Special Information Bulletin
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S) November 2004

[IMRA: Has Israel's intelligence establishment returned to the optimistic
"Oslo Mode"?

Given the close ties between the Intelligence and Terrorism Information
Center and the Israeli intelligence establishment the delicate presentation
of the views of Abu Mazen (for example, presenting the rejection of
terror - at this time - on tactical grounds as if it means someting more
than a tactical move and noting that Abu Mazen "is a supporter of the
fundamental, uncompromising views on the permanent settlement that were held
by Yasser Arafat" without explaining that this means no compromise on the
right of return and an insistence on a complete withrawal to the '67 lines)
should serve as a warning that the intelligence establishment is again
letting its own political orientation cloud its analysis.]

The four main figures in a post-Arafat Palestinian leadership
www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/12_04/leadership.htm

#1 Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee
following Yasser Arafat's death, supposed to succeed him as Chairman of the
Palestinian Authority

#2 Ahmed Qurei (Abu Alaa), Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority

#3 Salim al-Za'nun (Abu al-Adib), head of the Palestinian National Council
(PNC)

#4 Rawhi Fattuh (Abu Wissam), Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council
and interim President of the Palestinian Authority for a period of 60 days
following Yasser Arafat's death
-----

Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen)

Mahmoud Rida Abbas , also known as Abu Mazen , was born in Safed (the Upper
Galilee region) in 1935 to a family of dairy farmers. In 1948, he left for
Syria as a refugee. He is a father of three children (Mazen, his eldest son,
died a sudden death at the age of 42 several years ago) and has eight
grandchildren.

Abu Mazen studied law in the University of Damascus. He went on to earn his
PhD in the University of Moscow; his doctoral thesis was titled "The
Relationship between Nazism and Zionism, 1935-1942".

Having spent most of his life in Arab countries outside of Palestinian
territories, he served, among else, in the capacity of manpower resources
manager in the civil service of Qatar, where he accumulated significant
amounts of money. It was not until 1995, after the establishment of the
Palestinian Authority, that he returned to the Palestinian Authority
administered territories. He has been living in Ramallah for the past
several years. Financially well-off, he keeps two mansions in Gaza and in
Ramallah (as well as a house in Morocco). His sons are involved with various
financial projects for the Palestinian Authority and have in the past been
accused of corruption.

Positions and activities

Alongside Yasser Arafat and Farouq Qaddumi, Abu Mazen is one of the founders
of the Fatah movement. Since 1964, he has been a member of the movement's
Central Committee.

He made his way through the ranks of Fatah and the PLO as the successor of
murdered seniors. After the murder of Issam Sartawi in 1983, he was
appointed in charge of PLO's contacts with Israeli left-wing groups. In
1988, he assumed Abu Jihad's position as head of the Jordanian portfolio and
in charge of operations in the OPT ( Occupied Palestinian Territories), the
PLO Executive Committee. For many years, he has also been responsible for
the organization's finances.

Since 1968, Abu Mazen has served as member of the Palestinian National
Council (PNC). In 1996, he was elected Chairman of the PLO Executive
Committee, in which capacity he served as Yasser Arafat's substitute in the
Executive Committee.

Between the years 1996-2002, Abu Mazen served in the position of Chairman of
the Central Elections Committee. In addition, he served as head of PLO's
negotiations department. On April 29, 2003 he was appointed the first prime
minister of the Palestinian Authority, a position from which he resigned
five months later in the wake of disagreements with Yasser Arafat. Following
Yasser Arafat's death, he was appointed Chairman of the Executive Committee.
Nowadays, he is a candidate to succeed Yasser Arafat as Chairman of the
Palestinian Authority following the forthcoming elections.

His views regarding the political process

Abu Mazen was one of the first PLO figures to hold contacts with Israelis,
and is considered to be one of the key figures in the political process.
During the 1970s, he held contacts with Israeli left-wing groups and took
part in numerous meetings with Israelis before official contacts commenced.

Following are some of the main positions he held in the 90s with regard to
the political process.

In 1991, he was the head of the PLO delegation to the Madrid Convention.

In 1993, he was among the originators of the Oslo talks on the Palestinian
side; however, he did not personally partake in the talks but rather
followed their progress from Tunis. He signed the Declaration of Principles
( Oslo A).

