Vital Points on the Iran Deal: Major Flaws and Positive Elements
Brig.-Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser and Amb. Alan Baker,
Jerusalem Issue Briefs Vol. 15, No. 27 August 27, 2015
http://jcpa.org/article/vital-points-on-the-iran-deal-major-flaws-and-positive-elements/

-The nuclear agreement with the main world powers is set to enable Iran
safely, legally, and without economic hardships or changes in its rogue
policies, to overcome the main obstacles on its way to possessing a nuclear
weapons arsenal and becoming a regional hegemonic power.
-The agreement will legally provide Iran with the capability to shorten the
time required to produce such an arsenal within the next 10-15 years
(including the production of fissile material, weaponization, acquiring
delivery systems, and improved military capabilities to protect the military
nuclear program), so that it would be practically impossible to stop it.
-This is in exchange for a questionable and barely verifiable Iranian
commitment to avoid producing arms and some limited restrictions on its
nuclear program for 10-15 years.
-Reliance on Iran’s open reaffirmation in the agreement that it will not
seek, develop, or acquire nuclear weapons is untrustworthy and even naïve,
given Iran’s past record of concealing its nuclear activities, its periodic
declarations of hostility vis-à-vis the U.S. and Israel, and its regime’s
messianic aspirations.
-In short, the agreement unilaterally and unconditionally grants Iran
everything it has been seeking without any viable quid-pro-quo from Iran to
the international community.
-Above all, it should be obvious that no possible sympathetic statement by
the U.S. Administration, or even military or other compensation, could
logically stand against paving the route to a nuclear arsenal by a state
that repeatedly declares its commitment to obliterate Israel.



In light of the centrality and vast importance of the debate around the July
14, 2015, agreement between Iran and the main world powers – “The Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action” (JCPOA )1 – and with a view to analyzing in a
straightforward manner the various aspects of this agreement, this analysis
lists the major flaws of the agreement, as well as its positive elements. It
concludes with a discussion of some of the dilemmas inherent in the
agreement and its implications.

Flaws of the Agreement

General

The agreement is set to enable Iran safely, legally, and without economic
hardships or changes in its rogue policies, to overcome the main obstacles
on its way to possessing a nuclear weapons arsenal and becoming a regional
hegemonic power. The agreement will legally provide Iran with the capability
to shorten the time required to produce such an arsenal within the next
10-15 years (including the production of fissile material, weaponization,
acquiring delivery systems, and improved military capabilities to protect
the military nuclear program), so that it would be practically impossible to
stop it. This is in exchange for a questionable and barely verifiable
Iranian commitment to avoid producing arms and some limited restrictions on
its nuclear program for 10-15 years.

Reliance on Iran’s open reaffirmation in the agreement that it will not
seek, develop, or acquire nuclear weapons is untrustworthy and even naïve,
given Iran’s past record of concealing its nuclear activities, its periodic
declarations of hostility vis-à-vis the U.S. and Israel, and its regime’s
messianic aspirations.

The agreement fails to empower the international community with the means to
prevent Iran’s crossing the line that keeps it from producing a nuclear
weapon even during the 10-15 years in which there are restrictions on its
enrichment. Iran could accomplish it via various paths: First, through a
“break out” policy, since, unlike the main argument of the U.S.
Administration that Iran will need a year to acquire enough fissile material
for its first nuclear explosive device, in fact it is going to need only
about six months to acquire the necessary amount. Second, Iran can adopt a
“sneak out” policy since its nuclear activities outside the declared sites
are not going to be effectively monitored, if at all, and since there is no
real monitoring of its cooperation with other rogue countries such as North
Korea.

In short, the agreement unilaterally and unconditionally grants Iran
everything it has been seeking without any viable quid-pro-quo from Iran to
the international community.

Inasmuch as the agreement paves the way for Iran to produce an arsenal of
nuclear weapons through the enrichment of uranium before the 10-15 year
period, after the period, and certainly later through the production and
processing of plutonium, the agreement is clearly a danger to the world
order and to the future of the Middle East, as well as to U.S. interests and
to the security of Israel.

