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Sunday, January 26, 1997
Government Press Office: Amending the PLO Covenant: An Unfulfilled Commitment

The following report was distributed today by the Israel Government Press Office:The following report was distributed today by the Israel Government Press Office:

Amending the PLO Covenant: An Unfulfilled Commitment

Executive Summary

The Agreement: In his exchange of letters with Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin on September 9, 1993, at the beginning of the Oslo
process, Chairman Yasser Arafat undertook a commitment to amend the
PLO Covenant.

Two years later, the Covenant had still not been changed, but a
deadline was fixed in the Interim Agreement (Oslo 2) of September
28, 1995. Under Oslo 2, the PLO was obligated to change the
Covenant no later than two months after the inauguration of the
elected Palestinian Council. Since the Council was inaugurated on
March 7, 1996, the deadline for the PLO to amend the Covenant was
May 7, 1996.

The PNC Resolution: The resolution adopted on April 24, 1996 by the
Palestinian National Council (PNC) merely declared a readiness to
change the Covenant. The only practical step taken was the
empowerment of a legal committee to draft a new version of the
document. The PNC resolution failed to specify which articles were
changed, how they were changed or when the changes will go into
effect.

On several occasions, the Palestinians have asserted that a legal
committee was working on a new draft of the document. To date, no
new version of the Covenant has been submitted to the PNC.

In the Note for the Record which accompanied the January 15, 1997
Hebron Protocol, the PLO again reaffirmed its commitment to
"Complete the process of revising the Palestinian National
Charter." In agreeing to this, the PLO was implicitly admitting
that it had previously failed to change the Covenant.

The Covenant has served as the PLO's manifesto for over three
decades. It calls for Israel's destruction and runs counter to the
Oslo Accords' rejection of violence. It must be repudiated and
amended if the Oslo Accords are to have any meaning.

Conclusion: While the PNC resolution on the Covenant may be seen as
a first step toward compliance with the PLO's obligation, it failed
to make the necessary changes and failed to satisfy the terms of
the Oslo Accords. Hence, the PLO has been in violation of Chairman
Arafat's commitment to the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and in
violation of its specific commitment to change the Covenant by the
May 7, 1996 deadline.

Amending the PLO Covenant: An Unfulfilled Commitment

I. The Agreement
One of the explicit commitments undertaken by the PLO at the
beginning of the Oslo process in 1993 was a pledge to amend the
Palestinian National Covenant.

In his exchange of letters with Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on
September 9, 1993, Chairman Yasser Arafat wrote,

"the PLO affirms that those articles of the Palestinian Covenant
which deny Israel's right to exist, and the provisions of the
Covenant which are inconsistent with the commitments of this letter
are now inoperative and no longer valid. Consequently, the PLO
undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National Council for formal
approval the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian
Covenant."

Two years later, the Covenant had still not been changed, but a
deadline was fixed in the Interim Agreement (Oslo 2) signed in
Washington, DC on September 28, 1995:

"The PLO undertakes that, within two months of the date of the
inauguration of the Council, the Palestinian National Council will
convene and formally approve the necessary changes in regard to the
Palestinian Covenant, as undertaken in the letters signed by the
Chairman of the PLO and addressed to the Prime Minister of Israel,
dated September 9, 1993 and May 4, 1994" (Article XXXI (9)).

The elected Council, which came into being after the Palestinian
elections of January 20, 1996, was formally inaugurated on March 7,
1996. Thus, under the terms of the Oslo Accords the PLO was
obligated to amend the Covenant no later than May 7, 1996.

On January 15, 1997, eight months after the passage of the May
7, 1996 deadline, Israel and the PLO signed the Protocol Concerning
the Redeployment in Hebron. In the Note for the Record which
accompanied the Protocol, the PLO again reaffirmed its commitment
to "Complete the process of revising the Palestinian National
Charter."

With regard to the requisite changes to the Covenant, the
criteria are those referred to in Chairman Arafat's letter above.
Specifically, articles which deny Israel's right to exist, or run
counter to the PLO's other commitments in Arafat's letter, such as
the renunciation of violence and terror, must be changed.

II. The PNC Resolution
On April 24, 1996, the Palestinian National Council (PNC)
convened in Gaza and adopted a resolution concerning the Covenant
by a vote of 504 to 54 with 14 abstentions. Translated from the
Arabic, the text of the resolution read as follows:

"It has been decided upon:

1. Amending the National Charter by cancelling the articles that
are contrary to the letters exchanged between the PLO and the
Government of Israel, on September 9 and 10, 1993.

2. The empowerment of a legal committee with the task of redrafting
the National Charter. The Charter will be presented to the first
meeting of the Central Council."

III. Why the PNC Resolution is Insufficient
The PNC resolution regarding the Covenant is ambiguous and
inadequate insofar as the demands of the Oslo Accords are
concerned. The two primary failings of the resolution are as
follows:

A. Failure to Actually Change the Covenant
The pivotal problem with the PNC resolution is that it did not
alter the Covenant. While the PNC declared its readiness in
principle to change the document, the only practical step taken was
the empowerment of a legal committee to draft a new Covenant for
presentation at an unspecified future date. Since the Covenant is
a legally binding written document, amending it is not simply a
matter of declaring a willingness to alter it, but necessitates the
actual adoption and implementation of changes to the document. No
such changes were made by the PNC.

Immediately prior to the vote, PNC Chairman Salim Zaanoun made
clear to the assembled delegates that the choice before them was
between amending the Covenant or delaying the process by six months
by deciding to draft a new proposal. The PNC, he said, had decided
to adopt the latter option:

"We must fulfill the commitment demanded at the lowest possible
price. Therefore it was said that if we amend those articles whose
amendment is demanded, it will mean that we have paid a very high
price, and if we prepare a new proposal it will be less damaging.
The proposal which was drafted is the least damaging that we could
submit. It gives us an extension of 6 months until the Central
Council convenes."

