Dealing with Hamas’ Military Force Reconstruction
INSS Insight No. 606, September 11, 2014
Amos Yadlin

SUMMARY: While Hamas accepted the ceasefire with virtually none of its many
demands met, Israel, for its part, did not succeed in imposing on the
terrorist organization one of the central demands presented by Prime
Minister Netanyahu as an objective of the operation: the demilitarization of
Gaza and the establishment of mechanisms that would deny Hamas the ability
to reconstruct its force. However, the latter goal, disregarded after
previous rounds of fighting, must be central to Israel’s demands in the
negotiations on a long term arrangement. The issue of Hamas’ force
reconstruction must be brought back to center stage in the post-Operation
Protective Edge era. The strategy now taking shape must ensure that any
future military round against Hamas is postponed as much as possible, with
Hamas’ strategic arsenal comprising capabilities Israel knows and for which
it already has appropriate operational responses.

The political disagreement that began at the outset of the recent war
against Hamas between those advocating deterring Hamas and those in favor of
toppling Hamas is legitimate in a democratic country. With that, it is
necessary to undertake a critical assessment of Hamas’ expected force
buildup after Operation Protective Edge before formulating a concrete,
forward-looking policy. Indeed, now that the guns are silent, Hamas’ efforts
at force reconstruction must be addressed. The fact that there was no
insistence on mechanisms to prevent force reconstruction at the end of the
previous rounds of fighting – Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012 and
Operation Cast Lead in 2009 – was, to a large extent, the original sin that
allowed Hamas to touch off the most recent round of hostilities.

Earlier this week, a senior political source – apparently the Israeli
Foreign Minister – was quoted as saying that “Hamas did not even wait one
moment after the last round of fighting to start rearming itself in
anticipation of the next round.” In response, a senior defense establishment
source denied the claim, saying, “We have no such information and we have no
idea on what this charge is based.”

However, no particular intelligence capabilities are necessary to determine
that Hamas would start reconstructing its military capabilities immediately
after the ceasefire. This is what Hamas has done in the past, and one must
assume it will do so now. Hamas is an organization whose rallying cry is
armed resistance; it is therefore obvious that it will, without any delay,
make every effort to rebuild it military capabilities, badly damaged in the
50 days of Operation Protective Edge. In this latest round of fighting,
Hamas lost both of its main strategic capabilities: the long range missile
threat, which was destroyed by Israel’s Iron Dome, and the offensive
tunnels, almost all of which were destroyed by the IDF. Additional efforts,
such as infiltrations from the sea and UAVs, either failed or were badly
damaged.

Yet while Hamas accepted the ceasefire with virtually none of its many
demands met, Israel, for its part, did not succeed in imposing on the
terrorist organization one of the central demands presented by Prime
Minister Netanyahu as an objective of the operation: the demilitarization of
Gaza and the establishment of mechanisms that would deny Hamas the ability
to reconstruct its force. However, the latter goal, disregarded after
previous rounds of fighting, must be central to Israel’s demands in the
negotiations on a long term arrangement, expected to begin in Cairo 30 days
after the ceasefire began on August 26. Until an agreement is reached (and
the chances it will deal effectively with force reconstruction are low),
Hamas’ interest is to employ thousands of rocket manufacturers and thousands
of tunnel diggers, and place them at the top of its list of salaried
employees.

It is important to understand that the damage to Hamas was massive but not
total. Accordingly, focus must now be on three areas related to Hamas’
future military force reconstruction: the smuggling tunnels (which Egypt has
tackled), the manufacture of missiles and rockets, and the offensive
tunnels.
1. The smuggling tunnels: Hamas had an estimated 800-1,000 smuggling
tunnels. Egypt has destroyed most of them, but presumably several dozen have
survived and Hamas will give preference to smuggling arms and money through
them, as humanitarian aid, food, fuel, and even construction materials will
in any case enter Gaza through Kerem Shalom under Israel’s auspices.
2. Arms production: Presumably 30-50 percent of this capability survived
Israel’s attacks and has been reactivated at the highest possible rate,
pending the availability of raw materials.
3. The offensive tunnels: Most of Hamas’ digging operations are likely
currently directed at retrieving bodies and identifying members of the
military branch buried in the rubble. Still, the operating assumption must
be that one or two offensive tunnels were not discovered or destroyed
outright, and that Hamas will make every effort to make them operable. Even
if they failed to fulfill their intended purpose, the publicity the
offensive tunnels garnered and impact they had on people’s imagination will
drive Hamas to apply itself further to this means of terrorism. Even if much
time passes before strategic capabilities can be dug, Hamas is interested in
preserving and making use of the tunnels as a platform for carrying out
pinpoint terrorist attacks. Such attacks would aim to be as deadly as
possible and gain much media coverage, so as to puncture both the morale of
the communities in the western Negev and the narrative of fortitude after
Operation Protective Edge.

