Jerusalem Issue Brief
Institute for Contemporary Affairs
founded jointly at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
with the Wechsler Family Foundation

Vol. 4, No. 22 - 5 May 2005

Putin Leads Russia's Return to the Middle East and the Arab Embrace
Michael Widlanski

* Russian President Vladimir Putin promised to support Egypt's bid for
a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and insisted that his country
sell advanced missiles to Syria, while continuing to aid the nuclear
development of Iran, particularly the Russian-built, 1,000-megawatt, Bushehr
nuclear reactor.

* The real reason for Putin's visit and for Palestinian enthusiasm
seems to be an attempt to restore previous Russian or Soviet policies. "The
Soviets were always keen on the Middle East. The region was practically
their backyard," said Reda Shehata, a former Egyptian ambassador to Russia.

* With former Soviet Central Asia today dotted with American air force
bases, Putin's best option is to skip over this tier of American influence
and re-engage the Arab world. The Middle East is the natural area for Russia
to be active, if Moscow is to regain some of the influence that the Soviet
Union once enjoyed. However, past Russian diplomacy, aid, and weapons offers
have sometimes spurred wars and arms races, not peace.

* Abbas is not very different from the Ba'ath party officials in Syria
who believe in a Russian counterweight to U.S. policies. Abbas did his
advanced university training in Moscow, speaks fluent Russian, and once
served as the PLO ambassador to the Soviet Union.

* The chosen instrument that both Russia and the PA hope to employ to
neutralize American power is the Quartet, where a united front of Russia,
the EU, and the UN can be depended upon to offset the position of the U.S.
After Putin met Abbas in Ramallah, he called for strengthening the role of
the Quartet.

* The renewed Russian drive for influence in the Middle East raises
serious questions about the entire idea of relying on a multilateral Quartet
for peacemaking. Given Putin's harsh critique of U.S. support for Middle
Eastern democracy, how can he be a partner for President Bush in the Middle
East? Why empower those who oppose you?

Putin Visits Israel and the PA

When Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Israel and Egypt in April, he
offered to host a Middle East peace conference in Moscow and, in return, he
offered the Arab/Islamic world several things. Putin made his bold offer
even as he promised to support Egypt's bid for a permanent seat on the UN
Security Council, and while insisting that his country sell advanced
missiles to Syria - missiles which Israel fears will alter the power balance
in the region.1 He, in fact, came to Syria's defense, calling for
conciliatory policies toward the regime in Damascus. Putin has also
reasserted Russia's right to sell the Palestinians armored personnel
carriers, while continuing to aid the nuclear development of Iran,
particularly the Russian-built, 1,000-megawatt, Bushehr nuclear reactor -
something which deeply concerns both the United States and Israel, which
Iran has pledged to destroy.2 At the end of his visit to Israel, Putin
placed some minimal caveats on his support for the Iranian nuclear program,
insisting that Russia's "Iranian partners" put all their nuclear programs
"under complete international control." But no cutback in Russian
involvement in Iran's nuclear infrastructure was proposed.

Israel and the United States both demurred on the Russian peace conference,
while Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas and the PA media immediately welcomed
the Russian initiative warmly. Why was Putin so eager to invite, and why
were the Palestinians so overjoyed to come?

Palestinian Authority (PA) Chairman Abbas supplied a tentative answer in
interviews with Palestinian radio and official PBC television, noting,
first, that "this visit has great importance because it is the first time
the president of the Russian republic has visited the region."3 Despite
Abbas's initial analysis, however, this was not the real reason, although
similar comments came from some Israeli officials who seemed overjoyed at
the latest photo opportunity.4

The real reason for Putin's visit and for Palestinian enthusiasm seems to be
an attempt to restore previous Russian or Soviet policies. "The Soviets were
always keen on the Middle East. The region was practically their backyard.
Today the Russians, under Putin, are trying to regain their presence, if not
influence, in the Middle East," said Reda Shehata, a former Egyptian
ambassador to Russia.5 As one life-long student of Middle East politics
wrote 30 years ago, "what the tsars seized, the commissars never gave up."6
Putin's visit was viewed as significant, as an official Egyptian newspaper
noted, because it was the first visit of a Russian/Soviet head of state to
Egypt since Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev attended the funeral of Gamal
Abdel-Nasser in 1970.

