BESA Center: Jordan is Israel=92s Only Defensible Eastern Border
April 13, 2014

BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 244

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Israel has a natural right to, and an internationally =

recognized need for, defensible borders. The Jordan Valley is the only trul=
y =

defensible eastern border for Israel.

UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967 stated that Israel must =

have =93secured and recognized boundaries=94 =96 borders that are not neces=
sarily =

identical to the indefensible lines that preceded the war. The resolution =

did not demand that the IDF retreat completely to the 1947 lines. Even back =

then it was understood that the 1967 lines were too tempting to Israel=92s =

enemies.

In 2004, the United States gave Israel a letter of guarantee that recognize=
d =

Israel=92s right to =93defensible borders that would allow it to defend its=
elf =

by itself.=94 This document was signed by President George W. Bush and back=
ed =

by a bi-partisan majority in the American Congress.

As we seek to determine the location of these defensible borders for Israel=
, =

we must take into account two main factors, with a long-term and historic =

perspective. First, we have to consider the threats to Israel =96 conventio=
nal =

warfare, missiles and rockets, terrorism, nuclear weapons. Second, we have =

to consider the geo-strategic and the topographic situation.

The State of Israel is by no means a weak nation, but it is vulnerable =

because it is small and narrow. Seventy percent of its population and 80 =

percent of its industrial capacity is concentrated in the narrow coastal =

strip between the Mediterranean Sea and the West Bank. The hills of the Wes=
t =

Bank topographically dominate the exposed coastal plain, which contains a =

significant share of Israel=92s national infrastructures, including: =

Ben-Gurion International Airport, the Trans-Israel Highway (Road 6), Israel=
=92s =

National Water Carrier, its main high-voltage electric power lines, and =

more. This topography gives a distinct advantage to any attacker in terms o=
f =

observation, firepower, and good defensive capability against an Israeli =

ground response.

These reasons led the architects of Israel=92s national security doctrine, =

from Yigal Alon and Moshe Dayan to Yitzhak Rabin, to tenaciously oppose =

Israel=92s return to the vulnerable 1967 lines; which, they believed, would =

only invite aggression and endanger the future of Israel rather than pave a =

path towards peace.

Many years have passed and the need for defensible borders has only =

increased. Indeed, the history of Arab aggression against Israel and chroni=
c =

instability in the Middle East has recently been compounded by a number of =

significant developments.

The =93Arab Spring=94 or =91uprising=92 has led to civil wars and unprecede=
nted =

bloodshed, increased terrorism, and even introduced global jihadist terror =

to the Middle East. This threatens regimes and reinforces the region=92s =

fundamental uncertainty.

Iran is doggedly moving towards nuclear weapons, and is aggressively =

involved in every conflict in the region; establishing =93outposts=94 in =

neighboring countries.

Never-ending terrorism is on the rise, and its effectiveness has grown with =

the development of terror-by-rocket. The involvement of terrorist =

organizations in regime struggles, the introduction into the region of =

global jihadist terrorism and Iran=92s involvement have made terrorism a =

strategic threat that could lead to war in the region.

Renewed efforts to bring the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a peaceful =

resolution places the issue of borders on the negotiating table and puts it =

at the forefront of the core issues under dispute.

Defensible borders for Israel must meet the following criteria: Fundamental =

strategic depth; room to wage war against the threat of conventional attack =

from the outside; and room that allows for effectively combatting terrorism.

In the south of Israel (with the demilitarization in Sinai) and in the nort=
h =

(given that Israel has held onto the Golan Heights), Israel has defensible =

borders.

What is the meaning of the criteria for defensible borders on the eastern =

front?

First, Israel requires fundamental strategic depth, whose importance only =

increases in the age of ballistic missiles and long-range rockets =96 which =

threaten civilian population centers and even impact upon military =

recruitment and the deployment of reserve forces. Under these conditions ID=
F =

ground units will be forced to operate for long periods of time without =

significant assistance from the Israeli Air Force. The air force will be =

busy achieving air superiority through destroying enemy air defenses and =

suppressing the launching of ballistic missiles and rockets aimed at Israel=
=92s =

cities. In addition, the threat of nuclear arms in the region reinforces th=
e =

need for a strategic depth required to deploy early warning and interceptio=
n =

systems.

