Hamas has used the period in which the Muslim Brotherhood ruled Egypt to
establish a real military industry in the Gaza Strip (with advanced tooling
equipment) and to smuggle a large amount of anti-tank missiles, including
Kornet anti-tank missiles (Russian-made) that were transferred to Syria
before the outbreak of the civil war there.

Fight to the Finish
We must remember that the IDF was dragged into a ground fighting round
knowing the price might be heavy. Despite heavy losses, the technological
advantage and the quality of personnel are factors that are still absolutely
on the Israeli side of the equation.

Commentary

Amir Rapaport 21/7/2014
http://www.israeldefense.com/?CategoryID=483&ArticleID=3036


Fight to the Finish IDF was dragged into a ground fighting round in the Gaza
Strip knowing in advance the price might be heavy: the 13 Golani Brigade
troops who were killed in battles on Saturday and Sunday only prove that
there was no other way to "handle" all of the many tunnels Hamas has dug out
of the Gaza Strip into Israel.

In many ways, Operation Protective Edge resembles the Second Lebanon War,
much more than it does Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip in 2009 or
Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012. The pace in which Hamas fired rockets
since the beginning of the operation does not fall into the scope of
Hezbollah's launches from Lebanon in 2006, and the ground activity is
accompanied by a stubborn resistance, reminiscent of the fiercest battles of
the army in al-Ghandouriya and Wadi Saluki in last two days of the "Second
Lebanon War".

What makes Operation Protective Edge much more difficult than the Operation
Cast Lead is the strengthening of Hamas: the organization has used the
period in which the Muslim Brotherhood ruled Egypt to establish a real
military industry in the Gaza Strip (with advanced tooling equipment) and to
smuggle a large amount of anti-tank missiles, including Kornet anti-tank
missiles (Russian-made) that were transferred to Syria before the outbreak
of the civil war there.

In many ways, even the bloody battle of the Golani Brigade in Sagaya
reminisces the entanglement of the brigade in Bint Jbeil, which was the most
difficult battle of the Second Lebanon War. The results of the battle are
especially difficult because of the adherence to the mission showed by the
troops, and because commanders were at the head of the force. The ultimate
goal was to not allow Hamas to kidnap any one of the fighters – dead or
alive.

In addition to the battle of the Golani Brigade, dozens of battles took
place in recent days throughout the Gaza Strip. IDF has had absolute air and
intelligence superiority in all battles, but the "point-blank range" battles
eliminate many advantages, and give advantages to the attacking guerrilla
force, especially when it emerges from the endless tunnels that have been
built for years.

What has changed greatly since the Second Lebanon War is the function of the
Israeli side: The defense establishment has encountered great response at
the home front (through the Home Front Command and the "Iron Dome" system),
the General Staff and the government are running the operation well (the
decision to requite reserves was made at the beginning, and the transition
to the ground phase was done strongly and on time, not with hesitation as
was in the Second Lebanon War).

Preliminary analysis shows that Hamas had dragged the IDF into the ground
fighting round, because he could not achieve a significant scale of
casualties on the Israeli side when the fighting was done only from afar.
Moreover, the Hamas sends its fighters to fight face-to-face with IDF
forces, and fights for its tunnels while paying a heavy price in casualties.

However, just because Hamas is the party that initiated the bloody conflict
does not mean that its decision was correct: the technological advantage and
the quality of personnel are factors that are still absolutely on the
Israeli side of the equation. We count the dead, but on the other side the
scope of casualties in battle is several times higher. When the cease-fire
will be achieved, it is likely Hamas will find out its strategy has failed,
and that its arrays ​​of weapons (especially tunnels) prepared for years
using human capital and huge budgets, went down the drain.

Hamas will struggle to renew its strength as the Gaza crossings are
currently dominated by the new Egyptian government, who hates it most.
Operation Protective Edge would eventually end in a compromise agreement
presented by Egypt or in a resolution of ceasefire by the UN Security
Council.

Until we reach that point, the IDF is expected to encounter quite a bit more
battles that are difficult.