Russia Re-engages the Arab World

Foreshadowing the Russian reentry into the Middle East, two days earlier
Putin gave a state-of-the-Russian Federation speech in Moscow in which he
enunciated a theme that is popular both on the Russian Left and the Russian
Right: The fall of the Soviet Union was, according to Putin, "the greatest
geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century."7 In his nationally televised
speech, Putin unabashedly and nostalgically returned to the Great Power
themes that dominated the Communist era. As one observer remarked: "Putin,
who served as a colonel in the KGB, has resurrected some communist symbols
during his presidency, bringing back the music of the old Soviet anthem and
the Soviet-style red banner as the military's flag."8

With the extension of NATO to the Baltic states in the 1990s, the
resurrection of Russia's Great Power status is not going to come through
Eastern Europe. Even former Soviet Central Asia is today dotted with
American air force bases. Like Khruschev in the late 1950s, Putin's best
option is to skip over this tier of American influence and re-engage the
Arab world. The Middle East is the natural area for Russia to be active, if
Moscow is to regain some of the influence that the Soviet Union once
enjoyed.

This hasn't been lost on the Palestinians. When Abbas explained to a
Palestinian radio and television audience more fully the importance of the
Putin trip and the Putin invitation, he said, "This is especially so because
we have historical relations with the Soviet Union which has become Russia,
and because it is one of the Committee of Four Nations (the Quartet)."9 Why
would Abbas hint at any sentimentality toward the Soviet Union?

Arab diplomats with historically close ties to Moscow are hoping that
Putin's entry into the Middle East can help offset what they view as
American hegemony over the region. Tired of Washington's critique of their
lack of democratic institutions and need for political reform, they have an
interest in a counterweight to the U.S. that can help alleviate pressure to
curtail corruption and open up their political systems. Putin picked up on
this sensitivity during his Israel visit, declaring that it is the U.S. that
is destabilizing the Middle East with its support for democratization of the
Arab world: "with their policies the Americans are supporting the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt."10 Putin probably picked up this line of argument in
Egypt, but it rang well with other Arabs including Palestinians.

Abbas is not very different from the Ba'ath party officials in Syria who
believe in a Russian counterweight to U.S. policies. After all, Abbas did
his advanced university training in Moscow. He is part of a generation of
Fatah leaders who share strategic, historical, and personal links with the
old Soviet elites and even shared their goals. Abbas speaks fluent Russian
and once served as the PLO ambassador to the Soviet Union.

Russia and the PA: Shared Areas of Interest

With Putin, both the Russians and Abbas have a number of shared areas of
interest. Putin and the Russian leadership are eager to regain political and
economic influence in the Middle East region that is in Russia's backyard,
while the Palestinians are eager to curtail the "pro-Israel" role of the
United States in the Arab-Israeli arena. The Arab world gained global power
by playing the superpowers against one another during the Cold War.
Additionally, the "anti-American" side of Palestinian politics is frequently
on display in mosque sermons and newspaper editorials and cartoons, all
controlled by the PA.

The chosen instrument that both Russia and the PA hope to employ to
neutralize American power is the Quartet, where a united front of Russia,
the European Union, and the United Nations Secretariat can be depended upon
to offset the position of the U.S. After Putin met Abbas in Ramallah, he
called for strengthening the role of the Quartet in the future. Putin
asserted: "There is no alternative but that the Quartet monitor the
implementation of the Roadmap, the renewal of permanent status negotiations,
and assisting the Palestinians in establishing institutions and a state."
Abbas also looks for the Quartet to provide a "political horizon" and
articulate positions calling for a full Israeli withdrawal from the West
Bank, contrary to the Bush commitments to Sharon.

Putin and the Palestinian leadership are both suffering from serious
domestic problems and disappointments, according to public opinion polls.
Russia is suffering a huge public health crisis that includes spiraling AIDS
deaths and infant mortality.11 The average young Russian male is nearly ten
times likelier to die a violent death than the average Israeli.12
High-powered summitry is especially attractive to Putin because it meets the
Russian populist desire to reassert Great Power status. For Abbas, it
distracts from his relative inability to improve the Palestinian quality of
life or to make any major inroads in reducing corruption or internal
Palestinian violence. Abbas can also present an advantage over Hamas to the
Palestinian public, showing that he is capable of mobilizing international
support on behalf of the Palestinian cause.

Both Putin and Abbas, each of whom were trained and/or employed by the
Soviet KGB for significant periods in their lives, are both past masters at
the KGB tactics of disinformation and "peace offensives." During the 1980s
and early 1990s, after his return from doctoral studies in Moscow, Abbas was
in charge of PLO contacts with the Israeli "peace camp."