He was one of the leaders of the Palestinian team in the negotiations which
led to the signing of the Paris Agreement (1994); subsequently, he signed
the Interim Agreement (1995) on behalf of the PLO.

In 1995, he joined Israeli Knesset member Yossi Beilin to formulate the
"framework for the conclusion of a final status agreement between Israel and
the PLO", a document known as the "Beilin-Abu Mazen Plan".

Abu Mazen's status in the Palestinian leadership

Abu Mazen is considered to be among the key figures in the Palestinian
leadership; for many years, he was seen as Yasser Arafat's right-hand man
and second-in-command. Abu Mazen's relationship with Yasser Arafat was
occasionally marred by tensions that mounted between the two. A major rift
between them surfaced during Abu Mazen's term as Prime Minister (2003). The
grounds for the discord was a disagreement over the transfer of authorities
from Yasser Arafat to Abu Mazen, as well as significant differences of
opinion on such issues as the way to direct the confrontation and the
implementation of structural reforms in the Palestinian Authority.

Abu Mazen (like his colleague, Abu Alaa) lacks some biographical and
personal characteristics that would be relevant for the image of a leader on
the Palestinian scene:

- The reputation of active participation in the on-the-ground confrontation
and in personal sacrifice.

- The lack of his own loyal "corps" of field operatives in Fatah and in the
security apparatuses, who would be able to back his political position (Abu
Mazen is attempting to find a compensation of a sort in his relations with
Muhammad Dahlan, a senior Fatah activist and former head of the Preventive
Security apparatus in the Gaza Strip).

- He lacks political charisma and strength. Unlike Yasser Arafat, Abu Mazen
is hardly a symbol for the Palestinian people.
However, being one of the founders of the Fatah, along with Yasser Arafat,
he does enjoy a certain measure of prestige in Palestinian politics.
Substantial support for Abu Mazen rests on his long-lasting activity and
connections, as well as on his being a refugee, authentically representing
the "Nakba generation" (referring to the 1948 catastrophe, as viewed by the
Palestinians) and the "ethos of return". All these make him, as already
stated, the most prominent figure to succeed Arafat without any real
competition (after Marwan Barghouti withdrew his candidacy).

It should be stressed that Abu Mazen is an experienced politician, one of
the PLO/Tunis "old timers", and that he is intimately familiar with the ins
and outs of the Palestinian political system. He can even be characterized
as a bold politician, having no qualms about expressing his political
agenda, even when it does not conform to accepted trends on the Palestinian
scene (such as his precedent-setting declarations condemning terrorism in
the Sharm al-Sheikh and Aqaba summits in June 2003, infuriating many
Palestinians, including Yasser Arafat). He is considered to be a key figure,
with his own agenda and backing in the Fatah institutions, and he commands
the support of both a significant part of the old-time leadership, most of
whose members have come from outside the Palestinian Authority administered
territories, from Tunis, as well as by many of Fatah's "middle generation",
most of them having come from the "inside" (the Palestinian Authority
administered territories).

Abu Mazen has good personal contacts with Israeli figures from the entire
political spectrum, with whom he held talks and negotiations in the past. He
is a shrewd negotiator, closely familiar with the Israeli political system
and with Zionist history. However, he expressed his bitter disappointment
with the way he was regarded by the Israeli government during his term as
prime minister in 2003. In his view, the Israeli government failed to
provide his policy with support and did little to help him reinforce his
position.

Abu Mazen's pragmatic views, endorsing the resolution of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, have earned him the support of the
international community, including the US. He also maintains good relations
with Arab countries such as the Persian Gulf countries (especially Qatar),
Jordan and Egypt - that wish to see him elected.

Abu Mazen's doctrine and views

Abu Mazen is the most pronounced representative of PLO's pragmatic stream.
He is one of the main proponents of the political settlement process with
Israel, and considers the negotiations table to be the right setting for the
resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Abu Mazen rejects the way of terrorism, and has expressed his opposition to
the violent course of the current confrontation ever since it began. In his
opinion, the "resistance" should have remained a popular, non-violent
protest. The escalation, in his view, has inflicted great damage upon the
Palestinian people and only served to distance them further from the
realization of their true goal. Even when he was elected prime minister, he
attempted to soothe the situation and bring an end to terrorist attacks,
placing a special emphasis on stopping suicide bombing attacks in Israeli
population centers.