The Deal Solves All of Iran’s Problems

In order to obtain a nuclear arsenal, Iran has to acquire sufficient
quantities of fissile material (uranium enriched to around 90 percent or
processed plutonium), gain the ability to turn this material into a weapon
(“weaponization”), and produce delivery systems, with an emphasis on
long-range missiles. In addition, it has to be able to protect its nuclear
facilities from attack so that it may safely cross the sensitive period in
which it is trying to produce a nuclear arsenal but it has not yet completed
a nuclear bomb (the “threshold”).

The deal solves all of Iran’s problems, if it is ready to wait 10-15 years,
by shortening the threshold that separates it from a nuclear arsenal to
practically no time. It does not effectively prevent Iran from breaching the
agreement and achieving its goal even earlier, if it decides that the
conditions justify it.

Uranium Enrichment – Break Out, Sneak Out, or Wait Out

Three paths are open for Iran to secure the enriched uranium for a nuclear
weapons arsenal: break out, sneak out, or wait out patiently until the
sunset of the restrictions on its (military) nuclear program in 10 or 15
years which are included in the agreement.

It has to be emphasized that Iran does not have any civilian justification
for its vast nuclear program, a fact affirmed by the United States and the
European Union. Therefore, the entire logic of the agreement is baseless and
stands in striking contradiction to the November 24, 2013, Joint Plan of
Action (JPOA), which states that the enrichment capabilities will be in line
with Iran’s civilian needs.

Break out – Rather than blocking Iran’s ability to enrich uranium to a
weapons-grade level to produce nuclear weapons, the agreement enables Iran,
if/when it decides to breach the agreement and dismiss the inspectors, to do
so within a six-month period and not in a year as the U.S. Administration
repeatedly and falsely claims. By activating the 13,000 centrifuges and
related equipment that are going to be uninstalled, rather than destroyed or
sent out of Iran (the agreement requires Iran merely to store the equipment
under IAEA monitoring), Iran will need only six months to produce enough
fissile material for the first nuclear explosive device.

Moreover, the agreement imposes only very minor limitations on the continued
development of highly sophisticated and advanced centrifuges and basically
allows Iran to proceed with them.

Part of these centrifuges may be installed in the deep underground facility
in Fordow. Despite President Obama’s declaration that there is no
justification for Iran’s Fordow military enrichment facility – the sole
purpose of which is to create weapons-grade uranium – the agreement makes no
requirement that Iran dismantle that military facility.

The agreement poses no limitations whatsoever on Iran’s ability to stock
unenriched uranium (UF 6) which is used as the raw material in the
enrichment process to produce weapons-grade uranium.

Sneak out – Even if Iran observes the terms of the agreement, it can utilize
the time-frame of the agreement in order to gradually develop its nuclear
weapons capability through:

1.The use of secret, undeclared, and uninspected facilities. The agreement
does not provide the ability to hold inspections “anywhere, anytime” in
undeclared facilities, and the procedures for getting permission to perform
inspections in such sites are going to last at least 24 days, and probably
fail. Firstly, this is because the Iranians make it very clear that they
will never permit inspections in their military and security facilities;
secondly, because according to the agreed-upon procedures, the IAEA has to
present to Iran the information upon which it bases its request. This
probably will not happen because of the sensitivity of such information; and
thirdly, it is going to be very difficult to get this intelligence.

2.Acquisition of the necessary raw materials from abroad, as well as the
secret operation of enrichment facilities outside Iran. The agreement states
that any cooperation with foreign entities has to be approved by the
monitoring committee,
but there are no means that enable IAEA or the E3+3 to monitor such
activities.

Wait out – Waiting until after the 10-year limitation on the numbers of
centrifuges

Iran will be then allowed to increase the number of its installed and
operating centrifuges without limitation and install advanced ones in order
to enrich its uranium more rapidly. This will enable it to produce vast
amounts of nuclear weapons-grade uranium within a very short period (even a
few weeks).

