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Monday, April 13, 2015
Ground Obstacles: New Technologies & Tactics unlike those of the Past

Ground Obstacles: New Technologies & Tactics unlike those of the Past
In the past, defensive lines were designed to disrupt the ground moves of
the enemy. Today, we face scattered strongholds and fortified localities of
non-state organizations. What lessons should we derive from this?
Atai Shelah 13/04/2015
http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/content/ground-obstacles-new-technologies-tactics-unlike-those-past

Obstacles were present on the battlefield since the first human conflict and
the first war to these days. Obstacles are intended to disrupt the ground
moves of the opponent and deny him his objective of capturing and dominating
the defender's territory. I will not wear out the reader with elaborate
descriptions of the various types of obstacles and their functions. I will
only state, generally, that all obstacles are generally classified into
natural obstacles (utilization of natural features) and man-made obstacles.
The latter classification includes the significant, primary category of
explosive obstacles (explosive charges, mines, booby-traps, explosive pits,
et al.), which is a highly significant element in combination with the
former obstacle categories.

One example of an interesting combination of natural elements with man-made
and explosive elements is the case of the "nature reserves", where
localities are excavated in a natural area, fortified strongholds are
erected and additionally, in accordance with a structured operational
concept, explosive charges and mines are laid and integrated. The "nature
reserves", just like the rural and urban areas, are characteristics that
reflect the transition from linear obstacle systems to obstacle focal points
that defend specific assets and areas.

In the not-too-distant past, most obstacles were built to defend the
national borders of states, when those states were concerned about the
possible invasion by the military forces of other states. The nature and
characteristics of the obstacle systems were, therefore, determined by the
need to defend states against other states. In line with this principle,
obstacle systems were built in Europe before, during and after the First
World War and the Second World War, and complete obstacle systems were
erected in the subsequent decades.

Similarly, the State of Israel erected its obstacle systems along the
borders surrounding it in accordance with the opponents it faced and the
threat of invasion by Arab countries into its territory. It was evident,
through the years, that Israel's borders were fortified and protected by
obstacle systems of varying intensity and depth, according to different
priorities. These obstacle systems were arranged in structured lines facing
the border, while the areas behind the obstacle systems, into the depth of
the national territory, remained almost totally free of any obstacles.

The old, linear obstacle systems were made up of lines of minefields
(containing a combination of anti-personnel and antitank mines), antitank
ditches, fence systems of various types and other obstacles, intended to
channel the opponent into points and bottlenecks dominated by observation
and fire. These obstacle systems were built with the direction from which
the opponent will arrive anticipated and the opponent's routes of advance
well known.

In the last few decades, and most intensively over the last two decades,
confrontations between states have disappeared completely, and the
confrontations that do take place involve states on one side and non-state
organizations on the other side: Hezbollah inside the State of Lebanon,
Taliban inside the State of Afghanistan or, naturally, Hamas inside the
Palestinian territory of the Gaza Strip. Terrorist organizations have
recently sprouted inside non-governed areas along the western border of
Syria (the north-eastern border of the State of Israel), in the Sinai
Peninsula and in many other areas around the world.

One of the primary characteristics of this new type of confrontation is that
the terrorist organizations do not have clearly-defined borders to defend.
What they do have is scattered assets and focal points. Moreover, those
organizations are always inferior to the states attacking them, so in order
to gain a relative advantage and compensate for their inferiority opposite
the superior capabilities of the state, they enter the built-up area and
avoid, to the maximum extent possible, combat encounters in open terrain,
where the state opponent is not hindered by the problem of collateral damage
(casualties and property damage inflicted on uninvolved parties).

One of the most significant phenomena that evolved in the last few decades,
which many refer to as asymmetrical warfare, is also reflected in the
context of the various ground obstacles and their characteristics.

So what happened to the obstacles? What are the actual implications? Where
did the changes occur and where are the primary challenges?

Well, the primary change is the fact that there are no longer structured,
"classic" obstacle systems, which means that there are no longer any "school
solutions", as many of us have been taught in the context of the
"breakthrough and obstacle breaching battle". This means that we must
improvise, as the opponent draws us in that direction. This also means that
the "toolbox" we "assembled" in the past in accordance with certain
standards, is no longer relevant in its present format. For example, the IDF
and Israeli defense establishment have endeavored, for many years, to find
solutions for breaching obstacle systems made up of linear minefields whose
specifications and boundaries were more or less known in advance. Today,
these solutions are no longer relevant as there are no linear obstacle
systems – only scattered focal points, heavily fortified localities and
decentralized areas that should be approached from different directions,
with the obstacle systems surrounding them often resembling a "sphere" – a
360-degree, all-around defensive system that includes obstacles above and
below the objective.

