MEMRI February 3, 2016 Inquiry & Analysis Series Report No.1224
Khamenei Capitulates To Pragmatic Camp, Accepts JCPOA Without The
Preconditions He Outlined In October 2015 Letter To President Rohani
By: Y. Carmon and A. Savyon*
http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/8987.htm

Introduction

According to the IAEA report released January 16, 2016, Iran has implemented
its commitments under the JCPOA. This means that Iran has not refrained from
meeting its obligations, despite Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's nine
preconditions, which he set out in an October 21, 2015 letter to Iranian
President Hassan Rohani.[1] Obviously, Khamenei, the head of Iran's
ideological camp which had opposed the JCPOA, has capitulated to the
pragmatic camp which demanded that the JCPOA be honored and that Iran
fulfill its commitments under it, with no further conditions.

How Can Khamenei's Capitulation Be Explained?

One explanation for Khamenei's capitulation over Iran's implementation of
the JCPOA is that the ideological camp has, in recent months, found itself
fighting on several fronts simultaneously:


1. The deteriorating Iranian economy and the need for sanctions relief.


2. The increasing conflict with the pragmatic camp in advance of the
upcoming elections for the Majlis and Assembly of Experts;[2] as noted, the
pragmatic camp has insisted that Iran implement the JCPOA.


3. Difficulties in Iran's multi-front war against the Sunni camp of Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, the Gulf states, Egypt, and Jordan.


4. Additionally, Iran's failure to carry out its implementation commitments
could have placed Khamenei in direct conflict with the West.

In light of all this, Khamenei has chosen not to confront both the West and
the Sunni world at the same time, focusing on Iran's domestic front. By
doing so, Khamenei has recruited the entire Western world, particularly the
U.S., to the side of Shi'ite Iran in its struggle against the Sunni threat
against it.

Khamenei's main struggle at this stage is domestic: there is a need to
strengthen the ideological camp, and through it, the regime of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, so that in future it can operate more freely on the
nuclear front as well.[3]

Another explanation for this capitulation is that Khamenei's position was
from the outset for purposes of bargaining, with the aim of maximizing
Iran's gains under the JCPOA. Ultimately, the West enabled Iran to carry out
its commitments in a way that benefited Iran more than the original JCPOA
did, as follows:

What Iran Has Achieved With The JCPOA

With the JCPOA, Iran has achieved the following:


1. International recognition as a nuclear state, with the right to enrich
uranium and to trade in nuclear products, as it maintains its membership in
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[4] This is in spite of its years of
striving for nuclear weapons, as was recently reaffirmed by the IAEA's
December 2, 2015 report on the Iranian nuclear project's Possible Military
Dimensions (PMD).[5]


2. Legalization and upgrade of its nuclear program, and at the same time the
lifting of most of the sanctions put in place because of its pursuit of
nuclear weapons. In return, it is subject to a series of restrictions
extending its breakout time, that is, the time it needs to produce enough
highly enriched uranium to make one nuclear weapon, from two months to one
year.[6]


3. Upgrade to a regional superpower with nuclear capabilities, and
strengthening of the resistance axis, which it leads. This comes at the
height of a regional Sunni-Shi'ite struggle against the U.S.'s traditional
allies – Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Turkey, Jordan, and Egypt.


4. Even the nuclear restrictions imposed on Iran involve substantial
benefits that upgrade and industrialize its nuclear program. Some of these
restrictions, which have been described by the U.S. administration as
substantially and irrevocably extending breakout time to produce a nuclear
bomb, do not actually do so reliably:


* Enriched uranium – In return for its removal of 11 tons of uranium
enriched at a level of 5% to Russia, Iran received 197 tons of yellowcake
(uranium ore).[7]


* Enrichment capability – Iran maintains its uranium enrichment capabilities
at its "declared facilities," as stated in the January 16, 2016 IAEA report,
which does not refer at all to nuclear and/or undeclared sites regarding
which Iran announced that it would not permit IAEA inspections.


* Number of centrifuges – Iran's ostensible reduction in the number of its
centrifuges from 20,000 to 6,000 is false, because of the original 20,000,
only some 10,000 were active, and most of these were first generation.
Therefore, the actual number of first-generation active centrifuges that
were shut down was only 3,000-4,000.[8]


* Research and development – Iran is permitted to continue research and
development of advanced centrifuges.[9] It should be noted that the JCPOA
even allows Iran to create a nuclear detonation installation for research
purposes only.


* Heavy water from the Arak reactor – The heavy water from Iran's Arak
plutonium reactor was removed to Oman, a tiny satellite state bordering Iran
that is incapable of standing up to any potential pressure from its
neighbor. Thus, removing the heavy water to Oman was practically a joke.


