IMRA Middle East News Updates https://www.imra.org.il Middle East News & Analysis en-US 1701893963 1701893963 http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss Capalon Internet 2.0 imra@netvision.net.il (Aaron Lerner) News & Analysis IMRA Middle East News Updates https://www.imra.org.il https://www.imra.org.il/imra_sm.png 144 97 Weekly Commentary: Hezbollah's Most Dangerous Rockets and Missiles Are https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74056 <p>Content preview: Weekly Commentary: Hezbollah's Most Dangerous Rockets and<br /> Missiles Are North of the Litani River Dr. Aaron Lerner, 6 December 2023 It<br /> should be noted that the withdrawal of Hezbollah from the territory south<br /> of the Litani River alone would fail to neutralize the most dangerous threat<br /> to the Jewish state: the mid-range and long-ra [...] <br /> <br /> Content analysis details: (-0.0 points, 5.0 required)<br /> <br /> pts rule name description<br /> ---- ---------------------- --------------------------------------------------<br /> 0.0 RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H3 RBL: Good reputation (+3)<br /> [194.90.6.2 listed in wl.mailspike.net]<br /> -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record<br /> 0.0 SPF_HELO_NONE SPF: HELO does not publish an SPF Record<br /> 0.0 RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL Mailspike good senders<br /> -0.0 T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE No description available.<br /> SpamTally: Final spam score: -10<br /> X-Antivirus-Scanner: Clean mail though you should still use an Antivirus</p> <p>Weekly Commentary: Hezbollah's Most Dangerous Rockets and Missiles Are North<br /> of the Litani River<br /> Dr. Aaron Lerner, 6 December 2023</p> <p>It should be noted that the withdrawal of Hezbollah from the territory south<br /> of the Litani River alone would fail to neutralize the most dangerous threat<br /> to the Jewish state: the mid-range and long-range rockets and missiles which<br /> Hezbollah has deployed north of the Litani.</p> <p>In fact, it has been suggested that the reason various Israeli officials<br /> warn that Beirut will suffer greatly in a full-scale conflagration with<br /> Hezbollah is that many of these rockets and missiles are positioned within<br /> the civilian population of Beirut.</p> <p>While the presence of Hezbollah south of the Litani River can make life<br /> impossible for Israeli communities close to the Lebanese border, it is the<br /> mid-range and long-range missiles which threaten to cause tremendous damage<br /> to vital infrastructure and other targets during the "window" before the<br /> Israeli Air Force (IAF) destroys them in a conflagration.</p> <p>While it would be absolutely fantastic if the international community<br /> somehow causes Hezbollah to both withdraw its forces and destroy its<br /> missiles and rockets, a deal according to which we guarantee not to act<br /> against the mid- and long-range rockets and missiles north of the Litani in<br /> return for a withdrawal of Hezbollah from south of the Litani River would be<br /> a disaster.</p> <p>________________________________________<br /> IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis</p> <p>Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on<br /> Arab-Israeli relations</p> <p>Website: www.imra.org.il</p> Wed, 06 Dec 2023 15:19:23 -0500 https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74056 INNS Poll: 51% of Israeli Jews fear attack by Israeli Arabs while 21% of Israeli Arabs fear attack by Israeli Jews https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74055 <p>INNS Poll: 51% of Israeli Jews fear attack by Israeli Arabs while 21% of <br /> Israeli Arabs fear attack by Israeli Jews <br /> Dr. Aaron Lerner 4 December 2023 <br /> <br /> Israel Jews asked: Are you afraid of an attack on yourself or your family <br /> by Israeli Arabs? <br /> Afraid: 51% Not Afraid 46% Don't know 3% <br /> <br /> Israel Arabs asked: A you afraid of an attack on yourself or your family by <br /> Israeli Jews? <br /> Afraid: 21% Not Afraid 71% Don't know 8% <br /> <br /> The survey, conducted on November 16-19, 2023, was prepared and analyzed by <br /> researchers at the INSS Data Analytics Desk. Field work was conducted by the <br /> Rafi Smith Institute. The survey was conducted by phone and on the internet <br /> among men and women who constitute