Abu Mazen objects to open interim agreements, believing these might serve
Israel to establish concrete facts in the Palestinian Authority administered
territories. Therefore, it is his preference to begin negotiations on the
final status agreement as soon as possible. This, despite his doubts of the
chances to achieve substantial results in such negotiations, given the
uneasy atmosphere of confrontation, enmity and distrust, and due to his
feeling that this is not something the Israeli government would be willing
to do. He is a supporter of the fundamental, uncompromising views on the
permanent settlement that were held by Yasser Arafat and are currently
espoused by the majority of the Palestinian leadership.

On the internal scene, Abu Mazen is one of the most prominent
representatives of the aspiration to instate order and implement reforms
that would bring an end to the internal chaos, reinforce the centralized
rule and improve the population's quality of life. In his view, the chaos
intensifies the military confrontation with Israel and puts political
negotiations further out of reach.

In summary

Although he has lost a significant share of his strength in the wake of the
crisis in his relations with Yasser Arafat in July 2004, Abu Mazen remains
one of the key figures on the Palestinian scene and has become the immediate
"successor" following Arafat's death.

Despite his failure as prime minister and his conflict with Yasser Arafat,
Abu Mazen's extensive political experience, along with his methodical
political doctrine accepted by major portions of the Palestinian public,
might help him gain many supporters in the Palestinian political system,
which yearns for a positive change.

Nevertheless, his moderate political reputation and weak leadership skills
might later on present an obstacle and arouse strong resistance to his
views, given the violent reality the Palestinians are currently in. The
level of his success to learn from past lessons and receive massive backing
from the various political circles on the Palestinian scene and from
inter-Arab and international parties might determine his ability to
stabilize his status and create a strong foundation for himself in the
Palestinian Authority administered territories in the post-Arafat era.

---

Ahmed Qurei (Abu Alaa), Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority

Ahmed Ali Muhammad Qurei , also known as Abu Alaa, was born in 1937 in the
village of Abu Dis, east of Jerusalem, where he currently resides. He is a
descendant of one of the town's oldest families. Abu Alaa spent most of his
adult life in Arab countries, outside of Palestinian territories and only
returned to the region when the Palestinian Authority was established in
1994.

A man of property, he was involved with the financial affairs of the PLO.
His assets include a cement production company
(cement being a monopolistic product in the Palestinian Authority
administered territories). His economic activities, privately as well as in
the PLO, have tainted him with a stain of corruption in the eyes of the
Palestinian public.

Abu Alaa suffers from coronary heart disease and underwent heart surgery in
2002.

Positions and activities

His role in the Fatah movement: Abu Alaa joined Fatah in the year 1968.
Since 1989, he has served as a member of the movement's leadership
institutions: the Central Committee and the Revolutionary Council.

His role in the PLO: Abu Alaa has held key positions in PLO's financial
sector: head of the foreign investment branch and director of PLO's economic
department and Yasser Arafat's economic advisor. He founded and became
director of Samed (in the 1970s)-PLO's economic infrastructure organization,
composed of numerous economic-financial projects (light industry plants such
as furniture, textile and carpets; agricultural farms in Africa and
elsewhere; stores and workshops). Later on, when the Palestinian Authority
was founded, he plotted the multi-year economic program for the development
of the Palestinian economy.

He is a member of the PNC (the Palestinian National Council) and PLO's
Central Committee.

His role in the Palestinian Authority: After it was established, Abu Alaa
held key positions in the Palestinian Authority:
director-general of PECDAR (since the establishment of that financial body
in 1993 with the purpose of channeling financial assistance from donor
countries to projects in the Palestinian Authority administered
territories). He also served as Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry in
the Palestinian Authority until he was elected as a Fatah representative to
the Palestinian Legislative Council in the general elections in January 1996
in the Jerusalem area (winning with the largest number of votes in the
Jerusalem electorate). He also served as Speaker of the Palestinian
Legislative Council until his appointment as prime minister on October 7,
2003.

Abu Alaa and the political process

Abu Alaa took a significant part in the negotiations with Israel. Following
are his main roles within this framework:

He was the leader of the Palestinian team that held secret talks with
Israeli representatives in Oslo, leading to the parties' signing the
Declaration of Principles Agreement (Oslo 1)on September 13, 1993.