* Removal of the reactor core at Arak – The reactor core was indeed removed
from Arak. However, as Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) director
Ali Akbar Salehi said, in any case Iran had no capability to produce
plutonium.[10]



* Y. Carmon is President of MEMRI; A. Savyon is Director of the MEMRI Iran
Media Project.



Endnotes:

[1] See MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis No. 1196, Iranian Supreme Leader
Khamenei's Letter Of Guidelines To President Rohani On JCPOA Sets Nine
Conditions Nullifying Original Agreement Announced July 14, 2015, October
22, 2015.


[2] A January 19, 2106 poll by the official Iranian news agency IRNA showed
that over 79% of Tehran residents are satisfied with the implementation of
the JCPOA and the lifting of sanctions, while 75% believe that Iran's
implementation of it will improve its situation. Another 18.2% believe that
this implementation will not change Iran's situation, while 6.4% believe
that it will change it for the worse.


[3] The scope of the domestic threat to the regime that Khamenei faces was
accurately described by Alireza Zakani, head of the Majlis Special
Commission for Reviewing the JCPOA, who warned on January 29, 2016 that the
supporters of the Rohani government, whether or not they are successful in
the upcoming elections, will find a way to paralyze Iran's Islamic
Revolution, the resistance axis, and the Muslim movement worldwide. Zakani
also warned, particularly, about Hashemi Rafsanjani, calling his supporters
"the pro-Western stream" in Iran. He stated that unfortunately, we are
dealing with conditions that are unlike those of previous election
campaigns, and if we are not careful, this can "lead to the destruction of
the regime and the Islamic Revolution." If we wish to succeed in the
elections, we must warn society and unite the ranks of the revolutionary
front to create a Majlis with conservative values and forces, he added. Fars
(Iran), January 29, 2016.


[4] On January 21, 2016, Ali Akbar Velayati, senior advisor to Khamenei,
told Iran's Fars News Agency about Iran's nuclear and foreign relations
achievements under the JCPOA, and about the resulting improvements in its
geopolitical status. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) head Ali
Akbar Salehi, said at a conference to examine the results of the JCPOA at
the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations on January 27: "We have not
permanently relinquished any nuclear right, but rather merely agreed to
certain restrictions for a certain period." Tabnaq (Iran), January 27, 2016.


[5] See MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis No. 1207, The Prospects For JCPOA
Implementation Following The Release Of IAEA Sec-Gen Amano's Report On The
PMD Of Iran's Nuclear Program, December 8, 2015.


[6] According to statements by President Obama and Secretary of State
Kerry, prior to the JCPOA, Iran needed only two months to produce enough
highly enriched uranium to make one nuclear weapon. See for example Reuters,
April 8, 2014; NPR.org, August 11. 2015.


[7] According to AEOI head Salehi; Tasnim (Iran), December 29, 2015. Salehi
also said, on January 27, 2016, at the conference to examine the results of
the JCPOA at Iran's Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, that "Iran has
amassed 550 tons of raw uranium from the start of the Revolution to date.
Following the JCPOA, 220 tons of raw uranium was added to this quantity.
This accelerates our potential." Tabnaq (Iran), January 27, 2016.


[8] See confirmation of this by Salehi at the January 27, 2016 conference:
"There is a claim that reducing the number of centrifuges from 20,000 to
6,000 was a major restriction. We had 20,000 centrifuges, [but] only 10,000
were enriching uranium, and now we have reduced the number to 6,000. This
means that our annual enrichment has gone down from 2.2 kilograms to 1.5
kilograms." Tabnaq (Iran), January 27, 2016.


[9] Salehi said that "for the Bushehr reactor we would have needed some
30,000 kilograms of uranium, which would have taken 15 years to produce.
This was not commercially feasible. Therefore, we are advancing towards
centrifuges with industrial characteristics. With reverse engineering, we
have managed to design eight types of centrifuges, the latest of which is
the IR8. The [first generation] IR1 has only one SWU [Separation Work Unit],
while the IR8 has 24. Even without the JCPOA, we could not have achieved 190
SWU [the production level that Khamenei demanded] with the old centrifuges,
since Natanz only has room for 50,000 of the old units. However, with the
new centrifuges, we can reach one million SWU at Natanz. In any case, it
will take us seven to eight years before we can commercially manufacture the
new centrifuges." Tabnaq (Iran), January 27, 2016.


[10] Salehi said: "We agreed not to produce plutonium from spent fuel for
15 years. This seems to be a restriction, but we currently do not even have
fuel from which we would want to produce plutonium, [since] we are sending
the spent fuel from the Bushehr reactor to Russia... Even had we not
accepted this restriction, we would have been unable to actually produce
plutonium... We have no plutonium from which we would want to produce
metal." Tabnaq (Iran), January 27, 2016.

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