a representative sample of the adult <br /> population in Israel (age 18 and above). <br /> https://www.inss.org.il/publication/spotlight-arab-jews/ <br /> ________________________________________ <br /> IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis <br /> <br /> Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on <br /> Arab-Israeli relations <br /> <br /> Website: www.imra.org.il</p> Mon, 04 Dec 2023 02:26:30 -0500 https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74055 Hezbollah's Radwan unit is capable of carrying out an invasion of the Galilee at any given moment https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74054 <p>Hezbollah's Radwan unit is capable of carrying out an invasion of the <br /> Galilee at any given moment <br /> Tal Beeri, Director of the Research Department, Alma Research and Education <br /> Center November 29, 2023 <br /> <br /> https://israel-alma.org/2023/11/29/the-radwan-unit-is-capable-of-carrying-ou <br /> t-an-invasion-of-the-galilee-at-any-given-moment/ <br /> <br /> For the past two years, it seems that Hezbollah has been preparing for a <br /> confrontation in the north. We have written and published quite a bit about <br /> it. In the summer of 2022, in the final stages of negotiations between <br /> Israel and Lebanon on the maritime agreement, the name of the Radwan unit <br /> made headlines, since its operatives were put on alert and deployed, openly <br /> and unusually, in static positions along the border with Israel under the <br /> familiar cover of the "Green Without Borders" association. Radwan Unit <br /> operatives joined operatives of Hezbollah's geographic units "Nasser" and <br /> "Aziz," which are permanently stationed adjacent to the border with Israel. <br /> <br /> After the attack tunnels were discovered in December 2018 and Israel built a <br /> ground-physical barrier, the Radwan unit recalculated its route and <br /> continued to train in preparation for its main mission: to infiltrate <br /> Israeli territory and take over Israeli territories, bases, and communities <br /> in the Galilee. <br /> <br /> In our assessment, since the beginning of the summer of 2022, the Radwan <br /> unit has reached the operational capability to fulfill its mission to invade <br /> Galilee. In light of the accumulation of incidents on the northern border up <br /> until October 2023, we assess that Hezbollah was on the verge of deciding to <br /> authorize the invasion. The Radwan unit, Hezbollah's aerial unit, and <br /> geographic units in southern Lebanon were awaiting the order. <br /> <br /> How did Hezbollah plan to invade the Galilee? <br /> <br /> Stage 1 (Nasser/Aziz Geographical Units) - The geographic units in southern <br /> Lebanon are responsible for opening fire by means of massive rocket and <br /> mortar fire along the entire border, including firing into Israeli <br /> territory. In addition, they are responsible for neutralizing surveillance <br /> devices along the border by means of sniper fire, exploding UAVs, suicide <br /> UAVs (under the responsibility of the air unit), and anti-tank fire. <br /> <br /> Stage 2 (Radwan unit) - Simulatively, along with the above attack and the <br /> neutralization of the surveillance devices, Radwan Unit operatives are <br /> expected to storm the barrier throughout the entire sector, breach the <br /> barrier at various points and by various means (powerful IEDs, and possibly <br /> even booby-trapped tunnels dug under the barrier). <br /> <br /> Stage 3 (Radwan unit) - Radwan operatives will cross on foot and with <br /> vehicles (mainly motorcycles and ATVs) above ground into Israeli territory <br /> and move towards the communities and military bases near the border. It is <br /> possible that some of the operatives, according to advance planning, will <br /> try to reach targets deep inside the territory of the State of Israel. <br /> <br /> ***Note: The working assumption must take into account that there are still <br /> attack tunnels that the IDF has not yet exposed, and if so, they will be <br /> utilized at this stage. <br /> <br /> Stage 4 (Radwan unit) - Gaining control of bases and communities, executing <br /> killings, and taking hostages as bargaining chips. In addition, the transfer <br /> of abductees to Lebanese territory, with an emphasis on soldiers. <br /> <br /> Stage 5 (Radwan unit) - Barricading, deploying