IMRA Middle East News Updates

Weekly Commentary: Hezbollah's Most Dangerous Rockets and Missiles Are

Wed, 06 Dec 2023 15:19:23 -0500

Content preview: Weekly Commentary: Hezbollah's Most Dangerous Rockets and
Missiles Are North of the Litani River Dr. Aaron Lerner, 6 December 2023 It
should be noted that the withdrawal of Hezbollah from the territory south
of the Litani River alone would fail to neutralize the most dangerous threat
to the Jewish state: the mid-range and long-ra [...]

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Weekly Commentary: Hezbollah's Most Dangerous Rockets and Missiles Are North
of the Litani River
Dr. Aaron Lerner, 6 December 2023

It should be noted that the withdrawal of Hezbollah from the territory south
of the Litani River alone would fail to neutralize the most dangerous threat
to the Jewish state: the mid-range and long-range rockets and missiles which
Hezbollah has deployed north of the Litani.

In fact, it has been suggested that the reason various Israeli officials
warn that Beirut will suffer greatly in a full-scale conflagration with
Hezbollah is that many of these rockets and missiles are positioned within
the civilian population of Beirut.

While the presence of Hezbollah south of the Litani River can make life
impossible for Israeli communities close to the Lebanese border, it is the
mid-range and long-range missiles which threaten to cause tremendous damage
to vital infrastructure and other targets during the "window" before the
Israeli Air Force (IAF) destroys them in a conflagration.

While it would be absolutely fantastic if the international community
somehow causes Hezbollah to both withdraw its forces and destroy its
missiles and rockets, a deal according to which we guarantee not to act
against the mid- and long-range rockets and missiles north of the Litani in
return for a withdrawal of Hezbollah from south of the Litani River would be
a disaster.

________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on
Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

INNS Poll: 51% of Israeli Jews fear attack by Israeli Arabs while 21% of Israeli Arabs fear attack by Israeli Jews

Mon, 04 Dec 2023 02:26:30 -0500

INNS Poll: 51% of Israeli Jews fear attack by Israeli Arabs while 21% of
Israeli Arabs fear attack by Israeli Jews
Dr. Aaron Lerner 4 December 2023

Israel Jews asked: Are you afraid of an attack on yourself or your family
by Israeli Arabs?
Afraid: 51% Not Afraid 46% Don't know 3%

Israel Arabs asked: A you afraid of an attack on yourself or your family by
Israeli Jews?
Afraid: 21% Not Afraid 71% Don't know 8%

The survey, conducted on November 16-19, 2023, was prepared and analyzed by
researchers at the INSS Data Analytics Desk. Field work was conducted by the
Rafi Smith Institute. The survey was conducted by phone and on the internet
among men and women who constitute a representative sample of the adult
population in Israel (age 18 and above).
https://www.inss.org.il/publication/spotlight-arab-jews/
________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on
Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

Hezbollah's Radwan unit is capable of carrying out an invasion of the Galilee at any given moment

Sat, 02 Dec 2023 16:06:43 -0500

Hezbollah's Radwan unit is capable of carrying out an invasion of the
Galilee at any given moment
Tal Beeri, Director of the Research Department, Alma Research and Education
Center November 29, 2023

https://israel-alma.org/2023/11/29/the-radwan-unit-is-capable-of-carrying-ou
t-an-invasion-of-the-galilee-at-any-given-moment/

For the past two years, it seems that Hezbollah has been preparing for a
confrontation in the north. We have written and published quite a bit about
it. In the summer of 2022, in the final stages of negotiations between
Israel and Lebanon on the maritime agreement, the name of the Radwan unit
made headlines, since its operatives were put on alert and deployed, openly
and unusually, in static positions along the border with Israel under the
familiar cover of the "Green Without Borders" association. Radwan Unit
operatives joined operatives of Hezbollah's geographic units "Nasser" and
"Aziz," which are permanently stationed adjacent to the border with Israel.

