[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: Here is the portion of the original report that
does not appear to be addressed by this article:

"... particularly suspicious detail is the deep well which connects the
facility with Zaita Lake, four kilometers away. Such a connection is
unnecessary for a conventional weapons cache, but it is essential for a
nuclear facility.

But the clearest proof that it is a nuclear facility comes from radio
traffic recently intercepted by a network of spies. A voice identified as
belonging to a high-ranking Hezbollah functionary can be heard referring to
the "atomic factory" and mentions Qusayr. The Hezbollah man is clearly
familiar with the site. And he frequently provides telephone updates to a
particularly important man: Ibrahim Othman, the head of the Syrian Atomic
Energy Commission."
Assad's Secret: Evidence Points to Syrian Push for Nuclear Weapons
By Erich Follath DER SPIEGEL January 09, 2015 – 09:20 PM
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/evidence-points-to-syria-still-working-on-a-nuclear-weapon-a-1012209.html
===================
Much Ado at the Qusayr Site? A Syrian Nuclear Snapshot
INSS Insight No. 666, February 23, 2015
Ephraim Asculai, Emily B. Landau .
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=8825

SUMMARY: On January 9, 2015, the German weekly Der Spiegel published an
article alleging that Syria did not give up its nuclear weapons development
ambitions following the destruction in 2007 of its almost completed, North
Korean-constructed nuclear reactor near the town of Deir-al-Zor. Instead,
according to Der Spiegel, it is in the process of erecting a new nuclear
facility near the town of Qusayr, very close to Syria’s border with Lebanon.
Syria has a long history of deception and lying to the international
community on matters concerning its development and use of weapons of mass
destruction. Therefore, any new information concerning these matters, even
if highly speculative, should set the scene for further investigations,
which in the past have revealed problematic Syrian intentions and activities
in the chemical and nuclear realms.

Syria has a long history of deception and lying to the international
community on matters concerning its development and use of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). Therefore, any new information concerning these matters,
even if highly speculative, should set the scene for further investigations,
which in the past have revealed problematic Syrian intentions and activities
in the chemical and nuclear realms.

On January 9, 2015, the German weekly Der Spiegel published an article
entitled “Assad's Secret: Evidence Points to Syrian Push for Nuclear
Weapons,” based on known facts, facts leaked to the journal, assessments,
and speculations. According to the article, Syria did not give up its
nuclear weapons development ambitions following the destruction of its
almost completed, North Korean-constructed nuclear reactor near the town of
Deir-al-Zor, on the banks of the Euphrates River. Instead, according to Der
Spiegel, it is in the process of erecting a new nuclear facility near the
town of Qusayr, very close to Syria’s border with Lebanon. The newspaper
refers only to intelligence information from unnamed sources signifying that
the facility is related to nuclear activities, without further assessment as
to the nature of this facility, i.e., whether it is a nuclear reactor and/or
a uranium enrichment facility. Both types of facilities can produce fissile
materials – the materials from which nuclear weapons are produced. The
article was received with much skepticism by the professional community,
with some expressing their doubts as to the veracity of the information and
others literally tearing the case apart, to the point of denouncing it as a
hoax.

The satellite photography shown in the article does not present any
indication as to the nature of the facility. It could well house a
relatively small underground nuclear reactor that would be cooled by
significant amounts of air that enter through a filtering system and exit
through an exhaust stack (which is not visible in the photos) or concealed
ventilation shafts. Were it to be cooled by water, it would need a
significant water pipes system and a “heat sink” to remove the energy
produced by the reactor. In the case of a reactor it would need the
supplementary reprocessing and waste disposal facilities, in order to
produce the plutonium needed for the production of nuclear weapons. Another
option is that the facility houses a uranium enrichment facility, which does
not produce energy and does not consume much energy, and thus does not need
an extensive energy removal (cooling) system; alternatively, the necessary
air-conditioning equipment and heat removal could be concealed from sight.
It could also house auxiliary systems such as uranium conversion and storage
facilities.

On a related point, the article notes that following the destruction of the
Deir-al-Zor reactor, the equipment and materiel that survived the 2007
attack were removed from that site, and some of it could be used in the
construction of the new facility. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards are also
mentioned as involved in the Qusayr activities, as well as through the
Iranian-led Hizbollah organization. But in any event, an analysis of the
article confirms that the technical evidence is not sufficient to draw firm
conclusions as to the nature of the activities at the Qusayr site. A review
of any available past satellite photography and present-day heat photography
could provide the necessary information, or at least some clues as to the
nature of the site.

The article also highlights information about the continuation of
Syrian-North Korean nuclear cooperation, although this comes from unnamed
intelligence sources. The basis for concern regarding this bilateral
relationship stems from the fact that the facility bombed in 2007 was a
North Korean-style nuclear facility, and North Korean scientists were on the
ground in Syria. It also raises again long-held concerns about the nature of
probable trilateral cooperation in the WMD realm, among three states of
concern: North Korea, Iran, and Syria. The Iranian link ties in both
vis-à-vis North Korea and Syria. Bilateral cooperation between North Korea
and Iran on ballistic missiles has been documented for years, and suspicions
have been raised that it extends to the nuclear realm as well, with experts
noting, for example, the presence of Iranian scientists at North Korean
nuclear tests. Suspicions of the trilateral link focus mainly on the
facility at Deir-al-Zor and the question of funding. North Korea assists
would-be proliferators but only those that can pay hard cash; Iran could
likely be the source of funds, in light of the very strong strategic
relationship between the two states.

While the above concerns contain an element of speculation, relations
between Syria and the international nonproliferation regime are a matter of
documented fact. Syria has lied outright with regard to its chemical
capabilities: in a 2005 report to the UN, regarding Resolution 1540, Syria
stated as a matter of fact that it has no, and never had WMD, and has no
intention of developing them in the future. Yet seven years later, in 2012,
Assad was already issuing chemical weapons threats, and over the course of
2013 actually used them on the Syrian population. Following its use of
chemical weapons in the summer of 2013, Syria was compelled to admit its
chemical weapons activities and to join the Chemical Weapons Convention; it
then dismantled facilities and gave up at least some of its arsenal that was
destroyed outside its territory.

Syria has also been uncooperative in the nuclear realm. Following the 2007
attack, it has stonewalled repeated requests from the IAEA to inspect the
Deir-al-Zor site after the one and only inspection in June 2008. Similarly,
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is almost powerless to act in
a legal way to ascertain the nature of the facility at Qusayr; its only
option is to request a “special inspection” at that site. However, such a
request will probably be refused by Syria, in the same manner as a North
Korean refusal.

If anything is to be learned from the chemical weapons experience in Syria,
it is that if enough pressure is applied, WMD-related issues can be dealt
with effectively. It certainly will take tremendous political will and
determination to do so, and in war-torn Syria it is not at all clear that
this is an international priority, even after Assad employed chemical
weapons. In the meantime, it is imperative that when information surfaces
regarding possible WMD activities – even if highly speculative – the
relevant intelligence organizations make a concerted effort to assess the
situation, due to Syria’s highly problematic WMD track record. In this case,
the Der Spiegel article is cause to investigate further what is underway in
Syria in the nuclear realm.