Hamas is aware that Israeli agreement to the lull is conditional on the
cessation of smuggling [arms] into the Gaza Strip and manufacturing [them in
the Gaza Strip] . Mahmoud al-Zahar claimed that regarding smuggling, Omar
Suleiman explained to Israel that responsibility for stopping the smuggling
was in the hands of Israel and Egypt [and by implication, not in the hands
of Hamas]. As to the manufacture of weapons, according to Mahmoud al-Zahar,
"that cannot be supervised" [ by implication, the lull in the fighting does
not include any commitment on the part of Hamas to stop manufacturing and
smuggling weapons ].

Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
at the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center (IICC)
May 6, 2008

The Egyptian initiative for a lull in the fighting
(updated to May 5, 2008 )

Overview

1. The Egyptian initiative for a lull in the fighting in the Gaza Strip has
gone into high gear. An agreement on principle was reached between Egypt and
Hamas regarding a six-month lull, " Gaza first," during which Egypt would
work to extend it to the West Bank . So far, a description of the agreement
has been revealed by the media but no authoritative written version has been
provided.

2. On April 29 and 30 representatives of 12 Palestinian organizations
operating in the Gaza Strip met with the head of Egyptian intelligence in
Cairo . After the meetings Egypt announced that they had agreed to the
progressively implemented lull. Egyptian and Palestinian sources noted that
the ball was now in Israel 's court .

3. In our assessment, Hamas is interested in the lull reached with Egypt ,
which meets most of its demands. It views the lull, which includes opening
the Gaza Strip crossings on Hamas terms and an improvement in the economic
situation, as a means of strengthening and stabilizing its control of the
Gaza Strip. Hamas is also of the opinion that the time-out achieved by the
lull will enable it to accelerate its military buildup in preparation for a
future confrontation with Israel and will improve its standing among
Palestinians, in the Arab and Muslim world (especially vis-à-vis Egypt ) and
even in the international arena.

4. Hamas expects to pay a price for the advantages it receives from the
lull, especially a cessation of rocket fire for a limited and perhaps to
stop other terrorist attacks from the Gaza Strip. 1 In addition, Hamas had
to drop its initial demand for a lull that would include the Judea and
Samaria as well as the Gaza Strip, and when dealing with the Egyptians had
to agree to a progressively implemented lull. A cessation of the attacks,
even temporarily, and not including Judea and Samaria in the agreement may
harm Hamas's image as a movement of jihad fighters, give rise to internal
criticism and increase the basic tensions between its governmental
responsibilities on the one hand and its radical Islamic ideology and
terrorist strategy on the other.

5. Initially, the lull is expected to be applied to the Gaza Strip and
enable the Israeli security forces to continue their counterterrorist
activities in Judea and Samaria . That is the agreement's weak spot, because
Israel 's success in its preventive activities in Judea and Samaria is
liable to provoke the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip into
responding, which would violate the lull, as has happened in the past. The
Palestinian Islamic Jihad has already stated that it accepted the lull, but
reserved the right to respond to Israeli "aggression" in the West Bank .

6. The lull initiative was motivated by Egyptian efforts at negotiation . In
our assessment, there are a number of reasons the Egyptians are interested
in promoting the agreement, which will end the escalation in the Gaza Strip
and ease the tensions:
i) To prevent the situation from deteriorating to the point at which Israel
initiates a broad military operation in the Gaza Strip;
ii) To find an arrangement which will enable the opening of the Rafah
Crossing and ease the humanitarian distress of the Gazans;
iii) To provide a response to the internal pressure exerted by the Muslim
Brotherhood, which identifies with Hamas;
iv) To increase Egyptian influence on the radical Islamic entity in the Gaza
Strip, which it views as a threat to Egyptian national security (the
potential danger of the Gaza Strip for Egypt has been well illustrated
during the time since Hamas took it over).

