The Struggle in Yemen: A Test for the Arab Collective
INSS Insight No. 680, April 1, 2015
Yoel Guzansky, Ephraim Kam .
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=9102

SUMMARY: It has been a long time since Arab countries managed to unite for
the sake of taking substantive action, especially military, in order to
defend their own interests. However, Iran’s efforts to penetrate various
arenas and expand its influence throughout the region are an ominous threat
to at least some Arab states. Therefore, one can already speak of a
collective Arab achievement in light of the Arab nations’ ability to come
together to deal with the inherent threat of increased Iranian influence in
the region. The Saudi-led collective move in Yemen entails a significant
advantage for Israel. It focuses the world’s attention on Iran’s involvement
in other nations in the Middle East and its growing influence in the region,
and it demonstrates that the threat coming from Iran is not limited to its
nuclear aspirations but is also manifested in its stark ambition to become
the regional hegemon. It is thus not inconceivable that the move will help
create shared interests between Israel and the member nations of the Saudi
coalition.
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While the action of the Arab coalition in Yemen may be in its initial stage,
it is already possible to draw some conclusions and assess their
significance for Israel and the region.

One, it has been a long time since Arab countries managed to unite for the
sake of taking substantive action, especially military, in order to defend
their own interests. However, Iran’s efforts to penetrate various arenas and
expand its influence throughout the region are an ominous threat to at least
some Arab states. Therefore, one can already speak of a collective Arab
achievement in light of the Arab nations’ ability to come together to deal
with the inherent threat – as they see it – of increased Iranian influence
in the region. If the military action against the Houthis and their
supporters in Yemen succeeds, it may represent the first of other joint
military actions.

Two, the Arab collective was willing to embark on a significant military
move even without the leadership of the United States, which was not always
the case, even when Arab interests were at stake. Now, having no choice,
Arab governments led the way when they perceived a clear and present danger
to their states’ security. That said, it is important to recognize that the
fight is against a non-state actor with limited powers and in an arena that
is on Saudi Arabia’s doorstep (while the Houthis are enjoying not
inconsiderable Iranian assistance, for example, they are light years away
from having attained the same capabilities as Hizbollah).

Three, in its drive to isolate the nuclear issue from other developments and
reach a nuclear deal with Iran, the United States has once again taken a
back seat regarding Yemen. Indeed, the administration announced it would not
raise the issue of Iran’s involvement in Yemen with the Iranians during the
nuclear negotiations. While it is possible to understand the Obama
administration’s behind the scenes involvement in the operation out of its
desire to reduce US military involvement in the Middle East, the
administration’s public statements on the events in Yemen were relatively
weak and its military involvement was decidedly low signature: intelligence
provision and logistical assistance (search and rescue) to the Arab forces.

Given that the administration made it clear that it does not want to link
Yemen to the nuclear talks, the negotiations will likely not be
significantly affected by regional tensions created by developments in Yemen
and renewed attention to Iranian involvement in Arab states. Nonetheless,
the administration is in an uncomfortable position, having to explain its
efforts to make rapid progress toward a nuclear agreement when Iran’s deep
involvement in the affairs of other nations is exposed yet again and when an
important segment of the Arab world is squaring off against Iran.

Furthermore, the operation has demonstrated the economic and political clout
that the Gulf states wield in the Arab world. They still need military
assistance and political backing from other Arab nations, first and foremost
Egypt, in order to score legitimacy and military assistance for their
actions, but since the regional upheavals began their authority in the
Middle East has grown. The Egyptian military remains the strongest among
Arab militaries, but because of the internal Egyptian shockwaves of recent
years the el-Sisi regime needs the massive economic assistance coming from
the Gulf states. Moreover, leaving the Bab el-Mandeb Strait – the strategic
naval passageway to the Suez Canal – free and clear of Iranian influence is
also a critical interest of the el-Sisi regime.

Complementing the current Arab activism and cohesion, Saudi Arabia’s foreign
policy, which for many years was characterized by relative passivity has –
indeed, since the outset of the upheavals that swept through the Arab world
in recent years, and evident in the entry of Saudi forces into Bahrain in
2011 – evinced new vitality. Moreover, Riyadh has a new king who is more of
an activist than his predecessor and is trying various means to unite the
Arab and Sunni world to curb the spread of Iran’s influence in the region.
The king has scored not inconsiderable achievements, for example, in his
ability to bring major Sunni rival sides – Turkey and Egypt – to support his
moves in Yemen.

