IMRA Middle East News Updates https://www.imra.org.il Middle East News & Analysis en-US 1741903955 1741903955 http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss Capalon Internet 2.0 imra@netvision.net.il (Aaron Lerner) News & Analysis IMRA Middle East News Updates https://www.imra.org.il https://www.imra.org.il/imra_sm.png 144 97 Weekly Commentary: "It's the Shidduch, Stupid" - Why Haredim Don't https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74325 <p>Weekly Commentary: "It's the Shidduch, Stupid" - Why Haredim Don't Serve<br /> Dr. Aaron Lerner 13 March 2025</p> <p>The overarching concern for the average Haredi young man is the quality of<br /> the shidduch he will eventually get.</p> <p>And this concern drives his decision-making process.</p> <p>So when he chooses where to study, it isn't based on his abilities or<br /> interests but rather on what he thinks will get him the best shidduch.</p> <p>I know Haredi teenagers who love science and have made the painful choice to<br /> attend an institution bereft of science studies for the sake of their future<br /> shidduch.</p> <p>Let's be clear: Even Haredi young men with a priori low prospects for a<br /> shidduch due to family background and other factors are focused on getting<br /> the best shidduch possible.</p> <p>And today, army service dramatically reduces the quality of the shidduch a<br /> young Haredi man can get.</p> <p>As long as this remains the case, the overwhelming majority of young Haredi<br /> men will continue to do everything in their power to avoid army service<br /> before marriage.</p> <p>I do not claim to know how to change this situation.</p> <p>I am only suggesting that this is a factor that should not be ignored by<br /> policymakers.</p> <p>A policy that exempts serious yeshiva students from the draft, for example,<br /> might serve to raise the "shidduch cost" of serving in the IDF.</p> <p>On the other hand, a program that drafts young Haredim from the top yeshivas<br /> of the country into any kind of service that requires them to wear uniforms<br /> and hold weapons - even for a short period - might remove the stigma from<br /> IDF service.</p> <p>One thing is certain: As long as IDF service is seen as a major impediment<br /> to getting a good shidduch, friendly talk won't go very far.</p> <p>________________________________________<br /> IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis</p> <p>Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on<br /> Arab-Israeli relations</p> <p>Website: www.imra.org.il</p> Thu, 13 Mar 2025 18:12:35 -0400 https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74325 Trump Envoy Wants to Split The Difference With Hamas? https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74324 <p>Trump Envoy Wants to Split The Difference With Hamas?<br /> ". dialogue means sitting hearing what someone wants and then identifying<br /> does it fit with what we want or not and then how can you get somewhere in<br /> the middle and not have a war."<br /> Trump hostage envoy Adam Boehler describing his talks with Hamas on Fox New<br /> Sunday 9 March 2025<br /> https://youtu.be/leiKyEgS26g?si=fSO8zOeDNOY5FGv0</p> <p>________________________________________<br /> IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis</p> <p>Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on<br /> Arab-Israeli relations</p> <p>Website: www.imra.org.il</p> Sun, 09 Mar 2025 18:01:49 -0400 https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74324 Weekly Commentary: Security Echelon Only Recommended Abandoning Judicial Reform - Not Preparing For Conflict https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74323 <p>Weekly Commentary: Security Echelon Only Recommended Abandoning Judicial <br /> Reform - Not Preparing For Conflict <br /> Dr. Aaron Lerner 7 March 2025 <br /> <br /> During the entire period leading to the October 7 2023 disaster the security <br /> echelon had only one recommendation to the political echelon: abandon <br /> judicial reform. <br /> <br /> And now this political recommendation is being cited as the efforts of the <br /> security echelon to prevent war. <br /> <br /> But by coming empty handed to the political echelon, without any <br /> recommendations which reflected a genuine belief that there was a danger of <br /> war, the security echelon stripped itself of any standing in the eyes of the <br /> political echelon. <br /> <br /> And there was a lot to do. <br /> <br /> Already back on 27 February 2022, in the wake of the Russian invasion of <br /> Ukraine, I published a call for an "overall ramp-up in development and <br /> production of defense systems/equipment with a shift to made In Israel <br /> production to minimize the possibility that third parties can impact timely <br /> supplies while delinking the programs from budget decisions made across the <br /> Atlantic." <br /> <br /> Instead, a yihye bseder (it will be OK) attitude prevailed. <br /> <br /> In January 2023 the United States sent 300,000 