PSR - Survey Research Unit: Palestinian - Israeli Joint Press Release
www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2008/p30ejoint.html

16 December, 2008
PRESS RELEASE

Joint Israeli Palestinian Poll, December 2008

Following Obama's Election, Palestinians and Israelis Seek a more active
role of the US in Moderating the Conflict

Among other findings of the joint Truman-PSR poll: both publics support
continuation of the cease-fire agreement between Hamas and Israel. Only
about a quarter of Israelis support reoccupation of the Gaza Strip if
shelling of Israeli communities continues

November 26-December 5, 2008

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry
S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey
Research in Ramallah, between November 26 and December 5, 2008. This joint
survey was conducted with the support of the Ford Foundation Cairo office
and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah and Jerusalem.

Following the election of Obama for president, a majority of the
Palestinians and half of the Israelis want the US to play a more active role
in moderating the conflict. Half of the Israelis and half of the
Palestinians think that a more active American involvement will be
successful, whereas the other half splits between expecting it to have no
impact or to fail. Nevertheless both sides expect no change in the US role
in the conflict. While the Israelis expect no change in US military economic
and political support of Israel, the Palestinians expect that US support of
Israel will strengthen.

Our poll also examined both publics' attitudes toward the Arab League
(Saudi) plan, given the recent public diplomacy campaign by the PLO
negotiation team which published the full plan in Israeli newspapers in
order to increase Israelis' awareness of the plan. Only 25% of the Israelis
reported having seen the ad. Following this public diplomacy initiative the
level of support for the plan remained stable: 36% of the Israelis support
and 61% oppose the plan now, while in September 38% supported and 59%
opposed the plan. Among Palestinians 66% support the Arab League plan and
30% oppose it.

With regard to the cease fire with Hamas, support is slightly down compared
to three months ago: 51% of the Israelis support its continuation and 44%
oppose it; among Palestinians, 74% support and 23% oppose the continuation
of the cease fire agreement.

The joint poll examined Israelis' and Palestinians' expectations and
assessments of the US policy toward the conflict, following the election of
President Obama. The poll also examined various negotiation tracks including
the Israeli-Palestinian track, the Israeli-Syrian track and the Saudi (Arab
League) plan currently on the public agenda; threat perceptions, support of
violence, and domestic political affairs.

The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the
West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations
between December 3 and December 5, 2008. The margin of error is 3%. The
Israeli sample includes 600 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew
Arabic or Russian between November 26 and December 2, 2008. The margin of
error is 4.5%. The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, the
Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the
Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, and Dr.
Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey
Research (PSR).

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Dr.
Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-2964933 or email
pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at tel.
03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

MAIN FINDINGS
(A) Expectations regarding the US policy toward the conflict following the
election of Barack Obama for President
49% of Israelis and 57% of Palestinians want a more active role for the US
in the conflict following the election of Obama for president. 31% of
Israelis do not want the US to intervene, and 18% want the US to continue to
play its current role in the peace process. 35% of Palestinians do not want
the US to intervene, and only 4 % want it to continue to play its current
role.
As to the results of such an involvement, 49% on both sides expect it to be
successful, while 22% of Israelis and 30% of Palestinians think it will be a
failure, and 23%of Israelis and 16% of Palestinians think it will have no
impact.
Despite the two publics' preference for a more active American role, 50% of
Israelis and 59% of Palestinians expect that the US role will not change.
19% of Israelis and 7% of Palestinians even think the US will play a weaker
role than in the past.
59% of Israelis believe that US support of Israel will not change, and the
others are split between expecting that this support will weaken (19%) or
strengthen (15%). Palestinians on the other hand expect US support of Israel
to strengthen (56%), and 29% more expect it not to change. Only 7% expect it
to weaken.
Two thirds of Palestinians think that Israel would benefit more if the US
intervened strongly in the peace process. Among Israelis 39% say that both
sides would benefit, 25% - that the Palestinians would benefit and only
14% - that Israel would benefit from such intervention.
Israelis and Palestinians are quite split as to the possibility of American
pressure on the two sides to accept and implement the peace plans currently
on the agenda. On each side a majority would accept such pressure with
regard to the plan on which there is majority support in the society, but
reject pressure with regard to the plan on which there is no majority
support. Thus, with regard to the Arab (Saudi) Peace Initiative (detailed
below in section B), 44% of Israelis think Israel should accept such
American pressure and 50% think it should reject such pressure. With regard
to a permanent settlement along the Clinton/Geneva parameters (as detailed
below) 51% think Israel should accept such pressure and 43% think that it
should reject it. Among Palestinians the pattern is the other way around:
56% of them think they should accept American pressure to accept and
implement the Saudi Plan, 39% say they should reject such pressure. As to a
permanent settlement along the Clinton/Geneva parameters, 47% of
Palestinians think they should accept and 49% think they should reject such
American pressure.
Among Israelis, 48% believe that the Palestinians would accept American
pressure on the two sides on both plans, and 39% believe that the
Palestinians would reject it. Similarly, more Palestinians believe that most
Israelis would accept than reject American pressure on both plans: on the
Arab/Saudi plan, 49% believe most Israelis would accept American pressure,
and 43% think that most Israelis would reject such pressure. On the
Clinton/Geneva parameters, 55% think most Israelis would accept American
intervention, and 36% think Israelis would reject it.

