The Syrian Highway in the Fight Against Israel Is Still Open
by Lt. Col. (ret.) Michael Segall
Jerusalem Issue Briefs Vol. 12, No. 1 24 January 2012
http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=1&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=442&PID=0&IID=12003&TTL=Iran:_The_Syrian_Highway_in_the_Fight_Against_Israel_Is_Still_Open

•The wave of protest in Syria has put to the test the strategic alliance
between Iran (and Hizbullah) and Bashar Assad's regime. Syria is the main
state component of the "resistance camp" and serves as a logistical
hinterland for Hizbullah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Iran sees
its unequivocal backing for Syria as a demonstration of its ability to stay
loyal to its allies despite the regional turmoil.

•Iran believes that ultimately the "Islamic mantle" will supplant the
region's pro-Western regimes as part of the Islamic awakening. This would
offset the possible loss of Syria and reconsolidate the resistance camp on a
broad basis of Islamic religion and ideological hatred of Israel and the
United States.

•Ali Akbar Velayati, Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei's adviser for
international affairs, speaks of the resistance camp as incorporating "the
new Iraqi government." If Bashar falls, Iran will make sure its western
border with Iraq is also an advantageous border with the Middle East,
enabling it to exploit instability in Syria so as to keep operating within
and from its territory.

•The fall of the Assad regime would affect Iran's ability to help Hizbullah
in "real time" in the event of another round of hostilities with Israel, and
the freedom of action of the Hamas headquarters in Damascus. Yet, at the
same time, opportunities will open for Iran in view of the electoral
victories of the Islamic forces in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco.

•For as long as it lasts, the crisis in Syria will manifest the inter-Arab
fault line of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states vs. Syria, and deepen
the Persian-Arab, Sunni-Shiite, and historical Persian-Turkish (Ottoman)
fault lines.

Iran Backs Its Syrian Ally

Since the wave of protest in Syria began as part of the Middle Eastern
upheavals - with the Middle East being recast in the Islamic mold - the
strategic alliance between Iran (and Hizbullah) and Bashar Assad's regime
has been put to its ultimate test. Both the international community and the
Arab-regional system (and Turkey) are trying to impose a change that entails
Bashar's ouster and the fostering of a democratic political process in
Syria, with Iran (and Hizbullah) standing alone in backing Syria. At the
same time, China and Russia are counter-balancing Western and Arab efforts
to oust Bashar, impeding a tough resolution in the UN Security Council.

Syria was a critical bulwark of the old Middle Eastern regional order that
Iran had cultivated with immense financial, political, and military
investments. It is the main state component of the "resistance camp" that
Iran counterposes to the "imperialist" presence in the region, and was also
a logistical hinterland for Hizbullah and to a lesser extent for the other
nonstate terrorist members of the resistance camp - particularly the
Palestinian terror organizations Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).

The Arab Spring, or, as Iran calls it, the "Islamic awakening," found Iran
almost at the height of the resistance camp's consolidation and power.
Hizbullah had completed its takeover of the Lebanese arena, Hamas was
entrenching its rule in Gaza, and the peace process with regard to Israel,
in its Syrian and Palestinian channels, had stopped. Iran, for its part, was
continuing to progress in its nuclear program and to project regional power
as the United States talked of completing its withdrawals from Iraq and
Afghanistan. Thus, Iran had successfully defied the United States and the
West, which it saw as "at a nadir of military and economic weakness."

Now, as Bashar's regime faces an ongoing storm of protest and he refuses to
give up his rule despite both internal and external pressures, his ally Iran
is backing him with all its might. It is doing so despite and perhaps
because of the regional conditions that are fostering a different Middle
East. Seemingly, Iran will have to pay a price for defying the Arab Spring
and sustaining its unstinting support for Bashar. Iran, however, sees its
unequivocal backing for its ally Bashar - as contrasted to U.S. president
Barack Obama's sudden abandonment of long-time U.S. ally Egyptian president
Hosni Mubarak - as a manifestation of its power and its ability to withstand
the revolution and stay loyal to its allies despite the regional turmoil.

