About Us

IMRA
IMRA
IMRA

 

Subscribe

Search


...................................................................................................................................................


Sunday, July 27, 2014
Hamas Underground Warfare

BESA Center
Hamas Underground Warfare
by Dr. Eado Hecht
July 27, 2014
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 259
Click here for a PDF version of this article
http://besacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Hecht-Eado-Underground-War=
fare-DW-edit-most-recent.pdf

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Since taking control of Gaza, Hamas has built a maze of =

underground concrete bunkers and tunnels. The tunnels were designed to =

enhance the survivability of Hamas in case of Israeli attack, and to provid=
e =

terror attack routes into Israel. The IDF must develop the technology and =

the tactical skills to locate, map and destroy these tunnels.

Underground warfare is not a new phenomenon =96 it started when humans were =

living in caves. However, it became a deliberate form of warfare when men =

began digging tunnels for military defensive and offensive use.

Defensive tunnels were used to hide people and property from attackers. =

Offensive tunnels were used to infiltrate under defensive walls or to =

collapse these walls by undermining their foundations. The defenders of =

besieged cities and forts fought back, trying to locate the attackers=92 =

tunnels by digging their own tunnels to break in and capture their enemies =

in hand-to-hand combat. The major problem for the defenders was locating th=
e =

tunnels. Unless the attackers were careless, this was rare. The invention o=
f =

gunpowder made siege and anti-siege tunnels much more effective =96 the =

sappers could be less accurate while navigating underground in order to hit =

the target.

During the First World War, hundreds of tunnels (called =91mines=92) were d=
ug on =

the French front by armies on both sides of the conflict, under each other=
=92s =

positions. These were packed with explosives and detonated, killing dozens =

of men, in some cases more than a hundred, with each attack.

Since the First World War, tunnel warfare reverted mostly to defensive, =

smuggling or infiltration uses =96 the most famous and widespread use being =

during the Vietnam War. The Vietcong dug hundreds of kilometers of =

multi-level tunnels to live in, hiding from American forces and using them =

to ambush or raid the Americans. The Americans established a special unit, =

the Tunnel Rats, to discover and fight inside the tunnels.

More recently, since the mid-1990s, Hezbollah has used tunnels to store =

weapons and protect personnel. At first these were only under Beirut and in =

central Lebanon. However, after the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, Hezbollah =

also began building them in southern Lebanon as underground combat position=
s =

for launching rockets and from which to conduct military operations against =

IDF units above ground. After the war in 2006, Hezbollah increased its =

investments in these tunnel complexes. Possibly, they are also working on =

cross-border tunnels into northern Israel.

The use of tunnels in Gaza began approximately a decade and a half ago, on =

the border with Egypt to smuggle weapons into Gaza under the IDF border =

security. Very quickly, in addition to smuggling weapons, the tunnel =

operators began importing civilian goods. After Israel withdrew from Gaza, =

the number of smuggling tunnels jumped from a few dozen to hundreds as more =

and more Gazans got involved in this lucrative business. Taxes imposed by =

the Hamas government on the imports were a major source of its revenue. =

After the Egyptian military overthrew the Muslim Brotherhood government, th=
e =

new regime shut down these tunnels =96 this being one of the causes of the =

present economic crisis in Gaza.

From 2001 the Palestinians began using explosive-filled tunnels to attack =

Israeli border-posts. However, they employed this tactic rarely because the =

effort far exceeded the benefit =96 casualties were light and it was much =

easier to achieve them by other means. In 2006 the Palestinians tried =

something new =96 a tunnel was dug underneath the Gaza-Israel border and an =

assault-team emerged behind an Israeli border-post. The Israeli soldiers =

were surprised =96 two were killed, one wounded and one abducted (Gilad =

Shalit).