(B) Negotiation Tracks on the Agenda
The Saudi Plan
61% of the Israelis oppose and 36% support the Saudi initiative which calls
for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it
ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the
establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat
from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza the West Bank,
Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian
state. The refugees problem will be resolved through negotiation in a just
and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. In return,
all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will
sign peace treaties with her and establish normal diplomatic relation. In
our September poll 59% of the Israelis opposed the plan while 38% supported
it. Among Palestinians, 66% support the plan and 30% oppose it, just like in
September.
Following the extraordinary step of public diplomacy initiated by the PLO
negotiation department which published the full plan in the Israeli papers
on November 20, 2008, 11% of the Israelis report they saw the ads but did
not read it, and 14% claim they saw it and also read it. 75% did not see the
ad. About half of those who report that they saw the ad and those who saw it
and also read it expressed support for the plan while only a third of those
who did not see the ad at all supported it. The fact that there is no
difference in support between those who only noticed the ad and those who
also read it indicates a self selection process where respondents who are
more interested in peace also exposed themselves more to the Palestinian
campaign, and the difference in support between those who did not see the ad
at all and those who saw it does not necessarily indicate a success of the
Palestinian campaign.

Clinton/Geneva Parameters

The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were
presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian
officials eight years ago, on December 23, 2000, following the collapse of
the July 2000 Camp David summit. The Geneva Initiative, along similar lines,
was made public around the end of 2003. These parameters address the most
fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: (1)
Final borders and territorial exchange; (2) Refugees; (3) Jerusalem; (4) A
demilitarized Palestinian state; (5) Security arrangements; and (6) End of
conflict. We addressed these issues several times in the past since December
2003, and in the current poll we revisited these crucial issues following
the Annapolis conference and the resumption of the peace talks between the
parties. The findings indicate stability in support of the overall package
among Israelis compared to 2006 and 2007, with a slight majority supporting
the package (52%). This is a significant decline from close to two thirds
support in December 2004 and December 2005. Among Palestinians, a minority
of 41% supports the overall package, down from 47% a year ago. Since we have
been tracking these issues in 2003, there was only once majority support for
this package on both sides, in December 2004, shortly after the death of
Arafat which was followed by a surge of optimism and considerable moderation
in both publics. Among Israelis there is consistent majority support for the
Clinton package since 2004, but this majority has shrunk. Palestinian
support for this permanent status framework package seems to have been
affected in the past more by the disengagement and the disappointment from
it, than by Hamas' rise to power. Israeli support only fell following the
Palestinian political turnabout, and does not seem to have been affected by
the disengagement. Below we detail support and opposition to the individual
items in the Clinton permanent status package.

(1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange
Among Palestinians 54% support or strongly support and 44% oppose or
strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank
that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in
accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The
map was identical to that presented to respondents in December 2007, when
support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 56% and opposition at
42%.
Among Israelis 46% support and 48% oppose a Palestinian state in the
entirety of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip except for several large
blocks of settlements in 3% of the West Bank which will be annexed to
Israel. Israel will evacuate all other settlements, and the Palestinians
will receive in return territory of similar size along the Gaza Strip. In
December 2007, similarly 46% of the Israelis supported this component while
50% opposed it.