Waiting until after the 15-year period of limitation on enrichment of
uranium

Iran will be completely unrestricted in its ability to produce enriched
uranium. It will be allowed to produce highly-enriched uranium without any
limitation on the level of enrichment (in the first 15 years it is not
allowed to enrich to a level exceeding 3.67 percent, which constitutes 40-50
percent of the time needed to enrich to 90 percent), and after the twentieth
year, even the limitations on the amount of enriched uranium it may possess
will be lifted. This will enable Iran to have enriched uranium for a nuclear
arsenal within a week or even less. In other words, the threshold will
disappear and no military threat will be considered credible by Iran.

Plutonium Production

Iran is permitted to maintain a heavy water nuclear reactor in Arak, in
clear contradiction to the original demand that it replace its heavy water
reactor, ostensibly intended for civilian purposes, with a light water
reactor. The exact design and details of the new reactor are not known yet,
but as long as the reactor is a heavy water one, changes may be carried out
in a way that will increase the plutonium production to enable production of
sufficient plutonium for use in nuclear weaponry.

After the 15-year term of the agreement, Iran will be allowed to acquire
additional heavy-water nuclear reactors that will enable production of
significant amounts of plutonium. Especially since all the other relevant
restrictions will also be lifted, Iran will be able to process and separate
the plutonium in order to make it suitable for military nuclear use.

Inspections, Supervision, and Weaponization

The provisions of the agreement regarding inspections and supervision of
undeclared sites provide no genuine possibility of ascertaining or proving
prohibited activity by Iran. Achieving the “smoking gun” information that
will justify intrusive inspection will be difficult.

The agreement has no clear definition of the severity of various breaches
and hence opens the possibility of downgrading any breach by Iran to a minor
issue.

Moreover, the agreement does not guarantee that the IAEA will have
uninterrupted access to Iranian scientists and experts so that the agency
will be able to be aware of their activities and interview them regarding
these activities. This may leave the agency clueless – as it is today –
about one of the most important assets of the Iranian nuclear program.

The agreement does not require Iran to provide full data regarding its past
practices for developing fissile material into bombs. The secret agreement
between Iran and the IAEA, which, for example, allows Iran itself to provide
the agency with the needed evidence of what it did in Parchin, is a clear
indication of the grand folly orchestrated between the parties to the
agreement regarding the “Possible Military Dimensions” of Iran’s past
activities. In fact, the agreement places all the responsibility for
starting the implementation of the agreement solely on the director-general
of the IAEA, Yukiya Amano, who is supposed to present his report by
mid-October, 2015. There is no way Amano will dare to report that Iran has
not come clean on its past activities (thereby delaying the activation of
the agreement). The efforts to hide the details from Congress and from
Israel, as well as the U.S. Administration’s strange announcement that the
U.S. already knows everything about the topic, are clear indications that
obfuscation will be the inevitable result. This means that the real data
about Iran’s progress in its weaponization efforts so far will not be
available to the international community.

Development and Production of Delivery Systems

The agreement imposes no limitations on Iran’s ability to produce more
ground-to-ground missiles with a range of 1,700-2,000 km., capable of
covering the entire Middle East region.

Similarly, it imposes no limitations on Iranian efforts to develop ICBM
missiles with an extended range of up to 10,000 km., capable of carrying
nuclear warheads and reaching the east coast of North America.

While, during the first eight years, Iran is prevented from acquiring
foreign assistance for the development of such missile capabilities, Iran is
permitted, between the eighth and fifteenth years of the agreement, to use
foreign aid in the development of its long-range missiles.

Limitation on Acquisition of Weapons by Iran

The agreement requires a mere five-year limitation on the acquisition by
Iran of weapons, including weapons to protect its nuclear capabilities.
During this five-year period Iran will, however, be able to sign contracts
with foreign suppliers and train personnel to use such weapons for
deployment immediately after the five-year period, thereby enhancing Iran’s
deterrence and response capacities.