While both Abbas and Putin have talked about peace and democracy, their
records are somewhat more modest. Putin has used the Russian legal system to
rein in press critics, while Abbas's election victory in January was
attained during a two-week election campaign in which none of the other
candidates were interviewed or covered significantly in the Palestinian
broadcast media, and when gunmen from Abbas's Fatah faction intimidated
election officials into opening polls so that Abbas backers could "vote"
repeatedly.13

Both men have promised to curb incitement against Israel and against Jews,
but anti-Semitism is rife in both regimes. Anti-Semitic laws are regularly
offered in the Russian national assembly, while Abbas's radio, television,
and school textbooks deny the existence of several major Jewish holy places
such as Solomon's Temple and Rachel's Tomb, with mosque sermons still full
of anti-Semitic references.

Both men have also had difficulty in curbing domestic terrorism and internal
violence. In theory, Putin should have serious reservations about Abbas's
willingness to embrace Hamas and Islamic Jihad, since Russia is at the
forefront of the war against jihadi movements in Chechnya. Moscow's concern
with militant Islamic terrorism should equally draw it closer to Israel. But
if Putin is seeking to restore the old Soviet position of strength in the
Middle East, he will take a less critical stand toward Arab or Iranian
leaders harboring terrorist groups, just like his Soviet predecessors.
Indeed, Putin's defense of Syria and Iran is really a throwback to
Soviet-era diplomacy.

Confronting Terrorism

Is there an alternative course for Russian diplomacy? The post-9/11 world,
in fact, has created new joint Russian interests with the West. Russia was a
primary target of al-Qaeda long before the U.S.; indeed, al-Qaeda was born
in the wake of the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan in 1989. Today, Putin views
the regional threat to Russia across the Caucuses as part of the threat of
international terrorism. Furthermore, if the energy factor is taken into
account, new Russian interests become evident. With the massive increase in
the energy needs of China and India, Russia has a strategic interest in
meeting this demand. This puts it in competition with Middle Eastern states
like Iran and Saudi Arabia. Russia is already using Israeli pipelines to
transport its oil from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, thereby
bypassing the Suez Canal, in order to reach these new Asian markets. Putin
must be torn between adopting policies toward the Middle East that were
fashioned by the Soviet bureaucracy fifty years ago, and fashioning an
entirely new Middle East approach based on cooperation with the U.S. and
Israel. Putin's recent visit indicates that he still prefers Soviet
"old-think."

Putin and Abbas seem to share an ambivalence about confronting terrorism,
except if it is directed at them. For his part, Abbas has promised Israel
and the United States to curb Palestinian terrorists, but he has not
arrested any gunmen, preferring to spend his first 100 days in office
demanding increased American and Israeli financial support as well as
Israel's release of all convicted Palestinian terrorists and arms
merchants.14 It is ironic that Putin can embrace Abbas, who is a
self-declared ally of the Chechen mujahidin, while Abbas has chosen a path
of legitimizing an armed Hamas and making it a part of the Palestinian
political system.15

Abbas has also talked to his own people about ending "the militarization of
the intifada" and the "anarchy of weapons." In real terms, this means
putting an end to internal Palestinian violence which has increased along
with Palestinian-Israeli violence. "People are being killed every day in the
street," observed Bassem Eid, director of the Palestinian Human Rights
Group. "Mostly it's not collaborators [people accused of cooperating with
Israel]," declared Eid, explaining, "Many Palestinians are killed, and our
people don't even know why."16

The renewed Russian drive for influence in the Middle East raises serious
questions about the entire idea of relying on a multilateral Quartet for
peacemaking of any sort. The idea of an international conference touching on
permanent status issues is a vehicle for skipping over the first stage of
the Roadmap - that calls on the Palestinians to dismantle the terrorist
infrastructure - and moving already into establishing a Palestinian state.
Given Putin's harsh critique of U.S. support for Middle Eastern democracy,
how can he be a partner for President Bush in the Middle East? Why empower
those who oppose you? The Quartet was conceived as a way of obtaining
international support for the U.S. prior to the Iraq War. Clearly,
participation in the Quartet didn't alter Russia's position on Iraq in any
way. It may be that this entire approach needs serious reexamination.
* * *

