IMRA Middle East News Updates

Weekly Commentary: Why I Oppose Snap Elections For Likud Chair

Thu, 16 Oct 2025 19:07:52 -0400

Weekly Commentary: Why I Oppose Snap Elections For Likud Chair
Dr. Aaron Lerner 16 October 2023

Members of the Likud Central Committee will be voting on 23 October on a
proposal that elections be held on 25 November for the chairman of the Likud
Party and the Likud's candidate for prime minister in the next elections.

Normally such a move is made when we are about to have elections, but that
is not the case today.

At least so far.

I believe that snap elections serve no one's interests.

The situation is so dynamic and there are so many "balls in the air" that it
is impossible to predict what the next elections will focus on nor how
Binyamin Netanyahu will fit into the picture.

In a best-case scenario, we will have elections after the situation with
Hamas has been satisfactorily concluded and other issues have been resolved,
with no doubt a huge victory for Netanyahu in elections for party chair
followed by fantastic results in the national elections.

But sometimes the situation doesn't turn out to be the best-case.

It can be argued that postponing the elections for the Likud chair can have
a positive influence on the decision-making process as, if nothing else, a
justification to third parties for declining to make unacceptable
compromises.

As the People of the Book we appreciate that even the greatest of leaders
aren't perfect.

Moses wasn't allowed to enter the Promised Land and I'm not going to go into
the consequences of decisions made by our wise King Solomon....

Binyamin Netanyahu has most certainly earned an important place in this new
chapter of our story.

And in the last two years Netanyahu made the critical decisions - often in
the face of considerable opposition - which took us from one of the most
dangerous focus of enemy forces we have ever faced to our dramatically
improved situation today.

It is indeed my fervent hope that if the vote is postponed to shortly before
the national elections that conditions bring Mr. Netanyahu a landslide
victory should he choose to run.

________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on
Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

PCPO Poll of Gazans: 6.6 % – Hamas’s survival is a “moral victory.”

Mon, 13 Oct 2025 10:19:08 -0400

PCPO Poll of Gazans: 6.6 % – Hamas’s survival is a “moral victory.”

Here is a question-by-question summary of Poll No. 215 – “Gaza War… A Battle Without a Victor” conducted by Dr. Nabil Kukali for the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion (PCPO) between 8–12 October 2025 .

Source: www.pcpo.org
1. Who won the Gaza war?
71.1 % – “No clear winner; both sides lost.”
11.3 % – Israel / Netanyahu’s government won.
11.0 % – Hamas won.
6.6 % – Don’t know / no answer.

2. Why do respondents think there was no victor?
64.1 % – Widespread destruction and suffering with no political gains.
6.6 % – Hamas’s survival is a “moral victory.”
3.0 % – Israel / Netanyahu gained politically.
1.3 % – Increased global sympathy for Palestinians.
1.4 % – Truce is only temporary.
17.6 % – Miscellaneous views (citizens themselves are the biggest losers).

3. Feelings after announcement of war’s end
53.8 % – Joy + relief with caution/anxiety.
27.0 % – Sadness / fear / psychological fatigue.
6.6 % – No change in life.

4.Top priorities for Gaza after the war

Priority %
Rebuilding homes & infrastructure 41.5 %
Humanitarian aid & civilian protection 20.3 %
Release of prisoners / hostages 9.3 %
National unity & reconciliation 13.0 %
Prevent re-armament / monitoring 4.0 %
Accountability for perpetrators 1.7 %
Emigration desire 7.0 %
Don’t know / no answer 3.3 %

5. Evaluation of U.S. President Donald Trump’s role
44.5 % – Positive (to some degree).
30.2 % – Negative.
19.3 % – Neutral / no influence.

Trust in Trump personally
54.2 % – Little or no confidence.
35.2 % – Partial / full confidence.
10.7 % – Neutral / no influence

6. Expectations for Gaza’s future
40.9 % – Gradual improvement expected.
38.9 % – Problems will persist long term.
9.6 % – Optimistic about political progress (unity gov’t / aid).
10.6 % – Uncertain / fear renewed conflict.