After the attack tunnels were discovered in December 2018 and Israel built a
ground-physical barrier, the Radwan unit recalculated its route and
continued to train in preparation for its main mission: to infiltrate
Israeli territory and take over Israeli territories, bases, and communities
in the Galilee.

In our assessment, since the beginning of the summer of 2022, the Radwan
unit has reached the operational capability to fulfill its mission to invade
Galilee. In light of the accumulation of incidents on the northern border up
until October 2023, we assess that Hezbollah was on the verge of deciding to
authorize the invasion. The Radwan unit, Hezbollah's aerial unit, and
geographic units in southern Lebanon were awaiting the order.

How did Hezbollah plan to invade the Galilee?

Stage 1 (Nasser/Aziz Geographical Units) - The geographic units in southern
Lebanon are responsible for opening fire by means of massive rocket and
mortar fire along the entire border, including firing into Israeli
territory. In addition, they are responsible for neutralizing surveillance
devices along the border by means of sniper fire, exploding UAVs, suicide
UAVs (under the responsibility of the air unit), and anti-tank fire.

Stage 2 (Radwan unit) - Simulatively, along with the above attack and the
neutralization of the surveillance devices, Radwan Unit operatives are
expected to storm the barrier throughout the entire sector, breach the
barrier at various points and by various means (powerful IEDs, and possibly
even booby-trapped tunnels dug under the barrier).

Stage 3 (Radwan unit) - Radwan operatives will cross on foot and with
vehicles (mainly motorcycles and ATVs) above ground into Israeli territory
and move towards the communities and military bases near the border. It is
possible that some of the operatives, according to advance planning, will
try to reach targets deep inside the territory of the State of Israel.

***Note: The working assumption must take into account that there are still
attack tunnels that the IDF has not yet exposed, and if so, they will be
utilized at this stage.

Stage 4 (Radwan unit) - Gaining control of bases and communities, executing
killings, and taking hostages as bargaining chips. In addition, the transfer
of abductees to Lebanese territory, with an emphasis on soldiers.

Stage 5 (Radwan unit) - Barricading, deploying and waiting for IDF forces
while positioning anti-tank and light anti-aircraft squads and snipers.

The role of Hezbollah's aerial unit is to accompany the entire operation by
using UAVs for intelligence gathering and attacks (suicide UAVs). Operatives
from the geographic units (Nasser/Aziz) will serve as reinforcements as
needed throughout the above stages.

October 7, 2023 - Hamas attack postponed Hezbollah's campaign.

In this article, we do not intend to analyze whether the Hamas operation on
October 7 was coordinated with the Iranians and Hezbollah, and if it was
coordinated, whether only in principle or was it also coordinated
specifically in terms of the time of its execution. In practice, on October
7, Hamas effectively copied the invasion plan of the Radwan unit and
implemented it, through its Nukhba units (and its naval unit), on the
southern border with the Gaza Strip.

In effect, Hamas' action postponed the timing of Hezbollah's invasion plan.
Hezbollah is not interested in being dragged after the Palestinians.
However, it is our assessment that as far as Hezbollah is concerned, it is
not a question of if. In light of the circumstances, Hezbollah will have to
make a new decision on the timing - when?

Is such a scenario relevant these days on the northern border? Can the
Radwan unit implement its attack plan today?

The events of October 7 proved again that any physical or technological
obstacle will inevitably be breached. It should be remembered that, unlike
the Gaza Strip, along the border with Lebanon there are sections where the
barrier has not yet been upgraded, which could make it even easier to
penetrate. The mostly mountainous terrain on the Lebanese border is more
difficult to maneuver than the flat terrain on the border with the Gaza
Strip, on the other hand, it allows for more concealed movement. Hezbollah
is well acquainted with the terrain and knows how to take advantage of it.

There is no doubt that the large concentration of Israeli forces along the
border with Lebanon and the readiness of the IDF's operational and
intelligence forces since October 7 greatly undermines the element of
surprise, which is a very important component of Hezbollah's plan of action.