He was the leader of the Palestinian team in the talks that led to the
signature of the Paris Agreement (April 1994) and the Oslo 2 agreement
(September 28, 1995).

He took part in various rounds of negotiations in Cairo, Taba and Camp
David. Also, he directed the secret negotiations channel in Stockholm with
Israel's former minister Shlomo Ben Ami and attorney Gil'ad Sher.

In late 2001, he held contacts with Shimon Peres (then, a minister in PM
Sharon's government) that were termed the Peres-Abu Alaa understandings.
These contacts led to the formation of an outline for ending the conflict
within two years, its main points being: ending the Intifada, mutual
political recognition, while recognizing a Palestinian state within
provisional borders, and negotiations on a permanent status agreement that
would be completed within one year. The principles of this outline affected
international elements (primarily European) and were later included in the
Roadmap outline.

In February 2002, he visited Washington on Yasser Arafat's behalf, and
presented the leaders of the American administration with the Palestinian
"Vision for Peace" (the Palestinian plan for a political outline and a
permanent status agreement).

Abu Alaa's status

Abu Alaa is one of the senior figures in the Palestinian leadership and his
name surfaced time and again as one of Yasser Arafat's potential successors.
For years, he and Abu Mazen were considered to be high-echelon figures close
to Yasser Arafat and capable of influencing the late Palestinian leader.
During the crises that occurred between Abu Mazen and Yasser Arafat, which
ultimately led to Abu Mazen's resignation from his position as prime
minister, Abu Alaa served as a mediator between the two.

Since he assumed his position as PM on October 7, 2003, Abu Alaa's approach
at first, unlike that of Abu Mazen, was to avoid challenging Yasser Arafat's
role as the dominant decision maker on the Palestinian scene. However, in
the course of 2004, their disagreements over the division of authorities
deepened and reached a breaking point. Abu Alaa, who wished to promote a
policy of reforms in the Palestinian Authority (primarily in the field of
security), sought to receive significant
authorities, which were up until then held by Yasser Arafat. The latter
apparently agreed to transfer the control over the three security
apparatuses,[1] at one time controlled by Abu Mazen, to Abu Alaa. However,
Yasser Arafat rendered the entire move obsolete by continuing to oversee
these three apparatuses in his capacity as chairman of the National Security
Council.

[1] The Preventive Security, the Civil Defense and the Civil Police.

The frustration felt by Abu Alaa over his inability to promote his policy on
political issues and on the issue of reforms have prompted him, over the
course of the last year, to submit his resignation from his post as prime
minister several times (the last time was triggered by a disagreement with
Yasser Arafat over the Palestinian participation in the donor countries'
convention that was scheduled for September 2004). In practice, however, he
refrained from going through with his threats.

It is likely that Abu Alaa's bitterness was further aggravated by the fierce
criticism expressed by the Legislative Council against him and his
government over his lack of action on promoting the reforms and weeding out
anarchy. This criticism was demonstrated in an actual threat by members of
the Legislative Council to cast a vote of non-confidence in the government,
thus disbanding it.

Abu Alaa, one of the PLO members who have come from outside the Palestinian
Authority administered territories, does not have a record and reputation of
active involvement in the struggle and of sacrifice (such as participation
in actions or being held under arrest). He does not have extensive
political-popular endorsement and is not supported by "troops" of Fatah
field operatives or apparatus members who could back his political status.

However, Abu Alaa is an experienced politician who has formed extensive
political connections in Israel, the US and Europe and has accumulated
valuable political experience, particularly in the course of his tenure in
the Legislative Council. Likewise, he has accumulated valuable, hands-on
political experience in the course of the negotiation talks, both official
and covert, that were held within the framework of the political process.
Such skills, alongside his economic experience, may well serve him in the
Post-Arafat era, to further his aims alongside Abu Mazen.

Abu Alaa's political views and perceptions

Abu Alaa is considered among the PLO's mainstream, which, under Yasser
Arafat's leadership, brought the Palestinians to a
peace process with Israel based on the aspiration to establish two states,
Israel and Palestine, within the borders of 1967.

His political perception is therefore pragmatic, and so has been his
fundamental approach in the course of the negotiations with Israel. However,
in the negotiations, he has relied on unyielding bargaining in order to make
the most for the Palestinian people.