7. President Mahmoud Abbas’s participation in Sharm El-Sheikh ceremony

56.2 % – Important for legitimacy and visibility.
41.2 % – Not important.
2.4 % – Don’t know

8. Assessment of Egypt’s role
83.5 % – Effective in achieving ceasefire.
10.6 % – Ineffective.
5.9 % – Don’t know.

9. Sample & methodology
301 respondents (18–76 years; avg ≈ 35 yrs).
Gender: 56.3 % male / 43.7 % female.
Governorates: North Gaza 16.6 %, Gaza City 27.6 %, Deir al-Balah 18.3 %, Khan Yunis 19.3 %, Rafah 15.9 %.
Method: CATI telephone interviews.
Response rate: 75 %.
Margin of error: ± 5.6 % (95 % confidence).
________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

Red Lines Honored Barring Release Of Top Hamas Leaders - Scramble For Red Lines For Gaza

Sun, 12 Oct 2025 09:15:23 -0400

Red Lines Honored Barring Release Of Top Hamas Leaders - Scramble For Red
Lines For Gaza
Dr. Aaron Lerner 12 October 2025

When Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu set red lines barring the release of
top Hamas leaders and Fatah favorite Marwan Barghouti, President Trump
respected these limits and Hamas dropped these terrorists from the list.

I repeat: our red lines ARE relevant.

Red lines regarding the Gaza Strip are not an exercise in futility.

Red lines may be crucial for our future.

We need to scramble to come up with detailed red lines.

And the proposed red lines need to be refined in a process which involves
rounds of drafts, each draft analyzed by Red Teams that propose how Hamas
could work around the draft.

This is particularly challenging because the countries slated to participate
in the forces in Gaza include allies of Hamas and others with a record of
being amenable to bribes.

So we need to think through, among other things:

What kinds of standards and milestones for weapons collection and
destruction are robust enough to be meaningful despite all the bad-faith
actors?

Ditto for the tunnel network.

How can the building of new tunnels be prevented?

What restrictions on dual-use manufacturing ensure that there's no weapons
production?

This is a challenging project.

It requires bringing in people with knowledge of many fields.

For example, not everyone knows that CNC equipment with a tolerance of 0.125
mm is enough for export-grade metal fabrication but not enough for weapons
production.

I want to emphasize that I am not describing an academic exercise to produce
nice binders of material to sit on the wall of someone's office or to be
referred to in a meeting of the Security Cabinet where the recommendations
are sent off to a committee to review.

We need to scramble to get this to President Trump.

Yes. President Trump.

Before someone else gets the jump on us with a program which he publicly
embraces.

________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on
Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

Weekly Commentary: Painful Reality: Only Israel Can Determine Hamas Compliance

Thu, 09 Oct 2025 19:50:00 -0400

Weekly Commentary: Painful Reality: Only Israel Can Determine Hamas
Compliance
Dr. Aaron Lerner 9 October 2025

A reminder:

Congress made aid to the PA contingent on PA compliance with Oslo:

"Public Law 103-125 103d Congress
An Act Entitled the "Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1993".
...
(2) PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION. - The President may exercise the authority
provided in subsection (a) only if the President certifies to the relevant
congressional committees that -
(A) it is in the national interest of the United States to exercise such
authority; and
(B) the Palestine Liberation Organization continues to abide by all the
commitments described in paragraph (4).

(3) REQUIREMENT FOR CONTINUING PLO COMPLIANCE. - Any suspension under
subsection (a) of a provision of law specified in subsection (d) shall cease
to be effective if the President certifies to the relevant congressional
committees that the Palestine Liberation Organization has not continued to
abide by all the commitments described in paragraph (4).

(4) PLO COMMITMENTS DESCRIBED.-The commitments referred to in paragraphs (2)
and (3) are the commitments made by the Palestine Liberation Organization -

(A) in its letter of September 9, 1993, to the Prime Minister of Israel;
(B) in its letter of September 9, 1993, to the Foreign Minister of Norway;
and
(C) in, and resulting from the implementation of, the Declaration of
Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements signed on September
13,1993. "

So for years the President of the United States of America dutifully
certified PA compliance even though the PA never actually complied.

Let's look at the structure of President Trump's deal for Gaza:

"...As the I.S.F.[International Stabilization Force] establishes control
and stability, the Israel Defense Forces (I.D.F.) will withdraw based on
standards, milestones, and time frames linked to demilitarization that will
be agreed upon between the I.D.F., I.S.F., the guarantors, and the United
States, with the objective of a secure Gaza that no longer poses a threat to
Israel, Egypt, or its citizens. Practically, the I.D.F. will progressively
hand over the Gaza territory it occupies to the ISF according to an
agreement they will make with the transitional authority until they are
withdrawn completely from Gaza, save for a security perimeter presence that
will remain until Gaza is properly secure from any resurgent terror threat."