After taking control of Gaza, Hamas began a project to build a maze of =

underground concrete bunkers connected with tunnels and multiple =

entrances/exits underneath the residential areas of Gaza. These underground =

complexes are fairly similar in concept to the Vietcong tunnels, though the =

quality of finishing is better with concrete walls and roofs, electricity =

and other required amenities for a lengthy sojourn.

Their purpose is to enable the Hamas command structure to reside safely =

underground while their armed forces conduct a mobile defense against =

Israeli forces. Many of the tunnels are interconnected to enable traveling =

underground from one to the other with multiple camouflaged openings to =

emerge above ground in different locations (inside civilian houses, mosques=
, =

schools and other public buildings). This enables surprise attacks on the =

IDF units from different directions, allowing the attackers to then =

disappear again underground to emerge and attack somewhere else. The exact =

extent of these complexes is not known. The entrances and probably the =

tunnels themselves are booby-trapped with explosives. These were first used =

during Operation =91Cast Lead=92 (December 2008 =96 January 2009). They wer=
e =

deemed successful so the project was expanded and accelerated.

After the failure of Hamas=92 rocket forces to inflict significant damage o=
n =

Israeli towns in November 2012 (Operation =91Pillar of Defense=92), Hamas =

apparently decided to build a large offensive tunnel capability that would =

enable them to infiltrate into Israeli villages within a few kilometers of =

the border or place large bombs underneath these villages.

The IDF knew of this operation but failed to find and destroy more than a =

few tunnels. Detecting the tunnels requires either detecting the entrance t=
o =

the tunnel or =91seeing=92 the tunnel itself with various acoustic, seismic=
or =

radar detection devices as it crosses the border. Even after detecting an =

entrance one does not know the exact route of the tunnel from there to the =

border.

To hide the tunnel-work from Israeli intelligence the entrances are mostly =

located on the bottom floor of civilian residences, mosques, schools or =

other public buildings. The digging of smuggling and offensive-attack =

tunnels is a long manual process, lasting several months, because the use o=
f =

motor-diggers would create a noise that could be heard by Israeli listening =

posts. On the other hand, tunnels distanced from the border can be dug by =

motor-diggers. In both cases, the removal of the earth from the site is don=
e =

gradually and camouflaged by various ruses.

As yet, no reliable technology has been developed that can cover a wide are=
a =

and see a man-sized tunnel to a depth of more than a few meters underground=
. =

The tunnels dug by Hamas are usually about 20 meters underground =96 so, ev=
en =

if you know the approximate location, they are almost impossible to detect. =

Therefore, Israel must either have excellent intelligence, or go in to =

search for the tunnels house by house.

Destroying a tunnel is a lengthy and somewhat complex operation. Just =

blowing up the entrance or some of the airshafts leaves most of the tunnel =

intact, so Hamas sappers will be able to quickly dig by-pass sections and =

continue to use the tunnel. Therefore, the entire length of the tunnel and =

its branches must be located, mapped and then completely destroyed.
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
Dr. Eado Hecht, a research associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategi=
c =

Studies, specializes in military doctrine, theory and history. He teaches a=
t =

Bar-Ilan University, Haifa University, and the IDF Command and Staff =

College, and serves on the Editorial Advisory Panel of The Journal of =

Military Operations.

A version of this article was published by BBC News on July 22, 2014.
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the =

Greg Rosshandler Family =

________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on A=
rab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

For free regular subscription:
Subscribe at no charge: imra-subscribe@imra.org.il
Unsubscribe: imra-unsubscribe@imra.org.il

For free daily digest subscription:
Subscribe at no charge: imra-subscribe-digest@imra.org.il
Unsubscribe: imra-unsubscribe@imra.org.il

IMRA is now also on Twitter
http://twitter.com/IMRA_UPDATES

Search For An Article

....................................................................................................

Contact Us

POB 982 Kfar Sava
Tel 972-9-7604719
Fax 972-3-7255730
email:imra@netvision.net.il IMRA is now also on Twitter
http://twitter.com/IMRA_UPDATES

image004.jpg (8687 bytes)