155mm artillery shells from <br /> the War Reserve Stockpile Ammunition-Israel (WRSA-I) to the Ukraine. <br /> <br /> It was only on August 1, 2023 that The Israel Ministry of Defense's <br /> Directorate of Production and Procurement (DOPP) signed an agreement with <br /> Elbit Systems to procure tens of thousands of 155mm artillery shells. <br /> <br /> That's right. We were short the 300,000 and we only got around to ordering <br /> tens of thousands over half a year later! <br /> <br /> If the security echelon genuinely thought there was a danger, we would have <br /> been ordering hundreds of thousands of made in Israel artillery shells back <br /> that January. <br /> <br /> And we would have purchased the ceramic vests, checked the batteries of the <br /> sniper scopes and a hundred of other things which were missing on October <br /> 7th. <br /> <br /> None of the above actions would have been the kind of "noise" which could <br /> have "accelerated" the realization of war threats which the security echelon <br /> cited to justify their recommendation that judicial reform be abandoned. <br /> <br /> And this is only the tip of the iceberg, <br /> <br /> So please spare us the criticism of the political echelon for ignoring these <br /> warnings. <br /> <br /> Don't get me wrong about judicial reform. <br /> <br /> The team handling judicial reform made a disastrous mistake by following the <br /> standard legislative approaching of loading the draft legislation with <br /> elements to concede to the opposition in bargaining. <br /> <br /> It was clear from day one that there were many good Israelis who were <br /> terrified by the idea that the drafts were going to be enacted as is. <br /> <br /> But the judicial reform isn't the story here. <br /> <br /> Itis that the security echelon, in the critical period before October 7 2023, <br /> acted like politicians instead of security experts. <br /> <br /> ________________________________________ <br /> IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis <br /> <br /> Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on <br /> Arab-Israeli relations <br /> <br /> Website: www.imra.org.il</p> Fri, 07 Mar 2025 06:58:19 -0500 https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74323 Were MFO reports of Egyptian Treaty Violations Kept Secret? https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74322 <p>Were MFO reports of Egyptian Treaty Violations Kept Secret?<br /> Dr. Aaron Lerner 3 March 2025</p> <p>Recently the reports of massive Egyptian violations of the terms of the 1979<br /> treaty in the form of troop deployments and miliary facilities in the Sinai<br /> have made it into the mass media.</p> <p>Has the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) been sharing this<br /> information for years with Egypt and Israel? </p> <p>See below excerpts of the treaty and as well as the Protocol establishing<br /> the MFO.</p> <p>The MFO was supposed to check out Egyptian compliance in all the zones of<br /> the Sinai </p> <p>A search finds no explicit evidence in readily available public sources of a<br /> formal agreement between Egypt and Israel to change the periodic<br /> verification frequency from "not less than twice a month."</p> <p>Which leaves us to disturbing questions: </p> <p>#1. Has the MFO been reporting the Egyptian violations on a regular basis to<br /> the Israeli Defense Forces' International Cooperation Division, part of the<br /> IDF Planning Directorate?</p> <p>#2. Who in the Government of Israel has been receiving these reports?</p> <p>#3. Has the appropriate Knesset subcommittee received these reports?</p> <p>#4. At what level has it been decided, for literally decades, to ignore the<br /> MFO reports of these serious Egyptian violations?</p> <p>#5. Why weren't these violations rectified within 48 hours?</p> <p>From: Dr. Aaron Lerner <br /> Sent: Monday, March 3, 2025 2:39 PM<br /> To: ENQUIRY, MEDIA (MFO-Rome) <br /> Subject: Technical question: Can the MFO, at its own initiative, launch an<br /> inquiry into Egyptian force deployments and military installations in the<br /> Sinai which may not comply with the Treaty without a request from Israel?</p> <p>Dear MFO,</p> <p>Technical question: Can the MFO, at its own initiative, launch an inquiry<br /> into Egyptian force deployments and military installations in the Sinai<br /> which may not comply with the Treaty without a request from Israel? </p> <p>Best regards,<br /> Aaron</p> <p>From: ENQUIRY, MEDIA (MFO-Rome) <br /> Sent: Monday, March 3, 2025 6:19 PM<br /> To: Dr. Aaron Lerner <br /> Subject: RE: Technical question: Can the MFO, at its own initiative, launch<br /> an inquiry into Egyptian force deployments and military installations in the<br /> Sinai which may not comply with the Treaty without a request from Israel?