The Disintegration of Syria and Its Impact on Israel
Brig.-Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser, August 31, 2015
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
Vol. 15, No. 28
http://jcpa.org/article/the-disintegration-of-syria-and-its-impact-on-israel/

-Syria’s fragmentation into separate, battling enclaves is intensifying. The
two main enclaves are “central Syria,” controlled by the Assad regime, and
the Islamic State.
-The Assad regime and Hizbullah, like the opposition, have been taking heavy
casualties. In an unusual speech on July 26, 2015, President Bashar Assad
explained that in light of a manpower shortage, the regime’s army is unable
to reconquer all the territories that the opposition has seized.
-The nuclear deal between Iran and the world powers has boosted Iran’s
capacity to support the Assad regime. The anticipated lifting of the
sanctions on Iran is set to enable it to funnel additional resources to this
purpose, to which Iran assigns very high priority.
-Iran and Hizbullah’s attempts to create a base for terror activity against
Israel from the northern Golan Heights apparently continue, relying on
released terrorist Samir Kuntar and Druze elements.
-Against the backdrop of the nuclear deal, there are increasing chances of
cooperation between the United States, Iran, and Assad, and possibly also
Turkey and Saudi Arabia, in the campaign against the Islamic State.


The complex civil war in Syria keeps developing in ways that reinforce the
trends that have been evident for some time. Despite the reports on a number
of proposals for ending the conflict, the chances of fostering a
breakthrough remain unclear.

The recent period has seen the following notable developments:

The Assad regime, with the help of Hizbullah, continues to entrench its
control of areas it regards as vital, namely, the Damascus-Homs-Hama coastal
axis and the vicinity of the Lebanese border. Following the takeover of
Qusayr and with the conclusion of the battles in the Qalamoun Mountains
(with gains by Hizbullah but without a clear victory), the battle for
Zabadani began. Although the regime and Hizbullah forces have made gains in
this theater, where they enjoy a clear advantage, they have not yet been
able to defeat the opposition, which in this area comprises local,
relatively less extreme forces. In any case, the regime and Hizbullah, like
the opposition, have been taking heavy casualties. In an unusual speech on
July 26, 2015, President Bashar Assad explained that in light of a manpower
shortage, the regime’s army is unable to reconquer all the territories that
the opposition has seized, and accordingly he has to prioritize which
territories to contest based on military, demographic, and economic
considerations.

Turkish involvement is growing. Following the Islamic State terror attack in
the Turkish town of Suruc on the Syrian border and the spate of terror
attacks by the Kurdish underground within Turkey, the Turks decided to
attack targets of the Islamic State and of the Kurdish underground in Iraq
and to allow the United States to strike Islamic State targets in Syria and
Iraq from the Incirlik Air Base in southern Turkey. The United States and
Turkey have also agreed to set up a safe zone along 95 kilometers of the
Syrian border, thereby making it possible for Syrian refugees in Turkey to
return to Syria. Meanwhile, Turkey is concentrating on attacking Kurdish
targets, actions that, some believe, were approved by the Americans. In the
face of Kurdish criticism, the U.S. Administration was forced to deny that
the actions had received Washington’s approval.

Turkey and the Kurds

Against this backdrop, tension is mounting in the Kurdish part of Syria. The
area has been taken over by the PYD – the Syrian sister movement of the
Turkish PKK, which cooperates with the Assad regime and is successfully
fighting the Islamic State in the areas of Kobani and Tall Abyad. Its
military force, the PYG, is being aided by Peshmerga forces sent from Iraqi
Kurdistan. In light of Turkey’s actions against the PKK, there are signs of
stronger unity among the different Kurdish factions in Syria. Considering,
however, that these factions tend to be suspicious of each other, this may
be a temporary phenomenon.

The nuclear deal between Iran and the world powers has boosted Iran’s
capacity to support the Assad regime. The anticipated lifting of the
sanctions on Iran is set to enable it to funnel additional resources to this
purpose, to which Iran assigns a very high priority. In addition, some
believe that the United States now sees Iran as a subcontractor that will
fight the Islamic State, which imperils Assad, and is ready to accept a
central Iranian role in dealing with the crisis. Not surprisingly, then, the
regime feels that it has been strengthened and is waiting for its
expectations to materialize. Noteworthy in this context are the increasing
contacts among supporters of the Assad regime, including the recent visit to
Tehran by Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem and Russian Deputy Foreign
Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, who holds the Syria portfolio, apparently to
discuss how the nuclear deal affects Syria and the various proposals for a
settlement.

Is Assad’s Demise Inevitable?

Meanwhile, the regime keeps losing assets in areas it does not regard as
strategically crucial. That is especially the case in the areas south and
east of Damascus, including the Daraa, Sweida, and Tadmur (Palmyra) regions,
and also in the north and particularly the Idlib and Aleppo regions.
Recently the important city of Qaryatayn to the east of Homs (where many
Christians live) fell to the Islamic State, and battles are raging around
Hama, in which control of the territory keeps shifting back and forth. Many
analysts have hastened to conclude from this phenomenon that the regime’s
demise is now inevitable, its remaining days rapidly dwindling. It is
doubtful, though, that this perception is accurate and even more doubtful
that the perception has trickled down into the ranks of the regime. There
appears to be no increase in the rate of senior figures’ desertion from its
ranks.

