IMRA Middle East News Updates

Weekly Commentary: Yes to Ending Funding - No To Disenfranchising Draft Dodgers

Fri, 05 Dec 2025 09:25:03 -0500

Weekly Commentary: Yes to Ending Funding - No To Disenfranchising Draft
Dodgers

Dr. Aaron Lerner Date: 5 December 2025

Some politicians have floated the idea that draft dodgers be denied the
right to vote.

It is a dangerous move against our democratic values.

There's more than enough to do to draft dodgers:

Draft dodgers should not get a discount on municipal taxes because they are
low income .

Draft dodgers should not get a discount on National Insurance and National
Health insurance because they are low income.

Draft dodgers should not have subsidized daycare for their kids.

Draft dodgers and the yeshiva they are recorded as attending shouldn't
receive government funds because they are studying at the yeshiva.

And more.

But, yes, even draft dodgers should have the right to vote.

________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on
Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

Mend the Rifts - State Commission of Inquiry and Pull Draft Law

Sun, 30 Nov 2025 07:31:12 -0500

Mend the Rifts - State Commission of Inquiry and Pull Draft Law
Dr. Aaron Lerner 30 November 2025

"Faced with the security challenges and diplomatic opportunities now
standing before the State of Israel, I am committed to doing everything in
my power to mend the rifts, achieve unity among the people, and restore
trust in the institutions of the state."
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, 30.11.2025

Our Prime Minister is completely right.

And therefore, for that same purpose:

- A state commission of inquiry must be established, with its composition
determined by the President of the Supreme Court together with Justice
Solberg. I emphasize: "together" - not merely "in consultation."

- The Draft Law must be withdrawn. It is true that a rift may exist between
those who refuse to share the security and economic burden and those who are
willing to do so, but at this critical time the important thing is to
prevent a rift among those who are carrying the burden and are prepared to
defend the country.

________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on
Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

Weekly Commentary: Enable Security Personnel To Warn Political Echelon

Wed, 26 Nov 2025 10:29:43 -0500

Weekly Commentary: Urgent Legislation So Security Personnel Can Warn
Political Echelon
Dr. Aaron Lerner 26 November 2025

Fact: Numerous Israeli security personnel warned their superiors of the
impending October 2023 disaster, but these warnings never reached the
political echelon.

The security echelon already has a set-up which allows for anyone in the
security echelon to jump the chain of command to provide critical
information to the head of their organization.

But today, already two years after the October 2023 disaster, it is
literally a violation of the law for members of the security echelon to
communicate with the political echelon without authorization from the top of
their chain of command.

We urgently need to extend this arrangement to its logical conclusion: a
set-up which allows for anyone in the security echelon to jump the chain of
command to provide critical information to the heads of the political
echelon, the Minister of Defense, and the Prime Minister.

Some have warned that such an arrangement would overwhelm the DM and PM
messages from "nudniks" in the security echelon.

But the arrangement doesn't need to give those who send the DM or PM reports
and warnings the protection enjoyed by whistle blowers.

In fact, the arrangement could require that a copy of any such communication
much also be sent, at the same time, to their immediate superior.

Those choosing to jump the chain of command would be literally betting their
careers on the importance of the information they are sharing.

From what we know today of the frustration of the lower echelons dealing
with "Jericho Wall", the spotters and others, It made sense that these same
people didn't contact the top of their own security groups because they knew
that the security echelon was blinded by the "conception".

It is reasonable, however, to conclude that they would have reached out to
Netanyahu if there was a way to do it, knowing that if there was a record
that the information was brought to his attention that Netanyahu, ever
fearful of future commissions of enquiry, would have acted on it.

It is with a heavy heart that I note that even in the national camp there
are many who vociferously oppose making it possible for people in the
security echelon to jump the chain of command to reach the PM and DM with
critical information.

For the life of me I don't know why so many good Israelis are unable to
connect the dots.

There is legislation stuck in the Knesset addressing this issue.

Even a dog who gets hit by a car learns not to go into the street again.

We urgently need to learn our lesson.

________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on
Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

Saudi Timeline To Pal Statehood Could Undermine What We Already Have

Thu, 20 Nov 2025 14:22:35 -0500

Observation: Saudi Timeline To Pal Statehood Could Undermine What We Already
Have
Dr. Aaron Lerner 20 November 2025

As I write this there's a convoy of cargo trucks on the way from the Gulf
through Saudi Arabia to Israel in a commercial operation for hot cargo too
heavy to fly.

Civilian jets are also flying over Saudi airspace on their way between
Israel and many destinations.

Behind the scenes there's considerable commerce underway between the two
countries.

And I'm not going to go into other active collaboration.

All of this is without any timeline for a sovereign Palestinian state.

Now some talking heads are suggesting that not such a big deal for there to
be yet another timeline for a Palestinian state.

This time one which is tied to the Saudis.

We've ultimately dodged the bullet with other timelines.

So, indeed, what's the big deal.

Well, I think it is important that convoys of cargo trucks and civilian jets
pass through Saudi Arabia one their way between Israel and other places in
the world.

