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Tuesday, November 25, 2014
Terrorism in the Jerusalem Synagogue: From National Struggle to Religious War?

[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: Challenge for readers: What logic is the
following policy recommendation buried in this piece based on?: "and the
formulation of regional guarantees for implementing political agreements
with the Palestinians."]

Terrorism in the Jerusalem Synagogue: From National Struggle to Religious
War?
INSS Insight No. 633, November 25, 2014
Udi Dekel .
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=8133

SUMMARY: The terrorist attack on November 18, 2014 in a synagogue in the Har
Nof neighborhood of Jerusalem was another step in an emerging trend whereby
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is liable to evolve from a national
struggle into a religious war. In recent months, the main Palestinian area
of concern has been the struggle over Jerusalem, and debate of the issue is
rife with religious extremism. Israel must prevent the continuing slide of
the conflict from the national to the religious level, particularly given
the lack of effective tools for managing a religious problem. The soil
nurturing the seeds of religious hatred is an outgrowth of many years of
neglect of the Arab population of East Jerusalem. Much time and a massive
infusion of resources are needed to create any real change that will affect
popular opinion and improve the atmosphere in the city. The article proposes
several tracks that the government can pursue in the immediate term in an
effort to restore calm in Jerusalem.

The terrorist attack carried out on November 18, 2014 in a synagogue in the
Har Nof neighborhood of Jerusalem, which killed four men during their
morning prayers and an Israeli policeman trying to stop the attack, was
another step in an emerging trend whereby the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
is liable to evolve from a national struggle into a religious war.

In recent months, the main Palestinian area of concern has been the struggle
over Jerusalem, inflamed by Fatah through the inciting label of “the war for
Jerusalem” and by Hamas’ rhetoric of “the al-Aqsa intifada.” Debate of the
issue is rife with religious extremism, manifested in the social media
discourse, which stresses repeatedly that the only alternative for a change
in the status quo is religious in nature. The effort to enlist popular
Palestinian support for the immediate need to defend al-Haram al-Sharif (the
Temple Mount) and the al-Aqsa mosque is heightened by attempts by certain
Israeli interest groups and Knesset members to change the status quo on the
Temple Mount. The Israeli government’s hesitant response to these attempts
is seen by the Palestinian public as yet another manifestation of Israel’s
doctrine of “establishing facts on the ground.” According to Palestinians
propaganda, the next Israeli objective is the takeover and destruction of
the al-Aqsa mosque. In the eyes of the younger Palestinian public, because
the rest of the Muslim Arab world is preoccupied by infighting in many
arenas, there is no one to protect al-Haram al-Sharif other than the Arabs
of East Jerusalem, who enjoy the significant advantage of freedom of
movement within Israel.

The religious aspects of regional conflicts and the phenomenon of Islamic
wars of jihad, which are part of the backdrop to the current tension, have
permeated the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This trend is evident in the use
of images of the Islamic State organization (ISIS) and adulation of the
organization’s limitless zeal for carrying out barbaric terrorism, including
the beheadings it has publicly glorified. By and large, the Palestinians –
with the exception of the radical fringe – do not currently uphold the
radical religious ideologies of ISIS, but they have embraced the tool used
by ISIS to maximize exposure of terrifying images in order to enlist
supporters and activists. The two largest social media campaigns in the
current Palestinian arena are “Ada’es” (from the word “to run over,” which
also sounds like “Da’esh,” the Arabic acronym for ISIS) and “Aten” (from the
word “to claim,” which means “stabbing”; the symbol for this campaign is a
picture of Palestinian youths wielding axes in order to decapitate). The
campaigns, through minimal effort and without a necessary critical mass of
volunteers, aim to produce a psychological effect of terror and undermine
the Israeli public’s sense of safety. The terrorists who carried out the
synagogue attack did not murder in the name of the Islamic State or for its
sake, but there can be no doubt that the pictures and videos in the social
media fueled their fanaticism and motivated them to act in similar fashion.
The addition and emphasis of inter-religious strife to the roots of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, joining the songs of praise in the Gaza Strip
and West Bank for the “shahids” who perpetrated the horror, only add fuel to
the fire.

In the social media, young Palestinians call the terrorist acts in Jerusalem
“fedayeen” operations by “the defenders of Jerusalem.” This group is keeping
its distance from the veteran, institutionalized political movements –
Hamas, Fatah, and Islamic Jihad – that bear the stigma of failure as a
result of their lack of significant achievements over several decades.
Unlike the young people, the political movements are trying to ride the
current wave of terrorism, attribute their own influence to it, and use the
image of “jihad on behalf of Jerusalem” as well as descriptions such as “the
Jerusalem intifada” and “the Jerusalem uprising.”

