A Global Conflict in the Backyard
Russia’s objectives in Syria are derived from Moscow’s global policy:
retaining Russia’s strategic foothold in the Middle East and developing a
stable position vis-à-vis the USA. Naturally, oil plays a part, too.
Exclusive
Yakov (Yasha) Kedmi | 1/12/2015
http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/content/global-conflict-backyard

The Russian policy in the Middle East generally and in Syria in particular
is derived from Russia’s global policy. The primary characteristic of its
global policy is the intensifying confrontation vis-à-vis the USA. This
confrontation is not only political, as it attains an increasingly more
military character.

The turning point in the Russian evaluations occurred as far back as 2003,
when the USA developed the Prompt Global Strike (PGS) doctrine.

The concerns of the Russian defense system increased with the establishment
of the PGS HQ in 2009. The plan to deploy a missile defense layout in
Eastern Europe, announced by President Obama in that year, only intensified
the Russians’ suspicions and concerns. Russia regarded the deployment of
that layout in Poland and Romania as a threat to her strategic missile
arsenal.

The deployment of the Aegis missile defense layout on board US Navy vessels
fit well into the threat Russia had sensed in that combined array. Estimates
consolidated in Russia in 2013 maintained that the USA was building a
combined offensive layout against Russia which is to be completed by 2020,
where the primary elements are Tomahawk cruise missiles deployed on the US
Navy Arleigh Burke-class destroyers (90 missiles) and Ticonderoga-class
cruisers (120 missiles).

According to the Russian military doctrine of 2014, PGS was regarded as a
threat to Russia. According to Russian evaluations, the number of US Navy
vessels in the Mediterranean theater would increase to about 40 by 2020. By
the end of 2015, a flotilla will be established within the US Sixth Fleet,
on the basis of four Arleigh Burke-class destroyers fitted with Aegis
systems and cruise missiles, based in the Mediterranean near Spain. By that
time, the cruise missile arsenal of the US armed forces will amount to about
5,000 missiles, of which about 3,000 will be carried by naval platforms
(about 1,150 on 39 submarines). Some of those missiles will be fitted with
nuclear warheads, and would constitute the primary element of the strategy.

A simultaneous launch of all of those missiles, including the ballistic
missiles, could, according to the estimates of the Russian military, destroy
up to 90% of Russia’s strategic nuclear capabilities.

According to the Russian naval doctrine of July 2015, the Russian Navy
should maintain a permanent presence in the Mediterranean. By 2020, the
Russians aspire to establish their Navy as a factor no one would be able to
ignore anywhere in the world. According to this concept, the Russian Navy
presence in the Mediterranean should be capable of coping with the US Navy’s
Sixth Fleet.

It is important to note that the considerations of coping with the threats
imposed by the US missile layouts in Eastern Europe and the Sixth Fleet are
among the primary elements that shaped the Russian policy regarding the
crisis in the Ukraine and the issue of regaining Russian control over the
Crimea and the port of Sebastopol. Today, the Russians believe that within
15 minutes they would be able to destroy the entire NATO presence in the
Black Sea, along with the missile centers in Romania and Poland.

In the Mediterranean, the Russian Navy needs a home port and a primary base
of operations. The only option at the moment is converting the Syrian port
of Tartus into a permanent base for the Russian Navy. Thus far, the Russian
Navy could only receive refueling and resupply services in Tartus. Keeping
the base in Tartus will depend on whether Syria remains a unified country
governed by the present regime, which is not pro-American. It is quite
possible that there are plans to provide services at the Port of Tartus to
surface vessels and submarines of the Chinese Navy, which could dispatch its
vessels to the Mediterranean for long periods of time.

This fits in with the overall-strategic view of Russia regarding the Middle
East. According to Russian evaluations, world oil consumption in 2040 will
increase by 56%. This leaves the Middle East as the chief supplier of oil to
the world, with all that entails. Russia, as well as China, have
consistently opposed the attempts to bring about the removal of Bashar
al-Assad by forceful measures. Recently, pursuant to the signing of the
agreement with Iran, Assad’s chances of survival have improved even more.
The ISIS phenomenon and the stream of refugees out of the Middle East will
create convenient conditions for the efforts to impose order on the Middle
East. All of the above led Russia to decide that it can intervene in the
crisis and help Assad gain an overbalance and emerge victorious from the
civil war in Syria.

The Russian General Staff prepared a structured, combined-arms plan for
military intervention in Syria. The Russian intervention was based on the
employment of the Air Force and partial employment of the Navy, without
employing any Russian ground forces. From a Russian point of view, an
overwhelming majority of the opposition forces in Syria belong to ISIS,
al-Qaeda and other radical Islamist groups, and the Russians do not bother
to distinguish between them as objectives for attack.