Notes
1. Putin told Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon that the missiles were
only defensive, that they would be used to "guard Syrian President Assad's
palace," according to several Israeli press reports. However, some Western
analysts suspect that Putin has basically agreed to sell Syria two weapons
systems: SS-26 and SA-18 missiles. The SS-26, also known as the "Iskander,"
is a highly mobile ground-to-ground missile that uses satellite guidance
systems and can be re-targeted in-flight. With a range of 180 miles, it can
carry a 1,000-pound warhead to most targets inside Israel. The SA-18
shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile, known also as the "Igla," uses its
enhanced seeker to hit aerial targets, such as jet fighters, head-on.
Israeli press reports have claimed that Putin, under Israeli pressure,
offered to sell a vehicle-based version of the SA-18, but the Israeli army
says it would be easy to re-convert back to a mobile version with parts
available on the open market. Such a missile could then find its way to
Hizballah, the Lebanon-based and Iranian-supported terror group that has
assumed a great share in the planning and financing of Palestinian terror in
the West Bank and Gaza. The Israeli defense establishment is especially
worried that such missiles could be used to attack Israeli military
helicopters and civilian aircraft. See Claremont Institute reports on
missile threats at

www.missilethreat.com/missiles/ss-26_russia.html and
www.missilethreat.com/threat/syria.html as well as an October 2004
report from Janes Missiles and Rockets. See also Michael Mainville, "
www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1320207/posts Crisis Is Brewing
Over Russ Missiles,"
www.freerepublic.com/%5ehttp:/www.nysun.com/article/7612 New York
Sun, January 13, 2005, www.nysun.com/article/7612

2. Israel's Channel 10 television reported on April 28, 2005, that Putin
indicated he might cancel a deal to provide the PA with armored personnel
carriers, which Israel has opposed as being counter to the terms of the
Israel-PA accords.

3. Voice of Palestine radio in Arabic (Sawt Felasteen) from Ramallah
(hereafter VOP), as well as Palestinian Television from Gaza (hereafter
PBC), April 28, 2005. All Arabic and Hebrew translations are by author
unless otherwise indicated.

4. Israel's Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert made almost identical remarks
in an interview with the Voice of Israel, April 28, 2005, and similar
remarks were made by Israeli President Moshe Katsav. Israel's Vice Prime
Minister Shimon Peres once again saw visions of a new Russia and a new
Middle East: "This is a sign of the changes that have occurred in Russia
itself, in Israel-Russia relations, and in Russian policy in the Middle
East."

5. Al-Ahram, April 28-May 4, 2005.

6. J.C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension (New York:
Octagon Books, 1974).

7. See Alex Nicholson, "Russia's Putin: Soviet Collapse a Tragedy,"
AP/Washington Post, April 25, 2005;
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/04/25/AR2005042500537_pf.html.

8. Ibid.

9. This was a reference to the "Quartet" or the informal
American-Russian-European-UN oversight of the Arab-Israeli peace process.

10. Yediot Ahronot, April 29, 2005.

11. Cesar Chelala, "Russia wastes time as AIDS crisis builds," Japan Times,
April 5, 2005. See
www.japantimes.com/cgi-bin/geted.pl5?eo20050405a2.htm

12. David Brooks, "Mourning Mother Russia," New York Times, April 28, 2005.
See www.nytimes.com/2005/04/28/opinion/28brooks.html

13. Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, who served as an international
observer, and the PA's own election commission made these charges.

14. Abbas promised to release Fouad Shoubaki from British custody in
Jericho, the man behind the "Karinne A" arms transport from Iran to the
Palestinians, as well as the men who planned and carried out the
assassination of Israeli Tourism Minister Rehav'am Ze'evi in Jerusalem in
2001.

15. Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror and David Keyes, "Will a Gaza
'Hamas-stan' Become a Future Al-Qaeda
Sanctuary?" Jerusalem Issue Brief 4- 7, November 8, 2004,
http://jcpa.org/brief/brief004-7.htm; Lt. Col. Jonathan D. Halevi, "
Undermining Mahmud Abbas: The 'Green Revolution' and the
Hamas Strategy to Take Over the Palestinian Authority," Jerusalem Issue
Brief 4-21, April 14, 2005, http://jcpa.org/brief/brief004-21.htm.
16. Interviews by Michael Widlanski with Bassem Eid, April 2005.
* * *
Dr. Michael Widlanski teaches political communication and comparative
politics at the Rothberg School of Hebrew University. He is a former
reporter, correspondent, and editor, respectively, at the New York Times,
Cox Newspapers-Atlanta Constitution, and Jerusalem Post. He has also served
as strategic affairs advisor to the Ministry of Public Security, editing
secret PLO archives captured in Jerusalem.

This Jerusalem Issue Brief is available online at:
www.jcpa.org/brief/brief004-22.htm

Dore Gold, Publisher; Yaakov Amidror, ICA Program Director; Mark Ami-El,
Managing Editor. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (Registered Amuta), 13
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Email: jcpa@netvision.net.il. In U.S.A.: Center for Jewish Community
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