Although one could point an accusing finger at the Palestinian Authority and
President Mahmoud Abbas for inciting the atmosphere by calling on people to
defend Jerusalem, in practice there is no evidence for organized activity.
There is no responsible party in charge dispatching the terrorists; recent
acts have been the result of personal initiative. Moreover, the terrorists
who carried out the synagogue attack embarked on their mission from areas
under Israeli security control, not from the PA. In the social media in the
Gaza Strip and West Bank, President Abbas is presented as a collaborator
with Israel, and often called “traitor” and “the Zionists’ dog.” According
to the more vocal members of this discourse, Abbas’ influence in East
Jerusalem is nonexistent, and there are even social media campaigns calling
for his assassination. The fact is that Abba is not interested in the
outbreak of a violent, terrorism-infused intifada, because he believes it
would not serve the Palestinian cause. To date, Abbas has believed that
controlled escalation in Jerusalem supports the strategy pursued by the PA
in recent years, a diplomatic strategy that turns to the international
community for recognition of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders as
part of a binding UN Security Council resolution that stipulates two years
for implementation. Stressing Israel’s failure to provide freedom of access
and worship at the holy sites in Jerusalem is designed to promote the
strategy. However, it seems that Abbas has begun to understand that he and
the PA are losing control of the situation and the escalation. Under
pressure from US Secretary of State John Kerry, Abbas condemned the attack,
but his influence on the Palestinian public is in any case limited and seems
to be shrinking.

The Israeli government’s attempt to place responsibility for the current
escalation in Jerusalem on Abbas stems from the fact that Israel knows how
to operate against a specific, defined address. Absent such an address,
there is no one to blame for the sequence of attacks and disturbances other
than the usual suspect. Furthermore, the continuity of events is interpreted
as Abbas’ hesitation in stopping them; hence the notion that damaging Abbas’
image and status, by accusing him of fomenting terrorism, will undermine the
Palestinian political option of appeal to the UN for recognition of a
Palestinian state.

Following the synagogue attack, the world expressed momentary empathy with
Israel, but one mustn’t err in reading the international community’s take on
the situation. The basic attitude reflects the assessment that the
escalation is the result of the deadlocked political process, which nurtures
hopelessness among the Palestinian public. Israel is viewed as the main
culprit for this state of affairs.

In light of recent events, the Israeli government must make an updated
strategic assessment to formulate new methods of coping with the worsening
challenge. We are witnessing the collapse of the strategic approach that saw
Israel as a “villa in the jungle” and maintained that it was possible to
isolate Israel from the events occurring in the region and view them from a
standoff position without the wave of regional events spilling across its
borders. But the policy of response without being proactive on the political
front is no longer effective. Therefore, what Israel needs is a formative
policy that will use the current period of time to change the paradigm of
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This change should focus on promoting
transitional arrangements in conjunction with the Arab world under the
umbrella of Arab Peace Initiative, and the formulation of regional
guarantees for implementing political agreements with the Palestinians.

Israel must prevent the continuing slide of the conflict from the national
to the religious level, particularly given the lack of effective tools for
managing a religious problem. The soil nurturing the seeds of religious
hatred is an outgrowth of many years of neglect of the Arab population of
East Jerusalem, both on the individual level and on the scale of public
infrastructures. Remedying the cumulative failures of almost 50 years is
impossible in the near term. Much time and a massive infusion of resources
are needed to create any real change that will affect popular opinion,
change the atmosphere in the city, and make a viable contribution to the
restoration of calm. In the immediate term, the government must act along
several concurrent tracks:

Easing religious hostility: It is necessary to invest colossal efforts to
prevent a response by Jewish radicals to attacks carried out by Palestinians
and to demonstrate actively that the Israeli government has no intent to
change the status quo on the Temple Mount.

Gathering intelligence: Concerted effort must be made to identify the
inciters motivating members of the younger generation from East Jerusalem to
carry out terrorist acts under the cloak of religious symbolism.

Neutralizing falsehoods: Via the social media and the media in general, it
is necessary to expose the lies designed to incite and escalate events. As
part of this effort it is important to prevent the dissemination of
photographs that should not be published and that only encourage more
violence on both sides.

Focusing on Jabel Mukaber: This neighborhood has been home to most of the
perpetrators of mass-casualty attacks in recent years. Movement out of the
neighborhood should be monitored, along with a concerted effort on the part
of the General Security Service to neutralize religious radicalism nurtured
by incitement, preaching, and the enlistment of young people to terrorist
activity.

Dialogue with the Arab civil society in East Jerusalem: An effort must be
made to establish an open dialogue with the city’s Arab residents and
integrate them in measures to resolve municipal problems and manage
municipal affairs.

Adopting a responsible conciliatory policy: On the cusp of dangerous
escalation in Jerusalem and the high probability that the fire will spread
beyond the city boundaries, the Israeli government must adopt a conciliatory
tone in its internal discourse. Given the radical elements, bolstered by
statements and actions providing inspiration for extremist acts on both
sides of the divide, decision makers must display responsibility and
restraint, promote solutions to issues that can be addressed in the
immediate future, and avoid steps that could potentially fan the flames.

Attention to the Israeli-Arab sector: Discourse on the social media reveals
close ties between the younger activists in East Jerusalem and Israeli
Arabs. In order to prevent negative developments among Israel’s Arab
population, a plan must be devised how to handle social gaps, reduce
discrimination, conduct an open dialogue, and soften the negative feelings
stemming from the events in Jerusalem.

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