A Technological Wake-Up Call
Although technological superiority is a key element of the Israeli defense
doctrine, the IDF failed to expedite the development of new technologies
prior to the Second Lebanon War. Today, the story is entirely different
Itzik Elimelech | 26/07/2016
http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/content/technological-wake-call

Apparently, in the years prior to the Second Lebanon War (2000 through
2006), numerous projects had been stacked up on the desks of the IDF General
Staff, waiting for authorization – technologies that had matured but failed
to find their way to the battlefield. Two major reasons led to this state of
affairs: the first was the on-going budget cuts that adversely affected the
force build-up process as well as training activities and the preparedness
of the forces. The other was the realization, which proved to be mistaken in
retrospect, according to which we were facing a window of opportunity where
force build-up could be accomplished on the basis of those evolving
technologies and innovative operational concepts while leaping directly into
the next technological generation without investing in the present. The
bottom line: we failed to produce, in those years, a long-term plan with
clearly defined vectors for force build-up.

Even before the War, we knew that the maneuvering capability of the ground
forces, as good as it may be, is plagued by survivability gaps, with the
emphasis on the missile and explosive charge threats. The issue of the
infantry platform had been raised for discussion many years prior to the
War, and the Namer APC was already there – admittedly on paper, but awaiting
a decision nonetheless. The active protection technology was also there,
mature and waiting. We had specified a technological vision of ground
superiority that incorporated all of the force build-up elements. We
developed numerous technologies in the field of precision fire, from
collection through locating to accurate engagement. We also developed highly
effective warheads. We dealt extensively with the issue of maneuvering. We
aspired to provide battalion commanders with overhead video capabilities. We
invested substantially in the infantry soldier but failed to have these
investments mature into an operational capability prior to the War. So, just
to name one example in the field of support fire, IDF found themselves
firing more than 170,000 artillery rounds into Lebanese territory with very
low to zero operational effectiveness, while experiencing difficulties in
locating accuracy and in staging prompt, relevant attacks.

The Second Lebanon War was a wake-up call for IDF, not just with regard to
the operational concept, but also with regard to the preparedness of the
forces, collegiality issues, the crisis of confidence between the combat
echelon and the staff echelon, and in this writer's view, that wake-up call
was very relevant to the technological aspect as well. Apparently, the
Second Lebanon War caught us at some technological low point, with numerous
technologies stacked up on the decision-making table and others in the
process of being implemented. This situation will take place in any future
war, but evidently, in 2006 we were at a particularly low point.

The Technology Matured after the War

The technological wake-up call of the Second Lebanon War led IDF and IMOD to
authorize, immediately following the war, numerous projects that had been
waiting on the table for many years prior to the War. Some of those projects
were based on the new-old realization that the ground maneuver has always
been and will always remain a primary element of the IDF's ability to subdue
the enemy. Immediately after the War, the Israeli defense establishment
decided to develop and acquire the Namer APC (a heavy armored personnel
carrier for infantry), and to complete the development of the active
protection system and acquire it for the new Merkava tanks. Additionally,
IDF invested in new ammunition for tanks (the 120mm APAM-MP-T M329 cartridge
and the 120mm HE-MP-T M339 cartridge). IAF realized that the conclusions of
the pre-war weapon system discussions were correct, namely – that the
reliability of their air-to-surface bombs was low, so it embarked on the
development of an upgraded bomb (MPR500), and there were many other
examples.

Whatever applies to the ground and to the air is equally relevant to the
field of intelligence. When the Second Lebanon War broke out, IDF had about
200 marked targets. This is a very small number. Today, IDF have thousands
of marked targets – targets that would be attacked immediately as the next
war breaks out, with IDF employing a very high rate of fire so as to have
those targets destroyed in a matter of days. The technology on which the
intelligence and tactical surveillance efforts rely matured only after the
War. The evolving command and control elements enabled the decision makers
to break conventions and currently enable the combat formations at the
battalion and brigade levels to enjoy comprehensive and detailed
intelligence that is relevant to their respective sectors. The development
of the video world provided battalion commanders with the Rokhev Shamayim
(Skylark) UAV, which enables them to collect over-the-hill intelligence and
employ accurate, effective fire.

