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Thursday, February 11, 2016
Gal Hirsch: Deploy special commando forces to fight Islamic State

Other Boots on the Ground
Before any ground forces are committed to the operation against the Islamic
State, C6ISR forces – relying on a proper integration of technology,
commando, special operations units and covert intelligence services – will
constitute the interim phase in the use of force. Exclusive article
Gal Hirsch | 11/02/2016
http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/content/other-boots-ground

The doubts about committing ground forces to an operation present a
difficult dilemma to the decision makers. Traumatic past experiences,
concerns about public criticism, moral-ethical dilemmas and the fear of
unexpected developments lead to reluctance and eventually to the preference
of other tactics. Apparently, in this day and age, the ground maneuver
option will be last on the scale of priorities for the use of force.


Bitter experience has taught us about the development that repeats itself in
ground operations with regard to the operational aspect as well as with
regard to the consciousness aspect. Concepts like "The Lebanese Mire",
"Vietnamization", "Bloodshed" and so forth convey the sense of failure
experienced when the maneuvering momentum has been blocked, the advance and
assault battles have evolved into defensive, retreat and delay battles and
the stage of holding on to the captured territory and remaining in it has
turned the hunter into the game, the attacker into the defender and the
threatening element into a cluster of targets. The narrative changes
accordingly: the heroic-supportive attitude is replaced by a critical
attitude and patience gradually diminishes. The desire to "deliver a
decisive blow and get out" is not usually practicable. The diplomatic
accomplishment is the outcome of the military move. It requires that the
territory be maintained until the situation has been stabilized and
resolved, and the process of remaining in the captured territory exacts a
bloody toll and creates a conscious sense of failure.

The US offensive during Operation Iraqi Freedom ended with the toppling of
the statues in Baghdad, a "victorious image" and a sense of success and
achievement. Immediately thereafter came the defensive presence stage. The
advantages of the local opponent emerged and the regular "standard" military
found it difficult to cope with terrorism and guerrilla tactics.

US presence in Vietnam is perceived as a period of bloody failure. Operation
Peace for Galilee (1982) started out as a legitimate heroic move, but
evolved into the Lebanon War – 18 years of anti-guerrilla warfare in the
Security Belt were etched into Israeli national consciousness as "Wallowing
in the Lebanese Mire". The accomplishments of the attack stage were eroded
during the period of controlling the captured territory. The legitimacy
batteries, both domestic and foreign, are depleted in view of the cost, and
if the diplomatic accomplishment is not consequential and immediate –
history might repeat itself.

The use-of-force dilemma currently arises once again: the Islamic State
organization (ISIS) has been identified as a global threat – it is no longer
regarded as merely a local or regional problem. The forces of the free
world, the superpowers and their partners, operate against ISIS through
various coalitions and focus on air strikes. ISIS is a stealthy opponent,
generating a small signature. As a guerrilla organization, it is highly
proficient in terrorism tactics. Uprooting ISIS necessitates a ground
operation and apparently, the superpowers have thus far relied on Kurdish
and Iraqi forces (or on some other Arab forces) as the future of the ground
maneuver against it.

About the Ground Move

An aerial operation has the nature of a single decisive blow, a "knockout"
of sorts and creates an illusion of action (a lot of noise, documented
bombing operations, a high media profile), along with lower levels of
friction and risk.

The superiority of the "intelligence/air" concept reigns supreme in most
modern armed forces and their power build-up efforts are diverted in that
direction primarily. Long-term investments channeled in this direction have
inflicted an inherent damage on the ground forces and have led to the loss
of significant ground superiority. Quite naturally, this raises concerns
about limited capabilities opposite the challenging opponent of this day and
age.

Effective overbalance, as per its classic-symbolic meaning, can only be
achieved through the deployment of forces generating a sufficiently high
signature on the ground, in a visible manner and while actually dominating
key areas, routes, observation points, command and control centers and so
forth.

A thorough elimination of enemy infrastructures necessitates combing
(through the infrastructures), fighting and direct engagement using fire.
These axioms are valid with regard to symmetrical opponents and most
certainly with regard to asymmetrical opponents. Only an approach of
systemic dismantling (as was demonstrated during Operation Defensive Shield
in 2002, for example) can uproot the opponent from his infrastructures in
the built-up area, tear him away from the cover provided by the civilian
population and pull him out of the subterranean medium and his fortified
localities.

The "Western" approach aspires for a prompt settlement at the conclusion of
every war, and does not take kindly to prolonged operations and to a
"routine of combat". It imposes time limits on the conduct of operations and
leads to an on-going quest for "exit stations". A ground operation has an
on-going nature, and a high level of friction is one of its characteristics.
The unwillingness to "sustain" over a long period of time is highly typical
of contemporary leadership. Concerns about domestic public criticism are
much in evidence, with regard to being drawn into entanglement that leads to
massive casualties, to the commitment of more and more forces and to the
familiar claims by various segments of the public, according to which "this
is not our war."

