Demilitarization of the Gaza Strip: Realistic Goal or Pipe Dream?
Kobi Michael
[Chapter in The Lessons of Operation Protective Edge
Anat Kurz and Shlomo Brom, Editors ]
http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/ZukEtanENG_final.pdf

Operation Protective Edge has made the concept of low intensity conflict
irrelevant. It dramatized the weight of Hamas’ military capabilities and
infrastructures in the Gaza Strip and their potential for striking the
Israeli home front, along with the organization’s steadfastness in a
prolonged campaign, which was longer than both previous Gaza campaigns and
even the Second Lebanon War. In addition, Hamas’ military capabilities and
infrastructures reflect both a process of institutionalization of the group
as a governmental and military power in Gaza, and the link between military
and political power.

Hamas’ military capabilities since Operation Protective Edge have remained
significant, certainly in comparison to those of the Palestinian Authority
(PA). Hamas will seek to maintain or even develop them, despite the
difficulty involved in light of the results of the operation. It is clear
to Hamas that its military capabilities are the basis for realizing its
political demands in the Gaza Strip, and in general, in securing its
standing as an influential political force in the Palestinian arena and
beyond. Therefore, Hamas will refuse any voluntary demilitarization and will
use its military capabilities to challenge the PA or any entity that in the
context of the operation to reconstruct Gaza attempts to undermine it or
threatens its power or influence.

The reconstruction of Gaza, led by the international community and
implemented through the PA, has a greater chance of success if Hamas’
influence on the project is limited. The same is true of prospects for
turning the project into leverage to restart the political process with the
Palestinians and build a Palestinian state in a controlled and responsible
process, with the Gaza Strip as the first significant layer. In order to
neutralize Hamas’ negative influence on the process, it must be allowed to
be a political partner only, in the framework of the Palestinian
reconciliation government led by Abu Mazen, and not be allowed to exercise
veto power or exploit the process for another seizure of Gaza and from
there, a takeover of the PA. To this end, Hamas’ military capabilities must
be weakened, which means demilitarization. In other words, without
demilitarization, a constructive reconstruction operation in Gaza will not
be possible.

To Israel, the successful reconstruction of the Gaza Strip is a necessary
condition for reshaping the Palestinian, Israeli-Palestinian, and regional
systems. Therefore, it is important to make every effort to ensure the
necessary conditions for successful reconstruction, and demilitarizing Gaza
is one of, if not the most important of these conditions. The failure of the
immediate attempts at reconstruction would reduce the chances for any
further reconstruction efforts, particularly insofar as complex projects of
this sort must balance between the required investment of extensive
resources, coordination between the respective actors, and the political
prestige of the party leading the effort.

The more that Gaza is demilitarized, the less the likelihood that Hamas will
continue to rule, and the greater the likelihood of a gradual PA return to
political and security control. Similarly, the more substantive the
demilitarization, the greater the chances of economic and infrastructure
development and reconstruction in Gaza. The greater the improvement in the
quality of life for Gazans, and the more that Gaza is rebuilt, the stronger
the restraints on escalation. In strategic language, the greater the assets
possessed by the governmental authority in Gaza, the greater will be the
ability to deter violence and escalation.

Thus, the strategic benefit to be gained from the demilitarization of Gaza
and the ensuing benefits to the Gaza civilian population are indisputable.
In this context, however, three fundamental questions arise:

a. What is demilitarization? Is this an all-or-nothing situation of
demilitarization or no demilitarization, or is this a continuum, with no
demilitarization at one end and complete demilitarization at the other,
with countless values of demilitarization along the continuum?

b. Is it even possible to achieve demilitarization of Gaza (total or
partial), and how?

c. Could even partial demilitarization of Gaza become leverage for changing
and reshaping the system in Gaza?

Answers to these questions can help shape an informed approach to definition
and implementation of Israel’s strategic interests in Gaza.

Demilitarization in the Context of the Gaza Strip

Demilitarization denotes clearing or evacuating fighting forces and weapons
from a defined area and a ban or restriction on any military activity. It is
a security regime of sorts and a means of managing or settling violent
conflicts, which reduces the potential for escalation and allows for an
early warning zone and early deployment to thwart possible escalation,
whether peacefully (through diplomacy) or through military means.