Iran wants to proceed carefully, without betraying the basic elements of its
policy and losing its main cards in the region so far - Syria, Hizbullah,
and the Palestinian organizations. Tehran is well aware that Bashar Assad
may eventually be toppled, but for now keeps giving him its full support
including security and military,1 economic, and diplomatic assistance2
(including coordinating positions toward Russia and China). Iran believes
that ultimately the "Islamic mantle" - as already evident from the Egyptian
and Tunisian elections that saw the triumph of the Islamist movements, with
which Iran maintained a dialogue during and despite the rule of the
"dictators" - will supplant the region's pro-Western regimes as part of the
Islamic awakening. As Iran sees it, this Islamic ambience, which is
fundamentally hostile toward Israel and the United States, would offset the
possible loss of Syria and reconsolidate the resistance camp on a broad
basis of Islamic religion and ideological hatred of Israel and the United
States.

For now, Iran prefers to hold the rope at both ends: to keep supporting the
Syrian regime and helping it to survive - including through Hizbullah - to
repress the protest, and to portray the United States, Israel, and the
moderate Arab states and bodies - those whose leaders still stand, such as
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Qatar, and the Arab League - as lurking behind the
efforts to overthrow Bashar for having led the Middle East's anti-Israeli,
anti-Western resistance camp for years. Iran is pursuing this course even
though it knows that, if Bashar falls, it stands to pay a heavy political
and military price in terms of its future relations with the new regime and
its ability to assist Hizbullah via the Syrian-Turkish conduit. The
commander of the Qods Force of the Revolutionary Guards said recently in
this regard that "the war in Syria is not a sickness that will destroy the
regime," since most of its citizens continue to support Bashar.3

Indeed, Iran's loyalty to Syria has already cost it dearly in the form of
rising tensions with Islamist Turkey. Here, too, Iran has criticized Turkey
for siding with the West instead of Syria, and as relations have worsened,
some in Iran have even characterized Islam in Turkey as "Western Islam" - an
appellation formerly reserved in Iran for the moderate Arab states,
especially Saudi Arabia.

Syria: "The Gold-Plated Link in the Chain of Anti-Israeli Resistance"

Iran's present position regarding the "plots" unfolding in Syria, along with
Syria's role in Iran's overall regional policy, was formulated quite
precisely by Ali Akbar Velayati. He is Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei's
special assistant for international affairs, currently coordinating for him
the strategy toward the Islamic awakening in his role as secretary-general
of the World Assembly of the Islamic Awakening. Velayati praised Syria's
staunch resilience "in the face of the plots and collusions of different
states aimed at weakening Syria's firm stance as the main arm of the
resistance front against the Zionist regime." Velayati also linked together
all the members of this camp when he said that "the chain of resistance
against Israel, whose main links are Iran and Syria, Hizbullah, the new
government in Iraq, and Hamas runs along the Syrian highway." He also
referred to Syria as "the gold-plated link in this chain."4

On another occasion, perhaps manifesting wishful thinking, Velayati insisted
that the Syrian uprising had passed its worst and the Assad government would
not collapse thanks to the government's "strong roots" in Syrian society.

He added that Burhan Ghalioun, head of the opposition Syrian National
Council, had no social base in Syria and accused him of being an "agent" of
the West and Israel.5

Iran's ambassador to Lebanon, Qazanfar Roknabadi, averred that "Fortunately,
Syria is strongly moving towards stability and a full failure of the
enemies' plots grows more and more obvious each day."6 Several times Iran
has denied reports that it has held contacts with opposition elements.7

Velayati's assertions echo repeated claims by various spokesmen and
commentators that the "Syrian case" is different and not part of the Arab
Spring. They also charge that the United States, Israel, some of the Arab
states, the West, and Turkey (!) seek to exploit the atmosphere of the Arab
Spring so as to be rid of Bashar's regime, which they see as a thorn in
their side given his strong posture - which they liken to Iran's - against
the West and his role as a key member of the resistance front against Israel
and its efforts to gain legitimacy.

Is Syria a Red Line for Iran?

