Khamenei Redefines Iran’s Red Lines for Nuclear Talks
Lt. Col. (ret.) Michael Segall
Jerusalem Issue Briefs
Vol. 15, No. 11 April 15, 2015

Institute for Contemporary Affairs
Founded jointly with the Wechsler Family Foundation
http://jcpa.org/article/khamenei-redefines-red-lines-nuclear-talks/

-On April 9, 2015, Iran’s top leaders, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and
President Hassan Rouhani, took firm positions on new red lines for the
ongoing nuclear negotiations: immediate removal of the sanctions as soon as
the agreement takes effect; opposition to special monitoring and inspections
of Iran’s military sites and missile program; and non-intervention in Iran’s
ongoing assistance to “resistance” organizations around the world.
-Khamenei’s remarks were was intended to counter the public-relations
campaign of President Obama who portrayed the West’s achievements both to
Middle Eastern public opinion and in the United States itself. Whereas Iran’s
opening positions are rigid, the West, in the latest talks, has already
shown how far it is willing to go for a signature on an agreement.
-Khamenei has already stated that Iran’s involvement in the region,
including its assistance to “resistance” elements, is not part of the
negotiations, and Iran is not required to put them on the agenda. Such words
reflect Iran’s growing confidence as its regional and international status
improves, and its defiant conduct will likely put it on a collision course
with the countries in the region.
-The IRGC commander’s support for the agreement on the one hand, and on the
other, the opposition of some conservative Majlis members who are associated
with Ahmadinejad, may indicate disagreement within the conservative camp and
possibly within the IRGC.


Different Interpretations of the Deal within Iran

On April 9, 2015, Iran’s religious-military leadership marked National
Nuclear Technology Day, where Iran’s nuclear achievements were revealed.
Iran’s top leaders, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Hassan
Rouhani, took staunch positions on new red lines for the ongoing
negotiations and the final agreement: immediate removal of the sanctions as
soon as the agreement takes effect, without connection to other issues;
opposition to special monitoring and inspections of Iran’s military sites
and missile program; and non-intervention in its ongoing assistance to
“resistance” organizations in various parts of the world.

In Iran’s domestic arena, divergent interpretations of the Lausanne
Agreement have emerged between the different leaders. These concern the
price Iran paid and, particularly, its stance on the signing of a final
agreement. These controversies, along with the public attention given them,
constitute a significant part of Iran’s negotiating strategy that aims to
give the West an impression of domestic wrangling over the terms of the
agreement (several Majlis members have indeed pointed out that the Majlis
must approve the final agreement). But the wrangling also reflects genuine
disagreements between the different domestic power centers, particularly
between the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Foreign
Ministry, and possibly also within the IRGC itself and between some of the
IRGC and Khamenei.

“The United States Has Recognized Iran’s Regional, International, and
Nuclear Status”

Along with U.S. President Barack Obama’s efforts to market the nuclear
agreement in the United States, the Iranian Supreme Leader, president, and
negotiating team, headed by Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, have
likewise been describing the agreement’s contents and achievements to the
Majlis, to the conservative elements (including those within the IRGC), and
to the Iranian people.

In a special address on National Nuclear Technology Day, Rouhani paid homage
to the nuclear scientists killed in a string of assassinations and
highlighted “Iran’s victory over the great military and economic superpower
of the world,” which, he said, has recognized the regime along with Iran’s
regional, international, and nuclear status. He proclaimed: “Did we want
more than that…we made clear that we do not submit to power…we proved this
[now] as we did during the eight years of war with Iraq…the world has begun
to dignify the Iranian nation.”

