Ephraim Kam: Iran Under Pressure [full text]
JCSS - Tel-Aviv University

Iran has recently come under increasing domestic and international pressure
stemming from three primary factors. The first is the changes to Iran's
strategic environment that resulted from the American operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq, some of which have been positive for Iran but most of
which have been negative. The second factor concerns new revelations about
Iran's progress towards acquiring nuclear weapons, sparking a great deal of
international pressure on the country. The third factor is domestic unrest
within Iran, characterized primarily by student protests against the policy
and leadership of the ruling regime. The fact that these three sources of
pressure emerged in the same period in effect links them and causes each one
to influence the other, and their interplay makes it difficult for the
regime to resolve them.

Changes in Iran's Strategic Environment

Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack in the United States, and to a
great degree as a result of the attack, Iran's strategic environment has
changed significantly. In most ways, these changes increased the American
threat towards Iran and heightened the external pressures on the country.
The fact that the Bush administration insisted on embarking on a war on
terrorism positioned Iran as a possible target for American action, given
that since 1984 Iran has consistently been defined by the United States as
the country most involved in terrorism. Iran's links to al-Qaeda operatives
and the Hizbollah - also marked by the Bush administration as a possible
target in its war on terrorism - and its ever increasing encouragement of
Palestinian terrorism against Israel contributed to Iran's inclusion in the
so-called tri-polar "axis of evil."

The American military operation in Afghanistan in late 2001 increased
external pressure on Iran. Although the campaign resulted in the toppling of
the hostile anti-Iran Taliban regime and presented Iran with an opportunity
to strengthen its influence among the Shiite minority in western
Afghanistan, a regime linked to the United States was established in
Afghanistan and American soldiers were positioned just across Iran's western
border. The message that the United States sent to Iran was equally
important: the United States has taken military action in order to topple a
Muslim regime - a neighbor of Iran, no less - because it sheltered a
terrorist organization. The inclusion of Iran along the axis of evil and the
operation in Afghanistan, steps regarded as threats to Iran's Islamic
regime, caused shock in Iran, forcing the regime to regard the possibility
of an American and/or Israeli military attack as greater than before. Based
on this concern, and based on emerging signs that the United States might in
fact undertake military action in Iraq, Iranian Defense Minister Ali
Shamkhani announced in December 2002 that Iran would increase its military
spending for 2003 in order to better prepare itself for a possible war in
the region.

The war in Iraq brought about the most important change in Iran's strategic
environment. On the one hand, the war yielded some positive developments for
Iran. The American operation toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein, with whom
Iran had a long and bloody account to settle. Iraq would no longer be able
to threaten Iran with conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction.
Iraq's disappearance as a central player in the Middle East, at least for a
significant period of time, leaves Iran as the major force in the Gulf
region. The outcome of the war also presented Iran with new opportunities
for expanding its influence in Iraq, primarily among Iraq's Shiite
population, who recently started undergoing a process of ethnic awakening;
Iran might even try to create a new Iranian-Iraqi Shiite center of gravity.

On the other hand, Iran's strategic posture was damaged by the war,
primarily due to the significantly increased American threat. A large
American force was stationed in Iraq, with no sign of leaving in the
immediate future. The American administration is attempting to stabilize an
American-sponsored regime in Iraq that will cooperate with it. It is also
possible that the United States will attempt to rebuild Iraq as a
counterbalance to Iran, not only politically but militarily as well. Iran
will thus be surrounded on almost all sides by countries with regimes linked
to the United States, most of which have American forces stationed on their
soil. The toppling of Saddam's regime also weakened the group of radical
countries in the region, which includes Iran, and increased the power of
American deterrence. Furthermore, the message sent by the American operation
was no less significant: the Bush administration has gone to war again -
this time, despite significant international opposition - in order to topple
a Muslim or Arab regime that crossed a red line in terms of American
interests. The campaign in Iraq also demonstrated the fundamental difference
between a modern army and an army like that of Iraq or Iran.