More than 4,000 Katyusha rockets were fired into Israeli territory and
landed on settlements, major cities and strategic IDF points during the War.
These rockets were etched into the consciousness of the decision makers and
led, after the War, to a more profound understanding of the need to invest
in missile defense layouts. The objection to the Iron Dome project
diminished and after the War the project gained momentum and reached
operational status within a few years. With the capabilities of the Iron
Dome and David's Sling systems in the background, IDF will be substantially
better capable of executing their missions.

Technological superiority is an essential element of Israel's national
security doctrine. Substantial resources have been invested over the years
in an on-going effort to retain this superiority. This superiority is
evident every day, but is originally intended to enable prompt overbalance
in the event of a war. The development and assimilation of a technological
capability is a process that takes a long time to complete. When a war
breaks out, it may find the weapon systems in several possible states: most
of them already assimilated with the warfighters thoroughly familiar with
them as they had used them during their compulsory service or on subsequent
reserve duty, in the previous war or operation; some are new and this war is
their baptism by fire, although they were assimilated through a structured
process, as in the case of the Merkava Mark-IV tanks; a small percentage is
in advanced development stages. The capability of the IDF relies on the
first category – the good old familiar weapon systems. The new weapon
systems should constitute the added value of technological superiority, the
elements that were added since the last war – the cutting edge of knowledge
translated into an operational battlefield capability. This is the
technological element of surprise, like the emergence of the Sagger antitank
missiles during the Yom-Kippur War, the Python air-to-air missiles during
the First Lebanon War and the Iron Dome system during Operation Protective
Edge. This weapon system offers a capability that takes the enemy off
balance and reshapes the battlefield. So, when IDF entered the Second
Lebanon War with the new Merkava Mark-IV tanks, for which the war was the
baptism by fire – the world's best platform in its category and a truly
amazing war machine incorporating the very best technologies – these tanks
were expected to bring about a substantial change on the battlefield by
providing capabilities that had not been available before. Regrettably, that
was not the situation that evolved during that war. More than 40 IDF tanks
of all of the types used were hit. More than 20 tanks were penetrated,
including 5 Merkava Mark-IV tanks, and the ground maneuver trudged heavily
throughout the war.

Assimilating New Weapon Systems during the War

The third category consists of the use of new weapon systems introduced
during the actual fighting. This category is controversial and indeed
problematic. The desire to contribute, to influence and to enable the
warfighters to execute their missions successfully is equally fervent among
the people involved in the development of the weapon systems, within the
military and in the defense industries. The objective is to harness all of
the resources of the state, the development organizations, the officers and
the defense industries, to concentrate an effort in a state of emergency in
order to achieve a prompt overbalance and end the war in a victory. In some
situations, this trend collides head-on with the desire to fight using the
weapon systems you had trained with, the good old familiar weapons, not to
divert anyone's attention – especially that of commanders – to the
assimilation and employment of new weapon systems, and to avoid the
introduction of new elements of uncertainty in addition to those that are
already present in the war. The task of balancing between these two trends
must be taken care of by the commanders at the various levels. Many examples
may be presented of the introduction of new weapon systems during a war
which made a significant contribution, as well as examples of less
successful employment of new systems. Every technological organization and
defense industry have standing orders and procedures for wartime.
Additionally, in such wartime situations, the industries are requested to
attempt and produce technological solutions for pressing issues that arise
during the war, like bombs that would set fire to the "nature reserves" in
Southern Lebanon during the Second Lebanon War or a solution for quickly and
effectively destroying underground tunnels during Operation Protective Edge.
These emergency assignments necessitate the concentration of the best minds
in order to come up with a sufficiently effective solution within a very
short time.