Rouhani also asserted, “Iran will not sign any agreement except one that
immediately cancels all of the economic sanctions on the first day of the
agreement’s implementation.” He added that, as the “heroic” negotiation team
had made clear, Iran would not give up its nuclear technology to attain
peace. “[The enrichment facility] at Natanz will continue its activity. [In
addition] over a thousand centrifuges exist and will continue to be
installed at Fordow. [Likewise] we will have a heavy-water reactor at Arak
to produce medicines and medical equipment.”1 Rouhani stated further that
Iran would continue its research and development activity, utilizing the
potential of its scientists and thinkers in line with its national
interests, and declared the inauguration of the domestic “virtual fuel
complex, which serves as a testing facility for [nuclear] power reactors and
other products.”2

Khamenei: “No Agreement Has Been Signed”

Khamenei spoke of the Lausanne Agreement for the first time and asserted
that “everything is in the details.” Throwing cold water on those who
rushed to extol the agreement, he said, “The premature praise that was
heaped on me and on others [Rouhani and the negotiating team] is
meaningless…. What has been done so far does not ensure, either in principle
or in terms of the content that the talks will culminate in an agreement.”
He also remarked, “The side one cannot trust at all [the P5+1] may be
seeking to constrain Iran through the fine points of the agreement [i.e.,
its technical aspects].”

If people in the West, Khamenei continued, were wondering why he had not yet
taken a position on the talks’ outcome, it was because “there is no need to
take a position since the negotiating team itself says that nothing binding
has been reached between the sides…what position am I supposed to
take…nothing has happened.” Khamenei also said that he concurs with the
U.S. assertion that “No agreement is better than a bad agreement,” or, as he
put it, “The non-signing of an agreement is more honorable than signing an
agreement that compromises the interests and the dignity of your country.”
The Supreme Leader said he was not responsible for the details, as claimed
in the West, and that the negotiating team has his full trust. Nevertheless,
he was very disturbed “by the deception, the lies, and the betrayal” that
typify the other side; as an example he cited the “fact sheet” the White
House issued, “most of which is full of lies.”3

Khamenei asserted that if, with Allah’s help, the negotiating team were to
succeed in reaching an agreement, “all the sanctions must be removed on that
very day. If they [the West] drag their feet about lifting the sanctions and
link it to other processes, why should we continue the negotiations? We
negotiate with the aim of removing the sanctions; linking the sanctions to
other issues is completely unacceptable.”

Khamenei stressed that he had warned the negotiating team not to enable the
West to enter military areas and facilities (such as the Parchin base): “The
military leadership of Iran must not permit the entry by foreigners into
Iran’s military facilities under pretexts of monitoring or special
monitoring [i.e., surprise inspections and invasive monitoring] and other
pretexts, or to stop the advancement of Iran’s defensive capabilities [i.e.,
the issue of the missile and rocket industry, and especially the long-range
ballistic missiles that Iran is building].”

Khamenei further emphasized that the issue of Iran’s support for resistance
organizations in various regions must not be put on the agenda. The talks
with the United States, he said, “focus solely on the nuclear issue and not
on any other issue…. If the United States behaves appropriately during these
talks, there may be room for optimism about talks with it on other issues as
well.”4



Zarif in the Conservatives’ Sights

Foreign Minister Zarif, who led the negotiating team, was criticized by
ultra conservative elements in Iran. He was even depicted in some cartoons
as unconditionally capitulating to U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry.5
Zarif, who appears in the cartoon prostrate on the deck, says, “It looks
like it’s now win-win.” More scathing yet is the illustration that shows
Zarif standing behind Kerry, who is sawing the tree of the Iranian nuclear
program’s achievements and, apparently, offending the memory of the nuclear
scientists who were assassinated on Iran’s way to becoming a threshold
nuclear state.



On April 7, Zarif and members of his negotiating team presented the
framework agreement to the Majlis. Some of the parliamentarians criticized
the concessions, as they called them, and Iran’s crossing of red lines
during the talks. Previously, the foreign minister had given far-ranging
interviews to the Iranian media in which he detailed Iran’s achievements in
the negotiations. Students from Tehran University students and religious
seminaries demonstrated opposite the Majlis and presented 30 questions to
the foreign minister on the crossing of red lines during the Lausanne talks
and the ambiguity of the joint declaration.

