MEMRI August 25, 2016 Special Dispatch No.6587
The Free Alawite Movement – First Signs Of Armed Alawite Resistance To The
Assad Regime
http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/9412.htm

On June 4, 2016, Alawite officer 'Alaa Makhlouf, a bodyguard of President
Bashar Al-Assad's wife Asma, was assassinated after a bomb was placed in his
car. A group called the Free Alawite Movement claimed responsibility for the
act, thus becoming the first Alawite group to openly undertake military
action against regime forces.

An examination of its social media pages indicates that the Free Alawite
Movement, led by Sheikh Mohsen Al-Haidari, was founded in February 2016 to
combat the Assad regime and defend the Alawite sect from it. The movement
operates on three levels – political, informational, and military; its
military activity is carried out by its armed wing, the Free Alawite
Brigade. The movement openly advertises its activity in and out of Syria and
expresses its desire to cooperate with other Syrian rebel groups and
opposition factions. Statements issued by the movement indicated that its
founders' opposition to the Assad regime is also the result of years-long
rivalries between various factions within the Alawite sect,[1] specifically
between the Kalaziya faction – the majority faction that includes the
Al-Assad, Makhlouf, Shalish, and Kheirbek families – and the Haidariya and
Makhousiya factions, and possibly others as well.[2] The movement stresses
that the regime is not as tied to the Alawite sect as it claims but rather
harms the sect, and that many Alawites do not support it.


Free Alawite Movement slogan: "Syria and Nothing Else"
(Facebook.com/1192248117460289)

It should be mentioned that the anger directed at President Assad and his
regime from within the Alawite sect is not new, and was manifested by
widespread anti-regime protests in August 2015 in the regime strongholds of
Latakia and Tartus, and the founding, on October 22, 2015, of an Alawite
political opposition group operating outside of Syria called the Upcoming
Syria movement.[3] However, this is the first time since the onset of the
Syrian crisis in 2011 that an Alawite movement claims responsibility for
military action against the regime.

It should be mentioned that this report is based on the Free Alawite
Movement's Facebook and Twitter pages, and that no other sources of
information about the movement exist. As a result, the movement's size, the
scope of its activity, and the level of its support remain unclear.

This report will review the platform and activity of the Free Alawite
Movement:

The Movement's Platform: Assad Regime Will Be Held Accountable For Its
Crimes; Syria Is The Homeland Of All Its People, Regardless Of Sect

On April 24, 2016, the Free Alawite Movement issued its founding statement.
The statement called to view Syria as a homeland for all its residents,
regardless of ethnicity or sect, and to distinguish Alawites who were not
party to the crimes of the Syrian regime from those whose hands are covered
in the blood of their Syrian brethren, and who should be held accountable
for their actions. According to the statement, the movement's goals are to
assist all Alawites who wish to rebel against the rule of the Kalaziya
faction and its loyalist families, and to establish political and military
wings that work against these families and assist the Free Syrian Army. The
movement expressed support for Alawite organizations and figures who oppose
the regime, such as Monzer Makhous, spokesman for the Syrian High
Negotiations Committee, and the Upcoming Syria movement. To highlight its
rivalry with the Assad regime and its patrons, the movement stated that it
saw Iran, Russia, Hizbullah, and the Shi'ite militias in Syria as enemies,
and that the Alawite sect has no true religious ties with Iran; on the
contrary, the movement stressed that there was historic hostility between
them.

The founding statement reads: "The movement was founded on February 20,
2016. It includes a group of leaders from the Haidariya and Makhousiya
[factions of the] Alawite sect, as well as some officers in the regime army,
retired officers, and some current and former politicians.

"The movement's founding principles:

"- Syria is the homeland of all its sons, regardless of sect... religious
school, or ethnicity.

"- Anyone of us who spilled the blood of his Syrian brethren is a criminal
who will be held accountable by tribunals.

"- The movement will absolutely not serve as a cover for criminals and will
work to extradite any criminal whose crimes are proven.

"- We charge our brethren in the homeland to refrain from holding all of us
[Alawites] responsible for the events in Syria. A large number of us oppose
these crimes and some were thrust [into the war] following sectarian
brainwashing by regime loyalists.

"The movement's goals:

"1. Freeing the Haidaris and Makhousis from the control of the Kalaziya
[faction] and the Al-Wahsh,[4] Makhlouf, Shalish, and Kheirbek families.

"2. Defending our remaining youths from inevitable death in the service of
these families.

"3. Stressing to our youths that they are dying for families and not for the
homeland, while Kalaziya members and the Al-Wahsh [Al-Assad], Makhlouf, and
Shalish families sit in their palaces and offices and gamble.