I think it's important that there's considerable commerce.

And that active collaboration is certainly important.

But if there's a formal timeline for a sovereign Palestinian State and it is
associated with the Saudis there's a good chance that when that timeline
isn't met that the Saudis, due to domestic, regional and even worldwide
pressure, find themselves compelled to not only drop whatever additional
advancements there were in our relations, but also all of the things I've
mentioned above which we had without a timeline.

No timetables please.

Not even one with milestones whose fulfillment we can debate.

For anything we might temporarily gain by a timeline for a sovereign
Palestinian state. we have magnitudes more to lose at the end of it.

________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on
Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

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Weekly Commentary: Israel Needs Crash Program To Defend Against Stealth Platforms

Thu, 20 Nov 2025 09:43:08 -0500

Weekly Commentary: Israel Needs Crash Program To Defend Against Stealth
Platforms
Dr. Aaron Lerner 20 November 2025

With China, Russia and the Turks all planning to supply stealth platforms to
our region, Israel needs a crash program to defend against this technology.

President Trump's announcement of plans to sell F-35's to the Saudis simply
offers an opportunity for the issue to reach towards to the top of the high
stack of challenges our decision makers must contend with.

We already have many of the tools for a comprehensive stealth detection
system and the sophisticated military industry needed to complete the puzzle
in-house.

I emphasize "in-house" because we cannot risk including critical foreign
made parts in the system.

Ideally our crash program might be a two-track program: one based on
conventional solutions with certain success and the other pursuing a
promising exotic approach which, if successful, promises significant
advantages over conventional systems.

The above applies to detecting stealth platforms, neutralizing what the
platforms launch and intercepting the platforms themselves.

This is anything but a cheap overnight program.

But the question isn't if Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and basically everyone
else in the region is going to ultimately have stealth platforms. It is
when.

It is critical that we implement an in-house crash program to address this
challenge before it is too late.
.
________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on
Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

How UNSCR 2803 Could Be Exploited Against Israel

Tue, 18 Nov 2025 14:11:20 -0500

How UNSCR 2803 Could Be Exploited Against Israel
Dr. Aaron Lerner 18 November 2025

There's a school of thought here in Israel that UNSCR 2803 is a dead letter
because the International Stabilization Force (ISF) will never actually be
deployed.

They may be right, but the motives and interests of the actors involved in
this saga are so complicated and unpredictable that it would be a mistake to
ig nore the document.

Let's walk through excerpts from Paragraph 7 of UNSCR 2803

7. Authorizes Member States working with the BoP and the BoP to establish a
temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza to deploy under
unified command acceptable to the BoP, with forces contributed by
participating States...to use all necessary measures to carry out its
mandate ... to help secure border areas... protect civilians...provide
support to the vetted Palestinian police forces...

...As the ISF establishes control and stability, the Israel Defense Forces
(IDF) will withdraw from the Gaza Strip based on standards, milestones, and
timeframes linked to demilitarization that will be agreed between the IDF,
ISF, the guarantors, and the United States...

So:

#1. There's an international force on Israel's border with the function of
being responsible to "help secure" it using " all necessary measures" - but
without identifying who or what the force is securing it from.

#2. This international force also is to "protect civilians" using " all
necessary measures" - but without identifying who or what it is protecting
civilians from.

#3. The IDF is to withdraw based on some " on standards, milestones, and
timeframes linked to demilitarization" without indicating what body decides
if in fact they have been met.

So let us set aside our rose-colored classes for a moment and imagine this
kind of world:

#1. Tucker Carlson, who essentially enjoyed President's Trump's endorsement
last Sunday, succeeds in his efforts to poison the minds of Mr. Trump's
supporters.

#2. Declaring successes in Gaza is seen as more important for the White
House than reality

#3. Ultimately the White House is occupied by an enemy of Israel.

And so:

#1, Following the Hamas model, there are human shields protecting enemy
military forces in the Gaza Strip whose existence is either denied or deemed
an inconsequential remnant of opposition to the fantastic peace loving
Palestinian leadership whose credibility hinges on being able to show the
public progress in the form of IDF withdrawals.

#2. Within the context of securing the border area, the international force
prevents any Israeli aerial monitoring of the Gaza Strip nor the passage of
any Israeli forces in operations against threatening terrorist targets
inside the Gaza Strip.

#3. Even in an edge case where rockets are being launched against Israel,
the presence of a single civilian next to the rocket launchers puts the area
under the protection of the international force.

Conclusion: while our Israeli talking heads focused on how the wording of
UNSCR 2803 relates to a future Palestinian state, we have flaws in the text
which we may pay for dearly in the near future.