Mohsen Rezaee, secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council and former
IRGC (Revolutionary Guards) commander, said in an interview to Hizbullah's
Al-Manar network that Syria, Hizbullah, and Hamas constitute a red line for
Iran, which "will not allow any problem to be created for them since they
form the Islamic world's front line [of defense] against Israel."8

The conservative newspaper Kayhan, which reflects Khamenei's positions,
claimed the United States fears that the resistance camp will only gain
power once the Syrian crisis ends and hence is working to topple the Syrian
regime. The writer of the article opines that what is happening in Syria has
no connection at all to the Arab Spring, which only provides a pretext for
overthrowing Bashar and weakening the resistance camp. In his view, U.S.
activity in Syria is aimed at offsetting the great damage that the Islamic
awakening has inflicted on U.S. policy in the region, including the loss of
its power base and popularity.9 Former Iranian ambassador to Syria Ahmad
Mousavi said similarly that the West's hostility toward Syria stems from
Syria's ongoing support for the resistance against Western peace plans aimed
at bestowing legitimacy on Israel. Mousavi added that President Assad is the
only Arab leader who has not been charged with either moral or economic
corruption. He also expressed support for Bashar's reforms in Syria.10

The hard-line newspaper Jomhouri Eslami, too, denies any Arab Spring context
for the events in Syria and depicts them as an attempt by the West, led by
the United States, to uproot a main pillar of the resistance camp. The paper
describes the failure of the American attempt to influence the revolutions
in the region, points to the rise of the Islamist regimes in Egypt and
Tunisia, and asserts that Iran and Hizbullah's close ties with the Assad
government are an important factor in its stability and have neutralized the
plot by the king of Jordan and the Turkish government to topple him.

It is totally clear that the aim of the United States and its allies in
ousting Assad's regime is to destroy the resistance front against the
Zionist regime. Neutralizing this plot requires strengthening the Syrian
regime. This can be done through two channels: external support from Syria's
friends who share a common denominator in the struggle against Zionism and
the United States, and internal reforms that the Syrian regime itself must
carry out, and without which there will be no benefit from the external
support....Even though the Syrian regime has overcome the plots, it needs to
take some sort of measures to achieve full stability and not provide a
pretext to the opponents. In truth, the rulers of Syria, more than in the
past, must go in the direction of reforms....Reform must start with the
Baath Party, continue with the uprooting of administrative corruption, and
move on to solving the problems of the public's welfare and ensuring
freedom.11

Ali Larijani, chairman of the Majlis, called on all the Islamic countries
not to exploit the crisis in Syria and play into the hands of countries
outside the region, or cooperate with their plot against Syria. "We expect
Islamic countries not to allow those who hold a grudge against Syria for its
resistance against the Zionist regime to take advantage of the situation."12
Majlis member Mohammad Karim Abadi said that Iran "strongly condemn[s] the
plots against the Syrian nation that is on the frontline of resistance
(against Zionists)....We ask Muslim nations in the region, especially Qatar,
Saudi Arabia and Turkey, to support the people of Syria who were in the
forefront of Zionists' aggression and their lands are still under the
occupation of aliens."13 The editor of Kayhan, Hossein Shariatmadari, also
criticized Qatar, calling it "the undeclared, and sometimes declared, base
for the United States in the region. Qatar's open ties with the Zionist
regime and its open participation in the plots of Saudi Arabia and Turkey to
exert pressure on Syria and remove it from the resistance axis, are only
some examples of the treachery of the mercenary Qatar government."14

Iran also exploited the recent suicide bombings in Damascus to slam the
United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia and claim they were responsible.
After one of the bombings, a spokesman for the Iranian Foreign Ministry said
"the nation and the government in Syria will succeed to foil the
Zionist-American axis that seeks to ignite civil war and separatism in the
region."15 The director of the board of the state-run Iranian satellite
channel Al-Alam (which targets an Arabic-speaking audience) claimed that
"the attack points to the terrorist nature of the armed group and to the
activity of a few groups that work hand in hand with their allies." He
hinted that the attack was carried out after the intelligence agencies of
Turkey, France, the United States, and several Arab states held parleys on
sowing chaos and instability in Syria.16 The semi-official Fars news agency
was more blunt. It claimed in a recent news dispatch from Syria that
al-Qaeda and Salafi terrorists have infiltrated into Syria in recent months
and were involved in terrorist attacks, the latest of which was a suicide
attack that killed 25 people. The report maintained that, in addition to the
support provided by Saudi Arabia for the terrorist attacks in Syria, Saudi
clergymen and Friday prayers leaders in the kingdom have also called the
protests and moves against the Syrian government as halal (religiously
legitimate) and have persuaded people to conduct them.17

Iran and Turkey in Conflict: "Real Islam" vs. "Secular Islam"

Iran's firm support for Syria, almost unquestioned within Iran, together
with its opposition to Turkey's strong stance against the violent repression
in Syria, has quickly put the two states at loggerheads. And this comes
shortly after a "golden age" of improving relations within the
Syrian-Turkish-Iranian triangle, which had emerged briefly as a new regional
axis before the Syrian crisis erupted. This tension between the two non-Arab
states, each of which for its own reasons not only seeks to mold the new
regional order but to stand at its helm, has brought their intense rivalry
and political-religious divergence to the fore.

