Arafat [controls 5 armies] outmaneuvers Abbas on road map

By Ze'ev Schiff Ha'aretz 5 May 2003
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=290222&contrassID=2&su
bContrassID=1&sbSubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y

Five different Palestinian Authority security organizations, including Force
17 and the General Intelligence, remain under the direct command of Chairman
Yasser Arafat - and this can be seen as the first substantial breach of one
of the important security clauses of the U.S. road map for a resolution of
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

A complaint along these lines has been relayed to the Americans and the
matter is now a central talking point between Israeli officials and U.S.
representatives.

The road map explicitly stipulates that Palestinian security organizations
will be combined into three services that report to the PA interior
minister.

The reorganization following the appointment of Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) as
PA prime minister have produced a very different arrangement. The PA
security organization's seven separate mechanisms have not been reduced to
three. The Interior Ministry where Mohammed Dahlan is minister for state
affairs has authority over just two security organizations - the
counter-intelligence apparatus and the uniformed police.

Arafat remains in charge of five different security organizations - General
Intelligence, the National Security Forces, Force 17, Military Intelligence
and the naval forces.

To place his five organizations under something of a new and separate
command, Arafat has set up a new body, the National Security Council, in
which the PA chairman's close associate and former PA interior minister
Hanni al-Hassan has a central role. Clearly this is a false reorganization
that is designed to leave things as they were and allow Arafat to retain
separate and independent military powers, far from the watchful eye of Abu
Mazen.

A number of the organizations under Arafat - Force 17, for example - have
been directly involved in acts of terrorism. As far as Israel is concerned,
these organizations have been terror groups for all intents and purposes,
and many of Israel's reprisals have been directed against them. The
redistribution will weigh heavy on Israel's security cooperation with Abu
Mazen's government.

It's clear that if this reorganization received the Palestinian Legislative
Council's stamp of approval, Arafat will get a special budget to maintain
his security organizations, just as the organizations under Abu Mazen and
Dahlan will receive budgets.

Agreements with the counter-intelligence organization will be put into
question because alongside it there are Palestinian security organizations
over which the PA Interior Ministry and Mohammed Dahlan will have no say,
further compounding the problem when it comes to facing off against Hamas,
Islamic Jihad or the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which
are armed with illegal weapons.

Abu Mazen and Dahlan will also face a tough problem in that the PA will play
host to another five armies over which they have no power. Under such
circumstances, Abu Mazen's chances of eradicating terror are very slim.

This is a negative outcome the Americans wished to avoid, and they persuaded
their partners to the road map to insist on a reduction in the number of
security organizations and to bring them all under a single entity convinced
of the need to eradicate terror.

The situation poses a very tough problem for Israel and the Americans. One
way to tackle it would be to resort to the old system adopted in the wake of
the Oslo accords, when the approach was to disregard various violations and
take solace in the fact that progress in general was being made in
implementing the agreements. The Americans supported this approach and did
not make a fuss about the incitement, the arms smuggling or the
establishment of illegal settlement outposts.

In retrospect, this approach was clearly a big mistake that constituted one
of the principal causes for further violations and the failure of the Oslo
accords. Clearly, if they return to the old approach of lying to themselves,
the Americans will not have the moral authority to argue that Israel is not,
for example, dismantling outposts that were established in the territories
after March 2001.

Another way of tackling the problem is to insist on the fulfillment of the
details of the road map immediately at its outset - particularly with regard
to a one-time move such as a reduction in the number of security
organizations and their placing under the authority of the Interior
Ministry. This would be in contrast with, for example, an ongoing process
such as rounding up of illegal weapons or the indictment of individuals
involved in acts of terror.

If concessions are made to one side in any particular field, the other side
will surely come out with similar claims when approached with a demand to
uphold its part of the understandings.