Text: Key Researcher In Foremost Israeli Leftwing Think Tank INSS Denounces
Reservists for Combining Politics with Service and Condemns Military and
Political Leaders for Tolerating It
Dr. Aaron Lerner 19 April 2023

Prof. Kobi Michael is a senior researcher at INSS and editor in chief of
"Strategic Assessment" and a professor at the International Centre for
Policing and Security University of South Wales UK. Among his primary
research interests are conflict resolution; strategy; national security;
civil-military relations; failed states and peace keeping and state building
operations; and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Prof. Michael served as
the deputy director general and head of the Palestinian desk at the Ministry
for Strategic Affairs.

Some excerpts:

They have eroded not only the relations between the various echelons, but
the relations between the military and Israeli society as well.

...any declaration of intent to stop volunteering is tantamount to a threat
to paralyze these branches of the military or to severely disrupt their
smooth operations, and undermines a unique model of service. In essence, it
is a refusal to serve.

They harnessed their background, experience, military reputation, military
expertise, and vital reserve duty to protest an issue that is fundamentally
civilian and political in nature, without having been issued an order that
was expressly illegal and without their being able to say with any degree of
certainty that because of the judicial overhaul promoted by the government
they would find themselves being given an order that was expressly illegal -
a "black flag" - which legally must be rejected.

The severity of the incident and responsibility for its spread are also part
and parcel of the civilian leadership, which failed to implement effective
civilian oversight of the military - that is, subordinate military thinking
to political thinking in the abstract sense of the concept, and totally
subordinate the military to the political leadership in the most fundamental
sense of the concept.

The incident and the IDF response have scarred Israeli democracy,
undermining the public consensus regarding the military and its apolitical
standing, certainly when it comes to some of the most important branches of
the military and the top echelons of the IDF leadership,...

Suspicion and lack of trust will make it hard for the political echelon to
believe that the professional positions offered by the military are free of
an agenda or of political and/or moral considerations.

If elected politicians are suspicious of the security establishment, and of
the military itself, Israeli democracy will be severely damaged, in terms of
the civilian control as a fundamental layer in civil-military relations in a
democratic regime, and in terms of what must be the apolitical nature of the
military in the eyes of the political leadership and society as a whole.

=====

A Sea Change and a Slippery Slope: When the Military Becomes a Political
Actor
The turmoil weathered by Israeli society in recent months has not bypassed
the military, when volunteers in the reserves announced they would not
report for training, in protest of the government's policy. INSS researcher
Prof. Kobi Michael examines the danger inherent in the IDF's becoming part
of the political game
Kobi Michael INSS Insight No. 1710, April 18, 2023
https://www.inss.org.il/publication/idf-politics/

The threat by reservists to refuse to volunteer - which is cast by the
political leadership, large portions of the public, and even some among
those serving in the IDF as tantamount to insubordination - represents
nothing less than a sea change. The IDF, against the wishes and not at the
instigation of the top military leadership, but specifically because of the
mishandling of developments within the military due to the political crisis,
has become a political actor. Moreover, the threat of refusing to serve has
proven to be of much influence in the public sphere, in the current reality
that is shaped by a heated moral civil-political argument.

The chapter itself and the response by the military leadership have scarred
Israeli democracy, undermining the public consensus regarding the IDF and
its apolitical standing. They have eroded not only the relations between the
various echelons, but the relations between the military and Israeli society
as well. From now on, the military could find itself forced to deal with
organized refusals to serve among reservists and perhaps even among
conscripted soldiers, over issues that are civil-political in nature, or
with other national issues. Moreover, this is a slippery slope that will be
characterized by tense civil-military relations.

The threat of refusal to volunteer to serve by reserve pilots in the Israeli
Air Force, reservists in Special Operations units, and reservists in the IDF
cybersecurity units has been described in some quarters as "gray refusal,"
since those involved announced that they would only refuse to volunteer for
reserve service but would not refuse to serve if called for operational
reasons. This, however, is little more than a whitewash - certainly as far
as the vast majority of Israeli's political leadership is concerned, and
among a large portion of the public.

These three sectors in the military, which are at the heart of the IDF's
operational and offensive capabilities - at least in the public conception
that relies on reports in the media - depend on reservists and a model of
volunteer reserve duty, which is unlike the usual model of reserve service.
Under this model of service, mobilization orders are issued retroactively
once the volunteers have agreed with their commanding officers on their
service days. In practice, however, the moment that volunteers receive their
mobilization orders, the reserve duty is reserve duty in all respects.
Accordingly, any declaration of intent to stop volunteering is tantamount to
a threat to paralyze these branches of the military or to severely disrupt
their smooth operations, and undermines a unique model of service. In
essence, it is a refusal to serve.

Even if one can understand the considerations of the commander of the Air
Force, the IDF chief of staff, and others in the top military echelons in
their response to the challenge - that is, the desire and belief that they
would be able to resolve the problem internally, to placate concerns, and to
prevent the spread of the phenomenon by responding harshly and punishing
those involved - it would be wrong to justify the phenomenon and downplay
its severity. The move spearheaded by officers and reservist soldiers from
these branches of the military was collective action, not the individual
decision of one reservist or another. Even if we ignore philological and
legal casuistry regarding the essence of collective action as an act of
sedition, as one could define it in terms of the military establishment or
in accordance with Clause 136 of the penal law on sedition, and even if it
does not exactly fit the definition of sedition, it is clear that those who
spearheaded this collective action understood the significance of their
actions. They harnessed their background, experience, military reputation,
military expertise, and vital reserve duty to protest an issue that is
fundamentally civilian and political in nature, without having been issued
an order that was expressly illegal and without their being able to say with
any degree of certainty that because of the judicial overhaul promoted by
the government they would find themselves being given an order that was
expressly illegal - a "black flag" which legally must be rejected.

