Observation: What we do not know for policy making for Gaza challenge
Dr. Aaron Lerner Date: 12 November 2012
A "shot from the hip" policy recommendation:
1. Retake a wider version of the Philadelphi Corridor that separates
between Egypt and Gaza, implementing whatever technological and civil
engineering measures are required to put an end to the operation of the
2. With the supply of new weapons via the smuggling tunnels cut off,
complete the demolition of the current IDF target bank of armories, weapons
factories and other weapons related targets as quickly as possible – this
with warning provided to avoid harming innocent civilians but coupled with a
warning that human shields will be dispatched to Paradise.
3. Declare an end to the "siege", with all restrictions on the movement
of civilian goods into the Gaza Strip lifted – including cement and rebar.
[Ideally the announcement would somehow be coordinated in a way that Turkish
PM Tayyip Erdogan can take credit for the move as part of restoration or
normalcy with the Jewish State – but let’s not hold our breaths on that.]
4. Implement and maintain a "quick response human target bank" in Gaza so
that it is possible to dispatch someone to Paradise before they all hunker
down in reinforced bunkers after an attack against Israel.
But there are some unknowns for us kibitzers:
1. Are there technical military considerations that weigh heavily in
favor of postponing the operation? (vital weapons in the supply pipeline,
critical forces still completing training, etc.)
2. Is there some compelling argument that Egypt will be less of problem
for Israel if such a major campaign were to be launched further down the
timeline rather than now? (My hunch is that the opposite is the case).
3. Is there something else on the immediate agenda that makes us unable
to devote the resources such a major campaign would require?
Then again, the policy makers in Jerusalem are also working under conditions
of limited information.
1. Israel has intelligence assessments of what has already been smuggled
into the Gaza Strip but cannot be sure of the extent to which the
information has been deliberately distorted by double agents and other
intelligence gathering problems.
2. By the same token, projections of what threat/challenge Gaza will pose
Israel in six months if the "quiet for quiet" policy (the Palestinians can
smuggle in, assemble and deploy any and every weapons system as long as they
don’t shoot too much) continues.
Hardly a simple decision.
But it is a decision that must be made.
Dr. Aaron Lerner, Director IMRA (Independent Media Review & Analysis)
(Mail POB 982 Kfar Sava)
Tel 972-9-7604719/Fax 972-3-7255730
INTERNET ADDRESS: firstname.lastname@example.org