Immediately after the agreement was reached, Iran declared that it will soon
receive the advanced S-300 air defense missile system from Russia and planes
from China – deals that make a mockery out of the prohibition on arms
acquisition.

Foreign Assistance to Protect Iran’s Nuclear Installations

The agreement provides Iran with assurances of international assistance in
the protection of its nuclear installations from attempts to harm them, as
well as access by Iran to cooperation with foreign states in the field of
nuclear installation safety and security.

No Link to Iranian Behavior on Terror, Incitement or Human Rights

The agreement includes no delay mechanism, or sunset limitation, that
conditions the lifting of international sanctions to a requirement that Iran
refrain from supporting terror and insurgency, to refrain from its calls for
the destruction of Israel, to end its Holocaust-denial, and to observe human
rights norms.

Breach of the Agreement and “Snapback” Sanctions

The complicated mechanism in the agreement for reinstating international
sanctions (“snapback”) is totally unrealistic and inoperable. Any such
restoration of sanctions, if at all, would only be long after Iran has
acquired many billions of dollars and after commercial relations with Iran
would reach such proportions that would render possible restoration of
sanctions to be impractical and impossible to implement.

Moreover, under the JCPOA agreement, sanctions snapback cannot be applied
“with retroactive effect to contracts signed between any party and Iran or
any Iranian individuals and entities prior to” sanctions being re-imposed.2
In other words, long-term contracts signed on Iranian gas and oil sales, for
instance, which Iran is quickly locking in, will be immune to reinstated
sanctions.

Apart from a theoretical re-imposition of sanctions in the event of a
material breach of the agreement, it remains unclear what would be the
consequence of lesser breaches of the agreement. The U.S. has already
announced that breaches of the limitations on weapons purchases would not
lead to a renewal of sanctions.

It remains unclear what would bring about a U.S. decision to use military
force in order to block Iranian advances toward nuclear weapons
capabilities.

Iran’s International Standing

Even before ascertaining how to properly implement the agreement, and
despite the fact that Iran has given no commitment to change the extreme and
hostile nature of its policies, Iran is openly declaring its intention to
become a major power in the region as part of its designs to alter the world
order. Iranian leaders declared their intention to increase efforts to
assist their allies in the region (such as Hizbullah, Syria’s Assad, the
Houthis in Yemen, Palestinian terror groups, and the Shiite movement in
Bahrain).

Parallel to this, Western and other countries are not concealing their
intention to cooperate with Iran in confronting the Islamic State in Iraq
and Syria, to expand their commercial and political relationships with Iran,
and even to grant Iran a leading role in dealing with issues that affect
Iran directly.

This enables Iran not only to free itself from economic pressure and
isolation, but to move rapidly towards becoming a hegemon power in the
Middle East. For that purpose Iran has several new tools: the huge amount of
money it will receive as a result of the agreement; new relations with the
West; and its victory over Western and especially the American pressure,
which prove Iran’s strength to many in the region and how weak are the West,
in general, and the United States in particular.

In summation, the agreement enables Iran to achieve its goal of becoming a
hegemon power in the region even before acquiring the nuclear weapons it
wants to possess as a tool for achieving this goal.

Internal Stability and Moderation

The hopes enunciated by the U.S. Administration that the agreement will
bring about a moderation of the extreme nature of the Iranian regime are
nothing more than a naïve illusion and wishful thinking.

To the contrary, the strengthening of the status of the Iranian leadership,
the bolstering of Iran’s economy, the upgrading of its status in the
international community, as well as the likelihood of Iran’s advancing
toward nuclear weapons capability, will only serve to bolster its status and
enhance its repression of opposition elements.

Unrealistic Reliance on Intelligence

The confidence of the U.S. Administration in its ability to monitor Iranian
compliance by intelligence means is misplaced. History has proven that
revealing foreign nuclear agendas, including those of North Korea, Iran,
Syria, Pakistan, India and Iraq, by U.S. intelligence was far from
impressive. The covert nature of such activities would clearly pose
extremely difficult problems for any viable intelligence collection.