The problem is that even if there are absolutely fantastic "standards" and
"milestones" we have already learned from the implementation of the "Middle
East Peace Facilitation Act of 1993" that even the United States of America
cannot be relied upon to tell the truth about Palestinian compliance when it
is inconvenient.

It would appear that the only way for there to be true compliance in this
deal is if Israel has the final say as to if standards and milestones were
met.
________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on
Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

President Trump: We Accepted & Your Arab Partners Endorsed The Plan As Is - No Changes Now

Tue, 07 Oct 2025 16:53:15 -0400

President Trump: We Accepted & Your Arab Partners Endorsed The Plan As Is -
No Changes Now
Dr. Aaron Lerner 7 October 2025

Dear President Trump,

It was not easy for our Prime Minister to agree to your plan.

But he did.

And after he accepted the deal and the TEXT of the deal was published the
leaders of the Arab world ENDORSED THE DEAL ISRAEL ACCEPTED.

Now Hamas is trying to CHANGE the deal and there's talk that you will
pressure BOTH sides to compromise.

We compromised by ACCEPTING the deal.

The ball is in Hamas's court to ACCEPT THE DEAL AS IT IS.

If you truly want to bring an end to a conflict which you believe started
3,000 years ago when Saul became the first king of the Jewish People then
there's a lot of deals to make after this one.

Don't set the precedent now that when you get us to make compromises to
agree to a deal that this becomes no more than the opening offer for
negotiations with the other side.
_______________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on
Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

PCPO poll: 29.3% reject gradual Israeli withdrawal from Gaza 33.7% oppose removing Hamas and destroying its military infrastructure

Sun, 05 Oct 2025 08:00:46 -0400

PCPO poll: 29.3% reject gradual Israeli withdrawal from Gaza 33.7% oppose
removing Hamas and destroying its military infrastructure
Palestinian Center for Public Opinion (PCPO) – Poll No. 214
Date Published: October 4, 2025
Fieldwork: September 28 – October 3, 2025
Respondents: 304 Palestinian adults (West Bank and Gaza Strip)
Margin of Error: ±5.6% at 95% confidence level
Director: Dr. Nabil Kukali
http://www.pcpo.org