Demilitarized zones do not require reciprocity or symmetry between the
parties to the conflict. There may be situations in which a demilitarized
zone is created only in the sovereign territory of one party. Alternatively,
there may be cases in which there are demilitarized zones in the sovereign
territory of two (or more) parties involved in the conflict, but the size of
the zones is not identical. An example is the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.
There is also partial demilitarization, which permits retention of a limited
and defined number of weapons and military forces, such as in the Israel
Syria Separation of Forces Agreement. There are also cases in which the
presence of military forces of any of the parties to the conflict is banned,
but the presence – and operation – of military forces of a third party is
permitted, be they peacekeeping forces or a party agreed upon by the sides
that is engaged in supervision of the disputed area.

Full demilitarization of the Gaza Strip means depriving Hamas and other
terrorist organizations of the ability to operate militarily against Israel
or another player that seeks to operate in Gaza, including for purposes of
reconstruction. In this context, therefore, it is important to distinguish
between capabilities and intentions. While the intention to continue to
attack Israel or other actors cannot be suppressed in the foreseeable
future, the ability to do so can be suppressed or very significantly
contained by: eliminating the existing tunnel infrastructure and preventing
its renovation; eliminating the rocket and weapons production
infrastructures and preventing their renovation by means of self-production
or smuggling; and neutralizing senior operatives and others in the
organizational military apparatuses, whether through persuasion, arrest, or
targeted killing.

Although a goal sought by Israel, total demilitarization of the Gaza Strip
will presumably not be possible in the short term. Until then, Israel, with
aid from Egypt, the moderate axis in the Arab world (including the PA under
Abu Mazen), and the international community will need to benchmark points on
the continuum between no demilitarization and full demilitarization, and
will need patience, determination, and strategic insight to ensure progress
across the continuum. Full achievement of the goal will require ongoing
international resolve and backing, close cooperation between Israel and
Egypt and the PA, determination and a capacity for action from the PA, and
an ongoing military effort against the terrorist infrastructures. In
addition, there is a need for efforts, led by the international community
via the PA, to rebuild and develop Gaza while at the same time strengthening
and entrenching PA rule there. As such, this involves an intelligent,
cautious, patient, and ongoing combination of militarism and diplomacy.
The actors operating in the Gaza Strip are a state actor (Israel), a
semistate actor (Hamas), and non-state actors (Islamic Jihad and other
terrorist organizations).

The formative logic of the system in Gaza is different from that of an
interstate conflict, and the actors’ respective motivations regarding
demilitarization do not converge. In this case, it is likely that voluntary
demilitarization cannot be implemented, nor apparently can complete
demilitarization. Hamas, and certainly the other terrorist organizations,
will seek to maintain military capabilities, because without them they have
no political viability.

While it is clearly impossible to achieve total demilitarization of Gaza in
the immediate wake of Operation Protective Edge, Israel’s strategic interest
following the campaign makes it necessary to demand that any ceasefire and
settlement agreement be conditional on Gaza’s full demilitarization, even if
the process is gradual. The settlement agreement must determine the
appropriate mechanisms for implementing the demilitarization and give Israel
the legitimacy to thwart any attempt to renovate the military
infrastructure. For this purpose, it is important to start the process by
formulating an agreement on the minimum threshold definition of
demilitarization necessary to allow the arrangements for Gaza’s
reconstruction through the PA to begin. At the same time, the PA’s status
and influence must be strengthened, while Hamas’ political standing is
continuously and regularly weakened.

On the other hand, Israel must prepare for a situation in which there is no
agreement. In such a case, it must work to consolidate legitimacy for
ongoing operations against the terrorist infrastructures and establish new
rules of the game about a response if the terrorist infrastructure is used
against the Israeli population. In light of the lessons of Operation
Protective Edge, Israel cannot allow Hamas and the other terrorist
organizations in the Gaza Strip to rehabilitate themselves militarily and
return to the situation that existed prior to the campaign.

Partial Demilitarization of the Gaza Strip: Likewise a Lever for Change?