and waiting for IDF forces <br /> while positioning anti-tank and light anti-aircraft squads and snipers. <br /> <br /> The role of Hezbollah's aerial unit is to accompany the entire operation by <br /> using UAVs for intelligence gathering and attacks (suicide UAVs). Operatives <br /> from the geographic units (Nasser/Aziz) will serve as reinforcements as <br /> needed throughout the above stages. <br /> <br /> October 7, 2023 - Hamas attack postponed Hezbollah's campaign. <br /> <br /> In this article, we do not intend to analyze whether the Hamas operation on <br /> October 7 was coordinated with the Iranians and Hezbollah, and if it was <br /> coordinated, whether only in principle or was it also coordinated <br /> specifically in terms of the time of its execution. In practice, on October <br /> 7, Hamas effectively copied the invasion plan of the Radwan unit and <br /> implemented it, through its Nukhba units (and its naval unit), on the <br /> southern border with the Gaza Strip. <br /> <br /> In effect, Hamas' action postponed the timing of Hezbollah's invasion plan. <br /> Hezbollah is not interested in being dragged after the Palestinians. <br /> However, it is our assessment that as far as Hezbollah is concerned, it is <br /> not a question of if. In light of the circumstances, Hezbollah will have to <br /> make a new decision on the timing - when? <br /> <br /> Is such a scenario relevant these days on the northern border? Can the <br /> Radwan unit implement its attack plan today? <br /> <br /> The events of October 7 proved again that any physical or technological <br /> obstacle will inevitably be breached. It should be remembered that, unlike <br /> the Gaza Strip, along the border with Lebanon there are sections where the <br /> barrier has not yet been upgraded, which could make it even easier to <br /> penetrate. The mostly mountainous terrain on the Lebanese border is more <br /> difficult to maneuver than the flat terrain on the border with the Gaza <br /> Strip, on the other hand, it allows for more concealed movement. Hezbollah <br /> is well acquainted with the terrain and knows how to take advantage of it. <br /> <br /> There is no doubt that the large concentration of Israeli forces along the <br /> border with Lebanon and the readiness of the IDF's operational and <br /> intelligence forces since October 7 greatly undermines the element of <br /> surprise, which is a very important component of Hezbollah's plan of action. <br /> <br /> Nonetheless, it is our assessment that even today, at any given time, if it <br /> so desires, Hezbollah can implement its operational plan to invade Israeli <br /> territory with a smaller Radwan unit force and into a more limited area. In <br /> light of the existing limitations, we estimate that Hezbollah is able to do <br /> so with a smaller force of a few dozen to a few hundred Radwan operatives <br /> (100-200), compared to the original plan, which in our assessment, included <br /> hundreds to two thousand operatives. A lower signature will make it <br /> difficult to monitor intelligence and provide an early warning. <br /> <br /> In light of the fact that most of the Israeli population living near the <br /> border has been evacuated, in our assessment, Hezbollah can focus on a <br /> limited area, with an emphasis on military zones and/or taking over the <br /> territory of a small number of communities. <br /> <br /> Radwan's unit's competence has not been affected. <br /> <br /> Even if most of the Radwan operatives have distanced themselves from the <br /> border since the beginning of the war, in our assessment this does not <br /> neutralize their ability to fulfill their main objective. It is our <br /> assessment that the Radwan unit is continuing to collect intelligence near <br /> the border and is making adjustments to its operational plans. As of this <br /> writing, around 90 Hezbollah operatives have been killed since October 7. It <br /> seems that some of those killed were operatives and commanders in the Radwan <br /> unit. The number of operatives killed has no bearing on Hezbollah's overall <br /> competence or the Radwan unit in particular. <br /> <br /> The capability of the rocket and mortar arrays has not been affected. <br /> <br /> According to our assessment, Hezbollah's short-range rocket and mortar <br /> arrays, which are a critical component in carrying out the