(2) Refugees
Among Palestinians, 40% support and 58% oppose a refugee settlement in which
both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and
242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These
are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the
Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no
restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas.
Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and
Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its
decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to
third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees
would be entitled to compensation for their "refugeehood" and loss of
property. In December 2007, 39% agreed with an identical compromise while
57% opposed it.
Among Israelis 40% support such an arrangement and 54% oppose it. In
December 2007 44% supported it and 52% opposed.

(3) Jerusalem
In the Palestinian public 36% support and 63% oppose a Jerusalem compromise
in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state
with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish
neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty. The Old City (including al
Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception
of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli
sovereignty. In December 2007, an identical compromise obtained 36% support
and 63% opposition.
Among Israelis, 40% agree and 57% disagree to this arrangement in which the
Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem including the old city and the Temple Mount
will come under Palestinian sovereignty, the Jewish neighborhoods including
the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty,
East Jerusalem will become the capital of the Palestinian state and West
Jerusalem the capital of Israel. In December 2007, 36% supported this
arrangement and 63% opposed it.

(4) Demilitarized Palestinian State
Among Palestinians 27% support and 73% oppose the establishment of an
independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a
strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to
ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to
end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise
received in December 2007 23% support, and opposition reached 76%.
This item receives the lowest level of support by Palestinians. Unlike the
refugees and Jerusalem components, this issue has not received due attention
in public discourse, as it should, since it may become a major stumbling
block in the efforts to reach a settlement.
Among Israelis 64% support and 33% oppose this arrangement compared to 61%
support and 38% opposition obtained in December 2007.

(5) Security Arrangements
In the Palestinian public 35% support and 64% oppose a compromise whereby
the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and
airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace
for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the
West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the
Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of
time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the
implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and
coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international
crossings. In December 2007, 51% of the Palestinians supported this
parameter while 47% opposed it.
In the Israeli public 56% support and 40% oppose this arrangement compared
to 53% who supported it and 44% who opposed it in December 2007.

(6) End of Conflict
In the Palestinian public 55% support and 44% oppose a compromise on ending
the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is
fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further
claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and
Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. An identical question
received in December 2007 the support of 66% and the opposition of 32%.
In the Israeli public 67% support and 29% oppose this component in the final
status framework. In December 2007, similarly, 66% of the Israelis supported
it while 30% opposed it.

The Whole Package
Among Palestinians 41% support and 57% oppose the whole package combining
the elements as one permanent status settlement. This level of support is
lower by 6 percentage points than that obtained in December 2007, when 47%
supported and 49% opposed such a package.
Among Israelis 52% support and 43% oppose all the above features together
taken as one combined package. In December 2007, similarly, 53% supported
and 43% opposed such a package.

It is important to see that the pattern of support for the overall package
is more than the sum of its parts, suggesting that people's calculus is
compensatory and trade-offs are considered. Despite strong reservations
regarding some of the components, the overall package always receives
greater support in both publics, where the desirable components and the
chance of reaching a permanent status agreement seem to compensate for the
undesirable parts.

31% of the Israelis estimate that a majority in their society supports the
Clinton parameters as a combined final status package. 55% believe that the
majority opposes it. These perceptions tap the normative facet of public
opinion and indicate that despite the consistent support in the package over
time, it has not acquired widespread normative legitimacy in the Israeli
public. Among Palestinians 45% believe now that a majority in their society
supports the Clinton parameters as a combined final status package and 46%
believe that the majority opposes it. In addition 48% among Palestinians
incorrectly assume that the majority of Israelis opposes the package, and
40% think there is an Israeli majority for the package. The assessment of
Israelis of the Palestinian majority is quite split: 43% of Israelis think
that a majority of Palestinians supports the parameters, and 40% think that
a majority opposes them.