Second, Israel needs depth to wage defensive war against the threats from =

conventional attack from the east. Uncertainty and concern regarding the =

directions in which Iraq and Jordan may develop, and civil war in Syria tha=
t =

threatens to spill over to its neighbors, makes this depth critical.

Third, Israel must retain room to fight terrorism effectively. Only Israel=
=92s =

presence on the outer eastern border of the West Bank (the Jordan River and =

Valley) will enable genuine demilitarization of the Palestinian Authority, =

which is a condition for any stable arrangement and one of Israel=92s =

fundamental conditions for agreeing to a two state solution.

Thus Israel=92s only possible defensible border is in the Jordan Valley!

It is important to remember that Israel is on average only 40 miles wide =

from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River. This is, in all opinions, =

the minimal strategic depth and indivisible air space.

The width of the Jordan Rift Valley ranges between 6.7 and 14.5 km. The =

Jordan River flows at an altitude of some 400 meters below sea level, and t=
o =

the west is a ridge of mountains rising up to a height of up to more than =

1,000 meters above sea level. Thus, the Jordan Valley is a physical =

defensive barrier with a height of 900 to 1,400 meters, which is traversabl=
e =

only by five essential mountain passes. Therefore, even the limited force o=
f =

the IDF standing army should be able to successfully defend Israel against =

an attack from the east as long as it is deployed in the Jordan Valley and =

on the ridges that control it from the west.

The Jordan Valley is the eastern buffer zone surrounding the State of Israe=
l =

in general and the city of Jerusalem, its capital, in particular. Experienc=
e =

from Israel=92s withdrawal from southern Lebanon and Gaza has taught us tha=
t =

if Israel fails to control the buffer zone, the entire area we withdraw fro=
m =

will become a terrorist entity. And it is important to note that the Jordan =

Valley is an arid region with very little Palestinian population.

All this makes the Jordan Valley a vital line of defense for Israel=92s =

security. It is no wonder that Yitzhak Rabin, in his last speech to the =

Knesset in October 1995 stated that Israel must, in any peace agreement, =

control the Jordan Valley =93in the broadest meaning of the term.=94

There are those who would attempt to dispute this security statement by =

proposing the placement of early detection systems in the Jordan Valley =

backed by the deployment of foreign forces. However, experience proves that =

no warning system can replace the defensive space of the Jordan Valley, and =

that Israel must not rely on foreign forces for the combat of terrorism nor =

as a defensive force. Foreign troops will not risk their lives for the war =

on terror and they will be the first ones to leave should a crisis arise. =

Only Israeli forces can provide the security Israel needs.

Consequently, Israel must move from a policy of =93security based on =

international agreements and diplomatic guarantees=94 to a policy of =

=93agreements based on security provided by Israeli forces deployed in =

defensible spaces.=94 Neither the Green Line nor the Security Fence can ser=
ve =

as Israel=92s defensible border. Only full Israeli control of the entire =

Jordan Valley region as a security area, based on the Jordan River as a =

boundary line, will be able to provide Israel with sufficient security.

Defensible borders will not only ensure Israel=92s security needs but will =

also guarantee that peace treaties are sustainable.
=3D=3D=3D=3D
Maj. Gen. (res.) Uzi Dayan was head of the IDF Central Command, IDF Deputy =

Chief of Staff, and National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister of =

Israel. He currently heads Israel=92s National Lottery Corporation.
This paper is based on his remarks at a March 27 BESA Center conference on =

the negotiations with the Palestinians.
BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the =

Greg Rosshandler Family
Click here for a PDF version of this article
http://besacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Jordan-Valley-is-Israels-o=
nly-defensible-border1.pdf =

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