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Saturday, January 24, 2015
The Profound Difference between Hamas and Hezbollah

The Profound Difference between Hamas and Hezbollah
The next possible confrontation with Hezbollah will compel Israel to develop
a different concept regarding the defense of the home front and critical
infrastructure
Meir Elran 23/1/2015
http://www.israeldefense.com/?CategoryID=483&ArticleID=3324

The Profound Difference between Hamas and Hezbollah In a previous article
published in Israel Defense Magazine (September 2014), I suggested that it
would be wrong to learn too many lessons from Operation Protective Edge
(July – August 2014) when preparing for a future confrontation with
Hezbollah.

Before getting into this issue, a few words are in order regarding the
paradigm of military "rounds" between Israel and its adversaries: since the
symmetrical confrontations in the Middle East have ended to give way to
armed conflicts with non-states, or more accurately, "semi-state"
organizations, the role of the civilian front in Israel (unjustly referred
to as "the rear"), alongside the military front, has become increasingly
more significant. Without delving into a detailed discussion of the
characteristics of those asymmetrical confrontations, one particular
disconcerting issue should be emphasized. These confrontations are becoming
more frequent and longer in duration. This has been clearly demonstrated in
the very short span between the round of Pillar of Defense (November 2012)
and the recent one, which lasted almost three times as long as the duration
of the Yom-Kippur War of 1973, regarded justly as one of the most difficult
wars fought by the IDF, against two strong and well equipped countries
simultaneously.

To this one should add the prevailing estimate, that the last round ended in
a "strategic tie", which means that the IDF failed to crush Hamas
militarily, even after more than seven weeks. This is a cause for a severe
concern. The tantalizing question is whether Israel is now, or in the near
future, better prepared for the next round against Hamas or against the more
capable Hezbollah?

So, how will a future confrontation with Hezbollah be different from what
Israel had experienced during Operation Protective Edge? This article offers
three primary criteria for evaluating that difference: the duration, the
breadth and the depth of the next conflict. In the following paragraphs, I
will attempt to address these elements and offer some guidelines for an
enhanced systemic response for them, so as to elevate the resiliency of the
civilian front.

Regarding the duration criterion: In the Second Lebanon War, the actual
fighting lasted for 33 days. Operation Protective Edge, waged against a
significantly lesser opponent, lasted 51 days. Accordingly, it may be
rationally deduced that the next round against Hezbollah, under similar
circumstances, could last even longer, to the extent of developing
characteristics of a "war of attrition", which might have sever implications
on the civilian front. This might suggest that the IDF needs to develop and
readily utilize its existing offensive capabilities – in the air and on
land – that would make a substantial contribution to shorten the span of a
future conflict on the northern front. Previous rounds have proven that
Israel operates militarily under distinct external political restrictions,
which are expected to be at least as applicable next time. If this "glass
ceiling" remains, it would necessitate a different concept of preparations
for the civilian front, based on the assumption that most of its population
will be under heavy attacks, for long weeks, of rockets and missiles, with
an intensity scale of 7-10 times over what it experienced in the past
(120-150 rockets per day). Hezbollah acquired the capacity to launch
intensive salvos of dozens of rockets against selected targets, which would
elevate the threat on the civilian front to a level never experienced by the
Israeli civilian population. This calls for a more effective systemic
response capacities, at least until the active defense system's coverage
will suffice to provide adequate protection to military primary objects,
critical infrastructure, as well as the population centers. This is far from
being the case as of now, which means that at present the Israeli home front
will be only partly protected in case of a full pledged attack by Hezbollah.

As to the breadth criterion: In the last round, Hamas's offensive
capabilities turned out to be quite limited. The real threat was confined to
the southern areas (mortar bombs and offensive tunnels around the Gaza
Strip, and rockets with reduced warheads within the longer ranges).
Subsequently, about 60% of all rockets launched from the Gaza Strip
(including mortar bombs) landed on the area within 20 km, about 32% reached
areas within 40 km, and only 8% reached populated areas beyond that range.
The high-trajectory threat imposed by Hezbollah is much more severe, as it
covers most of the populated areas of Israel. But beyond the range factor,
the amount of their rockets and missiles is ten times larger, their warheads
are significantly heavier, and mostly, they possess a significant arsenal of
relatively accurate guided missiles. This places Hezbollah as a much more
ominous threat to the Israeli civilian front. Coupled with the duration
factor discussed above, this poses severe challenges for Israel. An
outstanding example could be the need for a massive evacuation of civilians
for extended periods of time. Reportedly, Israel has designed systemic plans
for such a scenario (not only of military nature). However, similar to what
happened during Operation Protective Edge, also in future cases, a decision
by the government to implement such a massive evacuation will be highly
sensitive and probably difficult to take. This was and might be the case due
to the unjustifiable stigmatic narrative associates with the notion that
people who leave their homes under enemy offensive pressure, manifest public
weakness, if not utter demoralization, which might represent a success of
the adversary. Beyond these emotional and political considerations, there
also stands the question of the actual implementation of the plan, under
wide scale chaotic circumstances of multiple major disruptions in numerous
population centers simultaneously. Evacuation to remote areas (the Arava in
the Negev?) of a large number of people is an extremely complex operation
from the organizational and logistical point of view. It further raises a
serious question regarding the functional continuity of the Israeli economy
for a protracted period. The national economy might be challenged by the
long conflict, but the consequences can be more dire if a large scale
evacuation is being carried out.

Finally, regarding the depth criterion: in the last confrontations with
Hamas, the rockets hit mostly and modestly the civilian population. In a
confrontation with Hezbollah, one should add to this possible serious
disruption to the critical national infrastructures, and military
installations. Israel has no experience with major disruptions of its
critical infrastructures, such as the electric grid, the water system or the
transportation systems. The potential capabilities of Hezbollah, mainly
owing to the ever-improving accuracy of their missile systems, together with
the potential cyber attacks, will impose a new threat on the functional
continuity of the Israeli economy. Adequate local solutions to specific
threats will no doubt be presented. But as the Head of the National
Emergency Management Authority has correctly stated recently, "the national
infrastructures are not ready for an emergency". This, too, calls for a
comprehensive national preparedness plan that would address the primary
issue of authority and responsibilities, which is of vital necessity for the
integration and collaboration of the various agencies, public and private,
so that they may all be adequately prepared for coping with an extreme
disruption and for an effective management of the systems in the case of an
emergency.

As the professional literature proposes, advance preparations are essential
for any scenario of extreme disruptions. The traditional Israeli approach to
challenge the security risks primarily with offensive response and
improvisations might be helpful, but hardly sufficient. The defensive
response should be augmented, mainly based on the active defense systems,
which already proved their high value. But beyond that, there is no way to
ignore the systemic implementation of the resilience approach, which is
designed to improve the capacity of the national systems to swiftly recover
after sustaining severe disruptions. In this realm, Israel is still in a
preliminary stage, both in terms of the development of a holistic concept,
as well as in terms of the preparation of the home front for scales of
hazards that have not been known in past confrontations.

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