Yemen is not a prominent Arab state politically or economically. Rather, its
importance lies in its location: its proximity to Saudi Arabia, with which
it shares a 1,800 kilometer border, and its control of the Bab el-Mandeb
Strait (the southern naval gate to the Suez Canal as well as to Israel).
Yemen is also one of several arenas in which there the struggle over the
nature of the Middle East continues between Iran and its satellites, on the
one hand, and the Sunni monarchist bloc, on the other. From the Saudis’
perspective, should Iran succeed in establishing its influence in Yemen,
they will be surrounded by Iran, which could then more easily inflame the
Zaidi Shiites within Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Yemen became a global arena for
the war on radical Sunni terrorism once al-Qaeda established its major
Arabian Peninsula base there.

These are the same reasons that for years Iran has made great effort to
create a bastion of influence in Yemen on the basis of the Shiite connection
to the Houthi rebels. After Iran established two hubs of influence aimed at
the Mediterranean – in Lebanon via Hizbollah, and in the Gaza Strip via
Hamas – it now seeks to create a similar locus of influence in Yemen aimed
at the Red Sea, intended to pressure Saudi Arabia not only from the
northeast but also from the southwest. In fact, the mode of Iranian
involvement in Yemen resembles the Iranian involvement in Iraq: assistance
in the form of money, weapons, and military training to local armed militias
in order to turn them into the major force in the country while relying on
Iran. It is therefore clear that the military move, led by Saudi Arabia and
with the participation of other Arab nations, is an undesirable development
for Iran, because it is aimed largely at Iran’s involvement in Yemen and
might lead to additional collective actions elsewhere in areas of Iranian
influence in the Arab sphere.

Finally, in going into battle, Saudi Arabia has taken a gamble, because at
this point it cannot afford to emerge as the loser in a struggle at its own
doorstep. Its military action is liable to invite a painful Iranian
countermove, by either the Houthis or other elements. In recent years, Iran
has not hesitated to try to attack Saudi assets, whether inside or outside
the kingdom (e.g., the 2011 attempt on the life of the Saudi ambassador in
the United States and the Iranian cyberattack that paralyzed Aramco’s
computer systems in 2012). In the current operation, Riyadh seeks to
eradicate Iranian subversion on its southern border and deter further
Iranian activities.

The Houthis cannot be defeated from the air, nor is this the objective.
Saudi Arabia’s major goal is to bring the Houthis back to the negotiating
table over the future of Yemen by the application of military pressure. A
secondary Saudi goal is to prevent the Houthis from using advanced weapons –
fighter jets and surface-to-surface missiles – and keep the strategic port
city of Aden from falling into their hands, which would spell the fall of
all of Yemen.

It may be that in their rapid conquests, the Houthis have prompted the rise
of forces stronger than their own, which could result in damage to their
troops and their retreat. Perhaps had they been less greedy, they would have
been able to digest all of Yemen with much greater ease. Saudi Arabia’s
chances of forcing the Houthis back are higher than its ability to operate
against Iran’s satellites in other arenas, if only because of its close
familiarity with different elements in Yemeni society and politics and its
geographical proximity to Yemen. But the Saudis must be quick and efficient
in exploiting their military and political momentum to try to reach a
political settlement, while also providing the Houthis with a greater say in
Yemen than before. Otherwise, Riyadh is liable to find itself mired in
Yemen. The Yemeni test of Saudi Arabia may therefore be summed up as
follows: attaining a military achievement that will lead to a political
settlement that the kingdom can tolerate. A settlement in which the Houthis
get even half of what they want would constitute a tough blow to Iran and
might even provide a tailwind to the forces fighting Iran in other arenas.

Lastly, the Saudi-led collective move entails a significant advantage for
Israel. The move focuses the world’s attention on Iran’s involvement in
other nations in the Middle East and its growing influence in the region,
and it demonstrates that the threat coming from Iran is not limited to its
nuclear aspirations but is also manifested in its stark ambition to become
the regional hegemon. It is thus not inconceivable that the move will help
create shared interests between Israel and the member nations of the Saudi
coalition.