The Threat to Israel’s Security

Israel, which is not a party to the agreement, will clearly face increased
dangers and will be obliged to invest huge resources to enhance its
intelligence and defense capabilities in light of the real threat emanating
from Iran.

Regional Nuclear Arms Race and the NPT

Given the agreement’s acceptance and the acknowledgment of Iran as a
threshold nuclear state, it is highly likely that Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and
Turkey, as well as other states, will find themselves in an arms race to
acquire their own respective military nuclear capability. This, in itself,
will pose a direct challenge to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty3 and to
regional and world stability, and will ignite a nuclear arms race in the
Middle East.

The agreement clarifies that the NPT remains the international regime
regarding nuclear activities and that the agreement will not serve as a
precedent for other states. But how can anyone now deny a demand by any
other country – which, unlike Iran, has not cheated – to be allowed to enjoy
exactly the same deal that Iran made?

International Stature of the United States

The substantial concessions to Iran by the United States in the agreement
and its failure to stand by essential prior commitments and promises cast a
very serious shadow over the reliability and dependability of the U.S.
vis-à-vis its allies and regional partners.

Weakening the Veracity and Effectiveness of UN Security Council Resolutions

Acceptance of the agreement in UN Security Council Resolution 2231 of July
20, 2015,4 requires, upon receipt of IAEA verification, the immediate
lifting by the UN Security Council, at the behest of the U.S. and the other
powers involved in the agreement, of the intricate, significant, and
effective sanctions mechanism that had been imposed and maintained on Iran
since 2006.5

This rubber-stamping by the UN Security Council, through the rapid and hasty
rescinding of six major, binding Security Council resolutions, each adopted
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,6 significantly weakens the veracity,
effectiveness, and significance of the organization as a whole, of the
Security Council in particular, and of any UN capability of supervising or
monitoring the agreement.

More significantly, the Security Council resolution serves to minimize and
empty several no-less major Security Council resolutions, calling on states
to prevent terrorism (Resolution 1566 of October 8, 2004),7 and to prevent
the flow of money that finances acts of terror (Resolution 1373 of September
28, 2001).8

Granting to Iran total immunity, impunity, and a license to continue its
incitement to genocide, denial of the Holocaust, calls for the elimination
of the State of Israel, and continued financial and operational support for
terror organizations and acts of terror throughout the world all constitute
very basic and clear violations of the UN Charter,9 especially Article 2(4),
according to which:


All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations.

Positive Elements of the Agreement

Reduction of Enrichment

The agreement requires a reduction by Iran in its production capability of
enriched uranium through installed centrifuges and forbids it from producing
more centrifuges for 8 years.

Reduction of Enriched Uranium Stored in Iran

The agreement requires Iran to significantly reduce the amount of enriched
uranium it possesses that can be further enriched to a military-grade level
of enrichment. The amount should not exceed 300 kg. of UF6 enriched to less
than 3.67 percent, compared with the 7.5 tons of this material it was
allowed to possess according to the JCPOA and the 12 tons it actually
possessed, according to U.S. Administration claims (which indicates that it
was in breach of the JCPOA without any Western protest, let alone
sanctions).
Improved Monitoring of Declared Sites

The agreement enhances and qualitatively improves the existing monitoring
mechanism of declared sites. It should be noted that these sites have been
effectively monitored for a long time.

Reduction in Functioning Centrifuges

The agreement reduces the number of functioning centrifuges from 9,000 to
6,100, of which 5,060 will continue to enrich uranium.

Restricted Plutonium Processing

The agreement reduces the production of plutonium at the Arak installation
and considerably limits Iran’s ability to obtain plutonium for the
development of nuclear weapons along the 15 years of the agreement.

Consequences of Breach

Despite the reservations set out above in detailing the flaws of the
agreement, Iran can assume that any fundamental breach of the agreement
could bring about serious repercussions, not excluding military
intervention.