Neither the ground maneuver nor the aerial maneuver are surgical and both
find it difficult to be selective. In air strikes, accuracy can be improved
but effectiveness – not necessarily, especially when the enemy is fortified
and benefits from the cover provided by human shields – the local
population. When methodical dismantling is required on the ground and under
the ground, the result will be a high level of friction. Guerrilla warfare
and terrorism will aspire to push and channel enemy military forces into the
multidimensional environment: the populated, built-up, afforested, dense,
mountainous areas and the subterranean medium – all those spaces where
maneuverability is restricted and the advantages of regular military forces
are seriously impaired. Damage inflicted on the civilian population can
undermine the legitimacy of the operation, both domestically and externally.
The opponent fights from within the civilian population and inflicts
casualties on the attacker. Under such circumstances, massive forces must be
used in order to minimize casualties and accomplish the mission. Massive
employment of fire for extrication purposes or for air support or a highly
destructive engineering operation become an asset for the enemy's
consciousness warfare campaign and a burden for the rapidly-depleting
"legitimacy battery".

Although the ground maneuver is a high-friction process, contrary to air
strikes, it may enable relative selectivity and minimize the damage
inflicted on uninvolved parties. Only the actual entry into the buildings,
fortifications and tunnels can eliminate the enemy's warfighters,
infrastructures and equipment in a pin-point, focused manner. Combined with
specialized skills and suitable equipment, the damage inflicted on
uninvolved parties may be minimized as well.

In the face of terrorism and guerrilla, there is no substitute for ground
operations and any other solution is nothing but a mechanism for 'buying
time' and for putting on a temporary show of "fighting". Understandably,
suitable operational preparations and deployment are required, along with
the advance preparation of public opinion and the promotion of diplomatic
processes, but the tangible danger of Jihadist terrorism generates the
desire to present accomplishments quickly, preferably as early as during the
interim phase, while engaging in stand-off strikes and before any ground
forces have been committed to battle. The interim phase, in this scenario,
can consist of committing C6ISR formations to battle.

C6ISR

In my previous article (Israel Defense Issue #16, October 2013), I described
the development of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in the early
1980s. This revolution brought into the world the formula we know as C4ISR,
where the four "Cs" stand for Command, Control, Communications & Computing.
More recently, there are many who have accepted the notion according to
which a fifth "C", for cyber warfare, should be added to this formula. The
"I" reflects the central role played intelligence; the "S" reflects the
importance of surveillance and the "R" stands for reconnaissance.

This formula was appropriate for the needs of those days – the destruction
of enemy armed forces (which consisted primarily of armored formations) and
the elimination of the threat of an invasion. The contemporary opponent is
different. Regular armed forces currently face cells, networked
organizations and armies of terrorism, guerrilla and insurgency. It is time
to agree on the next Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA2) and revise the
formula accordingly.

Operations always strive for symmetry, and in the face of asymmetrical
threats, gap-bridging capabilities are developed (for example, the Iron Dome
system, developed as a solution to the high-trajectory threat). Prompt
adaptation is required and relevant operational solutions must be developed
afresh. It is appropriate to combine technological opportunities with an
organizational-conceptual revision. In the face of the unique opponent we
should develop unique organizations – "formations" based primarily on an
effective combination between technology and suitable forces.

The official-state-military version of insurgency, guerrilla and terrorism
is special forces, commando units and covert services. They provide the
appropriate solution for the type of opponent we now face. These elements
may operate in accordance with and by virtue of a unique doctrine and
dedicated legislation and adopt changes and adaptations relatively easily.
This is the effective solution for the characteristics and pace of the
contemporary opponent.

Thus far, special operations forces were committed to battle in order to
support the primary maneuver, fill gaps and execute strategic missions.
According to the new concept, they will constitute the primary maneuvering
element, bringing to bear many of the capabilities of the "standard"
military, and even more. A substantial change will be required with regard
to the operational manifestation of the modes of battle, operational
doctrines and combat techniques. New operational patterns will have to be
created. These will be flexible, creative and technology-intensive, and the
maneuvers of the specialist forces will include commando operations on a
large scale.

Accordingly, the sixth "C" that should be added to the existing formula is
the "C" that stands for Commando! Hence, the appropriate forces for the
operations of this generation are C6ISR forces.

C6ISR Forces as an Interim Phase

Special operations forces are, first and foremost, groups of special
individuals, possessing unique strengths and resilience as well as unusual
training. They benefit from high-standard selection and a particularly high
degree of combat competence. They have at their disposal the latest
cutting-edge weapon systems and most importantly – they possess a different,
adaptive and creative character.

