"We're not going to redivide Jerusalem, or get off the Golan Heights, or go
back to the 1967 boundaries," he says. "We won't repeat the mistake our
[political opponents] made of unilateral retreats to merely vacate territory
that is then taken up by Hamas or Iran."

Benjamin Netanyahu
Iran Is the Terrorist 'Mother Regime'
Israel's would-be prime minister says he was mocked for warning of the Gaza
rocket threat.
Brett Stephens - The Wall Stree Journal January 24, 2009
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123275466964911679.html?mod=googlenews_wsj

Jerusalem
It's Sunday morning, and I've been trying for days to get an interview with
former -- and, if his poll numbers hold up through the Feb. 10 election,
soon-to-be -- Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. But it's a
political season, and there's a war on, and my calls aren't being returned.
With nothing better to do, I go downstairs to the hotel gym for a jog.

So who should be on the treadmill next to mine? Benjamin Netanyahu. We chat
for a few minutes, mostly about the cease-fire that the government of
outgoing Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has just declared, and I ask if he'd be
willing to sit for an interview later in the day. His answer is something
between a "maybe" and a "yes." As a nod to the customs of the country, I
take that as a definite yes, so much the better to press his aides to
arrange the meeting.

When the interview finally happens, in the grand reception hall of the old
King David Hotel, it's close to one o'clock in the morning on Monday. Mr.
Netanyahu has come from a long dinner with visiting European leaders --
French President Nicolas Sarkozy, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and
German Chancellor Angela Merkel among them -- and he is plainly exhausted,
joking that he can't be held responsible for anything he might say.

The crack is unnecessary. Rare for a leading Israeli political figure, the
59-year-old Mr. Netanyahu is a phenomenally articulate man -- Obama-esque,
one might even say -- not just in his native Hebrew, but also in the
unaccented English he acquired at a Philadelphia high school and later as an
architecture and management student at MIT. True to form, near-lapidary
sentences all but trip from his tongue. Such as:

"I don't think Israel can accept an Iranian terror base next to its major
cities any more than the United States could accept an al Qaeda base next to
New York City."

Or:

"If we accept the notion that terrorists will have immunity because as they
fire on civilians they hide behind civilians, then this tactic will be
legitimized and the terrorists will have their greatest victory."

Or:

"We grieve for every child, for every innocent civilian that's killed either
on our side or on the Palestinian side. The terrorists celebrate such
suffering, on our side because they openly say they want to kill us, all of
us, and on the Palestinian side because it helps them foster this false
symmetry, which is contrary to common decency and international law."

And so on. The immediate question, of course, is the Israeli government's
unilateral cease-fire, followed hours later by Hamas's declaration of a
conditional, one-week cease-fire. Was the war a win? A draw? Or did it
accomplish nothing at all -- thereby handing Hamas the "victory" it loudly
claims for itself?

When Mr. Olmert announced Israel's cease-fire late Saturday night, he could
hardly keep a grin off his face. In his estimate, along with that of his
senior military brass, Israel had scored a clear win: It had humiliated
Hamas militarily; it had caused a political rift within the group; it had
taken relatively few casualties of its own; it had focused international
attention on the problem of the arms smuggling beneath Gaza's border with
Egypt. Most important, in the eyes of the Olmert government, it had avoided
the trap of reoccupying Gaza -- the only means, it believed, of finally
getting rid of Hamas.

Ordinary Israelis, however, seem less confident in the result, and Mr.
Netanyahu gives voice to their caution. He is quick to applaud the
"brilliant" performance of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the
"perseverance and strength" of Israeli civilians under Hamas's years-long
rocket barrages.

But, he adds, "we have to make sure that the radicals do not perceive this
as a victory," and it remains far from clear that they would be wrong to see
it as one.
"Notwithstanding the blows to the Hamas, it's still in Gaza, it's still
ruling Gaza, and the Philadelphi corridor [which runs along Gaza's border
with Egypt] is still porous, and . . . Hamas can smuggle new rockets unless
it's closed, to fire at Israel in the future."

So is Mr. Netanyahu's preference regime change in Gaza? "Well, that would
have been the optimal outcome," he says, adding that "the minimal outcome
would have been to seal Gaza" from the missiles and munitions being smuggled
into it. So far it's unclear that Israel has achieved even that: A
"Memorandum of Understanding" agreed to last week by Israel, the U.S. and
Egypt could be effective in stopping the flow of arms, but that's assuming
Cairo lives up to its responsibilities.

"One would hope they would actually do it," says Mr. Netanyahu, sounding
less than optimistic. Within days, his doubts are confirmed when the
Associated Press produces video footage of masked Palestinian smugglers
moving through once-again operational tunnels.