Conclusion and Remaining Dilemmas

This analysis does not deal with the political aspects of whether the
agreement is a good agreement or not. (See Brig.-Gen. (res.) Yossi
Kuperwasser, “Questions and Answers about the Iranian Nuclear Agreement: Was
a Better Deal Possible? Is It Still Possible to Achieve a Better Deal?”)10

Nor does it enter into the basic question regarding the political wisdom in
the U.S. Administration’s declared preference for dialogue and concessions,
enabling Iran to view the agreement as an Iranian achievement, as opposed to
the Iranian propensity and capability to make greater concessions in light
of the heavy pressure posed by international sanctions.

The issue of whether the use of force could have achieved or might still
achieve a longer postponement of inevitable Iranian nuclear weapons
capability remains moot.

Practically speaking, military force could have achieved a longer
postponement. The continued credible threat thereof, which served up to now
to deter Iran from breaking out to become a nuclear power, will continue to
prevent Iranian plans to break out when the anticipated result would be
destruction of their nuclear weapons project.

The likelihood that non-approval of the agreement by the U.S. Congress
might, as claimed by President Obama, cause an enhanced rush by Iran toward
nuclear weaponry, and bring about war, is without any practical logic.

Iran’s need to remove the crippling sanctions imposed by the U.S. and other
major states and prevent renewal of such sanctions, and its fear of military
action, are considerations that would in any event drive Iran to cooperate
for the achievement of a better agreement.

Some very serious issues of principle stem from this agreement.

In its uncompromising intent to advance the agreement in spite of the very
serious security problems that the agreement poses to Israel’s security, the
U.S. Administration and its international colleagues would appear to
underestimate and even to downgrade Israel’s accepted stature as a
Western-oriented, liberal democracy and bastion against the Islamic
radicalization in the world advocated and practiced by Iran.

Attempts to assuage Israel’s real and genuine concerns by offering
compensation for the dangers posed by the agreement cannot seriously reduce
the nature of the threat that will still exist from Iran.

The agreement does not seek to change Iran’s continued support of, and
involvement in, international terror and its declared intention to eliminate
Israel. Above all, it should be patently obvious to all that no possible
sympathetic statement by the U.S. Administration, or even military or other
compensation, could logically stand against paving the route to a nuclear
arsenal by a state that repeatedly declares its commitment to obliterate
Israel.

* * *

Notes
1.http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action_en.pdf;
see also annexes
http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/annex_1_nuclear_related_commitments_en.pdf
http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/annex_2_sanctions_related_commitments_en.pdf
http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/annex_1_attachements_en.pdf
http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/annex_3_civil_nuclear_cooperation_en.pdf
http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/annex_4_joint_commission_en.pdf
http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/annex_5_implementation_plan_en.pdf
2.http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/enforcing-iran-deal-another-gaping-hole_1018287.html
3.https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1970/infcirc140.pdf
4.http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2231(2015)
5.See resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835
(2008), and 1929 (2010),
6.http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml
7.http://www.un.org/press/en/2004/sc8214.doc.htm
8.Adopted following the 2001 attack on the New York World Trade Center, and
Pentagon. See
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/392A001F254B4B9085256B4B00708233. See
also an excellent article on this aspect by Dr. Salomon Benzimra, “The Iran
Nuclear Deal’s Fallout on the United Nations,” American Thinker, 13 August
13, 2015,
http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2015/08/the_iran_nuclear_deals_fallout_on_the_united_nations.html
9.http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml
10.http://jcpa.org/article/questions-and-answers-about-the-iranian-nuclear-agreement/

* * *

Brig.-Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser is Director of the Project on the
Regional Implications of the Syrian Civil War at the Jerusalem Center. He
was formerly Director General of the Israel Ministry of Strategic Affairs
and head of the Research and Analysis and Production Division of IDF
Military Intelligence.

Amb. Alan Baker, Director of the Institute for Contemporary Affairs at the
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, participated in the negotiation and
drafting of the Oslo Accords with the Palestinians, as well as agreements
and peace treaties with Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon. He served as legal
adviser and deputy director-general of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and as Israel’s ambassador to Canada.