This warning signal was intended first and foremost for Iran, as the
accusations against Iran are much more serious than the factors that
motivated the Bush administration to go to war with Iraq. Iraq's involvement
in terrorism was limited in the two years preceding the war. It was far from
acquiring nuclear weapons, and the extent of its progress in developing
chemical and biological capabilities after the 1991 Gulf War has yet to be
proven. In contrast, Iran is engaged heavily in terrorism and is in contact
with al-Qaeda operatives. More than ever before, Iran is involved in
encouraging and directing Palestinian terrorism against Israel and thus in
sabotaging the Bush administration efforts to end the current
Israeli-Palestinian crisis and restore the conflict to the diplomatic track.
Iran has chemical weapons and, apparently, biological weapons as well. Most
importantly, it is on the way to acquiring nuclear weapons. The American
administration also accuses Iran of disrupting other important components of
its Middle East policy - by harboring al-Qaeda operatives who escaped from
Afghanistan and by interfering with American efforts to stabilize Iraq. As a
result, some voices in Washington are in favor of adopting a tougher policy
towards Iran, even to the point of taking military action for the sake of
regime change.

Since the end of the Iraq War, the Bush administration has been trying to
take advantage of the war's outcome in order to pressure Iran to change its
behavior. On a practical level, the United States has demanded that Iran
sever its ties with al-Qaeda operatives and extradite those who found refuge
in Iran. It has also insisted that Iran refrain from interfering and
developing spheres of influence in Iraq, primarily among the Shiites. But
the United States has also raised more general issues, such as demanding
that Iran cease its involvement in terrorism and, most importantly, that it
put a halt to its program of nuclear weapons development.

The New Stage of Iran's Nuclear Program

In light of recent findings, American pressure on Iran since the beginning
of 2003 has focused on the issue of Iranian nuclear development. The Iranian
nuclear program made no significant progress during the 1990s. Plans to
construct a nuclear power plant in Bushehr proceeded slowly, and plans to
build a large research facility did not progress at all. Iran did not
succeed in building a central nuclear facility that could contribute
directly to the development of fissile material through uranium enrichment
or plutonium separation. The difficulties in implementing the plans stemmed
both from the weakness of Iran's scientific and technological infrastructure
and from America's partial success in obstructing the transfer of nuclear
equipment and technology to Iran.

However, since 2001 a significant change has occurred in this realm,
apparently with the help of Pakistan and North Korea, as well as research
institutes and commercial companies in Russia and China. It became evident
that Iran has constructed a number of nuclear facilities that are highly
significant for the attempt to acquire nuclear weapons, and that it plans to
build more. Some of these facilities were discovered by Western intelligence
agencies and made public by Iranian opposition groups and the American
intelligence community. Others were discovered during visits of
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials to Iran during the first
half of 2003. For its part, Iran had refrained from declaring to the IAEA
the existence of most of these facilities, as well as providing information
on additional nuclear activity, until it was recently pressured to do so.
These facilities include:

A gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility at Natanz. The plant also
houses a pilot plant for the enrichment of uranium that was slated to begin
functioning in June 2003, and a large uranium enrichment facility with more
than 50,000 centrifuges, the construction of which is to be completed in the
next few years.

A workshop of the Kalaye Electrical Company in Tehran, which was disguised
as a watch factory and used as a cover for secret activity relating to the
centrifugal enrichment of uranium. Iran initially refused to allow IAEA
inspectors to visit the site, and when they did, part of the facility
remained off limits. It is suspected that unreported testing with nuclear
material was carried out at the site, violating the international Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). An Iranian opposition group
also reported two other secret facilities related to uranium enrichment.

A heavy water production plant in Arak, in advanced stages of construction,
and a 40 megawatt research plant to be powered by heavy water and natural
uranium, which Iran announced would be built at the site in 2004.