The forces of ISIS and al-Qaeda include as combatants about 4,000 former
citizens of the USSR, including up to 2,000 former citizens of Russia. In
the event that Assad’s regime collapsed and Islamist organizations dominated
Syria, Russia believes that many of those former citizens would have
attempted to infiltrate Russia and the neighboring countries. Consequently,
the elimination of these elements is also one of the considerations for the
Russian intervention in Syria.

Three dedicated Russian military task forces were dispatched to Syria. One
task force builds infrastructures for the establishment of a Russian naval
base in Tartus. A second task force maintains the airbase for the Russian
aircraft and helicopters in Lattakia, and the third task force consists of a
special forces battalion (paratroopers and marines) assigned to secure the
port of Tartus and the Lattakia airbase. These forces may have been
reinforced by a company of T-90 tanks. The total OrBat amounts to 2,000 men.

Twelve Sukhoi Su-25SM strike fighters and twelve Sukhoi Su-24 tactical
bombers take part in the combat operations. Additionally, six Sukhoi Su-34
fighter-bombers (the equivalent of the American F-15) were incorporated –
these are the front-line fighter aircraft of the Russian Air Force, which
maintains only about 80 aircraft of this type. Four Sukhoi Su-30SM air
superiority fighters were deployed to Syria as well.

All in all, 10 Russian fighter aircraft of the most advanced models
available to the Russian Air Force are currently deployed in Syria and are
capable of conducting aerial battles. Fighter aircraft normally escort other
aircraft and provide them with cover during their operational activity in
the event that enemy fighter aircraft attempt to attack them. In this case,
such attempts can only be made by aircraft of the US military or the NATO
forces.

According to some reports, several incidents of “Radar lock-on” (namely –
the option of an assured kill) have already been recorded with regard to US
strike drones that flew near the Russian airbase in Lattakia. In their
bombing attacks, the Russians use standard bombs as well as guided bombs
normally dropped on the targets from an altitude of more than 5,000 meters,
to avoid the threat of surface-to-air missiles. A substantial percentage of
the bombing attacks are performed during the night, and the number of ground
attack sorties has already reached 70 strikes per day. The Russian command
may also divert the Russian aircraft cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov, with her
fleet of 22 Sukhoi-33 aircraft, toward the Syrian shore.

Additionally, the Russian forces in Syria also include a group of transport
and rescue helicopters, including Mi-8 helicopters, and a group of Mi-24
attack helicopters. The most significant element is the Russian intelligence
layout, which includes UAVs, electronic intelligence and space intelligence
resources. Russian aircraft and UAVs perform surveillance flights all the
time, day and night. Additionally, the Russian attack helicopters fly in
pairs over the airbases as defensive measures against terrorist detachments.

A substantial anti-aircraft layout has also been deployed in the area. The
primary element of this layout is the Russian cruiser Moscow, which has been
patrolling the sea opposite Lattakia since September 25, 2015. This cruiser
carries anti-aircraft weapon systems that are the naval equivalent of the
S-300 system. In this way, Russia provides air-defense for most of the
Syrian territory. Additionally, an SA-22 system was deployed in Lattakia to
defend the airbase. This is one of the world’s most advanced air-defense
systems, which includes guns and missiles capable of engaging aerial targets
within a range of up to 20 km and an altitude of up to 10 km. Similar
assistance is provided by Russian Navy vessels patrolling opposite Lattakia
and Tartus.

According to some reports, SA-17M2 air-defense systems were also deployed in
Syria. This system is intended to provide defense from a height of 30 meters
to 6,000 meters and to a range of 20 to 30 km. Electronic warfare systems
were also deployed, at sea as well as on land.

The make-up of forces outlined above, including the air-defense and
electronic warfare elements as well as the fighter aircraft, indicates that
the Russian military is preparing for defensive action and aerial battles,
as well as against air strikes by the aircraft of the USA and its allies.

3-Stage Operation

The Russian General Staff planned that during first stage of the operation,
which began on September 30, the Russian forces will spot and destroy
infrastructures, command posts, storage depots, armored vehicles and other
vehicles of the opposition forces. During the second stage, which is already
under way, Syrian ground forces will stage attacks with Russian air support,
initially in the direction of Al-Hamah, Idlib and Aleppo, for the purpose of
dominating the entire area, all the way to and including the Turkish border.
This will effectively cut off the supply lines of the opposition forces from
their logistic bases in Turkey. According to various estimates, the Russians
intend to cooperate with Kurdish-Syrian forces that are also threatened by
ISIS and Turkey. The second stage is expected to last one month at most.

If these stages prove to be successful, the Syrian Army will stage a ground
attack into the Raqqa area, all the way to the border with Iraq, while
recapturing the Syrian oil fields. The other opposition forces will remain
isolated and cut off from their supply lines and the Syrian Army may achieve
overbalance quickly. The third stage may consist of a follow-up attack by
the Russian Air Force along with Syrian, Iraqi and Iranian forces with the
intention of eliminating ISIS in Iraq.