[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: Bottom line: while there won't be many photo ops
with the Arabs unless we agree to some terribly reckless terms with the
Palestinians, there will be ongoing cooperation and coordination. Is this
truly the case? Take a look at the body language of Saudi Prince Turki
al-Faisal when he appeared May 5, 2016 in Washington with Maj. Gen. (ret.)
Yaakov Amidror. The Saudi Prince was patting Amidror on the knee!! And
this while Amidror denounced Abbas.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/a-conversation-on-security-and-peace-in-the-middle-east
]

An Opportunity to Revive the Political Process, or an Illusion?
INSS Insight No. 824, May 29, 2016
Shlomo Brom, Anat Kurz .
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=11846

SUMMARY: In recent years, much has been said about the need for Israel to
identify opportunities that can be leveraged toward improvement of its
strategic position in the midst of the regional turmoil. It seems that the
renewed international and especially the regional interest in reviving the
political process is just such an opportunity that, if exploited, can be a
way for Israel to promote its relations with the pragmatic Arab states and
serve as a channel to make progress toward resolving the conflict with the
Palestinians. However, this opportunity will in all probability be
squandered because of the political situation in Israel and Abbas’s
weakness, factors that can be expected to discourage both the steps Israel
will have to take in exchange for realizing the potential inherent in this
opportunity and any willingness to put them into practice. Therefore, it
seems that Egypt and the Arab Gulf states will continue to cooperate with
Israel against their shared enemies in a limited fashion and only behind the
scenes, but in all probability, under current circumstances, the positive
potential inherent in these relations will not be realized.

There is an ostensible contradiction between the feverish diplomatic
activity in the regional and international arenas to revive the
Israeli-Palestinian political process and the internal political
developments in Israel. French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault visited
the Middle East earlier this month to promote the French initiative, which
seeks to convene an international conference to jumpstart the political
process between Israel and the Palestinians; Egyptian President Abdel Fattah
el-Sisi floated his own initiative to renew negotiations between Israel and
the Palestinians, and it was reported that he intends to host a three-way
meeting in Cairo, joined by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. In response, Netanyahu
declared that he is willing to restart direct negotiations with the
Palestinians, while Abbas declared his support for the French and Egyptian
initiatives. Former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, who served as the Quartet’s
special envoy to the Middle East, is also trying to promote a regional
political initiative that dovetails with el-Sisi’s plan. On May 24, 2016,
Blair announced that if the Netanyahu government agrees to restart talks
with the Palestinians on the basis of the Arab Peace Initiative, Arab
nations are prepared to take steps to normalize relations with Israel.
Meanwhile, in Israel, the attempt to have the Zionist Camp join the
government failed, and instead Yisrael Beitenu – a political party that
since the last parliamentary election has competed with the Prime Minister
over who represents the more extreme right wing positions – has joined the
coalition.


The key question now is: will Israel and the Palestinians be willing to
launch a political process in a format that regional and international
players are trying to establish? In particular, is the new constellation of
the Israeli government, with its more pronounced right wing flavor, capable
of doing so?

The major new development is the international, and in particular, the
regional involvement of the pragmatic Sunni states in the attempt to revive
the political process. From the perspective of Israel and the Palestinians,
the dynamic is a mixed blessing.

From Israel’s point of view, entering the process will allow it to try to
improve relations and work with the pragmatic Sunni states on the basis of
shared interests forged by the regional upheavals. Although the Israeli
right does not believe it possible to end the conflict, and feels that the
concrete need to steer Israel through the regional tumult is the most urgent
objective, normalization of relations with the Arab world has been one of
Israel’s traditional goals and seen as a key to Arab recognition of Israel
and an end to the conflict. At present, Israel and the pragmatic Arab states
alike believe that Iran’s regional policy is the most potent threat and are
wary of the growing strength of Iran’s regional allies; furthermore, they
are aligned in their resistance to Salafi jihadist groups operating in the
region and in their concern about the weakening of US power in the Middle
East. Regional and international participation in the political process also
promises to enhance the prospect that regional and international actors will
help implement agreements formulated between Israel and the Palestinians in
critical areas, such as the refugee problem, the holy sites, and security –
and helping finance these measures. To a certain extent, Israel can maneuver
between the French initiative and the joint el-Sisi-Blair initiative:
accepting the el-Sisi-Blair initiative may make it possible to refuse the
French initiative without paying a significant political diplomatic price or
to change its nature and make the proposed international conference into a
forum of support for the el-Sisi plan. But there’s the rub: from the point
of view of the Israeli government, the main drawback lies in the fact that
the regional actors might affect the parameters of the agreement with the
Palestinians, and that these would set the tone of the negotiations. The
main demand of the regional elements is that talks be conducted on the basis
of the Arab Peace Initiative, which speaks of borders on the basis of the
1967 armistice lines (allowing for the possibility of consensual land swaps)
and a just, consensual solution to the refugee problem on the basis of
General Assembly Resolution 194. Another critical disadvantage lies in the
French initiative’s attempt to establish parameters and a timetable for the
talks, although presumably the Palestinian side would also have to accept
parameters to which it is currently opposed, such as recognition of Israel
as the nation state of the Jewish people.

