The Attack in the Golan Heights: Is an Israel-“Axis” Conflict Expected?
INSS Insight No. 658, January 27, 2015
Omer Einav
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=8622

SUMMARY: The attack in the Golan Heights near Quneitra on January 18, 2015,
which killed Hizbollah operatives and Iranian Revolutionary Guards al-Quds
Force commanders, was attributed to Israel. Iran and Hizbollah appear to be
seeking an appropriate violent response to restore deterrence and signal to
Israel that they will not accept a change in the rules of the game, but
without this leading to war. A January 19 headline in the Lebanese daily
as-Safir read: “More than a Response, Less than a War.” The axis has a
number of possible responses of varying degrees of intensity, some of which
were implemented in the past. Israel’s starting point must be that this
incident is part of the conflict against the Iran-Hizbollah axis, which will
not exercise restraint in the face of targeted killings of its officials. It
remains to be seen how Iran and Hizbollah will choose to reshape the rules
of the game given the conditions dictated to them from within and without.

SUMMARY: In the background to the attack in the Golan Heights near Quneitra
on January 18, 2015 are last year’s air strikes in Syria on convoys of
weapons sent to Hizbollah by Iran. With the most recent attack, however,
which was attributed to Israel and killed Hizbollah operatives and Iranian
Revolutionary Guards al-Quds Force commanders, Hizbollah, Iran, and Syria
have apparently perceived a change by Israel of the rules of the game. Thus,
this attack, which was actually a targeted killing of a symbolic figure,
Jihad Mughniyeh, and Mohammad Ali Allah-Dadi, a senior Iranian Quds Force
officer, marked a new standard in the tension between Israel on the one
hand, and Hizbollah and Iran on the other. The attack on Hizbollah and Iran
on Syrian soil gave the recent incident a broader meaning than that attached
to previous events in the conflict arena between Israel and the
Iran-Syria-Hizbollah axis. Much attention, therefore, is now focused on
predicting Hizbollah’s response, in coordination with Iran or separately,
and assessing the considerations that will guide the “axis” response.

Apparently in the eyes of Iran and Hizbollah, the attack crossed a red line
and thus demands a high price of Israel. From time to time Israel is
perceived as violating the rules of the game formulated after the civil war
broke out in Syria, implying that Hizbollah’s deterrence, widely accepted as
a given since the Second Lebanon War, is eroding. Israel has attacked the
organization several times, including the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh in
2008, the killing of Hassan Lakkis in Beirut in 2013, and the recent strike.
These targeted strikes join numerous operations attributed to Israel against
arms shipments to Hizbollah in Syrian territory and the exposure of a spy
ring within Hizbollah that is suspected of collaborating with Israel.

Hizbollah’s responses to these events were relatively weak. They included
one significant response, the attack in Burgas, Bulgaria in July 2012, along
with failed attempts to launch further attacks abroad and pinpoint strikes
in the northern Golan Heights and Shab’a Farms during 2014. Against this
background, it is reasonable to assume that the organization and its Iranian
patron believe that they must restore deterrence against Israel so as not to
abandon the principle of attacking Israel, which in their view understands
only the language of force, and act in accordance with the spirit of
muqawama (resistance). To them, continued relative restraint will encourage
Israel to continue the trend toward escalation and erode Hizbollah’s
position as the leader of the resistance. This assessment concerning
Hizbollah’s intentions is supported by explicit statements in recent months
by Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, as well as declarations by Hizbollah
spokesmen following the latest strike, made in order to gain legitimacy for
a response.

However, a dramatic response by Hizbollah and Iran would entail tangible
risks of deterioration into war, a development that none of the parties
involved – Hizbollah, Iran, Syria, or Israel – desire. Not only is Hizbollah
mired in a long war in Syria, particularly in the struggle against the
Islamic State (IS) on Syrian and Iraqi soil, which is stretching its
capabilities over several arenas; it must also contend with problems at
home, namely, the domestic situation in Lebanon.

Indeed, the domestic tension in Lebanon is forcing Hizbollah to avoid
unnecessary additional turmoil. Hizbollah recently launched a dialogue with
opponents in the Future Movement, in an attempt to defuse the Sunni-Shiite
tension in Lebanon and end the political crisis regarding the lack of a
president in Lebanon since May 2014. Despite the inherent animosity between
the parties, the talks were launched out of the recognized need to stabilize
the country, given the wave of refugees from Syria, the infiltration of
Salafist jihadi elements into Lebanon, and the deterioration of domestic
security. The Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra aspire to expand the
boundaries of the fighting beyond Syria’s border into Lebanon and to bring
Lebanon into the cycle of violence. If they succeed, this will realize the
Lebanese nightmare. Nasrallah must also take into account this threatening
possibility if he chooses to risk a confrontation with Israel, which incurs
potential for severe damage. Moreover, Hizbollah’s unreserved support for
the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria has strengthened the ties between them.
For this reason, any action against Israel could lead to an Israeli response
against the axis that would damage the government in Damascus and weaken it
against its enemies at home.

