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Sunday, July 27, 2014 |
Hamas Underground Warfare |
BESA Center EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Since taking control of Gaza, Hamas has built a maze of = underground concrete bunkers and tunnels. The tunnels were designed to = enhance the survivability of Hamas in case of Israeli attack, and to provid= terror attack routes into Israel. The IDF must develop the technology and = the tactical skills to locate, map and destroy these tunnels. Underground warfare is not a new phenomenon =96 it started when humans were = living in caves. However, it became a deliberate form of warfare when men = began digging tunnels for military defensive and offensive use. Defensive tunnels were used to hide people and property from attackers. = Offensive tunnels were used to infiltrate under defensive walls or to = collapse these walls by undermining their foundations. The defenders of = besieged cities and forts fought back, trying to locate the attackers=92 = tunnels by digging their own tunnels to break in and capture their enemies = in hand-to-hand combat. The major problem for the defenders was locating th= tunnels. Unless the attackers were careless, this was rare. The invention o= gunpowder made siege and anti-siege tunnels much more effective =96 the = sappers could be less accurate while navigating underground in order to hit = the target. During the First World War, hundreds of tunnels (called =91mines=92) were d= the French front by armies on both sides of the conflict, under each other= positions. These were packed with explosives and detonated, killing dozens = of men, in some cases more than a hundred, with each attack. Since the First World War, tunnel warfare reverted mostly to defensive, = smuggling or infiltration uses =96 the most famous and widespread use being = during the Vietnam War. The Vietcong dug hundreds of kilometers of = multi-level tunnels to live in, hiding from American forces and using them = to ambush or raid the Americans. The Americans established a special unit, = the Tunnel Rats, to discover and fight inside the tunnels. More recently, since the mid-1990s, Hezbollah has used tunnels to store = weapons and protect personnel. At first these were only under Beirut and in = central Lebanon. However, after the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, Hezbollah = also began building them in southern Lebanon as underground combat position= for launching rockets and from which to conduct military operations against = IDF units above ground. After the war in 2006, Hezbollah increased its = investments in these tunnel complexes. Possibly, they are also working on = cross-border tunnels into northern Israel. The use of tunnels in Gaza began approximately a decade and a half ago, on = the border with Egypt to smuggle weapons into Gaza under the IDF border = security. Very quickly, in addition to smuggling weapons, the tunnel = operators began importing civilian goods. After Israel withdrew from Gaza, = the number of smuggling tunnels jumped from a few dozen to hundreds as more = and more Gazans got involved in this lucrative business. Taxes imposed by = the Hamas government on the imports were a major source of its revenue. = After the Egyptian military overthrew the Muslim Brotherhood government, th= new regime shut down these tunnels =96 this being one of the causes of the = present economic crisis in Gaza. From 2001 the Palestinians began using explosive-filled tunnels to attack = Israeli border-posts. However, they employed this tactic rarely because the = effort far exceeded the benefit =96 casualties were light and it was much = easier to achieve them by other means. In 2006 the Palestinians tried = something new =96 a tunnel was dug underneath the Gaza-Israel border and an = assault-team emerged behind an Israeli border-post. The Israeli soldiers = were surprised =96 two were killed, one wounded and one abducted (Gilad = Shalit). After taking control of Gaza, Hamas began a project to build a maze of = underground concrete bunkers connected with tunnels and multiple = entrances/exits underneath the residential areas of Gaza. These underground = complexes are fairly similar in concept to the Vietcong tunnels, though the = quality of finishing is better with concrete walls and roofs, electricity = and other required amenities for a lengthy sojourn. Their purpose is to enable the Hamas command structure to reside safely = underground while their armed forces conduct a mobile defense against = Israeli forces. Many of the tunnels are interconnected to enable traveling = underground from one to the other with multiple camouflaged openings to = emerge above ground in different locations (inside civilian houses, mosques= schools and other public buildings). This enables surprise attacks on the = IDF units from different directions, allowing the attackers to then = disappear again underground to emerge and attack somewhere else. The exact = extent of these complexes is not known. The entrances and probably the = tunnels themselves are booby-trapped with explosives. These were first used = during Operation =91Cast Lead=92 (December 2008 =96 January 2009). They wer= deemed successful so the project was expanded and accelerated. After the failure of Hamas=92 rocket forces to inflict significant damage o= Israeli towns in November 2012 (Operation =91Pillar of Defense=92), Hamas = apparently decided to build a large offensive tunnel capability that would = enable them to infiltrate into Israeli villages within a few kilometers of = the border or place large bombs underneath these villages. The IDF knew of this operation but failed to find and destroy more than a = few tunnels. Detecting the tunnels requires either detecting the entrance t= the tunnel or =91seeing=92 the tunnel itself with various acoustic, seismic= radar detection devices as it crosses the border. Even after detecting an = entrance one does not know the exact route of the tunnel from there to the = border. To hide the tunnel-work from Israeli intelligence the entrances are mostly = located on the bottom floor of civilian residences, mosques, schools or = other public buildings. The digging of smuggling and offensive-attack = tunnels is a long manual process, lasting several months, because the use o= motor-diggers would create a noise that could be heard by Israeli listening = posts. On the other hand, tunnels distanced from the border can be dug by = motor-diggers. In both cases, the removal of the earth from the site is don= gradually and camouflaged by various ruses. As yet, no reliable technology has been developed that can cover a wide are= and see a man-sized tunnel to a depth of more than a few meters underground= The tunnels dug by Hamas are usually about 20 meters underground =96 so, ev= if you know the approximate location, they are almost impossible to detect. = Therefore, Israel must either have excellent intelligence, or go in to = search for the tunnels house by house. Destroying a tunnel is a lengthy and somewhat complex operation. Just = blowing up the entrance or some of the airshafts leaves most of the tunnel = intact, so Hamas sappers will be able to quickly dig by-pass sections and = continue to use the tunnel. Therefore, the entire length of the tunnel and = its branches must be located, mapped and then completely destroyed. Studies, specializes in military doctrine, theory and history. He teaches a= Bar-Ilan University, Haifa University, and the IDF Command and Staff = College, and serves on the Editorial Advisory Panel of The Journal of = Military Operations. A version of this article was published by BBC News on July 22, 2014. Greg Rosshandler Family = ________________________________________ Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on A= Website: www.imra.org.il For free regular subscription: For free daily digest subscription: IMRA is now also on Twitter |
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