Abu Alaa has expressed his pragmatic views throughout the violent
confrontation, stressing the political channel at the expense of the
military struggle, although less blatantly than expressed by Abu Mazen. In
this context, Abu Alaa is opposed to terrorist attacks, and particularly to
suicide bombing attacks in Israeli population centers. However, Abu Alaa
voices, from time to time, critical statements over Israel's actions toward
the Palestinian Authority. For example, he blamed Israel, at one time, for
causing the downfall of Abu Mazen's government, for its intention to depose
Yasser Arafat, for its attempt to derail the efforts to calm down the
conflict, and for its striving to tear down the foundations of the Roadmap.

Abu Alaa expresses the official view of the Palestinian Authority,
considering the Disengagement Plan to be a part of a wider political context
as well as a first step in the implementation of the Roadmap.
-----

Rawhi Fattuh-Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council

Rawhi Ahmed Muhammad Fattuh (Abu Wissam) was born in 1949. Married and a
father of three children, he is a resident of the city of Rafah in the
southern Gaza Strip. His family descends from the Ashdod area but he arrived
as a refugee to the Gaza Strip. After a long stay abroad, he returned to the
Palestinian Authority administered territories in 1994, after the
establishment of the Palestinian Authority. He is a graduate of a military
academy in Iraq and has a B.A. in English language and literature from a
Syrian university.

Positions and activities

In the Palestinian Authority: Serves as Speaker of the Palestinian
Legislative Council as of March 2004. He was elected for the Legislative
Council in 1996 as a Fatah representative in the Rafah region and served as
the Legislative Council's secretary until he was appointed minister.
Starting November 2003 until his appointment as Speaker of the Legislative
Council, he served as Minister of Agriculture in Abu Alaa's government.

In the PLO: A member of the Palestinian National Council.

In Fatah: A member of the Fatah Revolutionary Council since 1989 as well as
a member of the Fatah Supreme Council in the Gaza Strip. He served as a
member of the Fatah recruitment and organization office since 1985.

In the 1970s and the early 80s, he served as a member and chairman of the
Palestinian students association in Syria. He was held under arrest by the
authorities for a period of a year and a half on political grounds.

In the course of the current violent confrontation with Israel, he has been
involved in the orchestration of Fatah's popular and public activity, mostly
in the south of the Gaza Strip. In his current capacity, he embarked several
times upon political missions on behalf of the Palestinian Authority in the
countries of the region, and held contacts with the Palestinian factions on
the issue of the intra-Palestinian dialogue. In this context, he visited
Egypt (August 2004) and Syria (September 2004). In Damascus, he met with
regime seniors and with representatives of the Palestinian factions; also,
he took part (July 2004) in meetings with the factions on the issue of
stopping the firing of rockets from the Gaza Strip to Israel.

Rawhi Fattuh's Status

Rawhi Fattuh is one of Fatah's "old-timers". They consider him one of their
own (and so did Yasser Arafat); at the same time, however, he enjoys the
confidence of the movement's "middle generation". He is not a member of
Fatah's first line of leadership and does not possess a strong independent
status, yet he is a political figure accepted by the public, particularly in
the Gaza Strip. In the course of 2004, he helped mediate and bridge between
elements from the various wings of the Fatah. Thus, for example, he took
part in a reconciliation conference that was held between Yasser Arafat and
Muhammad Dahlan.
Following Yasser Arafat's death, Rawhi Fattuh has become the interim
president of the Palestinian Authority for a period of 60 days, until a new
president is elected.

Political views

Rawhi Fattuh pursues Fatah's traditional line and supports the political
process and the implementation of the Roadmap. However, he has also
exhibited belligerent views with regard to the conflict with Israel.
Following are some of his notable statements:

"Choosing peace is a strategic, not a tactical choice, and the Palestinian
side is committed to that which was agreed upon with Israel" (June 1996).

"With no complete, just, real peace, which would grant the Palestinians the
right of self-determination and the right to establish a Palestinian state
with Jerusalem as its capital, there will be no peace. Peace in the Middle
East begins with Palestine" (October 1996).

