The emerging consequence of this situation is that the option that was most
rejected in recent months - a ground assault in the Gaza Strip - will become
the lesser of evils. The decision-makers in the government and the IDF -
headed by those whose shortsighted policy led to the army's withdrawal from
the Philadelphi corridor, brought Hamas to power and laid the groundwork for
the breach of the Palestinian-Egyptian border - will be pushed into
returning the IDF to the Qassam launch sites in the northern Strip and
encircling the dozen or so kilometers between Kerem Shalom and the sea in
order to trap the terror activists and recover their weapons in meticulous
house-to-house searches. If they decide against reoccupying the entire
Strip, they may make do with the Rafah and Khan Yunis area, up to the Gaza
river. In that case, about 700,000 Gazans would be cut off from their
livelihood in the north. This would be bad, very bad. Only an end to the
peace with Egypt, in the event that this scenario does not take place, would
be worse.
Burning sands
By Amir Oren Haaretz 8 February 2008
www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/952295.html
...
Whither Egypt?
Until the breaching of the wall, Israel's defense establishment assumed,
according to internal documents, that Egypt "was dedicated to the peace with
Israel, and views it as a vital strategic asset for preserving internal
stability and its special relations with Washington. Only a profound
change - a change of regime, or the much less likely possibility of a change
in the outlook of the present regime - could turn it into a strategic threat
again. In the event of a regional crisis, in the Palestinian or the
Syrian-Lebanese arena, it's likely that Egypt would choose to conduct a
diplomatic crisis accompanied by military signals that do not violate the
military addendum to the peace agreement."
In the long term, especially looking ahead to the post-Mubarak era, the
strengthening of Egypt with advanced Western weapons, in almost a
mirror-image of the IDF, could make it "a possible primary military risk."
The Egyptian army is not concealing its efforts to develop offensive
capabilities, to improve its emergency preparedness and to ready the Sinai
for the possibility of a military confrontation.
The difference between this type of confrontation and one that is one grade
below it - a serious but reversible Egyptian violation of the agreements on
the demilitarization and reduction of forces in Sinai - depends on the
existence of another factor that would stir up tension between the two
countries. In May 1967, it was Syria's fear of an Israeli attack. Now it
could be the Palestinian terror passing through Sinai on its way to the
Negev.
Israel has no satisfactory answer at hand. A fence has yet to be built.
Egypt's demand that it be permitted to increase the size of the forces
stipulated in the security addendum is justified only in its less important
aspect: They need reinforcements in order to repel a rioting mob at Rafah.
Israel turned its head when the 750 Egyptian border police sent to replace
the local officers were instead added to them, doubling their number. What
the Egyptians mainly need along the Israeli border are radar systems and
troop transport helicopters (Israel agreed to let them into the
"reduced-forces zone"), as well as the systematic recruitment of human
resources - agents from among the local Bedouin. Cairo has so neglected
Sinai that the peninsula has come to resemble the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan, which have eluded central control from
Islamabad.
So as not to put the fragile Israeli-Egyptian agreement to the test, one
option would be to amend a less problematic section, the one stipulating the
size and authorities of the international force. This force has an American
director, a Norwegian commander and an infantry brigade made up of three
battalions and other auxiliary units from 11 countries. For 25 years, this
force has been employed solely in a supervisory and reportorial capacity. It
could also be assigned to seal the border, but it would be hard to find
countries that would agree to contribute battalions to this, to kill and be
killed in a confrontation with Palestinians. NATO's experience in
Afghanistan, both in terms of the size of the units and their rules of
engagement, is not an encouraging precedent.
Israel could find itself in a serious dilemma, if the sometimes productive
intelligence cooperation with Egypt is insufficient to stop terror cells
that are about to cross the border. Restraint would endanger lives in Dimona
and Be'er Sheva - in fact, throughout Israel. But the violation of Egyptian
sovereignty, which has been ruled out as illegal - would create a crisis in
Jerusalem-Cairo relations.
The emerging consequence of this situation is that the option that was most
rejected in recent months - a ground assault in the Gaza Strip - will become
the lesser of evils. The decision-makers in the government and the IDF -
headed by those whose shortsighted policy led to the army's withdrawal from
the Philadelphi corridor, brought Hamas to power and laid the groundwork for
the breach of the Palestinian-Egyptian border - will be pushed into
returning the IDF to the Qassam launch sites in the northern Strip and
encircling the dozen or so kilometers between Kerem Shalom and the sea in
order to trap the terror activists and recover their weapons in meticulous
house-to-house searches. If they decide against reoccupying the entire
Strip, they may make do with the Rafah and Khan Yunis area, up to the Gaza
river. In that case, about 700,000 Gazans would be cut off from their
livelihood in the north. This would be bad, very bad. Only an end to the
peace with Egypt, in the event that this scenario does not take place, would
be worse.
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