"4. Establishing a political force of free sect members to defend the sect
from Kalaziya [loyalists].

"5. Ensuring safety for defectors, escapees, and those who refuse to be led
to battle.

"6. Establishing charity foundations to ensure aid to families that the
regime refuses to help due to their opposition to its crimes.

"7. Establishing a military force including officers, enlisted men, and
youths who defected [from the regime army].

"8. Striving to eliminate the Shabiha[5] activists of the Al-Wahsh,
Makhlouf, and Shalish families in all areas.

"9. Supporting Monzer Makhous and the leader of Upcoming Syria, brother
Fouad Hamira.[6]

"10. Contacting the Free Syrian Army... to provide information and support
and to defend it in all [our] areas.

"11. To distribute and put up flyers to expose criminals.

"12. To treat Iran, Russia, Hizbullah, and the militias sent by Iran to
Syria as our common enemy.

"13. [To stress] that nothing ties the Free Alawite Movement to Iran
religiously, and that there is a historic hostility between us [Alawites]
and them...

"14. [To reiterate] that Iran is implementing its ancient plan... to
transform part of the Alawite sect into its servant in the region."[7]

Military Activity: Free Alawite Brigade Targets The Regime

As stated above, unlike other Alawite opposition movements, the Free Alawite
Movement is the first to reportedly carry out armed resistance to the
regime, although apparently on a limited scale, so far. The movement's
military wing is the Free Alawite Brigade, and is likely comprised of Syrian
army defectors. There is no information regarding the brigade's commander,
but it is known that his lieutenant is Colonel Muhammad Barakat, who
defected from the regime army on May 2, 2016, to join the brigade.[8]

The brigade claimed responsibility for a number of operations, the most
prominent of which was the assassination of 'Alaa Makhlouf, the bodyguard of
President Assad's wife Asma, on June 4, 2016 by placing a bomb in his
car.[9] On June 12, the Free Alawite Movement tweeted that the one of its
fighters "managed to blow up the headquarters of a brigade in the [Syrian
army's] 4th Division and escape safely."[10]


Bombing a brigade headquarters in the Syrian army's 4th Division (Image:
Twitter.com/jojohm7, June 12, 2016)

Additionally, on May 19, 2016, the movement claimed responsibility for
bombing an ammo depot belonging to the regime's National Defense militia in
the city of Al-Suqaylabiya.[11]

Informational Activity

It appears that the movement's activity focuses on the informational level,
mainly via its Facebook and Twitter pages, criticizing the Al-Assad,
Makhlouf, and Shalish families and the Assad regime in general. The
movement's main argument is that these families, and the Assad regime, do
not represent the Alawite sect and even exploit it in the service of Iran.
Thus, for example, on April 13, 2016, the movement posted a Facebook status
arguing that nothing tied Alawites to Shi'ites, and that those who spread
Shi'a Islam among Alawites was the family of Suleiman Al-Assad, which was
not originally part of the Alawite sect and came to Syria from parts
unknown.[12] Another post argued that the Al-Assad family lives at the
expense of impoverished Alawites, who make up some 50% of the sect, and
works with Iran to control Alawite opponents of the regime, thus enabling
Iran to take over Syria.[13]

A post on May 10 stated that the Assad regime uses loyalists of Alawite
factions that are not among regime supporters as cannon fodder, citing as
evidence the number of Alawites belonging to the Kalaziya faction killed
during the war, which is far lower than the death toll among loyalists of
the other factions.[14] It further claimed that the Assad regime was
responsible for the massive terror attacks in Jableh and Tartus on May 23,
2016, which claimed 317 lives, all of them members of the Haidariya and
Makhousiya factions.[15] Even though ISIS claimed responsibility for these
attacks, the movement claimed that the Assad regime had carried them out to
prevent the outbreak of an "Alawite intifada" on the Syrian coast.[16]

On April 30, 2016, following the start of a massive Assad regime campaign in
Aleppo, the movement condemned the regime's crimes, claiming that the
movement itself could not be held accountable for the regime's actions.[17]


Free Alawite Movement symbol (Facebook.com/1192248117460289, May 2, 2016)

Political Activity

The movement claims to be conducting political activity beyond Syria's
borders. For example, on May 19 it posted a Facebook status claiming that
"the supreme authority of the Free Alawite Movement has launched day 3 of
its meetings in France. The movement rejected a request by Rifa'at Al-Assad
[President Bashar Al-Assad's uncle] to join the movement due to his poor
record. The movement will issue a statement after its meetings. These are
the final days of Bashar Al-Wahsh, and the whole world agrees on this."[18]

According to the movement, it has held ties with the Syrian High
Negotiations Committee through its spokesman Monzer Makhous, who is a member
of the Alawite Makhousiya faction. Following the May 2016 terror attacks in
Jableh and Tartus, the movement's leader, Sheikh Mohsen Al-Haidari sent a
letter to Makhous asking him to inform international elements that Kalaziya
loyalists were on their way to massacre displaced Sunnis on the Syrian
coast.[19] Beyond that, there is no information on ties between the
movement and other large Syrian opposition bodies such as the National
Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces.