Nonetheless, it is our assessment that even today, at any given time, if it
so desires, Hezbollah can implement its operational plan to invade Israeli
territory with a smaller Radwan unit force and into a more limited area. In
light of the existing limitations, we estimate that Hezbollah is able to do
so with a smaller force of a few dozen to a few hundred Radwan operatives
(100-200), compared to the original plan, which in our assessment, included
hundreds to two thousand operatives. A lower signature will make it
difficult to monitor intelligence and provide an early warning.

In light of the fact that most of the Israeli population living near the
border has been evacuated, in our assessment, Hezbollah can focus on a
limited area, with an emphasis on military zones and/or taking over the
territory of a small number of communities.

Radwan's unit's competence has not been affected.

Even if most of the Radwan operatives have distanced themselves from the
border since the beginning of the war, in our assessment this does not
neutralize their ability to fulfill their main objective. It is our
assessment that the Radwan unit is continuing to collect intelligence near
the border and is making adjustments to its operational plans. As of this
writing, around 90 Hezbollah operatives have been killed since October 7. It
seems that some of those killed were operatives and commanders in the Radwan
unit. The number of operatives killed has no bearing on Hezbollah's overall
competence or the Radwan unit in particular.

The capability of the rocket and mortar arrays has not been affected.

According to our assessment, Hezbollah's short-range rocket and mortar
arrays, which are a critical component in carrying out the first stage of
the invasion into Israeli territory, are fully capable and ready for
operation in the immediate future. In view of the large scale (deployment
and arsenal) of these arrays, it is our assessment that the IDF attacks only
damaged them in a particular area.

In conclusion, the Radwan unit still poses a significant challenge for the
IDF and still poses a clear and present danger. As time passes and the war
ends, the scope of IDF forces in the north will probably decrease
significantly. The main mission of the Radwan unit was and still remains to
penetrate into Israeli territory and take over communities and geographical
areas. This threat to Israel has not passed and is relevant at any given
time. Hezbollah only needs to decide when.

Israel must act to neutralize the threat posed by the Radwan unit. Even
removing Radwan operatives from the border will not neutralize this threat.
In our assessment, given Hezbollah's decision, the Radwan unit will now be
able to prepare an infiltration operation into Israeli territory, with a low
signature and will be able to carry out this operation in a focused and
swift manner. Even more so, when the scope of the IDF deployment is diluted
and civilians return to their homes.

In light of this, we believe that the IDF must act and cause direct and
extensive damage to the infrastructure of the Radwan unit and its
operatives.

Note - we intend to publish an article on the subject: Why the current
reality on the Lebanese-Israeli border is unsustainable - Possible
scenarios for the day after the war.

Weekly Commentary: No Good Will Come From Mr. Blinken's "Three Monkey Approach" Towards The Palestinian Authority

Thu, 30 Nov 2023 18:51:32 -0500

Weekly Commentary: No Good Will Come From Mr. Blinken's "Three Monkey
Approach" Towards The Palestinian Authority
Dr. Aaron Lerner 30 November, 2023

Take a look at Secretary Blinken's remarks tonight (Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability
TEL AVIV, ISRAEL NOVEMBER 30, 2023
https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-a-press-availability-43/ )
and try to find any criticism of the Palestinian Authority which is relevant
to 'ending the cycle of violence.'

Let's be clear about the challenge:

From day one of Oslo, the leadership of the Palestinian Authority viewed
this enterprise within the context of the destruction of the Jewish State in
stages.

For close to 30 years, the Palestinian Authority has been brainwashing their
public in the classroom, public square, media, and elsewhere to embrace,
support, and seek to actively participate in the ultimate achievement of
this goal.

The Nazi regime lasted 12 years in Germany and it took more than a
generation of active efforts to make a serious dent in the true thinking of
the German public.

Re-education isn't even on Mr. Blinken's agenda.

Forget about re-education; even ending the brainwashing isn't on Mr.
Blinken's agenda.

It seems that if the PA reduces corruption and establishes a free press, Mr.
Blinken would be ready to celebrate. He might break out the champagne to
celebrate the founding of a sovereign Palestinian state, one which continues
brainwashing its public to embrace, support, and actively participate in the
ultimate goal of destroying the Jewish State.

