[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: Until this report came out, the last refuge for
analysts trying to explain the activities of Prime Minister Olmert's team
without going for the obvious (sheer stupidity/blind ideological hubris
and/or a cynical willingness to put his interest in avoiding an indictment
over the needs of the nation) was the hope that, in the spirit of the
"incident" in Syria, that Israel was busy working on a military operation
with Washington to stop nuclear Iran whose importance transcended the damage
being done on the Israel-PA track. ]

ANALYSIS: Iran nuke study pulls military option off the table
By Shmuel Rosner and Aluf Benn, Haaretz Correspondents Last update - 02:44
04/12/2007
www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/930783.html

WASHINGTON - "An intelligence consensus is difficult to challenge with new
data," wrote Judge Richard Posner in his book "Preventing Surprise Attack,"
which deals with the necessary reforms in American intelligence services
post-9/11.

Intelligence officers, like anyone else, "are reluctant to change their
minds" and admit they made a mistake or were caught by surprise. So the U.S.
intelligence services should be given credit for trying to correct their
mistake. Meanwhile, it should be remembered that correcting a mistake with
another mistake makes it all the more difficult to change one's mind the
next time.

Israel's ambassador to Washington, Sallai Meridor, spent the weekend warning
about Iran's nuclear program. Meanwhile, Israel knew about the report that
was to be released, but Meridor warned in no uncertain terms that "time is
running out." Either way, the official report blew up in his face: Time is
not running out, the Iranians are not making progress, and Israel may come
to be seen as a panic-stricken rabbit. (Click here to read the report)

The debate surrounding this report's conclusions will be substantial, and
many will assume that its authors have failed in gathering or interpreting
the intelligence out there. A psychological interpretation will also be
thrown into the pot, discounting the conclusions. The same intelligence that
warned of Saddam Hussein's non-conventional arsenal is now making the
opposite, deadly error in relation to Iran. The Americans will find
themselves surprised like they did when they learned of the Indian and
Pakistani bombs.

Professionals will now argue passionately, continuing the debates between
Israel's assessment (an Iranian bomb in 2009-2010) and the American one (a
bomb in 2012-2013).

The Americans failed to explain Monday how they reached their new
conclusions. As such, the general public will find it difficult to decide
who is right. Maybe in the future, when there suddenly really is a bomb in
play, or maybe not  a decision on this can be final. Meanwhile, Israeli
intelligence has adopted the "most severe" approach, but the American
decision maker is only affected by the Americans writing the assessment.

It does not really matter. However successful or flawed this report may be,
there is a new, dramatic reality, in all aspects of the struggle against the
Iranian bomb: The military option, American or Israeli, is off the table,
indefinitely.