Weather and topographic challenges or the toughest opponent – these are no
obstacle for the special operations forces. It is their natural environment
and they are built to cope, to initiate, to adapt and to create something
out of nothing – new ideas, new solutions, even if they are not exactly
by-the-book. These forces are, indeed, what their title implies – "special".

Special forces are highly competent in precision and accuracy using
state-of-the-art technology, but can also import into the theater of
operations massive firepower (in the form of air support and other types of
fire support). The need to be able to handle hostage situations provides
them with selective capabilities and a selective approach to planning and
execution, as a minimum requirement and as a mindset in every mission and on
every battlefield.

Special operations are normally surgical, precise and meticulously planned,
so they do not include the employment of statistical weapons. This
experience enables planning and execution of limited ground maneuvers
characterized by selective, precise, cautious fighting, with minimum damage
inflicted on the civilian population, with carefully calculated friction and
with a minimum of errors.

The close, year-round cooperation with all of the national (and even some
international) intelligence agencies and with the various defense/security
authorities, enable these forces to benefit from readily-available
intelligence of the highest quality. This enables "special" maneuvers to be
different and unorthodox – they may not necessarily involve massive
firepower and intensive maneuvering, but rather focused maneuvering,
high-precision fire, infiltration, stealth and lethality based on the other
elements of the formula (C5ISR). The support provided by these elements
enable the special force to be limited in size but still highly effective.

As far as policy and official statements are concerned, the dispatching of
specialist forces is not conceived as a full-fledged ground maneuver, and
consequently we hear about occasional commando operations alongside the air
strikes. In some cases, these operations enhance the effectiveness of the
air strikes, but they also signify that risk management allows special
operations and from a public point of view, it is "OK" to employ such
forces.

"Special Maneuvers"

In their present format, C6ISR forces do not possess the critical mass
required for a ground maneuver – certainly not for methodical dismantling of
the enemy. Their activity is normally characterized by a small signature,
but the assumption according to which special forces mean small units is no
longer valid. Operational reality and the nature of the opponent call for a
revision of the force build-up process in any modern military organization.
What we need are larger formations of small, high-quality forces. The combat
teams and operational structure may remain small and intimate, but the scope
of the Order of Battle should increase substantially. In their new, revised
format, these forces will be able to operate effectively on the ground, to
dismantle enemy infrastructures, to create an effect of presence and
position themselves with a high-enough signature, but in their own unique
way.

Such forces, even when they operate as larger-than-usual formations, will
still be able to change their form, to change their modes of operation and
avoid becoming targets – prey for guerrilla and terrorism.

But more forces and larger formations are not the only issue here. Along
with the build-up of enough C6ISR formations, the form of maneuvering should
be adapted along with the typical envelope of these forces with regard to
the aspects of intelligence, C2, logistics and technology. The solid,
extensive support that is the hallmark of special operations is intended to
secure, support and backup a small force executing a unique, dedicated
mission. Maneuvers by special forces intended to take over, search,
dismantle and destroy enemy compound will require a different envelope,
better adapted to the larger scope but still possessing the same ability to
secure the survivability of the forces and provide a high-quality C2
standard, as is currently the norm in the conduct of special operations.

C6ISR formations operating continuously on the ground could help resolve the
dilemma world leaders face with regard to initiating ground operations in
crisis areas. They could constitute the interim phase and a strategic
bridging element between stand-off strikes and a full-scale ground
operation. Under-governed frontiers currently characterize the current
theater of operations in the Middle East and provide a natural environment
for special forces. These forces will execute missions that are typical of
ground military forces, but using different methods, state-of-the-art
technology and small teams. Their human advantage, the quality of the
warfighters and commanders, their creative ability and the ability to
improvise and adapt solutions to complex situations – all of these elements
will enable them to err less, to operate with a "surgical" mindset and
accomplish the missions assigned to them.

C6ISR forces will get the job done in their own way, even if that way cannot
currently be found in the doctrine manuals – these forces are adaptable and
know how to invent new combat doctrines in the field and write them into the
manuals later.

The author of this article, Brig. Gen. (ret.) Gal Hirsch, is a co-owner and
the chairman of the board of Defensive Shield. In the past, some of the
positions he served in included commander of the IAF Shaldag Unit, commander
of the IDF Benjamin Brigade during the fighting in the Judea & Samaria
region, J-3 of IDF Central Command during Operation Defensive Shield and the
building of the Israeli West Bank Barrier, commandant of the IDF Officer
Training School and commander of the IDF Galilee Division (91st Division)
during the Second Lebanon War. As a reservist, he served as deputy commander
of the IDF Depth Corps HQ.

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