An interesting paradox is at work here, which calls for some fresh thinking.
On the one hand, technologically, military organizations (including IDF)
have developed impressively in the last few decades, and a major share of
their investment in technology was devoted to the task of overcoming
obstacles in the context of the ground maneuver. Now, when there are hardly
any linear obstacle systems any more, the opponent improvises and comes up
with obstacle solutions of different types, thereby rendering the "cutting
edge of military technology" useless. On the one hand you will find
technological masterpieces, and on the other hand, in many cases, you will
encounter primitive but highly effective obstacles. The mixed urban arena,
including the rural areas and the areas in between, has produced a different
"playground" or obstacle ground that is often amorphous, which compels us to
switch to s different thought pattern. This new thought pattern should be
reflected in two primary elements: a suitable combat doctrine and suitable
weapon systems.

Concept-wise, the supreme command is the need to cope with a mobile,
decentralized, constantly-changing obstacle system that is not always
frontal and where the structures of two different localities are never
identical. For example, as far as the force build-up aspects are concerned,
there is no point investing in training activities of breaching through
frontal obstacle systems, as was the case until recently. The reason may be
found in actual examples all around us: the disintegration of Syria ("the
collapse of the last frontal obstacle system"), and on the other hand, in a
significant number of confrontations/operations conducted between 2006 and
today, in which the IDF had to cope, in Lebanon and in the Gaza Strip, with
scattered obstacle systems possessing different characteristics. In order to
successfully cope with these situations, there is no choice, with regard to
the force build-up, the doctrine and the training activities, but to ensure
that the various combat engineering units, including the assault demolition
units of the infantry formations, are always within reach, to enable the
ground maneuver to advance while overcoming obstacles, as even a
booby-trapped door at the entrance to a building is an obstacle – not only a
cluster of landmines and/or a complex explosive charge assemblage.

The rural-urban area and its margins provide the opponent with countless
opportunities to saturate the area being defended with many hundreds of
obstacles, booby-traps and tactical surprises. The same applies to the
dense, fortified areas in Lebanon, referred to as "nature reserves". In the
latter case the terrain is admittedly open, but it was intended to enable
the terrorist organization to control its activity, to defend its assets and
to enable the launching of rockets into Israeli territory when necessary.

The other element of the solution includes the various technologies that we
should continue to develop in order to provide the forces operating in such
"playgrounds" with a complete, diversified and relevant "toolbox". I do not
wish to elaborate needlessly with regard to this particular issue – just
present one or two examples to illustrate the idea. IDF has invested
substantially over the years in the development and acquisition of "hurled"
breaching systems designed to clear a path through frontal minefields. These
systems are mostly statistical and have a robust effect – but they are not
very accurate. At this time there is a need for hurled systems that are less
energetic and much more accurate in order to deal effectively with the
obstacle systems deployed in the various areas I outlined above.

In conclusion: in the past, the combat engineering units, in accordance with
the force build-up and employment principles, adhered to the rationale of
providing a solution to broad frontal obstacle systems whose structure and
logic were well known. The combat doctrine and operational concept were
normally developed in accordance with that need. This is no longer the case.
Today, the combat zone must be saturated with numerous combat engineering
forces – smaller but better equipped detachments, capable of providing
solutions to the challenges they face. I believe that this phenomenon will
only expand, as that is where the world of terrorist organizations is
heading. They will take advantage of the area available to them to their own
benefit; they will exploit the local population in that area as well as the
fact that their opponents are regular military forces, operating according
to structured commands in the full sense of the word. This paradigm must be
smashed in the positive sense of the word. We must "change phases", revise
our thought patterns and operating procedures and adapt the force structure
and employment to the new reality, and even more importantly – to the
reality that evolves all the time right in front of us. ž
================================================
Colonel (res.) Atai Shelach is a former senior officer in the IDF Combat
Engineering Corps. Among other positions, he served as the commander of the
YAHALOM Unit, as the commander of the IDF Dignitary Protection Unit and as
the commander of the IDF CBRN Warfare Center. Today, he is the CEO of the
Engineering Solutions Group (ESG).

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