The Plasma Screen Generation

During the Second Lebanon War, field commanders who preferred to remain in
their rear-area command posts came under severe criticism. At that time, the
rear-area command centers were partially equipped with the new Tzayad
(Digital Land Army) system and other capabilities. During the week between
the outset of the war and the ground maneuver, the system was deployed at
the mobile command centers located inside Israeli territory, along the
border. A strenuous effort by the ordnance elements and the Elbit Systems
Company led to a situation where the command centers could monitor the
positions of the forces almost down to individual platforms, they could
monitor video input transmitted directly by UAVs flying over the
battlefield, had direct communication links, through the command and control
systems, with the various fire support units, including IAF, and fire loops
could be closed fairly quickly. These capabilities were not available,
during the Second Lebanon War, to the forward command groups, so the
commanders generally and brigade commanders in particular found themselves
facing the classic dilemma of any battle – the commander's position. During
this war, the dilemma became extremely acute, as the gap between the ability
to command and conduct the operations from the command centers and the very
limited capabilities available to the forward command groups was immense.
The field commander had to choose between operating out of a house located a
few kilometers inside Lebanon using only his radio communication system, a
very limited status picture, a nearly irrelevant fire employment capability
and a severely restricted conduct-of-operations capability, and operating
out of a command center fitted with every possible technological gadget
which enabled the commander to make intelligent decisions in real time based
on an extensive range of data and capabilities. Pursuant to the assimilation
of the complete Tzayad program after the War, this gap narrowed considerably
and today the technology makes it possible to delegate many capabilities to
the forward command group. Consequently, during Operation Protective Edge,
the IDF commanders could command their forces from the front and still enjoy
the benefits of technology.

Future Force Build-Up

When the War ended, IDF initiated numerous in-depth debriefing and analysis
efforts, at various levels. Technological debriefing and analysis efforts
were initiated as well, in all of the elements involved in the development
of weapon systems and in all IDF arms. The debriefing and analysis document
issued by MAFAT (IMOD's Weapon System & Future Technological Infrastructure
Research & Development Administration) is a fascinating document that
constituted a technological road map for many years to come. War is the
ultimate test for the technology developed and assimilated in the years
prior to the war for the purpose of achieving overbalance and victory.
During the war one learns which technologies made a contribution on the
battlefield, whether a weapon system developed through a substantial
investment actually provided a solution to the operational need, but mainly
about the gaps: what was missing? How can we deal with the "nature
reserves"? How do you cut down the duration of the war from weeks to days?
Which technologies should be developed and where should the efforts and
funds be invested? The feedback obtained from the warfighters carries
tremendous weight with regard to future developments. These lessons, along
with the attempt to predict and prepare for the next war – not for the one
you have just analyzed – led the research and development programs in the
years after the Second Lebanon War. There is no doubt that a decade after
the Second Lebanon War, the IDF have accomplished an amazing quantum leap
and today enjoy a significant technological superiority over our enemies. At
the same time, this is an on-going effort that requires massive investments
over the years. Looking ahead, it is important to continue enhancing the
accurate and effective fire capabilities by improving spotting accuracy and
the ability to attack promptly using munitions that are effective for the
given target. It is important to continue investing in the ground maneuver,
including operations in urban environments, while providing each combat
platform with a state-of-the-art, second-generation active protection
system. We should shorten and simplify the fire loop closure process and
enable the battalion commander to close such loops quickly and effectively,
and expand the overhead video capability so that it is readily available
even to the company command and, naturally, to the brigade commander as
well. The infantry soldier should be positioned at the very heart of the
technological effort. It is important to deal with the subterranean medium
by developing ground robotic capabilities and other capabilities. With
regard to IAF, the imminent assimilation of the F-35 Adir stealth fighters
will substantially change – for the better – the capabilities of IAF and
following the integration of Israeli-made systems in this aircraft, will
enable IAF to maintain air superiority. The next war should be completely
different: it should be shorter, more aggressive and based on the combined
employment of all of the capabilities and on achieving overbalance quickly
with a minimum of casualties among our own forces.

Col. (res.) Itzik Elimelech is the CEO of IMI USA and formerly a department
head at MAFAT.