When it came to fine-tuning Iran's policy toward Turkey, it was Velayati who
detailed the extremely delicate Islamic issues between the two states. He
criticized Turkey's governmental system as "secular Islam," a mere variant
of Western liberal democracy, and an inappropriate model for countries now
experiencing the Islamic awakening.18

Hassan Rowhani, one of Khamenei's two representatives on the Supreme
National Security Council (SNSC) and head of the Strategic Research Center
of the Expediency Council, similarly claimed that, while the West wanted
Turkey - not Iran - to be a model for the popular revolutions in the region,
Turkey maintained close ties with Israel and its anti-Israeli policy was
merely symbolic. Rowhani also asserted that the Second Lebanon War and
Israel's 2009 Gaza operation had provided the main impetus for the Islamic
trend in the region; and that by supporting the Syrian opposition, "Turkey
has crossed the boundaries that are permitted it."19

Also joining the criticism were senior officials in the Iranian religious
establishment. For example, Grand Ayatollah Nasser Makarem Shirazi advised
Turkey not to stoke the Syrian crisis. He claimed the unrest there "is a
conspiracy devised by the United States, Israel, and one of the Arab
countries, and Turkey is feeding the flames of the crisis....Turkish
officials took an anti-Zionist line for a while to gain popularity, but this
popularity will turn into disrepute. Why do they not understand?"20

Alaeddin Boroujerdi, chairman of the Majlis National Security and Foreign
Policy Committee, called on Turkey to modify its policy toward Syria and
recognize reality if it wants to pursue a policy congruent with Iran's. The
policy Turkey has adopted, he asserted, does not contribute to regional
stability.21 Former Iranian foreign minister Manuchehr Mottaki, who was
deposed a few months ago by President Ahmadinejad, also criticized Turkey's
position toward the Syrian crisis and called for a reconsideration. He also
urged Syria to focus on reforms and denied any possibility of Iran
intervening there.22

The escalating tension between Iran and Turkey not only concerns the Syrian
situation. It also stems from Ankara's decision to station components of
NATO's antimissile defense system on its soil. The vice-chairman of the
Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Committee did not rule out the
possibility that Iran, if attacked, would strike targets in Turkish
territory, while IRGC aerospace commander Brig.-Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh
stated:

We have prepared ourselves. If any threat is staged against Iran, we will
target NATO's missile shield in Turkey and will then attack other
targets....We are sure that the missile system is deployed by the U.S. for
the sake of the Zionist regime, but to deceive the world's people,
especially the Turkish people, they allege that the system belongs to
NATO....Turkey is a member and cover for NATO. Today NATO has become a cover
for the U.S. [moves] while the U.S. itself has turned into a cover for the
Zionist regime....Yet the Turkish people are aware and we are sure that
Turkey's Muslims will stop this plot by themselves....We are sure that the
Muslim people of Turkey will promptly cut these systems into pieces under
threatening conditions.23

Turkey, for its part, has not remained docile. With tensions between the two
countries mounting, Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu during a recent
visit to Tehran criticized Iran and urged his counterpart, Iranian foreign
minister Ali Akbar Salehi, to give the Syrian regime "good advice" on its
responsibility for the bloodshed in Syria and the need to put a stop to
it.24

Whereas the Iranian Foreign Ministry is trying to calm the winds with Turkey
and prevent further escalation, Khamenei's bureau and elements connected to
it are in fact pushing for a more aggressive policy toward Ankara. Salehi,
for his part, trying to tamp down the tensions, said the two states had a
good relationship and called on the Turkish media - which gave much play to
Iranian statements that did not rule out an Iranian attack on Turkish soil -
to distinguish between official spokesmen and those speaking only for
themselves. He also said that policy decisions, at any rate, are taken by
the supreme leader, the president, and the foreign minister.25 It appears,
however, that in the Turkish case in particular, and regarding the overall
Iranian policy toward the regional changes in general with an emphasis on
the Islamic awakening, the Iranian Foreign Ministry is not playing a
significant role in leading the aggressive and defiant Iranian policy.

