Yet no war in which missiles were employed – from the Iran-Iraq War to the
Second Lebanon War – has ever been won without the additional use of
maneuvering ground forces. In other words, the use of missiles has never
been a deciding factor in any armed conflict.

[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: Retreat advocates tell us that in the age of
missiles that they are the end all and be all and the movement of ground
forces - and hence strategic depth - are thus irrelevant. Yet here comes
Haim Rosenberg to explain that missiles don't win the war...]

Missile Warfare: A Realistic Assessment

by Haim Rosenberg

BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 161, January 25, 2012
http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/docs/perspectives161.pdf

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The threat to Israel of missile warfare is somewhat
exaggerated and public discourse on this issue should reflect realistic
assessments. At this stage, missile attacks would be able to inflict only
limited physical damage on Israel. Moreover, future military campaigns are
unlikely to be limited to missile attacks – thus, the argument “land and
type of terrain are unimportant in the missile age” is a dangerous fallacy.

Recent discussions around a preemptive strike on Iran have included the
possible repercussions of such a move, namely missile attacks on Israel. The
threat of ballistic missile warfare is perceived as a paradigm shift capable
of radically altering modern warfare. Those who believe that Middle East
battlefields of the future will primarily consist of missile attacks upon
Israeli cities therefore argue that Israel must prepare itself for such a
situation. Furthermore, since a missile war relegates ground forces to near
irrelevance, they claim, geographical and topographical factors will become
of lesser importance.

Yet no war in which missiles were employed – from the Iran-Iraq War to the
Second Lebanon War – has ever been won without the additional use of
maneuvering ground forces. In other words, the use of missiles has never
been a deciding factor in any armed conflict.

This is no coincidence, since missiles have limitations that prevent them
from becoming a decisive weapon. Their main limitation is inaccuracy, as
most are only capable of landing hundreds of meters off-target. This makes
the chance of a precise and direct hit very low.1 Another significant
limitation regards the physics of the explosion itself. The blast caused by
the warhead steeply drops as the distance from the blast center increases.
Thus, the actual damage indicates a much more limited threat than what
superficially seems to be the case. For example, an air-launched bomb
weighing one ton will destroy a building if it hits it directly, while at
only 45 meters off-target it will cause medium damage and at 60 meters
off-target the damage will most likely be very limited.

There are hundreds of missiles in the Middle East. Syria, for example, has a
particularly large array of surface-to-surface missiles with ranges of a few
hundred kilometers, most of which are low-accuracy. Considering that longer
range missiles cost considerably more, the number of 1,500 km-range missiles
(capable of covering the distance between Iran and Israel) is likely to be
much smaller than the number of 300 km-range missiles. Furthermore, launch
and logistics capacities are complicated by the fact that most ballistic
missiles used in the Middle East are liquid fueled, which ultimately
decreases the launch rate. Clearly then, the simultaneous launching of
hundreds of ballistic missiles is simply unrealistic.

On a countrywide – or even citywide scale – the expected damages and
casualties of such missile attacks are low. A bird's-eye view of any town
will show that due to public areas and numerous spaces between buildings,
only a fraction of any area is in fact occupied by buildings. It is
therefore likely that an attack by dozens of missiles will only cause a
small number of direct hits and result in a relatively small number of
casualties.

Nonetheless, the psychological impact of such an attack would be quite
significant. And of course, a direct hit to a site or facility containing
hazardous materials would drastically challenge this calculus. Such a
scenario, in which potential damage is extremely high, warrants a separate
discussion.

The largest missile battle that has taken place to date was during World War
II, specifically from 1944 to 1945, after Germany completed its development
of the V-2 ballistic missile, with a warhead of 980 kg and a range of 320
km. Most missiles were fired on Antwerp (approximately 1,660 missiles) and
London (approximately 1,400 missiles). Although this huge number of
missiles – 3,060 altogether – caused thousands of deaths, it did not prevent
the Allies from reaching Berlin.

Considering the current technological capabilities and limitations of the
missiles possessed by Israel’s enemies, it seems likely that the current
state of missile warfare will remain unchanged for quite some time. Any
efforts to alter this will meet constraints, particularly economic
considerations, policies pertaining to the sale of missiles, and
organizational and logistical hindrances. For example, Syria's current
stockpile mainly consists of the older, liquid fueled Scud-C and D missiles.
Even if Syria is able to acquire more advanced missiles in the future, it
would be incapable of replacing its entire missile arsenal in a short time
and would still be limited in firepower to a mix of advanced and old
technologies.

Next Generation Ballistic Missiles

The Russian SS-26 is an innovative ballistic missile that represents a
dramatic change of capacity for such weapons. It is capable of homing and
maneuvering even during the final stage of its flight path. While Russia and
the US currently possess this type of missile, no Middle East Arab country
has yet been able to obtain such a weapon.

Operational since 2006, the SS-26 maintains an almost pinpoint precision of
5-7 meters at its 280 km range. The export version is not equipped with a
homing warhead and therefore has a reduced accuracy of 30-70 meters. The
arrival of high-accuracy ballistic missiles to the Middle East theater will
change the situation, as such missiles pose a threat to military facilities,
such as airfields and army depots, as well as to strategic civilian
facilities. High-accuracy tactical ballistic missiles can significantly
impact the battlefield on the ground by hitting communications nodes,
headquarters, bridges, and so on.

The best response to next-generation ballistic missiles will most likely be
a combination of deterrence, active defense and passive protection.
Deterrence is central to any missile war. Israel must make it perfectly
clear that anyone attacking it with ballistic missiles will be exposing its
own vital infrastructure to great peril. One Israeli F-16 aircraft can carry
nine tons of highly-accurate bombs (nine times the payload of a Scud
missile). This means that the efficiency of one bombardment mission carried
out by a single fighter armed precision guided munitions is several times
more destructive than in the past. The defensive means available are
missile-to-missile interceptors, systems designed to jam and disrupt
attacking missiles' homing systems, and improved passive protection of
critical facilities and domestic residences.

Conclusion

The threat attributed by the general public to missile warfare is somewhat
exaggerated. The menace of ballistic missiles should be presented to the
public in a realistic manner. The belief that territory and type of terrain
are unimportant in the age of missiles is a dangerous fallacy. We do not
know how future war will look. While missiles fired at Israel's cities are
just one possible scenario, the use of ballistic missiles has never been a
deciding factor in any armed conflict.

Haim Rosenberg is the former head of long-term planning at Rafael Advanced
Defense Systems Ltd. This article is part of a monograph on "The Future
Battlefield: Technology's Impact on Topographical Factors" that will soon be
published by the BESA Center.

BESA Perspectives is published through the generosity of the Greg
Rosshandler Family

________________________________
1 Precision is measured by CEP (circular error probability), which is the
probability of 50 percent of the attacking projectile landing within a given
radius. For example, a CEP of 200 meters means that half of the attacking
missiles are likely to land within a radius of 200 meters from the target.