[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: I would hardly term acceptance of a Palestinian
state by the very same population that realizes that a sovereign Palestinian
State would not ultimately serve Israel's security interests to be a
positive development.

Professor Inbar's presentation of the Israeli public's position regarding
retreats in the West Bank might leave the reader with the impression that
the difference between them and Palestinian red lines is marginal. It
remains huge.]

Israel at 60 Remains a Success Story
Efraim Inbar
Perspectives Papers No. 42, May 11, 2008
www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/perspectives42.html

Israel was successful in parrying several military challenges intent on
destroying the Jewish state. Over time the power differential between Israel
and its regional foes has grown, enhancing Israel's capacity to deal
successfully with security problems. While Israel has become stronger, its
enemies, with the exception of Iran, have become weaker. Moreover, the
Jewish state is widely recognized as an entrenched reality even by Arab and
Muslim states.

The common image of a deeply-torn Israel is inaccurate, as social cohesion
is greater than before. An analysis of the political, social and economic
dynamics within Israel indicates that time is on Israel's side. This is good
news for the ability of Israeli society to withstand inevitable tests of
protracted conflict in the future.

Significantly, the ideological debate over the future of the territories
acquired in 1967 is over. The Sinai was relinquished in 1979 and Gaza in
2005. Over two thirds of Israelis oppose any territorial concessions in the
Golan Heights. Concerning Judea and Samaria, there is a great majority in
favor of partition, the traditional Zionist position, and in favor of
retaining the settlement blocs, Jerusalem (the Temple Mount), and the Jordan
Rift.

The current territorial debate revolves around the percentage of historic
homeland that can be relinquished to Arab control. The discussion is not
ideological, but couched in a pragmatic assessment of Israel's security
needs and domestic political costs. Similarly, the Israeli public no longer
opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state, once seen as a mortal
danger, although skepticism over the ability of Palestinian state-building
is widespread.

Furthermore, the expectations of the Left for peaceful coexistence with the
Palestinians after the Oslo agreements, which elicited ridicule and anger on
the Right, were replaced by a sober consensus that peace is not around the
corner. Israeli society has reconciled itself to the idea that it will have
to live by its sword for the foreseeable future and most of it is ready to
pay the price of continuous conflict.

Similarly, the debates over economic policies have long disappeared. Nearly
all Israelis agree that capitalism is the best way to create further wealth.
Israel's strong, vibrant economy is a result of wise economic policies;
stressing market values and adapting to globalization. Currently, all
economic indices indicate bright prospects despite continuous security
problems. A strong economy reinforces Israel's capacity to withstand the
protracted conflict with its neighbors.

The Ashkenazi/Sephardi social rift has also become much less divisive than
in the past. The number of "intermarriages" is on the rise, obfuscating
ethnic differences. The political system has responded positively to
complaints of discrimination by significantly increasing the number of
Sephardi politicians at the local and national levels. The past three
decades have seen an influx of Sephardi Jews into the middle class and into
the ranks of the senior officers of the Israeli military.

The only rift within Israeli society which is still of great social,
cultural and political importance is the religious-secular divide. However,
this situation does not differ greatly from the afflictions of identity
politics faced by other western societies. Moreover, the conflict is not
between two clearly defined camps, leaving room for finding a reasonable
modus vivendi. A growing number of Israelis identify themselves as
traditionalists, situated in the middle of the Orthodox-Secular continuum.

In the international arena, developments have been similarly positive. The
American victory in the Cold War and in the 1991 Gulf War bode well for
Israel, a valued American ally. The November 1991 Madrid conference,
convened by the US, marked greater Arab acceptance of Israel. The Arab
League peace initiative (2002) and the Arab states' presence at the
Annapolis gathering (2007), indicate the continuation of this trend.

Many important countries decided to improve relations with the Jewish state
due to its perception as a good conduit to Washington and its military and
technological strength. The year 1992 marked the establishment of
ambassadorial relations by important states such as China, India, Turkey and
Nigeria. Jerusalem nourished new strategic partnerships with Ankara and
Delhi, alliances which add significantly to Israel's national power.

The ups and mostly downs in Israeli-Palestinian relations have hardly had an
impact of how states conduct their bilateral relations with Israel.
Actually, the failures of the Palestinian national movement and the ascent
of Hamas in Palestinian politics have elicited greater understanding for the
Israeli predicament. 9/11 was an event that also sensitized much of the
world to Israel's dilemmas in fighting Palestinian terrorism.

Palestinian terrorism was successfully contained since the large-scale 2002
offensive in the West Bank. Gaza will in all probability be subject to a
similar military treatment to limit its nuisance value. The IDF learned its
lesson from the 2006 fiasco in Lebanon and seems better prepared to deal
with Hizballah.

In contrast, Israel's foes in the Arab world display weakness and their
stagnant societies are beleaguered by problems. The Human Development
reports released by the UN underscore their huge deficits entering into the
twenty-first century. Their ability to militarily challenge the status quo
is limited.

The only serious security challenge is a nuclear Iran. It is unclear how the
international community will deal with this issue, but the world seems more
attentive to Israel's perspective on this matter. Possibly, Israel might be
left alone to deal with the Ayatollas, but the obstruction of the Iranian
nuclear program is not beyond the capabilities of Jerusalem.

Finally, the Zeitgeist of this epoch that stresses democracy and free market
values favors Israel rather than its Muslim opponents, who continue to
grapple with the challenge of modernity.

In conclusion, Israel is a vibrant democracy that prospers and maintains
strong social cohesion. Significantly, it built a mighty military machine
able to meet all regional threats. In parallel, Israel's international
status has improved, while support for Israel in the US, its main ally and
the hegemonic power in world affairs, remains high. Israel is a success
story. If the country successfully continues to inculcate the Zionist ethos
into the next generations, its future looks bright.

Efraim Inbar is Professor of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University and
the Director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies.

BESA Perspectives is published through the generosity
of the Littauer Foundation.