[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: Close but no cigar. Let's be honest with
ourselves: we have a very clear track record: if there aren't civilians
around we tend to pull out our troops when things get tough. Sure there's
international opposition to the settlements - just as there is international
opposition to French Hill and Ramat Eshkol!! The world isn't so happy
about our presence at the Western Wall in the Old City either for that
matter.
So when you want to pitch a policy you should come to grips with the problem
that when the settlements are removed its an open invitation to increase the
pressure to the point that we retreat.
Want an example? Sure. At the early stages of talk about the retreat from
the Gaza Strip almost everyone with any kind of defense orientation INSIDE
the Sharon administration was confident the IDF would continue being
deployed in the Philadelphi Corridor running between Sinai and the Gaza
Strip. But once we started bulldozing settlements the idea was dropped.]

Back to the Idea of Administered Territories
INSS Insight No. 623, October 30, 2014 Ron Tira
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=7950

SUMMARY: It is hard to argue that the past few governments of Israel had a
clearly articulated policy with regard to the conflict with the
Palestinians, especially its territorial aspect. Yet while rolling along
without clear objectives may be possible for a while, perhaps under the
rationale of conflict management (as opposed to conflict resolution), it is
unclear how sustainable this is in the long run. Events such as Operation
Protective Edge underscore the need to articulate a final objective with
regard to the Palestinian Authority. The policy proposed in this article
brings us back to the idea of the administered territories presented
immediately after the Six Day War. According to this idea, Israel holds the
territories in temporary but long term belligerent occupation until the
security and political reality allows otherwise, and without operating
according to any type of ideological basis liable to undermine future
agreements.

It is hard to argue that the past few governments of Israel had a clearly
articulated policy with regard to the conflict with the Palestinians,
especially its territorial aspect. Both the rhetorical and operational steps
were notably inconsistent, challenging any attempt to “reverse engineer” and
formulate the policy from statements and steps on the ground.

Rolling along without clear objectives may be possible for a while, perhaps
under the rationale of conflict management (as opposed to conflict
resolution), but it is unclear how sustainable it is in the long run. Events
such as Operation Protective Edge underscore the need to articulate a final
objective with regard to the Palestinian Authority: were such a final
objective in place, operations such as Protective Edge would have had a
clear policy heading and guidance. Moreover, measures by Palestinians and
actors in the international community to internationalize the conflict could
force Israel to decide on its policy. Continued Israeli settlement in the
West Bank on the basis of current parameters establishes facts on the ground
and exacts an increasingly steep international toll. Accordingly, it may be
that the time is approaching that Israel will have to announce a clear
policy on the Palestinian question.

This analysis seeks to propose such a policy, driven by what is achievable
and feasible rather than dictated by any particular ideology. Indeed, given
international diplomatic constraints on the one hand and strategic security
constraints on the other, Israel’s consequent feasible policy spectrum is
very narrow.

International Diplomatic Constraints

The international community is increasingly adamant in its demand for the
establishment of a Palestinian state, and the cost Israel is paying for the
lack of a negotiated settlement toward a Palestinian state is rising
steadily. Of all of Israel’s positions on the conflict and its potential
resolution, the one that is most difficult to defend and that arouses the
most international opposition is continued settlement in the West Bank on
the basis of current parameters. Israel’s allies around the world can accept
Israeli actions that are inconsistent with their own worldview (such as
preemptive military operations or collateral damage resulting from military
actions) as long as it seems that Israel estimates they are necessary for
its vital national security interests. But even Israel’s closest friends
balk at the expansion of settlements that undermines the feasibility of a
future negotiated settlement with the Palestinians. Indeed, such expansion
threatens to turn the political conflict between Israel and the Palestinians
into a religious one.

One of the chief reasons for the downfall of nations is overstretching – the
attempt to defend interests, territories, or positions despite their high
cost. The settlement enterprise, at least its ideological component, is
liable to become Israel’s overstretching point. Should Israel have to pay
dearly for its relations with its partners around the world, it could be
justified on the basis of defense of vital security interests, but not on
the basis of defending an ideology plagued by questions of legitimacy.

This leads to the next assertion, namely, that while the final resolution of
the conflict must be concluded bilaterally with the Palestinians, for the
time being Israel must deal with the Palestinian issue in such a way as to
remove the obstacles in its relations with its strategic and economic
partners around the world. If there is difficulty in arriving at an actual
negotiated solution with the Palestinians, Israel’s positions must at least
sound reasonable and credible to Israel’s international partners. The
introduction of an Israeli initiative for an interim agreement or final
resolution may not necessarily change the bilateral reality on the ground,
but it could perhaps give Israel breathing room and an opportunity to
improve its relations with its global partners.