Zarif and the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)
presented the main points of the agreement to the Majlis chairman and the
members of its National Security and Foreign Policy Committee. Heated
arguments erupted between Zarif and some ultraconservative Majlis members,
particularly concerning the clauses on future enrichment at the Fordow site
in the Qom area and at the main site in Natanz. These parliamentarians, led
by Javad Karimi-Ghodousi (one of former President Ahmadinejad’s staunch
supporters) reviled Zarif for breaching Khamenei’s directives. According to
one version of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran will not conduct
enrichment at Fordow, only research. Hassan Shariatmadari, editor of the
newspaper Kayhan, which is considered Khamenei’s mouthpiece, also criticized
the agreement and wrote that Iran “gave a saddled horse and received a torn
bridle.” He called on the government not to exaggerate when describing its
achievements in the agreement that are unrealistic, according to him, and to
be open to the criticisms for the sake of the national interest.6

Waiting for the Iranian Version of the Fact Sheet

Several members of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee who
were present at Zarif’s briefing said he had told them that in the coming
days he would issue the Iranian version of the fact sheet on the agreement
signed in Lausanne. They said this was his most important statement during
the briefing, “so that those issues that have stirred serious concern among
the Iranians will be revised and released in this fact sheet.” Iran is
taking this step to confront what it calls “lies” in the U.S. version of the
document, which, in Iran’s view, was aimed at reassuring the U.S. allies in
the region.7 Zarif revealed that the leader “”told us to prepare our own
version of the Lausanne joint statement.”8

The accounts of the briefing also claimed that the Iranian negotiating team
had made clear that Iran would not permit, in the context of the monitoring
process, the placement of online cameras in its nuclear facilities that
would give live transmission of Iran’s activity within them, so as to avoid
endangering the lives of the nuclear scientists. According to the Mehr News
Agency, Zarif said during the closed door meeting, “Iran will not fulfill
any of its undertakings until the Security Council issues a resolution [on
removing the sanctions] under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.”9

Majlis member Gholamali Jafarzadeh, who was present at the meeting, said the
chairman of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran stated that Iran’s
achievements in the field of nuclear energy are what pushed the world powers
to the negotiating table. Javad Karimi Qoddousi, another committee member
and critic of the agreement, quoted the AEOI chairman as saying that Iran
had injected UF6 into the latest generation of centrifuges, the IR8,
immediately after the final signing of the agreement with the world
powers.10

Surprising Support

Support for the agreement, surprisingly, came from IRGC commander
Mohammad-Ali Jafari, who censured the agreement’s critics and claimed the
ongoing criticism could hinder the “diplomatic jihad.” Jafari, who expressed
support for the foreign minister and the president, emphasized that, as
Zarif and his team had declared, Iran’s red lines include maintaining its
nuclear fuel enrichment cycle, continuing the relevant research and
development, and the removal of the sanctions. Jafari said that the United
States had failed in its attempt to impose its will on Iran and alter its
behavior, and actually it was Iran that had imposed its will on the United
States. Iran had induced Washington to replace the policy of “all options on
the table” with “a diplomatic channel for solving the nuclear issue.”

Jafari added that the United States’ insincerity and doubtful credibility
when it came to upholding its commitments, along with its distorted
interpretation of the joint declaration, posed difficulties for the
continued diplomatic endeavor. Nevertheless, Iran would keep adhering to
its red lines (as Khamenei had defined them): a complete fuel cycle and the
lifting of all of the sanctions.11 In this vein Mohammad-Reza Naqdi,
commander of the Basij (the volunteer arm of the IRGC), called the United
States “a liar that cannot be trusted.”12

Similarly, Hamidreza Moqaddamfar, adviser to the IRGC commander, portrayed
the agreement as an achievement and underlined Iran’s right to keep
enriching uranium and retain all of its nuclear facilities. He stressed that
the United States’ retreat from its red lines had been achieved through
Khamenei’s guidance of the negotiating team, along with the firm stance of
the team and the Iranian people. Another reason for the recognition of Iran’s
nuclear rights, he added, is Iran’s “considerable spiritual influence” in
the region and in the international sphere. He remarked that one source of
concern regarding the lifting of the sanctions is U.S. and/or Israeli access
to information on the Iranian nuclear program, to be attained by stealth
through the IAEA’s inspectors.13

What Comes Next?

