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Wednesday, July 27, 2016
Steadfast Vision, Flexible Implementation: The Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai

Steadfast Vision, Flexible Implementation: The Multinational Force and
Observers in Sinai
INSS Insight No. 837, July 25, 2016
Assaf Orion .
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=12123

SUMMARY: On April 25, 1982, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)
began its mission in the Sinai Peninsula to implement the supervisory
functions stipulated in the security annex of the Peace Treaty between
Israel and Egypt. In the decades since, and especially over the past five
years, the operating environment of the MFO has transformed dramatically,
and contributing countries and units have changed. Nonetheless, the
Multinational Force continues to fill a critical role in implementing the
security regime agreed upon by the leaders of Egypt, Israel, and the US, and
does so effectively. The secret of the MFO’s success lies in its steadfast
adherence to its strategic vision and to its defined purpose, as well as in
the flexibility that it has adopted in implementation of the Treaty mission.
Both its flexibility and its stability rely on the continued commitment of
the parties – as the Force’s “owners” – to the agreement, and on their
consistent support for the continuation of its mission under new and
changing conditions.
.
On April 25, 1982, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) began its
mission in the Sinai Peninsula to implement the supervisory functions
stipulated in the security annex of the Peace Treaty between Israel and
Egypt. In the decades since, and especially over the past five years, the
operating environment of the MFO has transformed dramatically, and
contributing countries and units have changed. Nonetheless, the
Multinational Force continues to fill a critical role in implementing the
security regime agreed upon by the leaders of Egypt, Israel, and the US, and
does so effectively. The secret of the MFO’s success lies in its steadfast
adherence to its strategic vision and to its defined purpose, as well as in
the flexibility that it has adopted in implementation of the Treaty mission.
Both its flexibility and its stability rely on the continued commitment of
the parties – as the Force’s “owners” – to the agreement, and on their
consistent support for the continuation of its mission under new and
changing conditions.

The security annex to the Peace Treaty provided for the existence of a
strategic demilitarized buffer between Egypt and Israel in the Sinai
Peninsula, as an alternative to the presence of the IDF in the area. This
arrangement created depth and an early warning zone to minimize the risk of
a military clash between Israel and Egypt, and to prevent the recurrence of
war between them. To this end, the Sinai region was divided into four
geographical strips (Zone A in the west of Sinai, Zone B in the center, Zone
C to the west of the Egypt-Israel border, and Zone D to its east) and the
military presence permitted in each zone was defined explicitly: up to a
mechanized division in Zone A, up to 2 border guard battalions in Zone B,
Egyptian civilian police in Zone C, and up to 4 IDF infantry battalions in
Zone D. In addition, warplanes and reconnaissance aircraft were prohibited
from operating over Sinai Zones B and C.

The Multinational Force and Observers was established as a joint project of
Egypt, Israel, and the US to interpose between the parties and to supervise
the restrictions in the security annex. Its headquarters and North Camp were
located at el-Gorah, its South Camp at Sharm el-Sheikh, and its civilian
headquarters in Rome. The Force has observation posts in Zone C, manned by
infantry soldiers; operates a Civilian Observer Unit (COU), which carries
out periodic inspections throughout the peninsula; has an aviation unit for
transport and inspections from the air; and has a Coastal Patrol Unit for
supervising the Straits of Tiran area. All of the units are intended to
separate the two sides and monitor military activity in the restricted and
demilitarized areas, and the headquarters of the Force reports violations to
the parties. In order to deal with specific security needs, the parties have
agreed from time to time on temporary adjustments in activities and presence
of military personnel and equipment, as part of the “Agreed Activities
Mechanism,” whereby the parties agree that there shall not be violations
determined by the MFO for what otherwise would be military presence or
activities prohibited by the limitations set in the Peace Treaty, without
prejudice to or change in their acceptance and adherence to the restrictions
in the agreement.

This operational routine continued until 2005, when Israel and Egypt signed
the Agreed Arrangements for the Rafah area, in preparation for Israel's
disengagement from the Gaza Strip. This Border Guard Force Agreement
approved the replacement of an Egyptian police (Central Security Police 
CSP) battalion with a Border Guard Forces (BGF) battalion (otherwise
prohibited by the security annex to the Treaty), and specified its approved
armament, as well as MFO monitoring of the arrangements that were adapted to
the new situation resulting from the agreement. During these years, various
parties proposed expanding the MFO's mission to include “monitoring”
smuggling activity conducted through tunnels from Gaza, arguing that this
would aid the fight against terrorism, but the parties to the Treaty and the
leadership of the MFO wisely chose to avoid this, keeping the MFO focused on
its original mission.