Summary Table: Support for Clinton's Permanent Settlement Framework
(2003-2008)
IsraelisPalestinians
Dec 03Dec 04Dec 05Dec 06Dec 07Dec 08Dec 03Dec 04Dec 05Dec 06Dec 07Dec 08

1) 47% 55% 53% 44% 46% 46% 57% 63% 55% 61% 56% 54% Borders and Territorial
Exchange
2) 35% 44% 43% 38% 44% 40% 25% 46% 40% 41% 39% 40% Refugees
3) 41% 39% 38% 38% 36% 40% 46% 44% 33% 39% 36% 36% Jerusalem
4) 61% 68% 69% 62% 61% 64% 36% 27% 20% 28% 23% 27% Demilitarized
Palestinian State
5) 50% 61% 62% 51% 53% 56% 23% 53% 43% 42% 51% 35% Security Arrangements
8) 66% 76% 80% 68% 67% 67% 42% 69% 64% 62% 66% 55% End of Conflict
47% 64% 64% 52% 53% 52% 39% 54% 46% 48% 47% 41% Overall Package

In addition to our systematic assessment of the two sides' support of the
Clinton parameters we also examine periodically Israelis and Palestinians
readiness for a mutual recognition of identity. Our current poll shows that
69% of the Israelis support and 28% oppose mutual recognition of Israel as
the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the
Palestinian people as part of a permanent status agreement. Among
Palestinians, 54% support and 46% oppose this step after all issues in the
conflict are resolved and a Palestinian State is established.

Other Tracks
63% of Israelis oppose full evacuation of the Golan Heights in return for a
complete peace agreement with Syria, and 25%, like three months ago, support
it. If in the peace agreement, Syria will commit to disconnect itself from
Iran and stop its support of Hizbulla and Hamas, support increases somewhat
to 29%.
55% of the Israelis support and 43% oppose talks with Hamas if needed to
reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. In September 57%
supported and 42% opposed such talks. A sizeable Israeli majority (67%)
support and only 31% oppose talks with a national unity government composed
jointly of Hamas and Fatah if such a government is reestablished. In
September these figures were 65% and 32% respectively.

(C) Conflict management, threat perceptions and support of violence
51% of the Israelis support the continuation of the cease fire agreement
with Hamas and 44% oppose it. Three months ago in our September poll, 55%
supported and 39% opposed it. Among Palestinians 74% support the
continuation of the cease fire agreement and 23% oppose it. Also among
Palestinians, this level of support is somewhat lower than it was in
September, when 81% supported and 15% opposed it.
A majority of Israelis (59%) support the deployment of a Palestinian
Authority military force in Hebron. Palestinians are quite split as to what
this force will accomplish: 45% think it will bring about law order and
safety to the residents, while 48% think it will not do that.
Among Israelis, 62% are worried that they or their family may be harmed by
Arabs in their daily life. Among Palestinians 47% fear that their security
and safety and that of their family are not assured.
Among Israelis, 27% suggest that Israel should reoccupy the Gaza Strip and
stay there if the shelling of Israeli communities from the Gaza Strip
continues; 40% think that Israel should carry out ad-hoc operations against
the shelling and get out; 28% believe that Israel should use primarily
diplomatic rather than military steps.
A majority of Israelis (59%) think that Israel should bomb the Iranian
nuclear facilities in case all the international measures taken to prevent
Iran from developing a nuclear weapon will fail; 34% oppose it.

D) Domestic political affairs
If personal elections for prime minister were held today in Israel, 37%
would vote for Bibi Netanyahu, Tzipi Livni would receive 30% of the vote,
and 11% would vote for Ehud Barak. Netanyahu is also considered by Israelis
as the best candidate to lead the country toward peace with the Palestinians
and/or Syria: 33% of the Israelis think he is the most able to do so; 26%
choose Tzipi Livni; Barak comes out third with 10%. When security challenges
are concerned, 38% of the Israelis trust Bibi Netanyahu most, 20% trust
Barak, and 20% believe in Livni. As to the economic challenges Israel is
currently facing, 49% trust Netanyahu, 26% believe in Livni, and 7% in
Barak.
In the Palestinian Authority, if presidential elections were to take place
today, Mahmud Abbas, the Fatah nominee, would receive 48% of the vote, while
Ismail Haniyeh as the Hamas nominee would receive 38% of the vote.
_______________________________________________________________________________*This joint survey was conducted with the support of the Ford FoundationCairo office and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Jerusalem and Ramallah.