As for the opposition, the Islamic forces keep gaining strength. The blow
dealt by the Al-Nusra Front to Division 30 rebel troops, some of whose
fighters were trained by the Americans, is further evidence of this fact.
Although the Americans, nonplused, assert that from now on they will also
protect the forces they have trained against their foes even within the
opposition, it is doubtful that they will be able to do so. Meanwhile, the
significance of the name-change for the grouping of Islamist factions that
are less extreme than the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State is still
unclear. At first this grouping called itself Jaish al-Fatah (the Army of
Conquest/Victory), and it made gains in the Idlib region. Later it changed
its name to Jaish al-Umawayn (the Army of the Sons of the Nation),
emphasizing its members’ Syrian identity. Forces belonging to this grouping
have been playing a central role in the fighting in the Zabadani area.

The contacts between Saudi Arabia and Russia, particularly the visit to
Moscow by Defense Minister Muhammad bin Salman (the son of King Salman), are
also viewed as potentially affecting the course of the Syrian imbroglio.
Some see the beginnings of a Saudi-Russian understanding where, in return
for the huge deal with Russia involving military purchases and the building
of a nuclear power station, Russia will loosen its support of Assad and
agree to his being replaced. Others see indications, conversely, that the
Saudis have despaired. It is unclear to what extent either evaluation has
any real basis. In any case, most of the reports claim that Saudi Arabia is
offering to stop backing the opposition in return for certain concessions by
Assad and his supporters.

Iran, Hizbullah and the Druze

Iran and Hizbullah’s attempts to create a base for terror activity against
Israel from the northern Golan Heights apparently continue, relying, among
other things, on the support released terrorist Samir Kuntar enjoys among
Druze elements in the border town of Al-Khader and on the assumption that
the Assad regime will look favorably on such actions even if it does not
initiate them. The attack attributed to Israel on a vehicle containing some
Iranian and Druze Hizbullah operatives who, according to the reports, were
killed, reflects this phenomenon. Israel is evidently working to prevent its
enemies from exploiting the Syrian chaos to attack it or improve their
capabilities to do so in the future.

Anxiety over these developments appears to be growing in the Druze
community. Traditionally, the Druze have been committed to their Syrian
nationality and to the Alawite-led alliance among the minorities that
constitute about 40 percent of the country’s population. However, the less
the regime controls the periphery as it focuses instead on maintaining
control of “little Syria,” the more the Druze fear it will abandon them. In
the main concentration of the Druze – the Druze Mountain, centered on the
city of Suwaida – there is considerable concern about the fall of the nearby
base of the Syrian army’s Brigade 52 into opposition hands. The regime’s
attempts to maintain control in the area via the Alawite militia, the
Shabiha, and to recruit Druze to its ranks have been opposed by local
leaders, who have taken matters into their own hands and are even
considering cooperating with the relatively moderate opposition forces
active in the southern region, thereby countering the more substantial
threat posed by the Islamic State after its conquest of Tadmur (Palmyra). As
noted, the situation in the town of Al-Khader, situated on the Israeli
border in the northern Golan Heights, is different, with the regime managing
to maintain its control and retain the town’s loyalty, at least on the
surface.

Given that Druze see themselves as mutually responsible for each other
wherever they are located, these developments have direct implications for
the Druze community in Lebanon and in Israel. The attacks by Druze on
Israeli ambulances carrying injured Syrians, which occurred on the Israeli
Golan and near Horfish in the Galilee, have sparked growing tension between
the Druze, particularly in Al-Khader, and the relatively moderate
opposition, which is perceived as being aided by Israel. Israel needs to
intervene in this issue and reinforce its policy of avoiding direct
involvement in the war while ensuring the security of the Druze, taking into
account the blood pact between them and the Jewish people.

The main implications that emerge from these developments are:

Syria’s fragmentation into separate, battling enclaves is intensifying. The
two main enclaves are “central Syria,” controlled by the Assad regime, and
the Islamic State. Other enclaves are controlled by the communities that
populate them (the Kurdish region in the north and the Druze Mountain in the
south) or by Sunni opposition elements (part of Aleppo, Idlib, the southern
Golan, and numerous rural areas around the main cities, including Damascus).
All factions are fighting to expand their spheres of control or prevent
gains by their enemies; and while each of these factions is pursuing local
offensives and succeeding, the Islamic State is expanding its control in a
way that could have strategic ramifications.

The fear of the Islamic State will probably lead external actors to boost
their involvement in the fighting, thereby lessening the centrality of the
regime’s struggle against the other insurgent groups. Against the backdrop
of the nuclear deal, there are increasing chances of cooperation between the
United States, Iran, and Assad, and possibly also Turkey and Saudi Arabia,
in the campaign against the Islamic State. This situation, apparently, forms
the background for initiatives to bring the war to an end.

Gains by the Assad regime, Iran, and Hizbullah in the crucial area of the
Syrian-Lebanese border are likely, under these circumstances, to lead to
intensified efforts by Iran and Hizbullah, as a secondary theater, to build
capabilities for attacking Israel in the northern Golan.

In light of all these factors, and given the ongoing human distress, Israel
may have no choice but to reconsider its policy toward the developments in
Syria.

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About Brig.-Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser

Brig.-Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser is Director of the Project on the
Regional Implications of the Syrian Civil War at the Jerusalem Center. He
was formerly Director General of the Israel Ministry of Strategic Affairs
and head of the Research and Analysis and Production Division of IDF
Military Intelligence.
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