ZOA Op-ed: Israel Has Overcome Many Disputes with US Since 1948
Jerusalem Post
February 22, 2015
by Morton Klein and Daniel Mandel

We are at that periodic occurrence, a crisis in Israeli/U.S. relations. This
one revolves around White House pique over Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu's acceptance of an invitation by House Speaker, John Boehner, to
address the U.S. Congress on Iran's nuclear weapons program, an issue on
which the White House and Jerusalem have been divided for some time.

But any remotely careful analysis of the U.S./Israeli relationship will show
that Jerusalem and the White House (but rarely the Congress and, by
extension, the U.S. electorate) have often clashed on issues deemed vital to
Israel's security and existence. In fact, Israel's first Prime Minister,
David Ben-Gurion, declared Israel's very independence in the face of strong
opposition from U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall.

Though personally favorable to Israel and quick to extend recognition to the
new Jewish state when it emerged in May 1948, President Harry Truman imposed
an arms embargo during Israel's 1948-49 war of survival against six Arab
nations. The embargo hurt Israel, which had few sources of weaponry, rather
than the Arabs, who enjoyed many.

In 1956, Israel conquered the Sinai from the Egyptians, following six years
of constant attacks by terrorist bands (fedayeen) sponsored by Egypt.
Nonetheless, the Eisenhower Administration insisted on Israel withdrawing
completely from Sinai without any peace treaty or recognition demanded from
Egypt and threatened Israel with sanctions if it failed to comply.

In 1967, Egypt imposed a blockade on Israel's southern port at Eilat.
Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban asked President Lyndon Johnson to honor
U.S. commitments made in 1957 to ensure free passage of Israeli shipping and
break the blockade. Johnson refused.

When Israel was attacked by Egypt and Syria in 1973 the U.S. pressured
Israel into ending the war prematurely when Israeli forces were on the road
to Damascus and Cairo. This prevented Israel from reaping a more decisive
military victory.

During the Carter Administration, the U.S. voted for UN Security Council
resolutions calling on Israel to withdraw from Lebanon following an Israeli
incursion in 1978 - despite the fact that Lebanon had been the launching pad
for major terrorist attacks on Israel - and condemning Israel's annexation
of the eastern half of Jerusalem; both vitally important issues to Israel.

In 1981, Prime Minister Menachem Begin ordered the destruction of Saddam
Hussein's Osirak nuclear reactor. This was condemned by the Reagan
Administration, even though a nuclear-armed Saddam would have posed a mortal
threat to Israel.

Successive U.S. administrations have opposed Israeli settlement in the
territories conquered in 1967, leading to recurrent tensions and crises in
the relationship. In 1992, the first Bush administration even withheld loan
guarantees to Israel in protest of Israeli settlement policies.

During the Oslo peace process (1993-2000), the Clinton administration often
pressured Israel to make one-sided concessions of territory, arms, assets
and even the releasing of imprisoned Palestinian terrorists, while ignoring
Palestinian failure to comply with its obligations to stop terrorism and end
the incitement to hatred and murder that feeds it. Securing new agreements
was preferred to holding Palestinians to past ones, as U.S. chief negotiator
Dennis Ross subsequently admitted.

The U.S. has criticized Israel's security fence and both President George W.
Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell pressured Israel to curtail
military incursions against terrorist strongholds, most notably during
Israel's offensive in Jenin in 2002. Despite U.S. understanding that the PA
has been a haven and launching pad for terrorists, the Bush Administration
pressed Israel to resume negotiations and make concessions to the PA.

So why the panic about the latest crisis? When the U.S. President and Israel
do not agree on a policy bearing on the existence and security of Israel,
there is bound to be a crisis. Yet none of these crises ruptured the
U.S./Israeli relationship; indeed, they often served as the unlikely
preludes to a stronger relationship.

The U.S./Israeli relationship became truly strategic in the 1970s, only
years after the crisis that led to the Six Day War. The early ructions
between the two countries in the first years of the Reagan Administration
settled into an expanded and harmonious strategic relationship for its
remainder.

President Obama has sought to cast Netanyahu's acceptance of an invitation
to address Congress as a slap in the face. But it isn't. The issue is
entirely a product of Obama's policy on Iran, which engenders bipartisan
concern in Israel. Put simply, President Obama seems willing to tolerate an
Iranian nuclear weapons threshold capacity - but Israel is not. Of course
there's a crisis.

Obama was glad to have British Prime Minister David Cameron urging Members
of Congress last month in support of his Iran policy, but is peeved to have
Netanyahu there critiquing it. In the end, however, the two countries are
bound in an alliance by a range of common interests which even a difference
in major policy can temporarily sour, but not sunder.
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Morton A. Klein is National President of the Zionist Organization of America
(ZOA). Dr. Daniel Mandel is author of H. V. Evatt and the Establishment of
Israel (London: Routledge, 2004) and Director of the ZOA's Center for
Middle East Policy.