first stage of <br /> the invasion into Israeli territory, are fully capable and ready for <br /> operation in the immediate future. In view of the large scale (deployment <br /> and arsenal) of these arrays, it is our assessment that the IDF attacks only <br /> damaged them in a particular area. <br /> <br /> In conclusion, the Radwan unit still poses a significant challenge for the <br /> IDF and still poses a clear and present danger. As time passes and the war <br /> ends, the scope of IDF forces in the north will probably decrease <br /> significantly. The main mission of the Radwan unit was and still remains to <br /> penetrate into Israeli territory and take over communities and geographical <br /> areas. This threat to Israel has not passed and is relevant at any given <br /> time. Hezbollah only needs to decide when. <br /> <br /> Israel must act to neutralize the threat posed by the Radwan unit. Even <br /> removing Radwan operatives from the border will not neutralize this threat. <br /> In our assessment, given Hezbollah's decision, the Radwan unit will now be <br /> able to prepare an infiltration operation into Israeli territory, with a low <br /> signature and will be able to carry out this operation in a focused and <br /> swift manner. Even more so, when the scope of the IDF deployment is diluted <br /> and civilians return to their homes. <br /> <br /> In light of this, we believe that the IDF must act and cause direct and <br /> extensive damage to the infrastructure of the Radwan unit and its <br /> operatives. <br /> <br /> Note - we intend to publish an article on the subject: Why the current <br /> reality on the Lebanese-Israeli border is unsustainable - Possible <br /> scenarios for the day after the war.</p> Sat, 02 Dec 2023 16:06:43 -0500 https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74054 Weekly Commentary: No Good Will Come From Mr. Blinken's "Three Monkey Approach" Towards The Palestinian Authority https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74053 <p>Weekly Commentary: No Good Will Come From Mr. Blinken's "Three Monkey <br /> Approach" Towards The Palestinian Authority <br /> Dr. Aaron Lerner 30 November, 2023 <br /> <br /> Take a look at Secretary Blinken's remarks tonight (Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability <br /> TEL AVIV, ISRAEL NOVEMBER 30, 2023 <br /> https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-a-press-availability-43/ ) <br /> and try to find any criticism of the Palestinian Authority which is relevant <br /> to 'ending the cycle of violence.' <br /> <br /> Let's be clear about the challenge: <br /> <br /> From day one of Oslo, the leadership of the Palestinian Authority viewed <br /> this enterprise within the context of the destruction of the Jewish State in <br /> stages. <br /> <br /> For close to 30 years, the Palestinian Authority has been brainwashing their <br /> public in the classroom, public square, media, and elsewhere to embrace, <br /> support, and seek to actively participate in the ultimate achievement of <br /> this goal. <br /> <br /> The Nazi regime lasted 12 years in Germany and it took more than a <br /> generation of active efforts to make a serious dent in the true thinking of <br /> the German public. <br /> <br /> Re-education isn't even on Mr. Blinken's agenda. <br /> <br /> Forget about re-education; even ending the brainwashing isn't on Mr. <br /> Blinken's agenda. <br /> <br /> It seems that if the PA reduces corruption and establishes a free press, Mr. <br /> Blinken would be ready to celebrate. He might break out the champagne to <br /> celebrate the founding of a sovereign Palestinian state, one which continues <br /> brainwashing its public to embrace, support, and actively participate in the <br /> ultimate goal of destroying the Jewish State. <br /> <br /> And of course, it's not just rhetoric. <br /> <br /> The Palestinian Authority continues to uphold 'Pay for Slay' as a core <br /> principle. <br /> <br /> In the very rare instances that Palestinian Authority officials see fit to <br /> say something negative about a particularly gruesome terror attack, they <br /> cite tactical ('doesn't serve Palestinian interests') rather than moral <br /> grounds. <br /> <br /> Apparently, the Palestinian Authority has concluded that the October 7th <br /> massacre does serve Palestinian interests. Hence the absence of criticism. <br /> <br /> In our region of the world, it is popular to entertain the possibility that <br /> there are intricate conspiracies. <br /> <br /> I don't believe that Mr. Blinken's 'Three Monkey Approach' is an intentional <br /> conspiracy against the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state. <br /> <br /> But that's going to be the result. <br /> <br /> ________________________________________ <br /> IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis <br /> <br /> Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on Arab-Israeli relations <br /> <br /> Website: www.imra.org.il</p> Thu, 30 Nov 2023 18:51:32 -0500 https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74053 1985: Severed genitals of relative of Hezbollah's head of security yields release of 3 kidnapped Russians in Beirut https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74051 <p>1985: Severed genitals of relative of Hezbollah's head of security yields <br /> release of 3 kidnapped Russians in Beirut <br /> Dr. Aaron Lerner 29 November 2023 <br /> <br /> On September 30th 1985 in Beirut, Lebanon four Russian diplomats, Valery <br /> Myrikov, Oleg Spirin, Nikolai Svirsky and Arkady Katkov, were kidnapped from <br /> outside of the Russian Embassy in an operation organized by Imad Mughniyah, <br /> the head of security for Hezbollah (1962-2008). <br /> <br /> On October 3rd 1985 Arkady Katkov's body was found in a Beirut garbage dump. <br /> <br /> The severed genitals of one of Mugniyeh's relatives were then sent to the <br /> Hezbollah's Headquarters with a message that the genitals of others would be <br /> following. <br /> <br /> Two days later the remaining three Russian diplomats were released and that <br /> was the last time that Russians were bothered in Beirut. <br /> <br /> ________________________________________ <br /> IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis <br /> <br /> Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on <br /> Arab-Israeli relations <br /> <br /> Website: www.imra.org.il</p> Thu, 30 Nov 2023 04:34:02 -0500 https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74051 Palestinian Poll find West Bankers more radical than Gazans both in support for October 7th Hamas "resistance" and view of the most radical groups (overwhelming majorities for Jew-less Palestine from river to sea) https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74050 <p>Palestinian Poll find West Bankers more radical than Gazans both in support <br /> for October 7th Hamas "resistance" and view of the most radical groups <br /> (overwhelming majorities for Jew-less Palestine from river to sea) <br /> Dr. Aaron Lerner 26 November 2023 <br /> [With thanks to Dr. Michael Widlanski for highlighting the poll] <br /> <br /> Public Opinion Polls <br /> Gaza Survey 7th October <br /> Tables of Results <br /> 14 November 2023 <br /> Arab World for Research and Development (AWRAD) <br /> Al-Masayef., Kamal Nasser St., Building # 43. P.O. Box: 2238, Ramallah - <br /> Palestine <br /> <br /> https://www.awrad.org/files/server/polls/polls2023/Public%20Opinion%20Poll%2 <br /> 0-%20Gaza%20War%202023%20-%20Tables%20of%20Results.pdf <br /> <br /> From October 31 to November 7, Arab World for Research and Development <br /> (AWRAD) surveyed 668 Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, during <br /> the fourth week of the ongoing Gaza War. The team conducted the survey <br /> through tablet-assisted, face-to-face interviews across the West Bank and in <br /> shelters and households in the three "southern" Gaza governorates (Deir Al <br /> Balah, Khan Younis, and Rafah) where people were presently residing. <br /> <br /> .... <br /> Table 27: How much do you support the military operation carried out by the <br /> Palestinian resistance led by Hamas on <br /> October 7th? (Disaggregated by region) <br /> <br /> West Bank <br /> Extremely support 68.3% <br /> Somewhat support 14.8% <br /> Neither support does not oppose 8.4% <br /> Somewhat do not support 3.3% <br /> Extremely against 3.6% <br /> DK/No answer 1.5% <br /> Total 100.0% <br /> <br /> Gaza Strip <br /> Extremely support 46.6% <br /> Somewhat support 17.0% <br /> Neither support does not oppose 14.4% <br /> Somewhat do not support 8.3% <br /> Extremely against 12.6% <br /> DK/No answer 1.1% <br /> Total 100.0% <br /> <br /> <br /> Table 29: How do you view the role of the following