Complete demilitarization promises the most favorable outlook for creating
the strategic leverage to change the situation in Gaza and restart the
political process in its broader contexts. But given a situation in which
the chances of total demilitarization in the near term are not great, could
limited demilitarization, i.e., partially dismantling Hamas’ military
infrastructures and capabilities and preventing another buildup, be
sufficient to create change there? The answer would appear to be “yes,” but
it is contingent on the simultaneous fulfillment of several conditions.

First, the minimum required demilitarization of Gaza must allow a functional
PA government, or alternatively, allow the PA security apparatus to deal
with attempted challenges by Hamas. At the same time, it must preserve and
maintain deterrence against Hamas and the other terrorist organizations and
reduce their ability to challenge the PA and disrupt its activities.

Second, security and strategic cooperation between Israel and Egypt must be
improved or at least maintained on the current level to ensure that the
smuggling of weapons and other military capabilities from the Sinai
Peninsula and by sea from the border with Egypt is thwarted. For this
purpose, US Egyptian relations should be tightened. The United States should
resume its support for the Egyptian regime and relax the pressure it has
placed on Egypt since the Muslim Brotherhood government was ousted. It
should also restore its economic, military, and political support for the
benefit of the regime of President el-Sisi.

Third, Qatar’s drive to support Hamas and radical elements must be
contained, whether by direct pressures on the country’s rulers or by other
means that will clarify to Qatar the price for supporting Hamas and the risk
inherent in its dangerous and subversive policy. In addition, there must be
an effort by the Arab world and the international community to strengthen
the axis of moderate Arab states – with an eye to other conflict zones in
the Middle East and as a counterweight to the dangerous radical and
subversive axes.

Fourth, the possibility of rebuilding and developing Gaza should be cast as
a significant stage in the process of Palestinian state building. This means
building functioning and responsible Palestinian institutions as well as
providing training, support, and supervision. In particular, it means
constructing mechanisms that will ensure that the resources allocated to
developing Gaza will be used in the most effective manner. After twenty one
years of economic support for the PA, crucial lessons must be learned.

UNRWA’s mandate and operating procedures must be changed, and there must be
tighter control over the resources at its disposal in order to ensure it
will be part of the solution instead of part of the problem. The financial
aid must not support the infrastructure of corruption and inefficiency. It
must ensure the development and prosperity of Gaza, the development of
Palestinian governmental institutions, law and order, and above all, the
monopoly on the use of force.
Fifth, Israel must comprehensively reformulate its strategic interests
vis-à-vis the Palestinian arena, turning the crisis in Gaza into an
opportunity for strategic change. Even if the chances of a peace treaty with
the Palestinians are not great, at this time the PA, headed by Abu Mazen,
can be a strategic partner for Israel in weakening Hamas and terrorist
organizations in the Gaza Strip and reorganizing the area. Such a strategic
partnership requires a change in Israel’s approach to rebuilding Gaza,
generosity and cooperation in easing the security closure of Gaza, and a
willingness to undertake more significant actions to implement the model of
two states for two peoples. In addition, Israel needs military resolve for
ongoing prevention of attempts to rebuild the terror infrastructures and
for maintaining deterrence against Hamas and the terrorist organizations.

Conclusion

Gaza must be demilitarized in order to reshape the system there and impose
restraints against further escalation, or in strategic language, achieve and
maintain deterrence. At the same time, demilitarization is presumed to be a
necessary condition for the success of the operation to rebuild Gaza and
resume the political process with the Palestinian Authority under Abu Mazen.

It is clear that at the current time and in the conditions created after
Operation Protective Edge – when Hamas retains sufficiently large military
capabilities to challenge any actor that attempts to step into its shoes –
it is not possible to achieve full demilitarization, either voluntary (by
Hamas) or by force. On the other hand, the situation is ripe for
international recognition of the need for demilitarization. Therefore,
Israel must ensure that there are mechanisms for implementing
demilitarization and international legitimacy for a response on its part
should there be any attempt to violate it.

The demilitarization of Gaza is a process that requires time, determination,
persistence, and much collaboration between many actors. A relevant strategy
could help Israel establish and promote the demilitarization process. Even
if at this time complete demilitarization appears to be a pipe dream, by the
very act of progress toward it, Israel can improve its strategic position.