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Sunday, November 22, 2026
IMRA poses questions to Neomi Neumann regarding omissions in her recent PolicyWatch analysis on the Board of Peace and Gaza implementation

IMRA poses questions to Neomi Neumann regarding omissions in her recent PolicyWatch analysis on the Board of Peace and Gaza implementation
22 November 2026


Subject: Questions regarding omissions in your recent PolicyWatch analysis on the Board of Peace and Gaza implementation

Dear Ms. Neumann,

I read with interest your recent analysis (Policy Analysis PolicyWatch 4299 Israel Risks Losing Influence Over Gaza’s Future by Neomi Neumann Nov 20, 2026 https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/israel-risks-losing-influence-over-gazas-future on the need for a more realistic and proactive Israeli strategy toward ending Hamas control of Gaza. While the piece usefully maps the Board of Peace’s growing assertiveness and the risks of prolonged stalemate, two significant omissions stand out and I would be grateful for clarification on why they were not addressed.

First, Hamas’s systematic seizure and monetization of tents and winter shelter supplies.

Multiple independent and Palestinian sources have documented that Hamas is not merely “diverting” materials in a general sense, but actively confiscating tents distributed by relief workers and Palestinian Authority personnel, then controlling or selling them for revenue.
• The Telegraph reported that Hamas security units confiscated tents handed out by relief workers and blocked efforts to upgrade camps ahead of winter storms, with Palestinians accusing the group of boosting its war chest by seizing and controlling distribution for profit (Henry Bodkin, The Telegraph / Yahoo News, 10 November 2026).

• Fatah spokesman Abd Al-Fattah Doleh stated on official PA television that PA personnel in Gaza who were attempting to distribute tents “were chased” by Hamas forces, who “confiscated the tents and prevented them from distributing them” (Official PA TV, 11 November 2026; also covered by Algemeiner, Jewish Chronicle, and others).

• Gaza residents interviewed by Israel Hayom described Hamas monopolizing the tent trade, selling at inflated prices, and preventing others from trading in winter supplies, while officials in SUVs collected multiple tents from local offices while families went without.

• These reports sit alongside earlier documentation of Hamas taxing incoming trucks (estimates of $2–5 million per day from taxation and resale of stolen aid—figures you yourself have previously cited) and broader patterns of aid diversion.

Given that your piece notes Hamas’s exploitation of the winter crisis for media purposes and its efforts to obstruct alternative authorities, the concrete, ongoing seizure of tents for revenue appears directly relevant both to the humanitarian picture the BoP is emphasizing and to Hamas’s ability to retain civilian influence. Why was this specific, well-sourced practice omitted?

Second, the material divergence between President Trump’s 20-point plan and the July 2026 Roadmap on core demilitarization provisions.

President Trump’s plan (Point 13) required that “All military, terror, and offensive infrastructure, including tunnels and weapon production facilities, will be destroyed and not rebuilt” and that weapons be placed “permanently beyond use through an agreed process of decommissioning… all verified by the independent monitors.” In practice, that entailed destruction or removal from Gaza under independent monitoring.

The July 2026 Roadmap accepted by Hamas and published by the Board of Peace states something fundamentally different: heavy weapons, weapons-production facilities, depots, and tunnels are to be “decommissioned and stored.” Explicitly, “no weapons shall be transferred or handed to Israel or non-Palestinian parties,” and “at the end of the process… only NCAG shall hold, store or control weapons in Gaza” (Roadmap Article 8; full text available via Board of Peace and The National, 30–31 July 2026).

This is not implementation of the original plan’s central security provisions; it is a rewrite that leaves the weapons and production capacity inside Gaza under a new Palestinian authority. Your article discusses Hamas’s acceptance of the Roadmap, Israel’s reservations about residual military capabilities, and the desirability of advancing alternative governance in parallel with demilitarization. It does not, however, address this specific discrepancy. Why was the difference between destruction/permanent removal and internal storage under NCAG not examined, particularly when it bears directly on the credibility of the
security framework Israel is being pressed to advance?

These points do not negate the strategic case for incremental civilian progress or the real costs of stalemate. They do, however, affect the factual baseline against which Israel’s caution and the BoP’s demands should be assessed. I would welcome any clarification on the editorial or analytical reasons for their omission.

I would like to share your response — without any editing — with the IMRA readers.

Thank you for your time.
Sincerely,
Dr. Aaron Lerner
IMRA
imra@netvision.net.il
www.imra.org.il

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