With this as background, what emerges is the following set of insights:
1. Hamas will make every effort to reconstruct its force and prepare for the
next military round.
2. Hamas is not expected to be able to reconstruct its force massively any
time soon. At this point Hamas is mostly concerned with damage assessment
and rehabilitation. It is far from having the capabilities it had in early
July 2014. However, Hamas has in the past demonstrated impressive force
reconstruction skills, and therefore there is cause for concern in this
regard.
3. Hamas has shown itself to be a learning organization. It will study its
successes and strengthen its capabilities that proved themselves; it will
also analyze its failures, and look for new ways of attacking Israel.
4. There is no doubt that Hamas is pleased with its success in targeting
civilians and soldiers with mortar fire and will reinforce this aspect of
its capabilities.
5. Hamas’ reconstruction efforts will be done covertly, hidden from Israeli
intelligence. Presumably the Gaza civilian population will provide the
defensive cover Hamas needs to do so.
6. Reconstruction will occur via external purchases and smuggling as well as
via manufacturing within the Gaza Strip.
7. Placing Palestinian Authority government and security services in Gaza
will not be enough to prevent Hamas’ reconstruction. For one, the damage to
Hamas was insufficient; in addition, Abu Mazen has no interest in handling
the issue. He prefers the strategy of political confrontation with Israel in
international institutions.

Policy Recommendations
1. Intelligence organizations must sound alerts when Hamas transitions from
the recovery stage to the force reconstruction stage, with emphasis on
buildup components and details about the pace of reconstruction for each
Hamas capability.
2. The political echelon must recognize the danger of Hamas’ current and
future reconstruction and translate this understanding into concrete
directives to the military, diplomatic, public relations, and legal
establishments.
3. Preventing force reconstruction must head the agenda in the indirect
talks in Cairo over a long term agreement. If the indirect talks do not
result in an agreement that provides an effective response to
reconstruction, Israel must formulate a strategy without Hamas’ consent,
though coordinated with Egypt and the United States, that will deal
optimally with Hamas’ future force reconstruction.
4. Israel must make sure to coordinate with Egypt increased efforts to block
the dozens of smuggling tunnels left open between the Gaza Strip and the
Sinai Peninsula.
5. Israel must convince its US and European allies that manufacturing
strategic weapons and digging offensive tunnels are a causus belli for
Israel, and that these are legitimate reasons for Israel to take military
action in Gaza.
6. When formulating a plan for reconstructing the civilian and economic
infrastructures of the Gaza Strip, it is necessary to establish an effective
mechanism to prevent dual-use materials from falling into Hamas hands.
7. Israel must overtake Hamas in lesson-learning. There is nothing that
prevents analysis and learning more than resting on one’s laurels. The IDF
must define the areas in which it must improve, chiefly: initiative,
innovation, surprise, deception, and time and intelligence management to
acquire high quality goals.

Conclusion
The issue of Hamas’ force reconstruction must be brought back to center
stage in the post-Operation Protective Edge era. The strategy now taking
shape must ensure that any future military round against Hamas is postponed
as much as possible, with Hamas’ strategic arsenal comprising capabilities
Israel knows and for which it already has appropriate operational responses.
The most difficult dilemma the political and military echelons will face,
and which deserves a thorough debate, is: what constitutes a level of force
buildup by Hamas that would justify proactive military action, and how can
Israel prevent being lulled into a sense of security in the short term and
not risk having to pay a much steeper price down the road.