Rather than looking for solutions from Egypt, however, Mr. Netanyahu's gaze
is intently fixed on Iran, a subject that consumes at least half of the
interview. Iran is the "mother regime" both of Hamas, against which Israel
has just fought a war, as well as of Hezbollah, against which it fought its
last war in 2006. Together, he says, they are more than simply fingers of
Tehran's influence on the shores of the Mediterranean.

"The arming of Iran with nuclear weapons may portend an irreversible
process, because these regimes assume a kind of immortality," he says,
arguing that the threat of a nuclear Iran poses a much graver danger to the
world than the current economic crisis. "[This] will pose an existential
threat to Israel directly, but also could give a nuclear umbrella to these
terrorist bases."

How to stop that from happening? Mr. Netanyahu mentions that he has met with
Barack Obama both in Israel and Washington, and that the question of Iran
"loomed large in both conversations." I ask: Did Mr. Obama seem to him
appropriately sober-minded about the subject? "Very much so, very much so,"
Mr. Netanyahu stresses. "He [Mr. Obama] spoke of his plans to engage Iran in
order to impress upon them that they have to stop the nuclear program. What
I said to him was, what counts is not the method but the goal."

It's easy to believe that Mr. Netanyahu, of all people, must be wishing
President Obama well: If diplomacy with Iran fails and the U.S. does not
resort to military force, it would almost certainly fall to Mr. Netanyahu to
decide whether Israel will go it alone in a strike. (In a separate interview
earlier that day, a senior military official assured me that a successful
strike on Iran's nuclear facilities is well within Israel's capabilities.)

On the other hand, a Prime Minister Netanyahu could easily tangle with the
Obama administration, particularly if it makes a big push -- as it looks
like it might with the appointment of former Senate Majority Leader George
Mitchell as the new special envoy to the region -- for the resumption of
comprehensive, "final status" peace negotiations. There's already a history
here: During his first term as prime minister from 1996 to 1999, Mr.
Netanyahu frequently clashed with the administration of the man whose wife
is now the secretary of state.

Mr. Netanyahu's own prescriptions for a settlement with the Palestinians --
what he calls a "workable peace" -- differ markedly from the approaches of
the 1990s. He talks about "the development of capable law enforcement and
security capabilities" for the Palestinians, adding that the new National
Security Adviser Jim Jones had worked on the problem for the Bush
administration. He stresses the need for rapid economic development in the
West Bank, promising to remove "all sorts of impediments to economic growth"
faced by Palestinians.

As for the political front, Mr. Netanyahu promises a gradual, "bottom-up
process that will facilitate political solutions, not replace them."

"Most of the approaches to peace between Israel and the Palestinians," he
says, "have been directed at trying to resolve the most complex problems,
like refugees and Jerusalem, which is akin to building the pyramid from the
top down. It's much better to build it layer by layer, in a deliberate,
purposeful pattern that changes the reality for both Palestinians and
Israelis."

Whether this approach will work remains to be seen: Palestinian economic
development was also a priority in the 1990s, until it became clear that
billions in foreign aid were being siphoned off by corrupt Palestinian
officials, and after various joint economic projects with Israel were
violently sabotaged.

But however Mr. Netanyahu's economic and security plans play out, he makes
it equally clear that he is prepared to go only so far to reach an
accommodation that will meet some of the current demands being made of
Israel -- not only by Palestinians, but by the Syrians, the Saudis, and much
of the rest of the "international community" as well. "We're not going to
redivide Jerusalem, or get off the Golan Heights, or go back to the 1967
boundaries," he says. "We won't repeat the mistake our [political opponents]
made of unilateral retreats to merely vacate territory that is then taken up
by Hamas or Iran."

This brings Mr. Netanyahu to the political pitch he's making -- so far
successfully -- to Israelis ahead of next month's election. When elections
were held three years ago, bringing Mr. Olmert to power, "we [his Likud
Party] were mocked" for warning that Gaza would become Hamastan, and that
Hamastan would become a staging ground for missiles fired at major Israeli
cities such as Ashkelon and Ashdod.

"I think we've shown the ability to see the problems in advance," he says.
"Peace is purchased from strength. It's not purchased from weakness or
unilateral retreats. It just doesn't happen that way. That perhaps is the
greatest lesson that has been impressed on the mind of the Israeli public in
the last few years."

The polls seem to agree. As of Wednesday, an Israeli poll gives Likud a
30-seat plurality in the next Knesset, ahead by eight of Foreign Minister
Tzipi Livni's Kadima party. Well behind both of them is the left-leaning
Labor Party of Defense Minister Ehud Barak (at about 15 seats), which in
turn is running roughly even with Avigdor Lieberman's right-wing Yisrael
Beiteinu.

The dovish parties of yore, particularly Meretz, barely exist as political
entities anymore. Whether they'll ever be back will be a testament, one way
or another, to the kind of prime minister Mr. Netanyahu will be this time
around.
===========
Mr. Stephens writes Global View, the Journal's foreign affairs column.
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Printed in The Wall Street Journal, page A9