Dr. Aaron Lerner -
"The longer the calm persists, the more of a success the operation will have
been."
Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaacov Amidror

Let's give some credit to Hamas, Iran, etc.

They aren't hotheads.

Amidror doesn't even entertain the possibility that Hamas will be prevented
from manufacturing missiles. At most he hopes we might be able to
"minimize, as much as possible, the use of materials for building terror
tunnels and military command centers."

If, thanks to "quiet for quiet" Hamas opts to devote the next years to
building 100,000 missiles with conventional and chemical warheads covering
all of Israel and even some with guidance systems then up to the nightmare
day that they opt to fire them people like Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaacov Amidror
will claim that this "calm before the storm" points to the success of the
operation.

That's hardly speculation on my part. The Second Lebanon War is cited as a
fantastic success because Hezbullah and their Iranian masters have opted for
"calm" so that they could devote years to deploying over 100,000 missiles in
Lebanon and develop capabilities to invade Israel.

By the way - "The reports were merely attempts to demonstrate how badly
Operation Protective Edge had failed, rather than the product of reliable
information." - apparently Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaacov Amidror hasn't seen
Palestinian Islamic Jihad Digs New Tunnels in Gaza
MEMRITV September 4, 2014 Clip No. 4478
http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/4478.htm ]

We Have to be Prepared
by Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaacov Amidror
September 15, 2014
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 271

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The rules of the game between Israel and Hamas will be
decided by Israel’s response to the first instance of rocket fire. Israel
must prepared for the next operation, while simultaneously making every
effort to push it as far into the future as possible

Last week, media outlets in Israel quoted a diplomatic official as warning
that Hamas has resumed manufacturing rockets and has begun rebuilding the
terror tunnels destroyed by Israel’s Defense Forces during the recent Gaza
operation.

The reports were merely attempts to demonstrate how badly Operation
Protective Edge had failed, rather than the product of reliable information.
However, at some point in the future, Hamas will in fact resume
manufacturing rockets and digging tunnels. After all, that is the nature of
the current cease-fire agreement: Both sides preserve the calm while
preparing for the next confrontation.

Anyone can see that in order to prevent the need to prepare for a future
confrontation, or to entirely prevent the possibility of a future
confrontation, the recent operation should have been handled differently.
The IDF should have re-conquered the Strip, or at least Gaza City and its
immediate surroundings, and paid the price that occupation entails in order
to ‘clean out’ the city. Israel should have been able to sacrifice more
Israeli soldiers and kill more Palestinians, including many civilians. The
occupation would have been short, but the cleansing process would have gone
on for months. The damage incurred by the fighting, the subsequent cleansing
and the demolition of tunnels would have been immense, much greater than the
devastation actually suffered by the Palestinians (itself not at all
trivial). Finally, Israel would have remained as the only entity required by
law to ensure the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Gaza and its
residents.

The moment Israel decided not to pay the price these actions entail, it
became obvious that there was no way to break Hamas’ will to fight or to
prevent it from remaining in power after the operation’s end. All the
proposed alternatives were, and are, completely unrealistic; both militarily
(the idea of “cutting off the snakes head”) and in regard to the aftermath
(transfer authority over to the U.N. or hand Gaza over to the Palestinian
Authority’s President, Mahmoud Abbas).

Therefore, having no illusions about the future, we must prepare for the
next operation, while simultaneously making every effort to push it as far
into the future as possible. And it is possible. But in order to do so we
must instate a very clear policy under which Israel responds to every
cease-fire violation with force and immediacy.

The rules of the game will be decided by our response to the first instances
of rocket fire, so it is important to have a clear plan of how to react when
it happens. Fortunately for us, on the other side there is a different
Egypt – not the Egypt that was completely passive during the Mubarak era, or
the Egypt that actively supported Hamas during the reign of Mohammed Morsi.
The current Egyptian leadership understands that Hamas poses as much of a
threat to Egypt as it does to Israel, and will make much more of an effort
to prevent Hamas from regaining its power. But even then, Hamas will
inevitably try, and may occasionally succeed, to smuggle weapons and other
materials into the Strip, because military power is its raison d’être.

In the negotiations that will soon begin in Cairo, Egypt will mediate
between Israel and Hamas. Israel will be pressured to allow the
reconstruction of Gaza. The destruction there is very obvious in certain
areas where the fighting was heavier, and in parts where there were command
centers and weapons manufacturing facilities, the destruction is localized,
but extensive.

The reconstruction of Gaza will serve Israel’s interests because, alongside
Israel’s power of deterrence, the Gazans will own property that they will be
afraid to lose again. But the reconstruction needs to be conducted under a
number of limitations. The chief limitations have to do with building
materials, and Israel must develop a mechanism that will minimize, as much
as possible, the use of materials for building terror tunnels and military
command centers. We must not delude ourselves that Israel can prevent this
absolutely – partial prevention of spillover will have to suffice. It cannot
be prevented completely.

The true test is not whether Hamas will continue to rebuild its military
might – in the absence of Israeli occupation that is the only possible
scenario (as we learned after Oslo and after the unilateral withdrawal from
Gaza) – the true test is the test of preserved calm. The longer the calm
persists, the more of a success the operation will have been. Time will
tell, but we have the power to influence how the future will unfold, and we
must not forget or neglect that, despite the complexity.

It is important that we readjust our expectations, not just in regard to
Gaza. Israel is a strong country, on both a regional and global scale.
However, military ability does not necessitate the use of force every time
we are faced with a security challenge. It is best to channel our
capability, and the little legitimacy we have in the world, toward the
really important threats, certainly if they are critical and existential,
and those are undoubtedly looming. It is essential that everyone’s
expectations are in line: the civilian and military leadership’s as well as
the public. It is always important, but in times of crisis it is 10 times
more important.

Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaacov Amidror is the Greg and Anne Rosshandler Senior
Fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, and former national
security advisor to the Prime Minister.

A version of this article was published today in Israel Hayom.

BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the
Greg Rosshandler Family