The movement's Facebook page also reported on ties with former Syrian
defense minister and chief of staff 'Ali Habib, who is an Alawite and was
ousted as defense minister by President Assad in August 2011. On May 10,
2016, the movement posted an "announcement from Paris" stating that "Major
General 'Ali Habib, the former Syrian defense minister, spoke with some
opposition factions and world officials [in Paris] in order to find a
solution for the Syria war that would lead to the expulsion of the Al-Wahsh,
Makhlouf, and Shalish families from Syria, and the punishing of anyone with
Syrian blood on their hands." The post further mentioned an upcoming meeting
"attended by Major General 'Ali Habib, Brigadier General Manaf Tlass [a
former general in the Syrian regime army and Assad associate who defected in
2012], and a number of [other] senior officers who defected from the
Al-Wahsh [Al-Assad] family army, in order to establish a transitional
military council that would lead Syria towards becoming a free democratic
country with no room for the Al-Wahsh, Shalish, and Makhlouf families, and
that will hold all criminals accountable. Our Sheikh [Mohsen Al-Haidari]
will join the meeting as head of the Free Alawite Movement and the Free
Alawite Brigade."[20]

On July 12, 2016, the movement posted a Facebook status stating that
Al-Haidari had arrived in Ankara together with 'Ali Habib, and that they had
begun a series of meetings with military and political leaders, including
Khaled Al-Mahamid, who is in charge of coordinating with defecting officers
in Syrian opposition factions in South Syria. It was said that the meetings
would last two days, after which the two would depart for Moscow.[21]

It should be mentioned in this context that 'Ali Habib's meetings in Ankara
were reported by other outlets, but none of them mentioned the Free Alawite
Movement or Al-Haidari. Thus, the Syrian oppositionist website
Orient-news.net reported on July 12 that 'Ali Habib had arrived in Ankara
from Paris two days prior to meet with the Turkish military high command to
discuss the establishment of a wide military government in Syria that would
be headed by and include many defecting officers from the regime, and also
to discuss the establishment of a core for a new national army. The report
stated further that, after the deliberations in Ankara, Habib would continue
his meetings in Moscow. However, as stated, the website did not mention the
Free Alawite Movement.[22] Additionally, some reports denied that Habib had
left Syria at all.[23]

Endnotes:


[1] The Alawite sect is divided into several different factions reflecting
religious schools that differ on solar and lunar rituals.


[2] Aljazeera.net, January 17, 2016.


[3] See MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis Series Report No. 1225, 'Alawi Sect
Showing Signs Of Opposition To Assad Regime, February 4, 2016.


[4] Al-Wahsh was the original last name of Bashar Al-Assad's grandfather.
He changed the name to Al-Assad in 1927 after acquiring status.


[5] The popular name given to the Syrian regime's plainclothes militia.


[6] See MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis Series Report No. 1225, 'Alawi Sect
Showing Signs Of Opposition To Assad Regime, February 4, 2016.


[7] The statement is dated April 24, 2016, but was posted on the movement's
Facebook and Twitter pages on May 25. Twitter.com/jojohm7,
Facebook.com/1192248117460289, May 25, 2016.


[8] Twitter.com/jojohm7, May 2, 2016.


[9] Twitter.com/jojohm7, June 4, 2016.


[10] Twitter.com/jojohm7, June 12, 2016.


[11] Facebook.com/1192248117460289, May 19, 2016.


[12] Facebook.com/1192248117460289, April 13, 2016.


[13] Facebook.com/1192248117460289, April 13, 2016.


[14] Facebook.com/1192248117460289, May 10, 2016.


[15] Twitter.com/jojohm7, May 23, 2016.


[16] Twitter.com/jojohm7, May 23, 2016.


[17] Twitter.com/jojohm7, April 30, 2016.


[18] Facebook.com/1192248117460289, May 19, 2016.


[19] Twitter.com/jojohm7, May 23, 2016.


[20] Facebook.com/1192248117460289, May 10, 2016.


[21] Facebook.com/1192248117460289, July 12, 2016.


[22] Orient-news.net, July 12, 2016.


[23] Orient-news.net, July 13, 2016; Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London), July 14,
2016.