7. This Bulletin examines the following aspects of the initiative for a lull
in the fighting:
i) Updated overview of the Palestinian-Egyptian contacts regarding the lull;
ii) Appendix I : The definition of the Arabic term tahadhiya , a lull in the
fighting, and the difference between it and hudna , a temporary truce.
iii) Appendix II : Previous tahadiya and hudna agreements during the current
Israeli-Palestinian confrontation ("the second intifada") and how they
ended.
Updated overview of the Palestinian-Egyptian contacts regarding the lull

8. The Egyptian initiative for a lull in the fighting recently accelerated,
and an unwritten agreement was reached in principle between Egypt and Hamas
for a progressively implemented lull (" Gaza first"). A press conference was
held after senior Hamas figure Mahmoud al-Zahar met with Omar Suleiman, head
of Egyptian General Intelligence on April 24, and the main points of the
agreement were announced by Mahmoud al-Zahar (Radio Sawt Al-Aqsa, April 25):
i) Hamas agreed to a six-month lull in the Gaza Strip , during which time
Egypt would work to extend it to the West Bank .
ii) The lull had to be mutual and simultaneous , and include the " lifting
of the blockade " and the opening of the crossings, including the Rafah
Crossing. The crossings would be opened as the lull went into effect.
Mahmoud al-Zahar said that an agreement had been reached [between Egypt and
Hamas] regarding the principles and commitments involved in reopening the
Rafah Crossing.
iii) The other Palestinian organizations had to agree to the lull within a
"national agreement." Omar Suleiman would invite their representatives to
Egypt to discuss the issue.
iv) Once the other organizations had agreed, Omar Suleiman would initiate
contacts with Israel to achieve its agreement to the lull and to set up a
time table for its implementation. Israel and Egypt would immediately take
steps to prepare public opinion for the lull and to provide the Gaza Strip
with basic supplies, especially fuel.
v) Egypt will ask the president of the Palestinian Authority for his
agreement to open the crossings. Mahmoud al-Zahar noted that Hamas was close
to an agreement with the PA regarding how the Rafah Crossing would be
administered.
vi) The release of Gilad Shalit would be delayed until after the lull went
into effect. Mahmoud al-Zahar said that the main obstacle was Israel 's
refusal to release terrorists who had been sentenced to long terms.

9. Khaled Mashal , head of Hamas's political bureau in Damascus , and
Mahmoud al-Zahar recently explained their concept of the lull in the
fighting (Khaled Mashal to Al-Jazeera TV on April 27; and Mahmoud al-Zahar
at the Islamic University in Gaza City , broadcast by Al-Aqsa TV on April
29):
i) It was Israel that asked for the lull and Hamas is prepared to accept it
from a position of strength . The movement has changed its initial stance
following consultations between the "internal" and "external" leadership,
and has agreed that the lull would begin in the Gaza Strip and later be
extended to the West Bank . Hamas regards the lull as " a tactic, a stage in
the resistance, and nothing more ." The lull was enabled by the balance of
power created by the Palestinian terrorist organizations ("the resistance"),
which does not permit Israel to subdue the Gaza Strip.
ii) Hamas opposes the Israeli control of the Rafah and other crossing s, and
claims that the crossings agreement of 2005 is no longer valid. Hamas will
accept joint Egyptian, Hamas , PA and European supervision of the Rafah
Crossing (on the condition that the Europeans arrive through Egypt , not
Israel , and that they have no authority to decide if the crossing is open
or closed). Israel will have no say regarding the opening or closing of the
crossings and Hamas will not back down on that issue.
iii) Hamas is aware that Israeli agreement to the lull is conditional on the
cessation of smuggling [arms] into the Gaza Strip and manufacturing [them in
the Gaza Strip] . Mahmoud al-Zahar claimed that regarding smuggling, Omar
Suleiman explained to Israel that responsibility for stopping the smuggling
was in the hands of Israel and Egypt [and by implication, not in the hands
of Hamas]. As to the manufacture of weapons, according to Mahmoud al-Zahar,
"that cannot be supervised" [ by implication, the lull in the fighting does
not include any commitment on the part of Hamas to stop manufacturing and
smuggling weapons ].
iv) Khaled Mashal threatened escalated terrorism against Israel if the lull
(on Hamas terms) were not accepted : "If the blockade continues, the Gaza
Strip will erupt in the face of anyone who blockades it, except for Egypt ."
Other senior Hamas figures also repeatedly stated that the lull was a means
to break through the blockade of the Gaza Strip and if it did not prove
itself, Hamas would act forcefully against Israel . Hamas spokesman Sami Abu
Zuhri threatened that if Israel dragged its feet regarding the proposed
lull, "there will most likely be an unprecedented escalation" (Al-Sharq
Al-Awsat, May 4).
Contacts between Egypt and the PA