A uranium conversion plant at Isfahan that China began constructing in the
1990s; construction was halted in 1997 due to American pressure. Iran
recently announced that it will soon complete the plant and start operating
it, and that it is also about to begin mining natural uranium at the uranium
deposits discovered in central Iran in the 1990s.

Iran likewise acknowledged that it received 1.8 tons of natural uranium from
China in 1991, which it had not declared to the IAEA as was incumbent on it.
Part of this quantity was stored in a nuclear laboratory in Tehran, which
Iran did not declare either. A small portion of this uranium, imported in
the form of UF6 gas, was not to be found in the cylinders that were
presented to the IAEA, and it is suspected that Iran used it for uranium
enrichment tests.

These findings have grave implications from a number of angles regarding
Iran's ability to develop nuclear weapons. First, the enrichment facility in
Natanz will give Iran the capacity to produce fissile material through
uranium enrichment. While the large facility at Natanz will only be
completed in a few years, Iran will be able to enrich significant quantities
of uranium before its completion. In addition, the pilot plant can already
enrich small quantities of uranium. Even if - as Iran claims - the plant
produces low-enriched uranium intended for future power plants, it will be
able to direct some of its capability towards producing a significant
quantity of military quality uranium, which would be enough to produce 2-3
nuclear bombs per year.

Second, Iran has proven that it is capable of disregarding its obligations
to the NPT and of secretly building nuclear facilities. It can be assumed
that Iran did not intend to declare the facilities it built, but rather some
were exposed by an Iranian opposition group and others were reported due to
the pressures exerted on the regime. And just as Iran secretly built the
enrichment facility at Natanz, so it might build a smaller secret facility
for the enrichment of military quality uranium elsewhere, in a location that
would be difficult for the IAEA to find. In fact, it is possible that Iran
has already built such a facility secretly (perhaps this is actually the
Kalaye facility), as the facility constructed at Natanz is so large and so
sophisticated that it could have only been built after Iran built and
operated a smaller enrichment facility, thereby violating the NPT. Indeed,
in July 2003, IAEA inspectors discovered traces of highly enriched uranium
in Natanz. In a clumsy attempt to explain the NPT violation, Iran told the
inspectors that the uranium came into the country on contaminated equipment
purchased abroad,

Iran thus exploited the loopholes in its present obligations to the NPT. It
was the only signatory country that by 2003 had not accepted the IAEA's
requirement of 1992 that countries report the construction of new nuclear
facilities prior to the beginning of construction. After a great deal of
pressure, Iran undertook this obligation for the first time in 2003, and
this will make it more difficult for the country to build additional
facilities clandestinely. However, even after accepting this obligation,
Iran can, in violation of its commitment, still attempt to build nuclear
facilities secretly, especially as long as it has not signed the Additional
Protocol, a document that grants the IAEA stricter supervisory authority.
Without this authority, the IAEA does not have the tools necessary to
identify and locate undeclared nuclear activity or to determine whether Iran
has built secret uranium enrichment facilities.

Third, indications thus suggest that through its recent actions, Iran has
been establishing the potential to acquire fissile material through uranium
enrichment in two possible ways: by enriching military quality uranium at a
secret enrichment facility that is difficult to detect (especially if Iran
continues to evade adopting the Additional Protocol, but even possibly if it
does sign it); and by withdrawing from the NPT with ninety days notice as
construction of the large enrichment facility in Natanz progresses, and
quickly produce a significant quantity of highly enriched uranium.

Fourth and no less disturbing is Iran's announcement that it will soon
start building a large research plant fueled by heavy water and natural
uranium. While Iran has offered a general explanation for its need for such
a plant, based on its plans to establish a complete nuclear fuel cycle, it
is clear that the main objective of building the plant can only be the
production of plutonium. This means that while Iran is apparently striving
to acquire nuclear weapons primarily through uranium enrichment, it is also
making simultaneous efforts to move forward on the plutonium separation
track, should it become evident that progress can be made in this direction
more quickly.