That the PNC did not amend the Covenant was confirmed immediately
after the vote by PLO spokesman Marwan Kanafani, who told reporters
in a videotaped interview that, "This is not an amendment. This is
a license to start a new charter."

Other PLO officials echoed the sentiment that the Covenant had not
been changed. PLO Executive Committee member Sakhr Habash said,
"the text of the charter remains as it is since it has not been
amended yet. Therefore, it is frozen, not cancelled." (An-Nahar,
May 5, 1996) An internal report published shortly after the PNC
vote by the Research and Thought Department of Chairman Arafat's
Fatah faction of the PLO contained a similar determination. The
report stated, "The text of the Palestinian National Covenant
remains as it was and no changes whatsoever were made to it. This
has caused it to be frozen, but not annulled."

The PNC itself failed to make any mention of changing the Covenant
in its closing statement. At the close of its session, on April 25,
the PNC published a concluding document summarizing its activity.
The statement included 19 specific resolutions and decisions on
subjects ranging from Jerusalem to Israeli settlements, but
contained no reference to any decision to amend the Covenant.
(Al-Quds, April 26, 1996; Voice of Palestine, April 26, 1996)

B. No Specifics Concerning Changes Made
Another crucial problem is that the PNC resolution fails to specify
which particular articles were changed, how they were changed or
when the changes will go into effect. Indeed, even Palestinian
officials appear to be unsure regarding the number of articles
amended.

PNC Chairman Selim Zaanoun asserted that the Covenant had been
amended but acknowledged that "there are no specific articles"
which were cancelled. (An-Nahar, May 16, 1996) By contrast, Sufian
Abu Zaidah, head of the PA's Israel desk, claimed that all 33 of
the Covenant's articles had been "cancelled" and that it had been
replaced by the PNC's 1988 Algiers declaration. (interview with
Israel Radio, April 25, 1996)

PA Planning Minister Nabil Shaath said after the vote that 16
articles had been altered while other PNC members claimed that 4,
7 or 10 articles had been changed (Jerusalem Post, May 1, 1996).

Faisal Hamdi Husseini, head of the PNC's judicial committee, said
on May 5 that he would submit a new Covenant for approval at a
later date in which 21 articles would be changed or cancelled,
thereby implying that none had actually been amended. (Jerusalem
Post, May 6, 1996)

If no one can state with certainty how many, or even which,
articles were changed, then it is clear that the process of
amending the Covenant remains incomplete.

IV. Practical Measures Since the PNC Vote
Since the PNC decision of April 24, 1996, the Palestinians
have declared on several occasions that a legal committee was
working on a new draft of the document.

On April 28, Chairman Arafat was reported to have issued a
"presidential decree" instructing the PNC legal committee to draft
a new version of the Covenant in accordance with the PNC decision.
(Voice of Palestine, April 28, 1996) A month later, PNC Chairman
Salim Zaanoun claimed that the PNC legal committee was working on
preparing a new Covenant. (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, May 23, 1996)

These declarations notwithstanding, no practical measures are known
to have been taken thus far. Immediately prior to the PNC vote,
Zaanoun declared that a new version of the Covenant would be
completed in six months, by October 24, 1996. Subsequently, Faisal
Hamdi Husseini, head of the PNC's judicial committee, said in early
May 1996 that he would submit a new Covenant for approval in three
months, in August 1996, which would incorporate changes to the
document. (Jerusalem Post, May 6, 1996)

In October 1996, senior PA official Abu Mazen told a Russian
newspaper that a new version of the Covenant would be published "in
another half a year," meaning in April 1997. (Novoya Vremya,
October 1, 1996)

To date, no new version of the Covenant has yet been submitted to,
or approved by, the PNC.

In the Note for the Record which accompanied the January 15, 1997
Hebron Protocol, the PLO again reaffirmed its commitment to
"Complete the process of revising the Palestinian National
Charter." In agreeing to this, the PLO was implicitly admitting
that it had previously failed to change the Covenant, otherwise
there would be no need to "complete the process of revising" it.

V. Why Amending the Covenant is Important
The Palestinian National Covenant is the founding charter of
the PLO, delineating the organization's stated aims and goals. It
was adopted at the PNC's first session in 1964, and attained its
present format in 1968 at the PNC's fourth session in Cairo.

The Covenant contains numerous articles which explicitly or
implicitly deny Israel's right to exist and reject any peaceful
solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. For example, Article 19
states, "The partitioning of Palestine in 1947 and the
establishment of Israel are fundamentally null and void, whatever
time has elapsed " Article 22 asserts that, "the liberation of
Palestine will destroy the Zionist and imperialist presence and
will contribute to the establishment of peace in the Middle East ."

The Covenant also denies the existence of the Jewish people as a
nation and any ties that it might have to the Land of Israel
(Article 20). It declares that "armed struggle is the only way to
liberate Palestine and is therefore a strategy and not tactics"
(Article 9).

For nearly three decades, the PLO engaged in acts of violence
and terror against Israel, with the Covenant serving as the
organization's manifesto. Since the conceptual foundation of the
Oslo Accords is the rejection of violence as a tool in the conduct
of bilateral relations, it is particularly important that the ideas
contained in the Covenant be wholly and publicly repudiated and
altered.

VI. Conclusion
While the PNC resolution on the Covenant may be seen as a first
step toward compliance with the PLO's obligation, it failed to make
the necessary changes and failed to satisfy the terms of the Oslo
Accords. Hence, the PLO has been in violation of Chairman Arafat's
commitment to the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and in
violation of its specific commitment to change the Covenant by the
May 7, 1996 deadline.
Jerusalem, January, 1997
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