10. After the April 27 meeting with Egyptian president Mubarak at Sharm
el-Sheikh, PA chairman Abu Mazen expressed his support for the initiative.
He said that the PA unreservedly supported the Egyptian efforts to achieve a
lull because it might ease the suffering of the Palestinian people and lead
to the opening of the Gaza Strip crossings (Wafa News Agency, April 27).
Contacts between Egypt and the other Palestinian organizations

11. On April 29 and 30 representatives of 12 Palestinian organizations,
including terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip, held a series
of meetings with Omar Suleiman. The Egyptian announcement summarizing the
meetings stated that the organizations had adopted "the Egyptian concept" of
the lull. According to the announcement, the plan for the progressively
implemented lull was part of an overall plan to lift the blockade of the
Gaza Strip, to end the internal Palestinian rift and to gradually return to
the status quo ante. According to Egyptian, Palestinian and Hamas sources,
the ball was now in Israel 's court (Pal-today Website, Agence France
Presse, Palestine-info Website, April 30).

12. The position of the PIJ , as expressed by senior members of the
organization, should be noted: Deputy secretary-general Ziyad Nahleh said
that the organization supported a full lull which included the Gaza Strip
and the West Bank , and added that his organization would not present an
obstacle to the proposed lull and would relate to it positively. However, he
said that "if Israel carries out a crime of assassination in the West Bank
the movement will preserve its right to respond" (Ma'an News Agency, April
29). Abu Imad al-Rifai , a senior member of the organization, said that his
organization accepted Hamas's suggestion regarding the lull but that it
preserved the right to respond to any Israeli "aggression" in the West Bank
(Reuters Cairo, April 29).

Appendix I

The definition of the Arabic term tahadhiya , a lull in the fighting, and
the difference between it and hudna , a temporary truce
1. Tahadiya in Arabic means "lull in the fighting," that is, lowering the
intensity of a confrontation through a mutual commitment to stop the
fighting, which does not necessarily include the complete cessation of all
military activities (such as collecting intelligence, procuring arms, etc.).
It can be translated "as a quiescent period in the fighting," even though
the media often mistranslate it as "truce."
2. Tahadiya is a modern, secular term adopted by the Palestinians and used
exclusively in relation to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It has no
religious Islamic validity and in practical terms means an agreement between
two rival sides, sometimes with the intervention of a third party, not
necessarily as part of negotiations or a written agreement (such as a
gentlemen's agreement, or an understanding). Thus it is less binding than a
hudna , a truce, which is an Islamic term. For that reason Hamas preferred
to use the term tahadiya both in relation to the current contacts with Egypt
and to the Cairo Agreement of 2005 (See below). That is because a tahadiya
does not commit Hamas to recognizing Israel and permits it to carry out
military activities except for engaging in actual fighting .
3. The term hudna, on the other hand, is taken from Islamic tradition, and
means an agreement or contract which entails the cessation of all fighting
for a specific period of time and under conditions which have been agreed
upon. The classic example of a hudna in Islamic history was the treaty of
Hudaybiyyah between the prophet Muhammad and the Quraysh tribe of Mecca
signed in 628 A .D. When Muhammad realized that his forces were inferior he
agreed to a cessation in the fighting and signed a hudna . Two years later
he conquered Mecca .
4. According to Muslim tradition, under certain circumstances Muslim
leadership is permitted to announce a hudna during a war against infidels.
The hudna is usually brokered and signed when the Muslim leadership is
convinced that it serves its interests, since according to the evaluation of
the prevailing circumstances the Muslims will not be able to win. Over time,
the evaluation may change. Thus, basically the hudna is limited in time ,
but the Muslim side can violate it should it so choose or extend the time
limit if it serves Muslim interests. For that reason the hudna is considered
a tactical move integral to fighting the enemy until in due time he is
overcome .
5. The hudna 's objective is a temporary cease fire to improve the Muslim
positions for a new round of fighting and to improve their resources. In
that sense it serves as a stage in jihad and does not express either
willingness or a genuine, fundamental commitment to solve a conflict or even
preserve a truce.