This move has had a profound impact on the entire military and has filtered
down to the ranks of conscripted soldiers, too - both those in mandatory
service and those who joined the regular army - and has shaken the military's
very foundations. Israel's political head, Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu, insisted that this was an extremely serious matter and demanded
that Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and the military leadership deal with it.
However, the IDF leadership was unable to contain or curtail the phenomenon,
and in part because of the very real concern that the phenomenon would
spread throughout the IDF, warned the political leadership that this was a
serious matter with dangerous security ramifications that could harm
operational capabilities.

And so, a sea change has occurred. The IDF, against the wishes and not at
the instigation of the top military leadership, but specifically because of
the mishandling of developments within the military due to the political
crisis, has become a political actor - the most influential actor in the
public sphere in the reality of the current civil-political-moral debate. A
precedent has been created: for the first time, and in blatant fashion, it
is the military that is spearheading the process of securitization. This is
the use of military and security arguments to highlight a potential threat
posed by a civil issue, as justification for the use of extreme measures to
deal with the threat, in this case, freezing the legislative part of the
judicial overhaul proposed by the government.

The severity of the incident and responsibility for its spread are also part
and parcel of the civilian leadership, which failed to implement effective
civilian oversight of the military - that is, subordinate military thinking
to political thinking in the abstract sense of the concept, and totally
subordinate the military to the political leadership in the most fundamental
sense of the concept. Evidence can be found in the change of policy from the
commander of the Air Force and the IDF chief of staff in the spirit of the
Prime Minister's instructions and his retroactive demands. Judging by the
outcome, the legislative process was suspended because of the extraordinary
speech by the Defense Minister, who, on the one hand, spoke about the
severity of security threats, and on the other hand, about the operational
ramifications and damage to the military. In fact, the military leadership,
against its wishes and because of a profound sense of distress among its
ranks, provided a significant tailwind to the civilian protest against the
proposed judicial overhaul and forced the political leadership to reverse
its original intentions. At this stage, the military - even if, more
specifically, it was reservists in vital branches of the military - became
identified with the civilian protest and the opposition camp fighting
against the judicial overhaul.

These incidents and the subsequent response sent shockwaves throughout the
military. Inter alia, for example, soldiers serving in the Air Force's
technical divisions contacted the commander of the Air Force and the chief
of staff, expressing their displeasure at the behavior of reservist pilots -
they even demanded that the pilots apologize to them, and they expressed
deep frustration over the discriminatory treatment that they and their views
received. Even if there are some who say that the collective protest action
was created by actors from the political sphere, this too should serve as a
warning about the slippery slope and how far the IDF has fallen from its
apolitical pedestal.

Moreover, the military's handling of this situation created a profound
divide with the political leadership because of the severe damage to the
political level's faith in the military leadership and its response to the
crisis. This will have a profound impact on future civil-military relations.
The incident and the IDF response have scarred Israeli democracy,
undermining the public consensus regarding the military and its apolitical
standing, certainly when it comes to some of the most important branches of
the military and the top echelons of the IDF leadership, which was perceived
as supporting, or at the very least, being willing to turn a blind eye to
the refusal to serve and, as a result, has become identified as opposing the
judicial overhaul - even though none of the top officers have spoken about
it. Therefore, the damage is not just in terms of civil-military relations,
but in socio-military relations as well.

It is hard to imagine, given the conditions that have been created, that
this will not have an impact on the IDF's recruitment model and on its
standing as the "people's army" which in any case has eroded in recent
years. Organized threats of refusal to serve and the decision by the
military leadership to contain these threats persuaded the Defense Minister
to call for the judicial overhaul process to be suspended, and laid the
groundwork for future protests and for future threats of refusal to serve in
the military. Since the external security threats existed in any case, the
Defense Minister would not have called for a suspension of the legislation
if it were not for the incident in question, which exacerbated external
threats due to the danger that it would impact negatively on the IDF's
operational preparedness and the possibility that Israel's enemies could
interpret all this as weakness and an opportunity to attack.

From now on, the military could find itself having to deal with organized
refusals, perhaps among other reservists, over different civilian,
political, and national issues. The implications of this slippery slope are
that the IDF will inevitably become more involved in civilian-political
issues and there will be increased tension between the political leadership
and the military echelon. Suspicion and lack of trust will make it hard for
the political echelon to believe that the professional positions offered by
the military are free of an agenda or of political and/or moral
considerations. This will disrupt the nature of the dialogue between the two
echelons, and instead of an open, challenging, and free discourse, which is
also a space for both echelons, who share a common base of knowledge and who
challenge each other's thinking, there will be a close, restrained,
hierarchical space in which no common learning is possible.

Once the dam has burst, the political leadership will be concerned about
future threats of refusal to serve. From now on, it will be hard for the
politicians to believe that the military can dedicate all its capabilities
and professionalism to a military operation designed to achieve a strategic
political goal, as determined by the elected leadership of the country. If
elected politicians are suspicious of the security establishment, and of the
military itself, Israeli democracy will be severely damaged, in terms of the
civilian control as a fundamental layer in civil-military relations in a
democratic regime, and in terms of what must be the apolitical nature of the
military in the eyes of the political leadership and society as a whole.

To begin the process of healing that Israeli society needs so much in terms
civil-military and socio-military relations, the severity of the problem and
the extent of the schism must be understood. Any attempt to downplay the
gravity of the situation will thwart a proper process of healing, which in
any case will be complex, difficult, and prolonged.

The opinions expressed in INSS publications are the authors' alone.