Saadollah Zarei is an international-affairs expert who also writes
editorials for Kayhan. In an article in the conservative newspaper Siyasat-e
Ruz on the crisis in Syria, he divided the Middle Eastern states into two
blocs - the "resistance front" and the "conciliation front" - and suggested
the cost-benefit tally for each of these:

The countries of the resistance front were always subject to criticism by
the West as well as harsh criticism from the Arab states in the region. Now,
when the international system has joined ranks to bring down Bashar Assad's
regime and is also threatening war against Iran, the Arab states that are
members of the Arab League have convened and decided to suspend Syria's
membership26 [a decision that Iran criticized] and also to impose sanctions
on it [in an attempt to promote the designs of the West]. The events of
recent years [the victories of Iran's allies Hizbullah and Hamas in the
anti-Israeli struggle], Iran's progress in the nuclear field, the U.S.
forces' withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, the economic situation in the
United States, and the power struggles surrounding the presidential
elections there are stymieing U.S. efforts to control and manage the region,
and given these conditions of an administrative vacuum along with the
turmoil in the Arab countries, Iran is the big winner. In parallel, Saudi
Arabia and other Arab states are trying to thwart these developments [the
strengthening of Iran and its allies] by isolating Syria, a strategic ally
of Iran in the region and the bridge to Hizbullah and Hamas. Another actor
that is trying to isolate Syria, with the aim of preventing Iran from taking
the reins, is Turkey. Turkey knows that presently there is not a single Arab
state in the region that can prevent it from becoming a superpower, which
only Iran can do, and therefore it has joined the Arab states in trying to
prevent the deepening of Iran's penetration.

Zarei also asserts that Iran unquestionably and assertively backs Syria
against the Western and Arab states.27

Where to Go from Here?: A New Approach for the Resistance Camp

All in all, the crisis in Syria poses one of Iran's most difficult
challenges in recent years in the field of foreign policy and exporting the
revolution. It is occurring at a time when international pressure on Iran is
mounting and sanctions on its oil exports and central bank (CBI) appear more
imminent than ever. Yet, even under the growing burden of sanctions, Iran is
not abandoning its longtime ally and in recent weeks has been unequivocally
supporting Syria and providing Bashar with military and security assistance
to curb the protests.

Even though Iran, when referring to the crisis in Syria, often stresses the
firm stance of the resistance camp and the price Syria is paying for being a
main pillar of it, Iran is already preparing for the possibility - despite
almost never publicly admitting it - that Bashar will eventually fall.
Especially important here is the statement by Khamenei's
international-affairs adviser on incorporating the "new Iraqi government" in
the resistance camp along with the growing contacts between Iran and that
government, which began as soon as the United States had completed its
withdrawal - a move whose strange timing plays into Iran's hands. If Bashar
falls, then, Iran will make sure its western border with Iraq is also an
advantageous border with the Middle East, enabling it to exploit instability
in Syria so as to keep operating within and from its territory. In recent
months Iran has - similar to its activity in Lebanon - been investing
substantial resources in Iraq. This goes beyond the subversion it waged
there throughout the U.S. presence and the assistance it provided, sometimes
in coordination with and through Lebanese Hizbullah, to the radical Shiite
elements there.

Furthermore, the possible loss of Syria will push Iran to deal more
forcefully with its "backyard" - the Persian Gulf - and to settle accounts
with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain; Iran has not yet said its last word about the
Shiite revolt in Bahrain and the Shiites' struggle in eastern Saudi Arabia.
Iran's recent show of strength in the gulf in the form of a wide-scale naval
and army exercise, to be complemented by a Revolutionary Guards exercise to
be held in the coming weeks, along with escalatory rhetoric about possibly
closing off the Strait of Hormuz in case of sanctions on Iran's oil exports
and central bank, indicates that Iran aims to tighten its grip and further
entrench its status in the region.

An Abundance of Fault Lines

For as long as it lasts the crisis in Syria will manifest the inter-Arab
fault line of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states vs. Syria, and deepen
the Persian-Arab, Sunni-Shiite, and historical Persian-Turkish (Ottoman)
fault lines. Parallel to the metahistorical processes is the ongoing
weakening of the United States in the Middle East and the rise of Islamic
regimes that, albeit mostly Sunni, are much closer to Iran than to America.
From Tehran's standpoint, the real challenge is Turkey, as illustrated by
the crisis with Syria. Turkey sees what is happening in Syria - its
backyard - as part of the Arab Spring and calls on the president to respond
to the will of the people, while Iran keeps backing Bashar and claims the
Arab Spring is just a pretext to get rid of him. Both of these states have a
superpower-imperialist past they would like to bring back, and will continue
their dispute as the Middle Eastern tumult intensifies and even when the
dust of the "Arab revolutions" settles. Both, with their apparent Islamic
agenda, are competing for the same public, but still a wide gap yawns
between them.