Thus several days after suffering a painful and humiliating blow,
operationally and in terms of collective organizational consciousness,
Hizbollah is planning its moves, making the expected threats, garnering
legitimacy, and preparing its response. What, however, is at work under the
surface? What contacts are there between Iran and Hizbollah, and what logic
will dictate the course of action of the axis? Tehran is undoubtedly paying
close attention to the question of whether Israel knew about the presence of
the Iranian officer and his assistants in the convoy that was attacked and
how the information affected the decision to attack. In addition, Iran’s
considerations are broader than Hizbollah’s Lebanese-Syrian angle and focus
on its position regionally and internationally. Decision makers in Tehran
must take into account the struggle for regional hegemony against Saudi
Arabia; the lack of Western resistance – which seemingly implies
legitimacy – to Iranian footholds in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and other places
via Shiite and other groups, which are proxies for Iran; and the
negotiations on the nuclear issue. When these weighty issues are factored
into a system of considerations, the result will be a decision translated
into a mode of action: who will act, when, where, and in what format. In any
case, it appears that this time, there is coordinated action by the
Iran-Hizbollah axis, while Syria exerted limited influence, even though the
incident took place on its territory.

The considerations of the axis are also evidenced by its defiant policy: For
the first time, the Iranians are not concealing their presence in the Golan
Heights, which until now was an improbable scenario. Hizbollah is permitting
itself freedom of action and a high profile on the Golan Heights and is
working to establish an infrastructure in the region for attacks on Israel –
not to protect Damascus, but out of a sense of power and freedom from the
need to take into account the considerations of the Assad regime, whether it
backs this activity or not. As the axis sees it, if Israel permits itself to
operate freely in the Golan Heights while aiding the anti-Assad rebels on
various levels, then the situation will change and the Golan Heights, an
area of chaos without governance, will become the main arena of struggle
between the axis and Israel. This is the place to design new rules of the
game.

Iran and Hizbollah appear to be seeking an appropriate violent response to
restore deterrence and signal to Israel that they will not accept the change
in the rules of the game, but without this leading to war. A January 19
headline in the Lebanese daily as-Safir put it well: “More than a Response,
Less than a War.” The axis has a number of possible responses of varying
degrees of intensity, some of which were implemented in the past and some of
which have not yet been put into action. These include an air strike using
unmanned aerial vehicles; a naval strike; an attack on IDF forces and camps
in the northern sector, including high trajectory fire; cyber warfare; a
pinpoint strike on the Israeli-Lebanese border (the Blue Line); or an attack
in the international arena.

For its part, Israel could influence the axis response in a number of ways.
Israel is already working to significantly improve the components of defense
in the north and to lower the profile of its moves so as to deny Hizbollah
attractive operational opportunities. It appears that Israel’s leading
objective, aside from peace and quiet and security, is not to allow Iran and
Hizbollah to establish a foothold for control and terror infrastructures in
the Golan Heights. At the same time, a new connection, perhaps irrevocable,
has been created between southern Lebanon and the Golan Heights, primarily
because Hizbollah’s sector of operations has expanded and Assad is
increasingly dependent on the organization. Hence a new equation: action by
Hizbollah from Syrian territory can lead to an Israeli response in Lebanese
territory, or conversely, action by Hizbollah from Lebanese territory can
cause damage to regime assets in Syria. Messages of this type could affect
Hizbollah and Iran’s considerations when they come to attack Israeli
targets, and even more so if they attempt to turn the Golan Heights into an
isolated arena of conflict unconnected to southern Lebanon.

In conclusion, the Israeli starting point must be that this incident is part
of the conflict against the Iran-Hizbollah axis, which will not exercise
restraint in the face of targeted killing of its officials. The balance of
deterrence and the equilibrium between the parties is on the verge of being
upset, and it remains to be seen how Iran and Hizbollah will choose to
reshape the rules of the game given the conditions dictated to them from
within and without. As for Israel, it must show resolve and not be deterred
by escalation if in fact it has an interest in preventing the establishment
of an Iranian-Hizbollah foothold in the Golan Heights, which would be a
platform for attacking Israel at a time and in circumstances that suit the
axis.