And of course, it's not just rhetoric.

The Palestinian Authority continues to uphold 'Pay for Slay' as a core
principle.

In the very rare instances that Palestinian Authority officials see fit to
say something negative about a particularly gruesome terror attack, they
cite tactical ('doesn't serve Palestinian interests') rather than moral
grounds.

Apparently, the Palestinian Authority has concluded that the October 7th
massacre does serve Palestinian interests. Hence the absence of criticism.

In our region of the world, it is popular to entertain the possibility that
there are intricate conspiracies.

I don't believe that Mr. Blinken's 'Three Monkey Approach' is an intentional
conspiracy against the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state.

But that's going to be the result.

________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

1985: Severed genitals of relative of Hezbollah's head of security yields release of 3 kidnapped Russians in Beirut

Thu, 30 Nov 2023 04:34:02 -0500

1985: Severed genitals of relative of Hezbollah's head of security yields
release of 3 kidnapped Russians in Beirut
Dr. Aaron Lerner 29 November 2023

On September 30th 1985 in Beirut, Lebanon four Russian diplomats, Valery
Myrikov, Oleg Spirin, Nikolai Svirsky and Arkady Katkov, were kidnapped from
outside of the Russian Embassy in an operation organized by Imad Mughniyah,
the head of security for Hezbollah (1962-2008).

On October 3rd 1985 Arkady Katkov's body was found in a Beirut garbage dump.

The severed genitals of one of Mugniyeh's relatives were then sent to the
Hezbollah's Headquarters with a message that the genitals of others would be
following.

Two days later the remaining three Russian diplomats were released and that
was the last time that Russians were bothered in Beirut.

________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on
Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

Palestinian Poll find West Bankers more radical than Gazans both in support for October 7th Hamas "resistance" and view of the most radical groups (overwhelming majorities for Jew-less Palestine from river to sea)

Sun, 26 Nov 2023 15:45:35 -0500

Palestinian Poll find West Bankers more radical than Gazans both in support
for October 7th Hamas "resistance" and view of the most radical groups
(overwhelming majorities for Jew-less Palestine from river to sea)
Dr. Aaron Lerner 26 November 2023
[With thanks to Dr. Michael Widlanski for highlighting the poll]

Public Opinion Polls
Gaza Survey 7th October
Tables of Results
14 November 2023
Arab World for Research and Development (AWRAD)
Al-Masayef., Kamal Nasser St., Building # 43. P.O. Box: 2238, Ramallah -
Palestine

https://www.awrad.org/files/server/polls/polls2023/Public%20Opinion%20Poll%2
0-%20Gaza%20War%202023%20-%20Tables%20of%20Results.pdf

From October 31 to November 7, Arab World for Research and Development
(AWRAD) surveyed 668 Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, during
the fourth week of the ongoing Gaza War. The team conducted the survey
through tablet-assisted, face-to-face interviews across the West Bank and in
shelters and households in the three "southern" Gaza governorates (Deir Al
Balah, Khan Younis, and Rafah) where people were presently residing.

....
Table 27: How much do you support the military operation carried out by the
Palestinian resistance led by Hamas on
October 7th? (Disaggregated by region)

West Bank
Extremely support 68.3%
Somewhat support 14.8%
Neither support does not oppose 8.4%
Somewhat do not support 3.3%
Extremely against 3.6%
DK/No answer 1.5%
Total 100.0%

Gaza Strip
Extremely support 46.6%
Somewhat support 17.0%
Neither support does not oppose 14.4%
Somewhat do not support 8.3%
Extremely against 12.6%
DK/No answer 1.1%
Total 100.0%

Table 29: How do you view the role of the following parties:(Disaggregated
by region)