Iran appears to be at an advanced stage of reshaping what it calls the
resistance camp. The fall of one of its mainstays, the Assad regime, would
affect Iran's ability to help Hizbullah in "real time" in the event of
another round of hostilities with Israel, and the freedom of action of the
Hamas headquarters in Damascus. Yet, at the same time, opportunities will
open for Iran in the region. In its view, the electoral victories of the
Islamic forces (even if Sunni) and the possibility of communicating with
them without fear of governmental repression - particularly in Egypt,
Tunisia, and Morocco, while in eastern Saudi Arabia the Shiite minority is
still under tight control - opens for Tehran a new range of ideology-driven
opportunities. As in the past, the common denominator around which it seeks
to unite all members of the camp is hatred of the West and Israel. Here,
Iran's rhetoric about the Syrian crisis, which it portrays as an attempt to
harm a central Arab actor that has operated against Israel and has paid and
is paying a price for its actions, plays a salient role.

Iran will try to consolidate the resistance camp in accordance with the
changing geostrategic conditions of the region. In the first stage, it will
work to widen the camp's ideological reach to include both a religious basis
of Islam and an ideological-political basis of hatred of Israel and the
United States. As for the practical aspects of the struggle against Israel,
Iran will continue to leave them in the hands of Hizbullah, Hamas, and
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, attempting to broaden the scope of
military-terrorist conflict with Israel in the future. Meanwhile, Iran is
assigning an important role to its nuclear program and to formulating an
appropriate deterrence concept that will be combined with its current
"resistance camp" doctrine.

* * *

Notes

1. Michael Segall, "How Iran Is Helping Assad Suppress Syria's ‘Arab
Spring,'" Jerusalem Issue Brief, July 20, 2011, Jerusalem Center for Public
Affairs,
http://jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=1&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=442&PID=0&IID=7945&TTL=How_Iran_Is_Helping_Assad_Suppress_Syria's_"Arab_Spring"

2. http://www.tehrantimes.com/component/content/article/93333

3.
http://www.nehzatejahani.com/1390/10/%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AA-%C2%AB%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AC-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%85%C2%BB-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D9%87/

4. http://www.mehrnews.com/fa/newsdetail.aspx?NewsID=1496800

5. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9007277334

6. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9007277071

7. http://www.irna.ir/ENNewsShow.aspx?NID=30666591&SRCH=1

8. http://shoranews.com/News/2549

9. http://kayhannews.ir/900921/14.htm#other1400

10. http://www.irna.ir/ENNewsShow.aspx?NID=30708565

11.
http://www.jomhourieslami.com/1390/13900926/13900926_01_jomhori_islami_sar_magaleh_0001.html

12.
http://www.tehrantimes.com/politics/93113-islamic-countries-should-not-play-against-syria

13. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9007275529

14. http://www.kayhannews.ir/900908/2.HTM#other200

15. http://irna.ir/ENNewsShow.aspx?NID=30751979

16. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9010170171

17. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9010171825

18. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9007277334

19. http://www.mehrnews.com/fa/newsdetail.aspx?NewsID=1482337

20.
http://www.tehrantimes.com/politics/93510-ayatollah-advises-turkey-against-stoking-flames-of-syria-crisis

21. http://www.mehrnews.com/en/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=1501152

22. http://www.javanonline.ir/vdcdf90osyt0k56.2a2y.html

23. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9007277163

24. http://www.mehrnews.com/en/newsdetail.aspx?NewsID=1502256

25. http://www.irna.ir/ENNewsShow.aspx?NID=30712338

26. http://www.irna.ir/ENNewsShow.aspx?NID=30666436

27. http://www.siasatrooz.ir/vdcdso09.yt0nx6a22y.html

* * *
IDF Lt.-Col. (ret.) Michael (Mickey) Segall, an expert on strategic issues
with a focus on Iran, terrorism, and the Middle East, is a senior analyst at
the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.