Khamenei’s clarification that “nothing has been signed yet” poured cold
water on the joy displayed in some sectors in Iran. It also implied
criticism of the negotiating team and the president, who praised the Iranian
achievements before any signing of a final agreement. Khamenei’s remarks
were intended to apprise the negotiating team of Iran’s new red lines for
the subsequent negotiations and to counter the public-relations campaign of
President Obama, who portrayed the West’s achievements both to Middle
Eastern public opinion and in the United States itself.

Apparently the statement “Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” will
continue to characterize the upcoming, more difficult stages of the talks.
These will include precisely those sensitive matters that, according to
Khamenei in his response to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),
must be included on the negotiating table. Whereas Iran’s opening positions
are rigid, the West, in the latest talks, has already shown how far it is
willing to go for a signature on an agreement.

The window of time remaining before the June 30, 2015 date set for reaching
a final agreement, which may also be extended, will see both open and covert
struggles in both capitals – Tehran and Washington – and between the West
and Iran as well. Iran will keep hewing to Khamenei’s new red lines
concerning the final results of the agreement and its implications for Iran.

The major changes in the Middle East since the “Arab Spring” or “Islamic
Awakening,” as Iran calls it, will also ultimately influence the final
outcomes of the negotiations. Khamenei has already stated regarding his new
red lines that Iran’s involvement in the region, including its assistance to
“resistance” elements, is not part of the negotiations, and Iran is not
required to put them on the agenda. Such words reflect Iran’s growing
confidence as its regional and international status improves (as evidenced
by the revival of its S-300 advanced SA missile deal with Russia) , and its
defiant conduct will likely put it on a collision course with countries in
the region, and ultimately with the United States itself.

The trigger could be Yemen, where the fighting between Iran and the Houthis
on the one side, and the Arab coalition on the other, is escalating. During
the months of negotiation over a final agreement, Iran’s domestic debate is
also likely to continue. Although this debate is authentic, it is also part
of Iran’s negotiating tactics of projecting domestic disagreements over the
“concessions” that it made during the talks on a framework agreement.

The IRGC commander’s support for the agreement on the one hand, and, on the
other, the opposition of some conservative Majlis members who are associated
with Ahmadinejad and of the previous chairman of the negotiating team, Said
Jalili, and of Kayhan editor Shariatmadari who is close to Khamenei and
serves as his representative in the newspaper, may indicate disagreements
within the conservative camp and possibly within the IRGC.

* * *

Notes

1 http://www.president.ir/fa/85967

2 http://www.president.ir/en/85973

3 https://twitter.com/khamenei_ir

4 http://farsi.khamenei.ir/news-content?id=29404

5 http://www.aryanews.com/News.aspx?code=20150405112510703&svc=24

6 http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13940116001288

7 http://www.tasnimnews.com/english/Home/Single/703591

8 http://en.mehrnews.com/detail/News/106653

9 Mehr News Agency, April 7, 2015

10 http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13940118000331

11 http://tnews.ir/news/913C39686101.html

12 http://tinyurl.com/ISNA94011704656

13 http://www.tasnimnews.com/english/Home/Single/702514




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About Lt. Col. (ret.) Michael Segall

IDF Lt.-Col. (ret.) Michael (Mickey) Segall, an expert on strategic issues
with a focus on Iran, terrorism, and the Middle East, is a senior analyst at
the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and at Foresight Prudence.