</p> <p>Dear Dr. Lerner,</p> <p>Thank you for your interest in the MFO and our work. The Treaty and the<br /> Protocol task the MFO with 1) operating checkpoints, reconnaissance patrols,<br /> and observation posts along the international boundary and Line B, and<br /> within Zone C, 2) conducting periodic verification of the implementation of<br /> the provisions of Annex I of the Treaty of Peace not less than twice a month<br /> unless otherwise agreed with the Treaty Parties, Egypt and Israel, and 3)<br /> conducting additional verifications within 48 hours after receipt of a<br /> request from either Treaty Party. (The MFO is also tasked with ensuring<br /> freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran in accordance with Article<br /> V of the Treaty of Peace but that is not relevant to your query.)</p> <p>In all cases, reporting on MFO findings are provided to the Treaty Parties,<br /> Egypt and Israel, only.</p> <p>Sincerely, </p> <p>the Multinational Force and Observers<br /> =====<br /> Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty<br /> March 26, 1979<br /> <br /> Annex I<br /> Protocol Concerning Israeli Withdrawal and Security Agreements<br /> Article VI<br /> United Nations Operations<br /> 1. The Parties will request the United Nations to provide forces and<br /> observers to supervise the implementation of this Annex and employ their<br /> best efforts to prevent any violation of its terms.<br /> 2. With respect to these United Nations forces and observers, as<br /> appropriate, the Parties agree to request the following arrangements:<br /> ...<br /> 2.2. Periodic verification of the implementation of the provisions of this<br /> Annex will be carried out not less than twice a month unless otherwise<br /> agreed by the Parties.<br /> ...<br /> 3. The arrangements described in this article for each zone will be<br /> implemented in ones A, B, and C by the United Nations Force and in Zone D by<br /> the United Nations Observers. <br /> ..<br /> 4. The United Nations Force and observers will report their findings to both<br /> Parties.<br /> 5. The United Nations Force and Observers operating in the Zones will enjoy<br /> freedom of movement and other facilities necessary for the performance of<br /> their tasks.</p> <p>"Protocol Between the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the<br /> Government of the State of Israel Establishing the Multinational Force and<br /> Observers (MFO), with Annex"<br /> August 3, 1981</p> <p>Functions and Responsibilities of the MFO<br /> 8. The mission of the MFO shall be to undertake the functions and<br /> responsibilities stipulated in the Treaty for the United Nations Forces and<br /> observers.<br /> 9. The MFO shall supervise the implementation of Annex I and employ its best<br /> efforts to prevent any violation of its terms.<br /> 10. With respect to the MFO, as appropriate, the Parties agree to the<br /> following arrangements:<br /> ...<br /> (b) Periodic verification of the implementation of the provisions of Annex I<br /> will be carried out not less than twice a month unless otherwise agreed by<br /> the parties.<br /> (c) Additional verifications within 48 hours after the receipt of a request<br /> from either party.<br /> ...<br /> 11. When a violation has been confirmed by the MFO, it shall be rectified by<br /> the respective party within 48 hours. The party shall notify the MFO of the<br /> rectification.<br /> .<br /> ________________________________________<br /> IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis</p> <p>Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on<br /> Arab-Israeli relations</p> <p>Website: www.imra.org.il</p> Mon, 03 Mar 2025 18:18:19 -0500 https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74322 Weekly Commentary: Key Conclusion From October 2023 Disaster Ignored - https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74321 <p>Weekly Commentary: Key Conclusion From October 2023 Disaster Ignored -<br /> Critical That Security Personnel Can Contact Political Echelon<br /> Dr. Aaron Lerner 27 February 2025</p> <p>They aren't connecting the dots!</p> <p>Everyone in Israel is asking why Hamas's attack plan, codenamed "Jericho<br /> Wall," as well as the warnings of the IDF spotters, was ignored, but the<br /> glaringly obvious operational conclusion is missing from the conversation.</p> <p>Everyone knows that the Minister of Defense and the Prime Minister didn't<br /> even know about "Jericho Wall".</p> <p>We also are witness to the infantile argument that if, by some miracle, PM<br /> Netanyahu had searched specifically for "Jericho Wall", a document he didn't<br /> know existed, he could have found it among the hundreds of thousands of<br /> documents in the security data base.</p> <p>To be clear: I don't know if things would have played out differently if the<br /> DM and PM had been aware of this information.</p> <p>Maybe they would have also ignored it.</p> <p>But it wasn't up to the security echelon to make this decision.