Turkey Navigates between East and West, Shiites and Sunnis
INSS Insight No. 687, April 20, 2015
Oded Eran, Gallia Lindenstrauss

SUMMARY: Despite repeated attempts over more than a decade, Turkish leader
Erdogan has failed to command a central role for his country in a region
beset by religious, ethnic, and economic controversies. In an attempt to win
on all fronts he has alienated friends and foes, as well as NATO allies. The
majority of these NATO allies are also members of the European Union; Turkey
has long aspired to become a member of the EU, and at least as far as formal
statements are concerned, Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party
share this goal. However, Turkey's dream of becoming an EU member is fast
fading away. Moreover, it is doubtful whether Turkey under Erdogan is
genuinely seeking membership, given the obligations it entails. In the past,
part of the allure of the “Turkish model” in Arab public opinion was the
fact that Turkey is an EU candidate state. Sans this element, Erdogan’s
autocratic tendencies and worrying signs regarding the Turkish economy make
the Turkish model much less enviable, and mark one more reason for the
relative decline of Turkey’s regional influence.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's one day visit to Iran on April 7, 2015
serves as yet another example of the unscrupulous nature of Turkey's
President. However, despite repeated attempts over more than a decade, the
Turkish leader has failed to command a central role for his country in a
region beset by religious, ethnic, and economic controversies. In an attempt
to win on all fronts he has alienated friends and foes, as well as NATO
allies. The majority of these NATO allies are also members of the European
Union; Turkey has long aspired to become a member of the EU, and at least as
far as formal statements are concerned, Erdogan and the Justice and
Development Party share this goal.

Just ten days before his visit to Tehran, Erdogan declared that “Iran and
the terrorist groups must withdraw” from Yemen. This remark drew a blunt,
undiplomatic rejoinder from Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif,
who stated, "It would be better if those who have created irreparable
damages with their strategic blunders and lofty politics would adopt
responsible policies." Indeed, one can argue that along with Iran’s
interventionist policy vis-à-vis Syria, Turkey’s uncompromising stance
regarding the removal of the al-Assad regime, while morally justified, has
also contributed to the prolongation of the conflict in Syria.

A few days after returning to Ankara, Erdogan was on the phone with the King
of Saudi Arabia and the Emir of Qatar. If his purpose was to mediate between
Iran, which backs the Houthis in Yemen, and Saudi Arabia, which leads the
intervention to curtail the advancement of the Houthis, he will probably
face yet another failure. United Arab Emirates Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs, Anwar Qarqash, called the positions of Turkey (and Pakistan) on
Yemen contradictory and vague, and claimed that Iran is more important to
these two countries than the Arab Gulf states. He also stated that these
contradictory positions prove that Arab security from Libya to Yemen is the
responsibility of none but the Arab countries. In his opinion, statements
coming from Ankara show coordinated views on Yemen among Iran and Turkey.

If the purpose of Erdogan’s visit to Tehran was the potential economic
opportunity, given a possible lifting of the sanctions, his success remains
to be seen. Erdogan himself stated that a major reason for his short trip
was to lower the price Turkey pays for the 10 bcm of natural gas it
purchases annually since 2001 from Iran. Turkey requested a price reduction
of 25 percent (a request now under international arbitration) but the fact
that oil prices, and the prices of natural gas pegged to them, tumbled
dramatically in recent months will make it hard for Iran to respond
positively. In response, Turkey could opt for importing more gas from
Russia, which agreed to reduce the price of gas it sells to Turkey by 10.25
percent, but that would increase the dependency on Russia, which Turkey is
loath to do. On the other hand, Iran is likely to become indispensable for
Turkey with regard to ground transportation routes, as security concerns
make it dangerous for Turkish trucks to pass through Syria and Iraq.
Furthermore, the non-renewal of the transportation agreement with Egypt
makes this route less relevant, and while the option of docking Turkish
trucks at Israel’s Haifa port still exists, it is not sufficient. In
addition, a giant deal could develop if Iran becomes a partner to the
Trans-Anatolian Gas-Pipeline (TANAP) that is designed to transport gas from
Azerbaijan to Turkey and from there to Europe. Future political
circumstances permitting, Iran will be able to use TANAP to transfer natural
gas to Europe. A stake in this project, if offered to Iran, could lead to a
strategic partnership.

Still, that is a project that may take years to implement, and while it has
the potential of improving Turkey’s relations with Europe, the current
status is one of tension and adds to an abysmal Turkish record in foreign
affairs – certainly far from the objective once set by the current Turkish
Prime Minister and former Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, of “zero
problems” with the neighbors.

Turkey's dream of becoming an EU member is fast fading away. The
difficulties in reaching a solution to the conflict in Cyprus (though not
wholly the responsibility of Turkey); the long list of the Turkish
government’s anti-democratic measures; the transparent objection of major EU
members to Turkey's acceptance; the Turkish denial of the Armenian genocide
(which recently led to a diplomatic crisis between Turkey and the Vatican);
and the crisis within the Eurozone – all cast a giant shadow over Turkey's
potential membership, at least if no major change takes place in the current
structure of the EU. Last year’s statement by EU Commission President
Jean-Claude Juncker, that there will be no further EU enlargement in the
next five years, adds to the improbability of Turkey ever becoming a full
member. The official statement of the EU Council in December 2014 that
Turkey is a candidate state and a key EU partner does not change the reality
of the current status of the relations. Moreover, it is doubtful whether
Turkey under Erdogan is genuinely seeking membership, given the obligations
it entails. His recent reaction to the official EU concern about steps taken
by his government against opposition media organs – that the EU should keep
its wisdom to itself – is telling. In the past, part of the allure of the
“Turkish model” in Arab public opinion was the fact that Turkey is an EU
candidate state. Sans this element, Erdogan’s autocratic tendencies and
worrying signs regarding the Turkish economy make the Turkish model much
less enviable, and mark one more reason for the relative decline of Turkey’s
regional influence.