West Bank
Hamas Very positive 61.90%
Somewhat positive 25.80%
Somewhat negative 4.60%
Very Negative 5.60%
DK (Don't read) 0.80%
No answer (Don't read) 1.30%
Total 100.00%
Fateh Very positive 4.30%
Somewhat positive 22.30%
Somewhat negative 25.60%
Very Negative 44.20%
DK (Don't read) 1.50%
No answer (Don't read) 2.00%
Total 100.00%
Palestinian authority Very positive 1.50%
Somewhat positive 10.20%
Somewhat negative 15.10%
Very Negative 70.30%
DK (Don't read) 1.50%
No answer (Don't read) 1.30%
Total 100.0%
Israel Very positive 0.0%
Somewhat positive 0.0%
Somewhat negative 1.3%
Very Negative 98.2%
DK (Don't read) 0.0%
No answer (Don't read) .5%
Total 100.0%
Hizballah Very positive 7.2%
Somewhat positive 38.6%
Somewhat negative 17.4%
Very Negative 32.2%
DK (Don't read) 3.3%
No answer (Don't read) 1.3%
Total 100.0%
Islamic Jihad Very positive 70.1%
Somewhat positive 22.8%
Somewhat negative 1.8%
Very Negative 4.3%
DK (Don't read) .8%
No answer (Don't read) .3%
Total 100.0%
Al Aqsa Brigade Very positive 55.2%
Somewhat positive 31.7%
Somewhat negative 6.9%
Very Negative 5.1%
DK (Don't read) .8%
No answer (Don't read) .3%
Total 100.0%
Al Kassam Very positive 80.8%
Somewhat positive 14.6%
Somewhat negative 1.0%
Very Negative 2.8%
DK (Don't read) .5%
No answer (Don't read) .3%
Total 100.0%
Gaza Strip
Hamas Very positive 28.9%
Somewhat positive 30.7%
Somewhat negative 16.6%
Very Negative 22.7%
DK (Don't read) 1.1%
No answer (Don't read) 0.0%
Total 100.0%
Fateh Very positive 0.7%
Somewhat positive 17.7%
Somewhat negative 32.9%
Very Negative 47.3%
DK (Don't read) 0.7%
No answer (Don't read) 0.7%
Total 100.0%
Palestinian authority Very positive 1.1%
Somewhat positive 7.2%
Somewhat negative 33.9%
Very Negative 56.0%
DK (Don't read) 1.1%
No answer (Don't read) 0.7%
Total 100.0%
Israel Very positive .7%
Somewhat positive .4%
Somewhat negative 1.8%
Very Negative 96.0%
DK (Don't read) .4%
No answer (Don't read) .7%
Total 100.0%
Hizballah Very positive 11.6%
Somewhat positive 32.5%
Somewhat negative 19.9%
Very Negative 35.0%
DK (Don't read) .4%
No answer (Don't read) .7%
Total 100.0%
Islamic Jihad Very positive 45.5%
Somewhat positive 26.4%
Somewhat negative 9.4%
Very Negative 18.1%
DK (Don't read) .4%
No answer (Don't read) .4%
Total 100.0%
Al Aqsa Brigade Very positive 41.2%
Somewhat positive 28.5%
Somewhat negative 10.5%
Very Negative 18.1%
DK (Don't read) 1.4%
No answer (Don't read) .4%
Total 100.0%
Al Kassam Very positive 57.4%
Somewhat positive 21.7%
Somewhat negative 6.9%
Very Negative 13.7%
DK (Don't read) 0.0%
No answer (Don't read) .4%
Total 100.0%

Table 33: Do you support the solution of establishing one state or two
states in the following formats: (Disaggregated
by region)

Region

West Bank
One-State Solution for Two Peoples 7.7%
Two-State Solution for Two Peoples 13.3%
A Palestinian state from the river to the sea 77.7%
Other 0.0%
D/K .5%
N/A .8%
Total 100.0%
Gaza Strip
One-State Solution for Two Peoples 2.2%
Two-State Solution for Two Peoples 22.7%
A Palestinian state from the river to the sea 70.4%
Other 0.0%
D/K 4.3%
N/A .4%
Total 100.0%
________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on
Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il