Appendix II

Previous tahadiya and hudna agreements during the current
Israeli-Palestinian confrontation ("the second intifada") and how they ended

1. During the past eight years of the second intifada the idea of a hudna
has been raised a number of times. In 2002- 2003 a number of attempts were
made, some of them negotiated by Egypt , to have the Palestinian terrorist
organizations agree to a temporary ceasefire with Israel . However, they
were never realized. The first hudna which was actually implemented began in
June 2003 with the election of Abu Mazen as PA prime minister. After his
election Hamas and the PIJ announced they were prepared to suspend their
attacks against Israel for three months. On June 29, 2003, three separate
declarations were made: by Hamas and the PIJ, by Fatah and by the PLO.
2. The hudna achieved by the Abu Mazen administration was short lived and
lasted less than two months , from June 26, 2003, the end of the Taba
Conference, until August 19. During the hudna the amount of terrorist
attacks decreased but they did not stop entirely, and there were also
suicide bombing attacks . At the same time, Israel continued it
counterterrorist activities against terrorist operatives, who were
considered ticking bombs. Nevertheless, during the hudna there was a short
lull and there were fewer Israeli victims of Palestinian terrorist attacks.
3. Political efforts were made during the hudna to implement the road map
and to rehabilitate the security cooperation between Israel and the PA. The
efforts did not bear fruit. For all intents and purposes, the hudna
collapsed on August 19, 2003, with a suicide bombing attack on a Jerusalem
bus which took the lives of 23 Israeli civilians. Following the attack
Israel renewed its targeted killings of terrorist operatives and initiated a
series of counterterrorist activities in Hebron (August-November 2003).
The Cairo Agreement (March 2005)
4. After the death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004 his successor, Abu
Mazen, reached an agreement with Hamas regarding the cessation of its
terrorist campaign against Israel . In view of the collapse of the previous
hudna , and because of Hamas's key position in the new political situation,
it was agreed that the term hudna would not be used and would be replaced by
tahadiya , which was regarded as less binding .
5. On March 15, 2005, a series of discussions began in Cairo , mediated by
Egypt , between the Palestinian terrorist organizations. They ended with the
Cairo Agreement, according to which the organizations agreed to a lull in
the fighting with Israel alongside internal Palestinian understandings. It
was agreed that elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council and the
local authorities would be held and the election systems were agreed upon in
a way that satisfied Hamas. It was also agreed that a committee would be
formed to integrate "all Palestinian forces and factions" within the PLO,
which was recognized as "the only legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people."
6. The lull agreed on in Cairo was also not fully implemented. During the
second half of 2005 it was eroded, especially by the smaller Palestinian
terrorist organizations, which ignored it and continued carrying out
terrorist attacks. Hamas kept to a restrained policy of attacks, and the PA
was incapable of enforcing its authority on the smaller terrorist
organizations. Thus they continued attacking during the lull, although to a
lesser extent. The most prominent organization at the time was PIJ which
continued carrying out sporadic suicide bombing attacks, although they were
fewer in number (the reason for the decrease in the number of suicide
bombing attacks, at the time and after the end of the lull, was primarily
the IDF's effective counterterrorist activities and the erection of the
security fence .)
7. The temporary decrease in the number of terrorist attacks enabled Israel
to carry out its plan of disengagement from the Gaza Strip. It also gave
Hamas a breathing space, which it exploited by increasing its influence in
the internal Palestinian arena after the Israeli disengagement. Hamas's
victory in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections in January 2006
marked the full utilization of the political advantages of the lull and
signaled the loss of its motivation to continue it, even partially. At the
end of 2005, after nine months, the lull was officially ended when both
Hamas and the PIJ officially announced that they were no longer bound by it.

===================

1 Hamas spokesmen were fuzzy about that point, relating only to an end to
rocket fire without discussing other types of attacks.