1. How do Palestinians view the Trump Plan?

Very positive – 13.2%

Somewhat positive – 54.9%

Negative – 28.3%

Did not specify – 3.6%

2. Attitudes toward a Comprehensive Ceasefire

Strongly support – 73.4%

Support to some extent – 14.1%

Oppose – 11.5%

Don’t know / not interested – 1.0%

3. Do Palestinians support the idea of a gradual Israeli withdrawal from
Gaza?

Practical step – 48.0%

Partial support – 20.4%

Impractical – 29.3%

Don’t know – 2.3%

4. Who should administer Gaza during the transitional phase?

Palestinian Authority – 43.8%

Multilateral civil administration (Arab or international) – 31.6%

The current situation (status quo) – 11.5%

Undecided – 13.2%

5. What is your opinion about the deployment of multinational forces in
Gaza?

Strongly support – 21.4%

Support partially – 28.3%

Oppose – 45.7%

No opinion – 4.6%

6. Do you support excluding Hamas from any future civil administration?

Yes, support exclusion – 34.5%

No, oppose exclusion – 23.0%

Possible under certain conditions – 35.5%

Declined to answer – 6.9%

7. Who should bear the responsibility for funding the reconstruction of
Gaza?

International community (UN, EU, US) – 43.8%

Arab and Islamic states – 28.3%

Israel (as the occupying power) – 26.0%

Did not specify – 2.0%

8. Assessment of the clause releasing Israeli hostages

Very necessary – 48.0%

Important but not a priority – 27.6%

Unnecessary – 19.4%

Unsure – 4.9%

9. Inclusion of Palestinian prisoners in the plan

Must be included as a core clause – 74.0%

Can be discussed later – 14.1%

Should not be a priority – 8.9%

Don’t know – 3.0%

10. What is the best way to handle the prisoners’ issue?

Comprehensive prisoner exchange – 46.7%

Mass release of prisoners – 45.4%

Improving detention conditions – 5.6%

Unsure – 2.3%

11. Do Palestinians have confidence in the Trump administration’s ability to
impose the plan?

Strong confidence – 36.5%

Partial confidence – 24.0%

Distrust – 35.2%

No clear view – 4.3%

12. Will the plan result in permanent or temporary peace?

Temporary peace – 50.3%

Permanent peace – 25.3%

Will not bring peace – 21.7%

Did not specify – 2.6%

13. What is your opinion about appointing Tony Blair for the interim
management of Gaza?

Would never be implemented – 58.8%

Could become a reality – 16.1%

Practical option – 12.5%

Don’t know – 12.5%

14. Acceptance of the idea of an international transitional authority

Reject outright – 59.9%

Accept as a transitional necessity – 19.7%

Welcome if transparent and fair – 16.8%

Unsure – 3.6%

15. Evaluation of choosing Tony Blair for this role

Unsuitable – 53.8%

Might be acceptable if time-limited – 32.3%

Suitable choice – 6.1%

No opinion – 7.9%

16. What is the main purpose of the proposal?

To protect Israeli interests – 51.3%

To establish a temporary political settlement – 25.8%

To improve the humanitarian situation – 17.2%

Don’t know – 5.7%

17. What is your opinion about including Bishara Bahbah in the plan?

Rejected – 52.6%

Supported under conditions – 26.1%

Strongly supported – 11.6%

No opinion – 9.6%

18. Do you have confidence in Trump’s promise not to annex the West Bank?

Symbolic only – 65.9%

Will be carried out – 15.7%

Might be partially implemented – 14.5%

Don’t know – 4.0%

19. Evaluation of the clause releasing prisoners

Insufficient – 52.6%

Positive but temporary – 31.3%

Fair – 12.9%

Don’t know – 3.2%

20. Is allowing 600 aid trucks daily sufficient?

Not enough – 55.0%

Temporary measure – 28.9%

Sufficient – 13.7%

Don’t know – 2.4%

21. Trust in the mechanism of aid distribution through the UN and Red
Crescent

Trust – 56.2%

Do not trust – 24.1%

Trust only under Palestinian supervision – 16.5%

No knowledge – 3.2%

22. Assessment of Trump’s phrase “intense and fruitful”

Political publicity – 39.0%

Indicator of progress – 28.5%

Reflects Israeli and Hamas reactions – 29.7%

Don’t know – 2.8%

23. Is the success of the plan linked to Trump’s ability to apply pressure?

Very strong link – 43.8%

Exists partially – 22.9%

He lacks ability – 29.7%

Don’t know – 3.6%

24. What is your opinion about removing Hamas and destroying its military
infrastructure?

Reject – 33.7%

Support – 30.5%

Accept if a legitimate Palestinian alternative exists – 26.9%

Unsure – 8.8%

25. Do you support regional security guarantees?

Support – 42.2%

Oppose – 22.9%

Support if provided by Arab countries – 26.5%

Don’t know – 8.4%

26. What do you think about deploying an international stabilization force
to train police?

Agree – 49.0%

Oppose – 18.5%

Support if Arab or Islamic – 25.7%

Don’t know – 6.8%

27. Position on Netanyahu’s statement (isolating Hamas and excluding a
Palestinian state)

Strongly reject – 56.3%

Partially reject – 8.2%

Neutral – 20.8%

Support to varying degrees – 8.7%

Don’t know – 6.0%

28. What advice should be given to Hamas regarding Trump’s plan?

Accept conditionally with substantial amendments – 36.3%

Accept as it is – 29.0%

Oppose accepting it outright – 25.8%

Don’t know – 8.9%

29. Which amendment introduced by Netanyahu is the most dangerous?

All amendments – 37.4%

Keeping Israeli forces inside Gaza – 22.8%

Linking withdrawal to disarming Hamas – 20.3%

Reducing clarity on aid – 10.6%

Refusal to release Palestinian leaders – 8.9%

30. How do Palestinians evaluate Israeli amendments to Trump’s plan?

Political maneuvers – 61.8%

Betrayal of the plan’s essence – 17.9%

Legitimate security concerns – 7.3%

Don’t know – 13.0%

31. What is the most important amendment proposed by Palestinian factions?

International guarantees to stop the war after hostages’ release – 36.5%

Delaying renunciation of arms – 23.8%

All points – 23.8%

Keeping Palestinian leaders – 7.9%

Don’t know – 7.9%

32. How optimistic are Palestinians about their political future?

Not optimistic – 44.7%

Somewhat optimistic – 39.5%

Very optimistic – 13.2%

Don’t know – 2.6%

Demographic Characteristics of the Sample

Men – 57.9%

Women – 42.1%

West Bank – 61.2%

Gaza Strip – 38.8%

East Jerusalem – 0.7%

Average age – 35 years (range 18–75)
________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il