The Iran Deal & the Missile Threat
By Russ Read August 30, 2015
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/08/30/the_iran_deal__the_missile_threat_108425.html

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or Iran Deal, includes far
more than just an agreement on the Iranian nuclear program. One of the most
crucial provisions is the cessation of ballistic missile embargoes against
Iran 8 years after the JCPOA goes into effect. The implications of this
provision will prove to be dire regardless of whether or not Iran chooses to
go nuclear.

Iran currently controls the largest and most diverse ballistic missile
arsenal in the Middle East. The Iranian arsenal includes Short Range
Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) with a range of 620 miles (1000 Km) intermediate
Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) with ranges around 1600 miles (2500 Km),
and various other systems with ranges in between. It is crucial to note that
Iran is the first country to ever field a missile system with a 1243 mile
(2000 Km) range without first having nuclear weapons capabilities, a telling
sign as to the regime’s intentions. According to various intelligence
estimates and the assessments of arms experts, Iran could have
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capability with a range of 3400
miles (5500 Km) or more anywhere between 2015 and 2025.

The threat matrix presented by the Iranian missile arsenal has several
facets. The threat most pertinent to the Iran deal is that many of Iran’s
missiles are capable of serving as a vehicle for a nuclear warhead. Even
without ICBM capability, Iranian missiles are within the reach of targets,
such as Tel Aviv, Riyadh, Baghdad, Ankara, Cairo, Islamabad, and even
Eastern European cities like Kiev and Bucharest. Many Iranian missiles are
able to launch from mobile platforms, making them difficult to track, and
therefore, more dangerous. The one set back Iranian missiles do have is a
lack of proper guidance systems, which limits accuracy and requires them to
be deployed en masse to be effective. Under the JCPOA provisions, Iran would
be able to access the technology necessary to make an already threatening
missile stockpile exponentially more dangerous via improved guidance
systems.

One frightening scenario presented by a mobile Iranian missile force is the
possibility of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack. Several security
experts have theorized that instead of a traditional kinetic nuclear attack,
Iran would instead opt for a nuclear detonation in the atmosphere above a
target region, thereby creating an EMP that could permanently disable a
target country’s electrical grid and computer networks. In the era of cyber
warfare, EMP is the ultimate weapon. In lieu of a deadly nuclear blast, an
EMP would wreak havoc on the target population potentially leaving millions
to die from lack of water, exposure, starvation, or any of the litany of
crucial resources dependent on electricity. A retaliatory strike or disaster
relief process could be extremely difficult, given US reliance on an
unsecure electrical grid. Launching a missile with even the most modest
range from a variety of platforms could enable this type of scenario, should
it carry the right nuclear payload. Though it may sound fantastical, there
has been evidence showing that Iran has seriously considered the EMP option;
such a strategy certainly would fit Iran’s modus operandi of utilizing
unconventional tactics against their enemies.

Iran would have to make some serious technological advances before an EMP
becomes a realistic possibility, particularly in the miniaturization of a
nuclear warhead small enough to fit on one of their missiles. The more
immediate threat Iran’s missile arsenal poses is much more conventional in
nature, but just as serious: Iran’s investment in anti-ship and
anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) weapons. The Iranian military, particularly
the Iranian Republican Guard Corps (IRGC), has a history of causing
significant problems in the Persian Gulf dating back to the 1980s when they
mined crucial oil shipping lanes and attacked Kuwaiti oil tankers. These
events eventually led to Operation Praying Mantis, a US retaliatory strike
on Iranian naval vessels and Persian Gulf assets that was one of the largest
surface warfare engagements post World War II.

In a paper for the Naval War College, Major Christopher Murphy (USAF)
explains that anti-access/area denial, or A2/AD, as it is referred to in the
military parlance, is a form of warfare that aims to deny movement or
prevent an adversary from operating in a theater. The backbone of a strong
A2/AD capability in the 21st century is a large and capable arsenal of SRBMs
and cruise missiles, and with the lift on the missile embargoes, Iran would
certainly look to improve its already significant capabilities in this area.

There are two primary threats posed by Iranian A2/AD. The first would be
potential Iranian attempts to disrupt the US ability to operate in theater;
the theater in this case being the Persian Gulf and Middle East in general.
As Maj. Murphy explains, the US military is an almost exclusively
expeditionary force. This means that the freedom to operate in secure
staging areas abroad is crucial for success in any operation. Based on Iran’s
past harassment of Gulf shipping lanes and their current incursions in Yemen
and Iraq, investing in an ability to deny US operations would be a logical
next step. We have seen the first steps toward this potential goal with Iran’s
purchase of S300 air defense systems from Russia. In conjunction with Iran’s
fielding of anti-ship missiles such as the Khalij Fars, it would appear Iran
is making progress on their A2/AD capability.

With the conventional threat evident, one must not discount the asymmetric
threat that Iran’s A2/AD presents to commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf
and the Bab el Mandeb, off the coast of Yemen. Between the Persian Gulf’s
Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el Mandeb, Iran has the ability to jeopardize
22% of the world’s total oil supply. With bolstered A2/AD capabilities via
missile purchases, Iran could threaten shipping lines easily, thus
disrupting the oil market and therefore, the global economy. Iran could
essentially assert control over regional waters and threaten the world
economy without ever stepping off shore; only in the 21st century could such
an idea be possible.

Of course, it is not simply the weapons themselves that are of concern, but
also those who are in control of them. The Iranian Republican Guard Corps
(IRGC), the hardline military wing controlled by the Supreme Leader, is not
only in charge of Iran’s entire ballistic missile program (including the
space program), but also naval operations within the Persian Gulf and covert
activities abroad via the Quds Force.

Unlike the Iranian negotiators who helped craft the JCPOA, the IRGC has
little involvement with President Rouhani, yet it is they who will glean the
most from the eventual lifting of the missile embargo, and they who control
the arsenal. The political divide between the IRGC and President Rouhani is
crucial, and policymakers must recognize that engaging with one actor does
not necessarily mean the other will follow suit. Therefore, it is the IRGC
and Supreme Leader that must be examined in regard to the missile threat,
not Rouhani and his cabinet.

The lifting of the missile embargo against Iran has repercussions that
resonate far beyond the deal’s 15 year sunset or issues such as uranium
enrichment or plutonium reprocessing. Iran being allowed to increase its
missile capability will only strengthen the Iran’s hand, potentially leading
to further strife in the region due to increased Iranian incursions. When
examining Iran in the Middle East, something as seemingly mundane as a
missile could have profound implications on the region’s security.
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Russ Read is the President & Editor in Chief of ParabellumReport.com, an
international security analysis website, and the Deputy Director of
Legislative Affairs at EMET, a Washington, DC based think tank specializing
in the Middle East.