“Historically, IDF operational design does not testify to coherent logic …
that connects high-value strategic aims with operational missions at a lower
level.”
Internal Study: Israeli Deterrence Needs Overhaul
Nov. 23, 2014 - 02:43PM | By BARBARA OPALL-ROME
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20141123/DEFREG04/311230012/Internal-Study-Israeli-Deterrence-Needs-Overhaul

TEL AVIV — Israeli deterrence is due for a wholesale overhaul, from basic
theory and language to practical matters of intelligence targeting and
operational planning up to the way the military fights and advises
government leaders.

Such are conclusions of an internal document published by the research
center of the Israel Defense Forces National Security College (IDF/NSC).

In the 43-page document, Maj. Gen. Yossi Baidatz, NSC commanding officer,
and NSC research fellow Dima Adamsky, a senior lecturer at Herzliya’s
Interdisciplinary Center, deliver an academically couched, yet nonetheless
sharp critique of Israel’s high command and its abilities to finesse a
fundamental niche in the art of war.

Israeli combat operations in recent years — and especially its latest
Protective Edge campaign in Gaza — highlighted a pronounced need to develop
sharper methods of designing and managing campaigns, they write.

Intellectual efforts in the field of deterrence are often improvised when
they must be based on solid, methodological doctrine.

While authors acknowledge that there will never be precise algorithms by
which to measure the effectiveness of deterrence, they urge greater
investment in analytical thought.

Against terrorist organizations and non-state actors, Israel must develop
“an alternative concept which is more contemporary, sophisticated and
attuned to the complexities demanded when designing operations against
hybrid actors.”

Not nearly enough attention, they say, is devoted to what authors called
“the otherness” of the enemy’s unique culture, logic and strategic thinking.

Need for Discussion

The fact that such a detailed critique was published by the military’s
National Security College “testifies that the IDF is on the right track,”
said retired IDF Col. Omer Bar-Lev, a lawmaker from Israel’s opposition
Labor Party and member of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense
Committee

“We need to have a deep and meaningful discussion about how to improve
deterrence. And about how, if deterrence fails, we can quickly recover
through improved performance at all levels, starting with the political
level that is supposed to be guiding some kind of grand strategy,” he said.

Amir Oren, a veteran defense analyst with Israel’s Ha’aretz newspaper, was
less optimistic.

While many of the authors’ findings are valuable — particularly those
pertaining to the need for improved strategic intelligence and better tools
to assess that so-called culminating point of deterrence — Oren did not
anticipate a meaningful revamp.

“It’s nice for the laboratory or in simulations at the Harvard School of
Business,” he said.

A senior officer on the IDF General Staff who was pivotal in planning Israel’s
latest Gaza war, acknowledged “conditions that are lacking,” which could
otherwise prevent escalation from surging beyond that culminating deterrent
point of no return.

“Few places developed mutual deterrence like the US and the USSR. But in
most other places, and especially here, there are no such tools. We don’t
have a red phone to pick up vis-a-vis Hamas or Hezbollah, ” the officer
said.

“Each side interprets actions his own way. Then add to that the complexity
of dealing with a terror organization where part of its leadership is
sitting pretty in a five-star hotel in Doha and the rest are hiding in
underground command posts in Gaza.”

'Misleading Self-Satisfaction'

Israeli intelligence, the authors write, needs to view the enemy as a
complete and complex system. Otherwise, they warn, Israel’s well-funded and
continuously growing intelligence community risks marginalizing itself to a
mere provider of targeting data.

“Today, more than in the past, it is expected that intelligence will create
for operational designers an ongoing diagnosis of the ‘otherness’ of the
enemy strategy and changes that will affect it over time,” they wrote.

Likewise, IDF war planners tend to be overly focused on tactical thinking
and specific weapons systems available to warfighters.

“Historically, IDF operational design does not testify to coherent logic …
that connects high-value strategic aims with operational missions at a lower
level.”

Authors also take government leaders to task for relying on military might
to compensate for lack of grand strategy. “The experience of recent years
supports the claim that even though deterring operations can, in the end,
deliver periodic quiet, it doesn’t solve the basic problems” with respect to
the enemy, they wrote.

“This can cause misleading self-satisfaction on the part of Israeli leaders,
and therefore save them from the need to devise strategy.”

They also noted the government’s responsibility to communicate clear and
credible messages to enemies and adversaries. Failure to do so can lead to a
breakdown of deterrence.

“Threats need to be understood by the enemy and also perceived by enemy as
real, rather than empty,” they wrote.

As an example relevant to Iran, Syria and other enemies, they cited the need
to “broadcast red lines without provoking escalation and large-scale war.”

Yet another example relevant to Israel’s latest Protective Edge operation
against Gaza-based Hamas, they cited the need “to send a message that a
particular operation is not targeted at the enemy’s existence, but rather
against certain unacceptable behavior.”

Baidatz, a member of the IDF General Staff, and Adamsky, also a senior
fellow at the NSC, said Israel mistakenly views deterring operations and
those aimed at influencing enemy decisions as polar opposites.

In fact, they insist, they are “perfect counterweights” that must be
employed jointly.

Finally, the study flags Israel’s risk of overshooting what they call “the
culminating point of deterrence,” an adaptation of Carl Von Clausewitz’s
culminating point of offense, or victory, where actions aimed at deterring
escalation actually end up provoking war.

First coined by Adamsky in a February 2013 study published in the Journal of
Strategic Studies, miscalculation of this point can lead to a total
breakdown of deterrence.

“In its need to ensure aspirations for tactical success, the IDF must not
miss the culminating point of deterrence … that escalates or creates a more
complicated and problematic strategic environment,” he writes.

Danny Yatom, a retired IDF major general and former director of Israel’s
Mossad intelligence agency, agreed that Israeli deterrent thinking and
planning is in need of refreshing.

“Deterrence is based in large part on psychology and analytical art, and
this key element used to be much stronger when we were dealing with nation
states instead of terror organizations,” Yatom said.

“No doubt better processes that strengthen deterrence will make it easier to
convince the political level to make wiser choices from wiser military
options proposed by the IDF,” he said.

Email: bopallrome@defensenews.com.