parties:(Disaggregated <br /> by region) <br /> <br /> West Bank <br /> Hamas Very positive 61.90% <br /> Somewhat positive 25.80% <br /> Somewhat negative 4.60% <br /> Very Negative 5.60% <br /> DK (Don't read) 0.80% <br /> No answer (Don't read) 1.30% <br /> Total 100.00% <br /> Fateh Very positive 4.30% <br /> Somewhat positive 22.30% <br /> Somewhat negative 25.60% <br /> Very Negative 44.20% <br /> DK (Don't read) 1.50% <br /> No answer (Don't read) 2.00% <br /> Total 100.00% <br /> Palestinian authority Very positive 1.50% <br /> Somewhat positive 10.20% <br /> Somewhat negative 15.10% <br /> Very Negative 70.30% <br /> DK (Don't read) 1.50% <br /> No answer (Don't read) 1.30% <br /> Total 100.0% <br /> Israel Very positive 0.0% <br /> Somewhat positive 0.0% <br /> Somewhat negative 1.3% <br /> Very Negative 98.2% <br /> DK (Don't read) 0.0% <br /> No answer (Don't read) .5% <br /> Total 100.0% <br /> Hizballah Very positive 7.2% <br /> Somewhat positive 38.6% <br /> Somewhat negative 17.4% <br /> Very Negative 32.2% <br /> DK (Don't read) 3.3% <br /> No answer (Don't read) 1.3% <br /> Total 100.0% <br /> Islamic Jihad Very positive 70.1% <br /> Somewhat positive 22.8% <br /> Somewhat negative 1.8% <br /> Very Negative 4.3% <br /> DK (Don't read) .8% <br /> No answer (Don't read) .3% <br /> Total 100.0% <br /> Al Aqsa Brigade Very positive 55.2% <br /> Somewhat positive 31.7% <br /> Somewhat negative 6.9% <br /> Very Negative 5.1% <br /> DK (Don't read) .8% <br /> No answer (Don't read) .3% <br /> Total 100.0% <br /> Al Kassam Very positive 80.8% <br /> Somewhat positive 14.6% <br /> Somewhat negative 1.0% <br /> Very Negative 2.8% <br /> DK (Don't read) .5% <br /> No answer (Don't read) .3% <br /> Total 100.0% <br /> Gaza Strip <br /> Hamas Very positive 28.9% <br /> Somewhat positive 30.7% <br /> Somewhat negative 16.6% <br /> Very Negative 22.7% <br /> DK (Don't read) 1.1% <br /> No answer (Don't read) 0.0% <br /> Total 100.0% <br /> Fateh Very positive 0.7% <br /> Somewhat positive 17.7% <br /> Somewhat negative 32.9% <br /> Very Negative 47.3% <br /> DK (Don't read) 0.7% <br /> No answer (Don't read) 0.7% <br /> Total 100.0% <br /> Palestinian authority Very positive 1.1% <br /> Somewhat positive 7.2% <br /> Somewhat negative 33.9% <br /> Very Negative 56.0% <br /> DK (Don't read) 1.1% <br /> No answer (Don't read) 0.7% <br /> Total 100.0% <br /> Israel Very positive .7% <br /> Somewhat positive .4% <br /> Somewhat negative 1.8% <br /> Very Negative 96.0% <br /> DK (Don't read) .4% <br /> No answer (Don't read) .7% <br /> Total 100.0% <br /> Hizballah Very positive 11.6% <br /> Somewhat positive 32.5% <br /> Somewhat negative 19.9% <br /> Very Negative 35.0% <br /> DK (Don't read) .4% <br /> No answer (Don't read) .7% <br /> Total 100.0% <br /> Islamic Jihad Very positive 45.5% <br /> Somewhat positive 26.4% <br /> Somewhat negative 9.4% <br /> Very Negative 18.1% <br /> DK (Don't read) .4% <br /> No answer (Don't read) .4% <br /> Total 100.0% <br /> Al Aqsa Brigade Very positive 41.2% <br /> Somewhat positive 28.5% <br /> Somewhat negative 10.5% <br /> Very Negative 18.1% <br /> DK (Don't read) 1.4% <br /> No answer (Don't read) .4% <br /> Total 100.0% <br /> Al Kassam Very positive 57.4% <br /> Somewhat positive 21.7% <br /> Somewhat negative 6.9% <br /> Very Negative 13.7% <br /> DK (Don't read) 0.0% <br /> No answer (Don't read) .4% <br /> Total 100.0% <br /> <br /> Table 33: Do you support the solution of establishing one state or two <br /> states in the following formats: (Disaggregated <br /> by region) <br /> <br /> Region <br /> <br /> West Bank <br /> One-State Solution for Two Peoples 7.7% <br /> Two-State Solution for Two Peoples 13.3% <br /> A Palestinian state from the river to the sea 77.7% <br /> Other 0.0% <br /> D/K .5% <br /> N/A .8% <br /> Total 100.0% <br /> Gaza Strip <br /> One-State Solution for Two Peoples 2.2% <br /> Two-State Solution for Two Peoples 22.7% <br /> A Palestinian state from the river to the sea 70.4% <br /> Other 0.0% <br /> D/K 4.3% <br /> N/A .4% <br /> Total 100.0% <br /> ________________________________________ <br /> IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis <br /> <br /> Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on <br /> Arab-Israeli relations <br /> <br /> Website: www.imra.org.il</p> Sun, 26 Nov 2023 15:45:35 -0500 https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74050