</p> <p>I am not raising this issue to defend Netanyahu from criticism. Based on<br /> open-source information, I was crying out for years about Hamas and<br /> Hezbollah, warning that they are "patient" rather than "deterred". </p> <p>The security echelon already has a set-up which allows for anyone in the<br /> security echelon to jump the chain of command to provide critical<br /> information to the head of their organization.</p> <p>We urgently need to extend this arrangement to its logical conclusion: a<br /> set-up which allows for anyone in the security echelon to jump the chain of<br /> command to provide critical information to the heads of the political<br /> echelon, the Minister of Defense, and the Prime Minister.</p> <p>The DM and PM won't be flooded with reports and warnings from low level<br /> people in the security echelon for the simple reason that they won't benefit<br /> from the protections of whistle blowers. </p> <p>They will be literally betting their careers on the importance of the<br /> information they are sharing.</p> <p>From what we know today of the frustration of the lower echelons dealing<br /> with "Jericho Wall" and the spotters, It made sense that these same people<br /> didn't contact the top of their own security groups because they knew that<br /> the security echelon was blinded by the "conception". </p> <p>It is reasonable, however, to conclude that they would have reached out to<br /> Netanyahu if there was a way to do it, knowing that if there was a record<br /> that the information was brought to his attention that Netanyahu, ever<br /> fearful of future commissions of enquiry, would have acted on it.</p> <p>It is with a heavy heart that I note that even in the national camp there<br /> are many who vociferously oppose making it possible for people in the<br /> security echelon to jump the chain of command to reach the PM and DM with<br /> critical information.</p> <p>For the life of me I don't know why so many good Israelis are unable to<br /> connect the dots.</p> <p>There is legislation stuck in the Knesset addressing this issue.</p> <p>Even a dog who gets hit by a car learns not to go into the street again.</p> <p>We urgently need to learn our lesson.</p> <p>________________________________________<br /> IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis</p> <p>Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on<br /> Arab-Israeli relations</p> <p>Website: www.imra.org.il</p> Thu, 27 Feb 2025 06:16:54 -0500 https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74321 Transcript - Israeli Radio spreads and bolsters "Hamas' Psychological Terror" https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74320 <p>Transcript - Israeli Radio spreads and bolsters "Hamas' Psychological Terror" <br /> Dr. Aaron Lerner 23 February 2025 <br /> <br /> Kan Reshet Bet - an Israel Government radio station, identified a recording <br /> it was about to broadcast as being " part of Hamas' psychological terror". <br /> <br /> They then proceeded to bolster the impact of this "psychological terror" by <br /> featuring recordings supporting the goals of the "psychological terror", <br /> namely for Israel to accept any and every Hamas demand. <br /> <br /> The following is a translation of an excerpt from the transcript - Kan <br /> Reshet Bet 07:00, February 23, 2025 news bulletin: <br /> <br /> .As part of Hamas' psychological terror, the hostages Gai Gilboa-Dalal and <br /> Evyatar David, who are still being held captive by Hamas, were brought <br /> yesterday to the site where Omer Shem Tov, Eliya Cohen, and Omer Wenkert <br /> were released. They were forced to watch the event from inside a vehicle. <br /> <br /> In a video released by Hamas, the hostages addressed Prime Minister <br /> Netanyahu, saying: "We saw our friends being released after 500 days; we <br /> just want this to end. Please, I am asking the government- you started <br /> something, now finish it, please." <br /> <br /> The families of Gai Gilboa-Dalal and Evyatar David approved the publication <br /> of the video. Ilan Gilboa-Dalal, Gai's father, told Yair Weinerberg on Kan <br /> 11: <br /> <br /> "I am seeing my son for the first time in 16 months, hearing his voice for <br /> the first time. For me, it gives me some air, knowing that he is okay, that <br /> he doesn't appear injured. I think people need to see this, to witness the <br /> abuse they are enduring - being taken to see their friends being freed, only <br /> to be sent back to the tunnels." <br /> <br /> Einav Tsangauker, the mother of Matan, who has been held captive in Gaza for <br /> 506 days, demanded last night that the Prime Minister fully implement the <br /> hostage return agreement and bring them all home. She made these statements <br /> at a protest near the Defense Ministry headquarters in Tel Aviv. <br /> ________________________________________ <br /> IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis <br /> <br /> Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on <br /> Arab-Israeli relations <br /> <br /> Website: www.imra.org.il</p> Sun, 23 Feb 2025 04:24:52 -0500 https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74320