIDE SUPPORT FOR THE
EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE AND FOR VARIOUS FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE, BUT
ENDING ARMED ATTACKS FROM THE GAZA STRIP IS CONTINGENT ON A FULL ISRAELI
WITHDRAWAL FROM IT

24-27 June 2004

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center
for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between
June 24 and 27, 2004. Total size of the sample is 1320 adults interviewed
face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3% and
rejection rate 2%.
For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Ayoub
Mustafa, at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS:

(1) Withdrawal from Gaza

Little less than two-thirds of the Palestinians (64%) support the Egyptian
initiative and 32% oppose it. But support for its different components
varies: 81% for unification of the security services under the control of
the cabinet, 87% for the appointment of a strong minister of interior, but
only 53% for the deployment of Egyptian military advisers and security
officials in the Gaza Strip.

High levels of support for various forms of international presence in the
context of the Sharon disengagement plan: 60% for the deployment of an armed
international or multilateral force in the Gaza Strip that would be
responsible for security in the Rafah international border crossing and the
Egyptian-Palestinian border; 61% for the deployment of such forces in the
settlements in order to take custody of them and maintain control until an
Israeli-Palestinian agreement on their future is reached; 64% for an
international presence aimed at rebuilding PA security services; 70% for an
international presence aimed at rebuilding PA civil institutions and
ministries; and 78% for an international presence aimed at rebuilding the
Palestinian economy and infrastructure.

Support for the modified Sharon disengagement plan as approved by the
Israeli government does not exceed 34% and only one quarter believes the
plan will actually be implemented. In March 2004, 73% welcomed the original
plan when it was first announced and only 24% believed that Sharon was
serious about implementing it.

As long as the withdrawal from Gaza is not complete, a majority of 55% would
support continuation of armed attacks from the Gaza Strip after the
withdrawal, but a majority of 59% would oppose such attacks if the
withdrawal from the Strip was complete.

An almost even split on the future of the homes in the settlements with 49%
wanting to keep them intact and 48% wanting them destroyed. Support for the
destruction of the settlements' homes increases among Gazans reaching 58%.

A slight majority of 50% believes the Bush letter to Sharon on borders and
refugees is important in shaping a permanent agreement with the Israelis and
45% believe it is not important.

After the Israeli withdrawal form Gaza, 59% are worried about possible
Palestinian infighting, only 30% believe the PA has high capacity to control
matters after the withdrawal, and only 31% believe life in Gaza will fully
resume in an orderly manner. Nonetheless, 59% believe the PA will be the
body that will assume control over the Gaza Strip after the withdrawal and
only 26% believe it will fall into the hands of factions and armed groups.

An overwhelming majority (90%) supports Hamas' participation in the
administration of the Gaza Strip after the Israel withdrawal. It terms of
the preferred percentage for Hamas' role in decision making, the median was
50% (and the mean 51%) for those supporting the participation of Hamas. The
median for the whole sample was 50% and the mean 45%.

(2) Peace Process: Intifada, Victory, Armed attacks, and Reconciliation

Despite the fact that 69% believe that armed attacks have helped achieve
national rights that negotiations could not achieve, only 40% believe the
Palestinians came out winners so far in the ongoing armed conflict that has
started in September 2000 and 37% believe no one won while 16% believe
Israel is the winner. On the other hand, 48% believe the majority of the
Palestinians think that the Palestinians are the winners, and 51% believe
the majority of Israelis think Israel is the winners.

A majority of 59% supports continued suicide bombings inside Israel if an
opportunity arises. Despite this, support for mutual cessation of violence
remains very high (79%) and if such cessation is obtained, a majority of 55%
would support, and 41% would oppose, taking measures by the PA to prevent
further armed attacks on Israeli targets.

Pessimism prevails: two thirds believe the Roadmap has collapsed; only 20%
believe the two sides will soon return to negotiations and violence will
stop; and 77% feel that their safety and that of their families are not
assured these days.

Nonetheless, support for reconciliation between the two peoples remains very
high (72%) even though 43% believe such reconciliation is not possible ever.

(3) Local and National Elections

Opposition to holding local elections in stages is greater than support (49%
to 45%) as more people want to hold these elections in all cities, towns and
villages simultaneously. If elections do take place now, a majority of 52%
believe it will not be fair and only 38% believe it will be fair. In any
case, only 44% believe the PA is serious about holding local elections in
September 2004.

