The Lie of the Blocking Percentage
By Amit Segal
Video Link
https://x.com/amit_segal/status/2053361895629803531/video/1

Grok transcript and translation.

Do you remember when your kids were little and you built towers with big blocks? Then as they got older, the blocks got smaller — like Lego. Now tell me: which tower is more stable, better looking, more precise, and stands taller? Exactly — the one made of many small blocks.

This is precisely what happened with the electoral threshold (the minimum percentage of votes needed to enter the Knesset). When the state was founded, the threshold was very low — less than 1%. That’s why there were many single-MK parties, like the Yemenite Party or WIZO. Over time, people left those parties and supported raising the threshold.

The argument was that small parties make Israeli politics unstable. If we just get rid of them, we’ll have more stable governments, fewer extremists, and fewer sectorial interests. In 2014, Lieberman and Lapid raised it together. Today it stands at 3.25% — about four mandates, or nearly 200,000 votes for the next elections.

So, has our politics become more stable? Less extreme? Do governments last longer? The exact opposite.

Why did we have five election cycles? Because in 2019, seven right-wing mandates were wasted due to the threshold — Feiglin, Bennett, and others. Netanyahu lost his majority, and we went back to elections. And I still remember the night Bennett became prime minister — people celebrated in Rabin Square, and someone said, “I haven’t been this happy since Bennett failed to pass the threshold.”

Great — so you’re against a high threshold? Then remember 2022: Meretz fell below it, and Netanyahu got a full right-wing government where Ben-Gvir and Goldknopf held the keys. The Arab parties united out of fear of not passing the threshold.

What was the result? A significant increase in extremism. When you merge with Balad supporters, you start justifying them, then agreeing with them. Did raising the threshold reduce extremism, or did it do the opposite?

And let’s not forget the technical blocs. The whole idea was to keep “your side’s” small parties out. But they still exist — they just merge before elections and split afterward.

The real problem in Israel isn’t extremism from small parties, but the fragility and blackmail between the big parties. Demands for six mandates in the security cabinet, or seven in a ministry, or full exemptions for all Haredim from the army.

There’s another problem with a high threshold: new, positive forces in Israeli society have no chance to break through and make a difference.

Think of the tens of thousands of working Haredim — those who support their families and serve in the army. Who represents them? No one. Secular, Arab, and even religious politicians often work against them.

Now imagine lowering the threshold. Suddenly they could have one MK, then two, then four. Or think of the new generation of Arabs who want economic progress and oppose terror. Why isn’t there even one Arab MK in the Knesset who clearly says “Hamas and Hezbollah are terrorist organizations”?

Lowering the threshold won’t solve every problem. But the current system isn’t the solution either. It would open possibilities for every camp: the center-left could prove it doesn’t hate Haredim, the right could build a coalition with Arabs. Instead, we have a monopoly where big parties decide how much representation smaller groups get.

Politicians get angry when someone tries to open a closed door with a key. Well, it’s time to break that door down.