The MFO's operating environment began to change rapidly and drastically
following the fall of the Mubarak regime in January 2011, the rise of the
Muslim Brotherhood regime in 2012, and the Egyptian defense establishment’s
return to power in 2013. During these years the security situation in Sinai
deteriorated, especially since the July 2013 overthrow of then-President
Morsi, with increasing terrorist attacks on the part of local and regional
jihadist actors gradually developing into a broad campaign between the Sinai
Province of the Islamic State and the Egyptian Army and security forces.
This chain of developments led to progressive requests by Egypt to increase
the military forces that it maintains and operates in Sinai beyond what is
permitted by the Treaty. The jihadist activities also resulted in an
increased threat towards MFO bases and forces in the field: at first
indirectly, due to the increased threats to transportation and supply routes
to MFO bases and posts, and then direct attacks by the so-called Sinai
Province.

These changes in the security environment have posed combined challenges to
the MFO and to the parties to the Treaty: how the MFO mission should be
carried out amidst rising risks and dramatic changes in the Force operating
environment, how trust is to be maintained between the parties in such a
dynamic environment and rapidly changing situation, and how the security of
the Force and the lives of those serving in it should best be protected.
Significantly, while the UN force in the Golan Heights, UNDOF, collapsed
when subject to terrorist threat and largely lost operational relevance,
the MFO, with the active support of the US, Egypt, and Israel, has managed
to respond effectively to changed circumstances and adapt and improve
methods of operation under new conditions. The security of the Force and
means of protecting its personnel and facilities have been improved, high
risk outposts were evacuated, the methods of monitoring the situation on the
ground have been expanded and diversified, the channels of communication and
contacts between the parties have been expanded, and the MFO has both
maintained and enhanced the situation updates that it provides to the
parties, preventing tensions, suspicions, and distrust.

The changes in MFO operations were based on the following main principles:
preservation of the Peace Treaty as well as the restrictions on military
presence and operations in the area; necessary exceptions to those
restrictions for security purposes, made only by agreement and prior
coordination between the parties through the “Agreed Activities” mechanism
and under the effective supervision of the MFO; and agreement by the parties
that any such exceptions to the Treaty restrictions do not constitute a
permanent change in the Treaty, and such changes are temporary and
reversible.

This combination has enabled the parties to improve their operational
response to increasing threats while maintaining the Peace Treaty and the
restrictions of its security annex, to deepen the trust between them, and to
improve cooperation in dealing with common threats. Thus, while UN
peacekeeping forces in the region have on more than one occasion served as a
platform for diplomatic bashing between the sides, through their reporting
mechanisms and discussions at the Security Council, the Treaty parties –
Egypt and Israel, with the support of the US – have focused on fulfilling
the MFO's mission with a practical attitude of joint problem solving. The
MFO has a traditional and deliberate policy of very low media exposure, thus
facilitating the discreet management of the strategic relations between the
parties to the Treaty. For example, in the past the MFO published its annual
report as a public document, but stopped doing so in 2015 after the reports
were used for political ends.

The Force's scale of operations and deployment has changed repeatedly over
the years since 1982. The number of remote sites, which in 1982 was 44,
dropped to 32 in 1989, and was lowered to 25 manned outposts and three
unmanned communications sites in 2015. The outposts were closed mainly due
to considerations of operational efficiency and relevance to the mission,
and only in the past few years due to security considerations as well. The
force numbered approximately 2700 soldiers in the early 1980s, and this
number was gradually reduced to approximately 1700 soldiers in 2015.

The MFO's budget is funded primarily by Israel, Egypt, and the US, in equal
amounts, and from supplementary donations by other countries. The budget,
which in the first few years exceeded $100 million dollars, was cut in half
within a decade, in accordance with the reduction in the size of the force.
Since 2009 the MFO has maintained a no-growth core budget, but costs have
risen due to rising inflation; in the past five years the overall MFO budget
increased significantly due to security and related costs, most of which
have been generously covered by the US and donors.

Recently, the Multinational Force completed a comprehensive revision of its
operational disposition, which included evacuation of many observation
outposts in the north of Sinai, proposals to replace other manned outposts
with technological means, and the transfer of the core of its headquarters
and the majority of its forces from North Camp at el-Gorah to South Camp at
Sharm el-Sheikh. In the spring of 2016, the Force withdrew from seven
outposts in northern Sinai, and in June completed its withdrawal from three
additional outposts in central and southern Sinai, while relocating Force
headquarters to South Camp. There have been renewed calls in the US to
reconsider the continued participation of American forces in the mission due
to increasing risks, but the administration continues to express commitment
to its part in the mission and to the architecture of peace between Israel
and Egypt, which for their part are united in their support for the
continued US role in the MFO.

The Multinational Force serves as an exceptional example of a successful
peacekeeping force, which operates in the framework of an agreed-upon and
well-founded security regime between Israel and its largest neighbor, with
the US as strategic guarantor. The keys to the success of the Force thus far
have been the continued commitment of the countries partnered in it; its
stability and strategic adherence to its original mission and the refraining
from expansion into other tasks; and most of all, the tactical flexibility
and joint creativity in adapting mission implementation methods to a
continuously changing environment, particularly the increasing risks. The
test of the Force's success in the future will continue to depend on the
ability and commitment of Egypt and Israel to providing the MFO with a
secure operating environment, to guaranteeing its safety, and continue to do
all that they can to preserve this essential mechanism serving the
architecture of the peace agreement between them.

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