From the Palestinian perspective, the renewed international and regional
interest in the political process has many advantages. One, to a certain
extent, international and regional involvement meets the traditional
Palestinian demand to balance the asymmetry in the power relations between
Israel and the Palestinians. Two, predetermining parameters for the
negotiations that are central to their interests – such as borders on the
basis of the 1967 lines and resolving the refugee problem – is a major
achievement. Three, regional support can help Abbas overcome his internal
political weakness and confront the Hamas opposition to his policies,
because it would constitute a response to the criticism liable to be leveled
against him for making agreements that will be presented as concessions to
Israel. On the other hand, the international and regional initiatives also
bear some disadvantages for the Palestinian side. One is the Arab states’
agreement to take some steps to normalize relations with Israel even before
the Palestinians have made any gains through negotiations, as Abbas does not
believe Netanyahu is sincere in his stated commitment to the two-state
solution; he suspects that the Israeli Prime Minister’s objective is to
conduct sham talks in order to ease the international pressure on Israel.
Two, Abbas would also have to agree to the parameters of the talks, which
are problematic for him, including recognition of Israel as a Jewish state,
and conduct yet another round of talks with Israel whose endpoint and
outcomes are far from defined, and to do so from a place of political
weakness within the Palestinian arena and with great doubt as to the Arab
states’ ability to provide him with decisive backing.

Despite the concerns, the balance of considerations is reflected in the way
Palestinian spokespeople talk about the various initiatives, indicating that
Abbas sees the proposed political process positively and is willing to
participate in it. By contract, the situation on the Israeli side is much
more complicated. Israel is vehemently opposed to international involvement
as per the French initiative, and to date, the Israeli government has never
agreed to hold talks on the basis of the Arab Peace Initiative and has even
avoided lukewarm expressions of support for it. Consequently, it is hard to
believe that the Israeli government in its new constellation will be any
more flexible than previous governments on the critical issues related to
revival of the political process. However, as there has been increased
cooperation between Israel and Egypt under el-Sisi’s leadership, it will be
difficult for Israel to refuse an Egyptian invitation to participate in the
three-way meeting in Cairo. Would a meeting result in Israel’s joining the
proposed process? It may also be that el-Sisi will make the agreement of all
three parties a precondition for holding the meeting, in which case the
meeting will in all likelihood not take place, especially if Israel will not
a priori agree to hold talks on the basis of the Arab Peace Initiative.

In recent years, much has been said about the need for Israel to identify
opportunities that can be leveraged toward improvement of its strategic
position in the midst of the regional turmoil. It seems that the renewed
international and especially the regional interest in reviving the political
process is just such an opportunity that, if exploited, can be a way for
Israel to promote its relations with the pragmatic Arab states and serve as
a channel to make progress toward resolving the conflict with the
Palestinians. However, this opportunity will in all probability be
squandered because of the political situation in Israel and Abbas’s
weakness, factors that can be expected to discourage the steps Israel will
have to take in exchange for realizing the potential inherent in this
opportunity and any willingness to put them into practice. Therefore, it
seems that Egypt and the Arab Gulf states will continue to cooperate with
Israel against their shared enemies in a limited fashion and only behind the
scenes, but in all probability, under current circumstances, the positive
potential inherent in these relations will not be realized.