Strategic Security Constraints

An opposing set of constraints stems from Israel’s strategic security
considerations. At present, one of the main features of the regional arena
is the challenge to the notion of the Arab nation state by sub-state,
super-state, and anti-state entities, and the collapse or at least challenge
to most Arab nation states, especially those created following the
Sykes-Picot Agreement.

The most notable characteristic of the Palestinian arena is the fact that
the Palestinian Authority, led by Fatah, suffers from a growing legitimacy
problem among the Palestinians themselves, partly due to its corrupt image.
Another key feature is the deep-seated enmity dividing Fatah, Hamas,
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other elements. If Israel ends its military
presence in the West Bank, Hamas, enjoying military superiority over Fatah,
is liable to seize the reins of government. Ironically, Fatah’s rule of the
West Bank is enabled in no small part by the IDF’s apparatus in that
territory. The notion that one can ignore the storms of the “Arab winter”
that have dismantled Arab nation states throughout the region, from Iraq to
Libya and from Yemen to Syria, and “package” Fatah, Hamas, and Palestinian
Islamic Jihad into a new, coherent, stable, peace-seeking state framework is
more wishful thinking than the result of any realpolitik and strategic
analysis.

Moreover, past experience lends weight to the assertion that even in
peacetime Israel must maintain its self-defense capabilities, including a
military presence in the Jordan Valley and military freedom in the West Bank
to foil and preempt the emergence of threats. The experience of Operation
Protective Edge (with regard to the tunnels and high trajectory weapons)
validates previous analyses that there are military threats that, once
emerged, cannot be uprooted at a reasonable price. Indeed, the absence of an
Israeli military presence in the Gaza Strip to foil hostile activity allowed
the buildup of a military threat that contradicted Israel’s traditional
security doctrine (prevention of the emergence of a threatening military
force between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River). During the last
three military operations in the Gaza Strip between December 2008 and August
2014, Israel gave up the attempt to uproot the threat because of the cost
entailed, and de facto yielded to living under an otherwise acceptable
threat. Therefore, Israel’s future strategy must be based on preventing
(unilaterally if necessary) the emergence of threats between the
Mediterranean and the Jordan, rather than on risking the possible emergence
a military threat and having to deal with it afterwards. The idea that
Israel can give up its military presence in the Jordan Valley and its
military freedom in the West Bank to foil hostile activity, and then –
should a military threat materialize – deal with the consequences at a
reasonable cost is more wishful thinking than the result of any
experience-based analysis.


Since the Oslo process started 21 years ago, Israel has been led by
governments of varying worldviews under Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, Ehud
Barak, Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert, and Benjamin Netanyahu,, but neither the
large military operations (from Operation Defensive Shield to Operation
Protective Edge) nor the far-reaching peace proposals (Camp David, Taba, and
Annapolis) managed to bring it any closer to the conditions for a stable end
state. It is hard to ignore the experience accumulated and therefore also
hard to claim with any degree of credibility that a new political move, no
matter what it consists of, will stabilize the political system vis-à-vis
the Palestinians and protect Israel’s long term strategic interests.

Proposed Policy

Accordingly, at this stage, any practical Israeli policy must include five
components:

a. Presentation of the long term political objective for a sustainable
Palestinian state in significant portions of the West Bank and all of the
Gaza Strip;

b. Provision of credibility to the presentation of that political
objective by a unilateral halt to ideological settlement liable to thwart
the possibility of reaching that objective;

c. Recognition that the objective of the long term policy cannot be
realized immediately in the current reality of the Palestinian and regional
arenas;

d. Insistence that for several decades to come, even in peacetime, Israel
must maintain its military presence in the Jordan Valley and preserve its
military freedom in the entire expanse between the Mediterranean Sea and the
Jordan River to foil the emergence of threats;

e. Attempts to formulate various interim agreements together with Israel’s
partners in the international community, no matter their chances of success,
as long as the cost of the initiative and the results of its possible
failure to realize are tolerable.



To a large extent, the proposed policy brings us back to the idea of the
administered territories presented immediately after the Six Day War. The
meaning of this idea is that Israel holds the territories in temporary but
long term belligerent occupation until the security and political reality
allows otherwise, and without operating according to any type of ideological
basis liable to undermine future agreements.