Resolution 2803 (2025)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 10046th meeting, on 17 November 2025
Source:
https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/full-text-us-resolution-gaza-approved-un-
security-council

The Security Council,

Welcoming the Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict of 29 September
2025 (“Comprehensive Plan”), and applauding the states that have signed,
accepted, or endorsed it, and further welcoming the historic Trump
Declaration for Enduring Peace and Prosperity of 13 October 2025 and the
constructive role played by the United States of America, the State of
Qatar, the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the Republic of Türkiye, in having
facilitated the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip,

Determining that the situation in the Gaza Strip threatens the regional
peace and the security of neighboring states and noting prior relevant
Security Council resolutions relating to the situation in the Middle East,
including the Palestinian question,

1. Endorses the Comprehensive Plan, acknowledges the parties have accepted
it, and calls on all parties to implement it in its entirety, including
maintenance of the ceasefire, in good faith and without delay;

2. Welcomes the establishment of the Board of Peace (BoP) as a transitional
administration with international legal personality that will set the
framework, and coordinate funding, for the redevelopment of Gaza pursuant to
the Comprehensive Plan, and in a manner consistent with relevant
international legal principles, until such time as the Palestinian Authority
(PA) has satisfactorily completed its reform program, as outlined in various
proposals, including President Trump’s peace plan in 2020 and the
Saudi-French Proposal, and can securely and effectively take back control of
Gaza. After the PA reform program is faithfully carried out and Gaza
redevelopment has advanced, the conditions may finally be in place for a
credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood. The United
States will establish a dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians to
agree on a political horizon for peaceful and prosperous coexistence;

3. Underscores the importance of the full resumption of humanitarian aid in
cooperation with the BoP into the Gaza Strip in a manner consistent with
relevant international legal principles and through cooperating
organizations, including the United Nations, the International Committee of
the Red Cross, and the Red Crescent, and ensuring such aid is used solely
for peaceful uses and not diverted by armed groups;

4. Authorizes Member States participating in the BoP and the BoP to: (A)
enter into such arrangements as may be necessary to achieve the objectives
of the Comprehensive Plan, including those addressing privileges and
immunities of personnel of the force established in paragraph 7 below; and
(B) establish operational entities with, as necessary, international legal
personality and transactional authorities for the performance of its
functions, including: (1) the implementation of a transitional governance
administration, including the supervising and supporting of a Palestinian
technocratic, apolitical committee of competent Palestinians from the Strip,
as championed by the Arab League, which shall be responsible for day-to-day
operations of Gaza’s civil service and administration; (2) the
reconstruction of Gaza and of economic recovery programs; (3) the
coordination and supporting of and delivery of public services and
humanitarian assistance in Gaza; (4) any measures to facilitate the movement
of persons in and out of Gaza, in a manner consistent with the Comprehensive
Plan; and (5) any such additional tasks as may be necessary to support and
implement the Comprehensive Plan;

5. Understands that the operational entities referred to in paragraph 4
above will operate under the transitional authority and oversight of the BoP
and are to be funded through voluntary contributions from donors and BoP
funding vehicles and governments;

6. Calls upon the World Bank and other financial institutions to facilitate
and provide financial resources to support the reconstruction and
development of Gaza , including through the establishment of a dedicated
trust fund for this purpose and governed by donors;

7. Authorizes Member States working with the BoP and the BoP to establish a
temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza to deploy under
unified command acceptable to the BoP, with forces contributed by
participating States, in close consultation and cooperation with the Arab
Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, and to use all necessary measures
to carry out its mandate consistent with international law, including
international humanitarian law. The ISF shall work with Israel and Egypt,
without prejudice to their existing agreements, along with the newly trained
and vetted Palestinian police force, to help secure border areas; stabilize
the security environment in Gaza by ensuring the process of demilitarizing
the Gaza Strip, including the destruction and prevention of rebuilding of
the military, terror, and offensive infrastructure, as well as the permanent
decommissioning of weapons from non-state armed groups; protect civilians,
including humanitarian operations; train and provide support to the vetted
Palestinian police forces; coordinate with relevant States to secure
humanitarian corridors; and undertake such additional tasks as may be
necessary in support of the Comprehensive Plan. As the ISF establishes
control and stability, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will withdraw from
the Gaza Strip based on standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to
demilitarization that will be agreed between the IDF, ISF, the guarantors,
and the United States, save for a security perimeter presence that will
remain until Gaza is properly secure from any resurgent terror threat. The
ISF shall, (A) assist the BoP in monitoring the implementation of the
ceasefire in Gaza, and enter into such arrangements as may be necessary to
achieve the objectives of the Comprehensive Plan; and (B) operate under the
strategic guidance of the BoP and will be funded through voluntary
contributions from donors and BoP funding vehicles and governments;

8. Decides the BoP and international civil and security presences authorized
by this resolution shall remain authorized until Dec. 31, 2027, subject to
further action by the Council, and any further reauthorization of the ISF be
in full cooperation and coordination with Egypt and Israel and other Member
States continuing to work with the ISF;

9. Calls upon Member States and international organizations to work with the
BoP to identify opportunities to contribute personnel, equipment, and
financial resources to its operating entities and the ISF, to provide
technical assistance to its operating entities and the ISF, and to give full
recognition to its acts and documents;

10. Requests the BoP provide a written report on progress related to the
above to the UN Security Council every six months;

11. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il