"If that [the achievement of the Palestinian national aspirations] is not
accomplished, the armed struggle will resurface once more and will take
various forms. Faced with the Israeli policy, we have no choice but to
return to the path we took before the peace process. There is no shame in
declaring to the whole world that the peace process has failed. The failure
of the peace process attempt has taught us that the only way to solve our
problem is by implementing the PLO Charter, which was unfortunately revoked,
and return to the path of armed struggle" (June 1998).

"After a long period of stagnation, the Israeli government must progress
swiftly down the path of peace; however, it seems that it is heading down
the path of the previous government, for so far it has taken no new measures
as far as the peace process is concerned" (July 1999).

In his visit to Jordan, Rawhi Fattuh spoke out against the suicide bombing
attacks carried out by Palestinian factions, claiming that the Palestinian
people were paying dearly for them (July 2004).

Rawhi Fattuh spoke out against a decision by the Israeli Supreme Court of
Justice on the issue of the demolition of houses in the Gaza Strip and
claimed that the decision was another proof of the policy of state terrorism
pursued by Israel and that it demonstrated the racist ideology prevalent in
Israel, providing legitimization to war crimes and to a policy of ethnic
cleansing. He also took the opportunity to reiterate the Palestinian people'
s right to resist the occupation (May 2004).

Rawhi Fattuh has voiced harsh criticism at the Palestinian government and
Abu Alaa for their lack of action to promote reforms, particularly on
security-related issues, in the Palestinian Authority-reforms that would
help bring an end to the anarchy that prevails in the Palestinian Authority
administered territories. In this context, he stated that the Palestinians
had the right to oppose some of the decisions made by Yasser Arafat
(probably in light of the latter's reluctance to give up his authorities).
----

Salim al-Za'nun, head of the Palestinian National Council

Salim Dib Salim al-Za'nun (Abu al-Adib) was born in 1927. He is a lawyer by
trade. In 1948, he moved to the Gaza Strip as a refugee. Nowadays, he makes
his permanent residence in Amman.

Positions and activities

His role in the PLO: Since 1993, he serves as the head of the Palestinian
National Council (PNC). Prior to that, since the 1980s, he served as the PNC
's vice chairman. In the past, he served in the capacity of Fatah/PLO
representative in Kuwait. In January 1991 he was banished from Kuwait to
Jordan due to Yasser Arafat's support of Iraq. He is considered to possess
lesser political influence, compared to Abu Mazen and Abu Alaa.

Throughout the 1990s, he served as a senior member in delegations on behalf
of the Fatah movement in negotiations with Hamas representatives. He
represented the PLO and the PNC in international and inter-Arab
parliamentary forums. He was one of the main activists responsible for the
preparation and execution of the 21st PNC convention on April 21, 1996, in
the course of which discussions were held on the amendments to the
Palestinian National Charter.

Fatah: Member of Fatah's Central Committee. He is one of the founders of
Fatah and has been active in Kuwait to garner support for the movement.

Za'nun began his political career in the Muslim Brotherhood movement, which
he left in the late 1950s. In the years 1956-57, he took upon himself a
leading part in the formation of the Popular Resistance Front against the
Israeli occupation in the Gaza Strip. At times, he had severe disagreements
with Yasser Arafat, but in recent years he has visited Syria, Iran, Yemen,
Libya and Iraq on Yasser Arafat's behalf and met with senior figures in
those regimes (including Saddam Hussein).

Political views

Salim al-Za'nun pursues the militant line in Fatah's mainstream, supporting
a two-state solution. In the course of the current confrontation, he has
made several blunt statements. In one of these, he called for the
continuation of the Intifada and the suicide bombing attacks "until the
Zionists are driven out from our land" (this statement was made during the
demonstrations that took place on the fringes of the inter-Arab
parliamentary union convention in Sudan, February 2002). However, he has
also expressed a pragmatic stand when, according to one of the reports, he
voiced his support for bringing an end to the Intifada in its current
militant manifestation.

In addition, in April 2002, he called upon the Arab regimes to sever all
diplomatic, economic and cultural ties with Israeldue to its policy with
regard to the Palestinians, and complained that the Arab states were not
determined enough in their support for the Palestinian people. On another
occasion, he made an accusation that the Israeli attacks in the Palestinian
Authority administered territories were planned in advance by former Israeli
PM Ehud Barak's government prior to the Camp David summit meeting. He
promised (May 2001) that the Israeli escalation would only lead to " Sharon'
s downfall into the grave, Allah willing".