Trump’s Missed Opportunity on the Kurdish Front
Dr. Aaron Lerner 26 July 2026

President Donald Trump’s decision to abandon the option of using Iranian Kurdish forces against Tehran was a strategic mistake.
And it was a mistake which could have been avoided.

Early in the campaign, reports indicated that both the Trump administration and Israel saw considerable potential in arming and coordinating with Iranian Kurdish groups to increase the pressure on the regime from within.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan objected to any movement by the Kurdish forces.

President Trump did not have to choose between abandoning the Kurdish option and ignoring Turkey’s security concerns.

He could have told Erdogan:

“We and the Israelis will respect your ‘red zone,’ and the Kurds have strict instructions not to enter it.

“The Kurds also understand that if they dare to enter that red zone, they will be entering a killing field without American or Israeli protection.

“On the other hand, if you make the mistake of attacking the Kurdish forces outside the red zone, remember that NATO membership would not oblige the alliance to protect Turkish forces conducting unilateral military operations inside Iran.
“And any such Turkish action would have serious consequences.”

Such a formulation would have directly addressed Turkey’s legitimate security concerns while preserving the Kurdish option against Iran.

It would have treated Erdogan as a serious partner without granting him veto power over American and Israeli strategy.

Would Erdogan have been furious?

Certainly.

But history strongly suggests that he would have ultimately accepted the reality.

Turkey’s trade with the European Union is approximately five times its trade with Russia.

Its defense industry depends heavily on Western components, technology and export markets.

And the Russian S-400 system has become such a political and technical liability that Ankara is now trying to find a way to neutralize the problem in the hope of regaining access to advanced Western weapons systems.

Erdogan’s pattern is clear.

He threatens.

He escalates.

He extracts whatever concessions he can.

But he does not lightly burn the bridges connecting Turkey to NATO, American technology and European capital.

Six months after such an exchange, Turkey would almost certainly still have been inside NATO, still dependent on the West and still negotiating with Washington.

And the Kurdish option against Tehran would still have been available.

There is, however, another important question:

Did Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his team propose such an approach to the White House?

The Israelis certainly understood that the Kurdish issue posed serious domestic and strategic problems for Erdogan.

They may also have explained how Washington could respect Turkey’s red zone without surrendering the Kurdish card entirely.

If Israel proposed such a calibrated response and President Trump nevertheless chose to defer to Erdogan, then the missed opportunity was even more consequential.

A single firm but respectful conversation could have protected Turkey’s legitimate security interests while preserving a powerful additional front against the Iranian regime.

Instead, Erdogan demanded that the Kurdish forces not move at all - and Washington removed the Kurdish card from the table