Time Out for Terror?Will Hamas use the cease-fire to become another
Hizballah?
Ehud Ya'ari The Jerusalem Report, February 21, 2005 issue
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Whether it's called a hudna or by any other name, as of the end of January
the cease-fire between Israel and the Palestinian Authority was worthy of
applause. Putting a stop to the bloodletting of the last 52 months is no
mean achievement, and Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen) deserves credit for having
the strength to part ways with the strategy of his predecessor, just as he
had promised to do during his election campaign.

After a little teetering during his first days as ra'is of the PA, he
demonstrated determination and perseverance, and all of a sudden it became
clear - to those who had never realized it before - that it had indeed been
none other than Yasser Arafat who stood in the way of ending the violence.
Palestinian security forces, as if brought to life by the wave of a wand,
deployed along the lines of engagement, and brought about a dramatic
reduction in the volume of terrorism of all kinds.

The question now is what will be the nature of this truce, if it in fact
stabilizes? What will be its political structure? Are we witnessing a hudna
that reflects genuine recognition that the terror campaign boomeranged into
failure? Or will it emerge as a mere opportunity for the armed factions to
use the truce to make gains, something that Hamas and its ilk are stubbornly
pressing for?

These are the three most important assets that these factions hope to
acquire during the hudna:

* A time-out for an unspecified period, during which they can recover and
regroup, after the blows they have sustained at the hands of the Israeli
army and the Shin Bet. Their main aim will be to upgrade their rockets so
that they can threaten Ashkelon.

* Participation in the PA's decision-making process, in a manner that could
tie Abu Mazen's hands to a certain extent. This would happen first within a
leadership framework in which Hamas and its cohorts would sit with Abu
Mazen's people and oversee negotiations with Israel, and second, through the
elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council, on July 17, which, after
an anticipated change in the election law, should see these factions gaining
substantial parliamentary representation. Hamas's landslide victory in
Gaza's latest round of municipal elections demonstrates the scope of the
threat.

* Immunity against Israeli attacks, and the legitimation of a "resistance"
movement within the PA, by means of guarantees from Sharon to discontinue
the attacks, and assurances from Abu Mazen that he'll refrain from disarming
Hamas.

There is a risk that along with the instant short-term advantages expected
to accrue as a result of the cease-fire, in the long term, a "cohabitation"
arrangement will emerge between the PA and the unholy alliance of terrorist
gangs. Under such an arrangement the cease-fire would entail - even
implicitly - Israeli reconciliation to the existence of armed groups outside
of the PA's legitimate security apparatus. These forces would have an agenda
differing from that of Abu Mazen and the capability of conducting an
independent military policy.

This would amount to a copy of the Lebanese model, where Hizballah exists
alongside the legitimate government as an armed movement, equipped with
thousands of long-range rockets. Hizballah, just as in the scenario
envisaged for itself by Hamas, is represented in the parliament in Beirut
and takes part in all the elections, but maintains an independent policy
along the border with Israel, and initiates incidents without recourse to
the approval of the central government.

Becoming a Palestinian version of Hizballah is exactly what Khaled Mashal,
the head of the Hamas political bureau is aiming for. Like the Lebanese
movement's Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, he too would try to avoid confrontations
with the authorities and to adapt his activities to the sensitivities of the
government. But, whenever he deemed it necessary, when changing
circumstances required it, he would open fire and launch attacks. Hamas,
like Hizballah, wants to reserve the right to decide when this or that
Israeli action calls for a violent response.

Israel at the moment has no choice but to show understanding for Abu Mazen's
reluctance to enter a confrontation with the armed organizations, but this
does not mean that Prime Minister Sharon can accept a system that preserves
the terrorist power of Hamas and allows it a role in the decision-making
process. In order to avert the dangers that such a system would represent,
it is vital to enlist international support for the position that the hudna
is only a stage in the removal of the terrorist threat, and not a means of
strengthening it. For if this is not made clear, Hamas and its satellites
will have it in their power to decide if and when the time has come for
intifada No. 3.