If local elections were held soon and were fair, 34% of the respondents
think Fateh candidates would win, 27% think Hamas candidates would win, 18%
think independents would win, and only 9% think family candidates would win.
As to how the respondents themselves would behave, 28% said they will vote
for Hamas and Islamic Jihad candidates, 26% for Fateh's, 17% for
independents, and 9% for family candidates. In the Gaza Strip, 32% will vote
for Hamas and Islamic Jihad candidates, 23% for Fateh's, 18% for
independents, and 7% for family candidates.

A solid majority of 70% supports the participation of refugee camp residents
in the municipal council elections within which these camps are located, 23%
support holding separate elections for these camps to elect local committees
for the camps, and only 5% oppose the participation of refugee camps in the
local elections.

Two thirds oppose the proposed amendments to local election law calling for
the election of the head of the local council by the elected members of the
council and not directly by the voters.

With regard to the general political elections, almost three quarters
support giving women a quota. The median for the preferred percentage of the
quota for those supporting such a quota was 30% and the mean 35%.The median
for the whole sample was 20% and the mean 25%.

A majority of 88% encourages the participation of Hamas in the general
legislative and presidential elections if they take place soon.

(4) Reform, Democracy, and Corruption

An overwhelming majority (92%) supports inside and outside calls for
fundamental political reforms in the PA. But only 40% of the public believe
the PA is actually
carrying out such reform.

Positive evaluation of the status of democracy in the Palestinian areas does
not exceed 25%, while only 20% believe that freedom of the press exist in PA
areas (37% believe it exists to some extent). Despite this, 50% believe that
people can criticize the PA without fear.

87% believe that corruption exists in the institutions of the PA, and among
those more than two thirds believe that this corruption will remain the same
or increase in the future. Moreover, two thirds believe that officials and
others involved in or accused of corruption are often not charged or brought
to account.

(5) Popularity of Yasir Arafat, Marwan Barghouti, and Political Factions

In an open question (without a list of names presented to respondents)
regarding the election of the PA president, a majority of 54% votes for
Yasir Arafat. No one else received 2% or more of the vote with the exception
of Marwan Barghouti and Mahmud Zahhar (2% for each). But in a closed
question (with a list of only two names presented to respondents) Arafat
received 49% and Haidar Abdul Shafi 10%. Since 1994, the name of former
Hamas leader Ahmad Yasin was presented. As of the next poll, Mahmud Zahhar's
name (and that of Marwan Barghouti) will also be in the list along with
Arafat. Since he received less than 2% in the open question, Abdul Shafi's
name will not be in the list of candidates for the office of the president.

In another open question, this time regarding the election of a vice
president, Ahmad Qurai (Abu Ala') received 9%, followed by Marwan Barghouti
(8%), Saeb Erikat (6%), Mohammad Dahlan, Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazin), and
Mahmud Zahhar (3% each), and Haidar Abdul Shafi (2%). But in a closed
question (with a list not containing Zahhar or any other Hamas leader, as
the names of Rantisi and Yasin were dropped) Barghouti came first with 25%,
followed by Erikat (9%), Ahamd Qurai' and Haidar Abdul Shafi (6%), Hanan
Ashrawi (5%), Mohammad Dahlan and Farouq Qaddoumi (4% each), and Mahmud
Abbas (3%). It is worth noting that Barghouti received more votes in the
Gaza Strip (27%) than in the West Bank (24%), and that Dahlan managed to
strengthen his support in Gaza (to 8%) while receiving only 1% in the West
Bank. Last March, Barghouti received the support of 16%. The results show
that the trial of Barghouti has positively affected his popularity as 67% of
the public said the trial has made him more qualified to be a Palestinian
leader.

The popularity of Fateh has remained unchanged from last March (28%) but
that of Hamas increased from 20% to 24% during the same period. In the Gaza
Strip, Hamas' support reached 29% compared to 27% for Fateh. Combined
Islamist strength (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and independent Islamists)
increased from 29% last March to 35% (40% in the Gaza Strip) in this poll.
This is the highest level of support for the Islamists since 1995.
Surprisingly, 39% of the respondents said that they thought that the
assassination of Hamas leaders (Yasin and Rantisi) has weakened the movement
while only 36% said it has strengthened it.

End of the press release