These serious findings both surprised and worried the American
administration, which quickly publicized the fact that Iran was progressing
towards nuclear weapons much more rapidly than was previously believed.
Similar to the assessments of Israeli intelligence agencies, sources within
the American intelligence community estimate that Iran will become capable
of acquiring nuclear weapons within three to four years. In the wake of
these assessments, senior administration officials have begun making tough
statements against Iran. President Bush called on the international
community to make it very clear that it would not tolerate the production of
nuclear weapons by Iran. In addition, a senior government official said that
while a military operation against Iran is currently a low American
priority, it remains an option.

For now, the administration is focusing on diplomatic efforts to bring the
Iranian nuclear program to a halt. Some of these efforts are directed at the
IAEA and at Russia. The American administration tried to persuade the IAEA
to declare unequivocally that Iran has violated the NPT and to set a
detailed timetable for rectifying the situation. Such a declaration would
enable the administration to bring the issue to the Security Council and
demand that it take steps against Iran, including an export embargo on all
nuclear materials to Iran.

So far, the American effort has been only partially successful. The IAEA's
report of June 2003 fell short of declaring that Iran violated the treaty,
adopting only a compromise statement that said that Iran "failed" to fulfill
some of its obligations by not reporting the use of nuclear materials to the
Agency and not declaring the sites where the materials were used. However,
the Agency did release a disturbing report that depicts Iran as hiding part
of its nuclear activity and offering insufficient explanations for doing so.
The Agency also determined that the number of times that Iran failed to
report its facilities and activities as required gave cause for concern. In
light of this, the IAEA urged Iran to take the following steps:

To commit to greater openness, providing the Agency with wider access to its
nuclear facilities, and, most importantly, to sign the Additional Protocol

To refrain from moving nuclear materials into the uranium enrichment testing
facility and to refrain from operating the facility

To correct the supervisory problems that were discovered and to provide the
Agency with additional information on Iran's nuclear activities

To allow inspectors to take environmental samples at the sites suspected of
enrichment activity

Faced with accumulating pressure, Iran has assumed tactics of evasion and
vagueness in order to gain time and defy the pressure. Since Iran recently
committed to reporting every new nuclear facility to the IAEA as soon as its
construction is decided upon, the bulk of the dispute has focused on the
issue of signing the Additional Protocol. Iran has so far refused to commit
to signing the document, while attempting to disguise its refusal with a
positive attitude and a willingness to discuss the issue. In the final
analysis, however, Iran conditioned its signature of the Protocol on lifting
the limitations on its ability to purchase advanced nuclear technology and
equipment.

The American administration has also been making use of recent discoveries
concerning Iranian nuclear activity in order to try to stop Russia's nuclear
assistance to Iran. In light of the new information, Russia's position on
the issue appears to have changed somewhat. Russia is no longer ruling out -
as it had in the past - the possibility that Iran is secretly developing
nuclear weapons, and the president of Russia has given the impression that
his country would be willing to curtail its nuclear assistance to Iran as
long as the latter refuses to accept intensified international monitoring of
its nuclear activity. In practice, however, the Russian change of position
is still limited. On the one hand, Russia publicly supports calls for Iran
to sign the Additional Protocol, but did not suggest it as a condition for
the continuation of its assistance to the Iranian nuclear program. On the
other hand, the Russians announced that they will not complete the
construction of the nuclear plant in Bushehr until Iran signs an agreement
attesting to its commitment to return used fuel rods from the reactor, which
is a commitment that Iran has been dodging for the past eight years. Russia
has also hinted that, in the meantime, it will not build another reactor in
Bushehr.

The American administration has secured a greater degree of support for its
position from the European Union countries, which are apparently convinced
that Iran is coming increasingly closer to acquiring nuclear weapons. An
official document of the French government that was leaked to the media
attests to this fact, stating explicitly that Iran has been maintaining a
secret nuclear weapons development program and will be able to acquire
nuclear weapons within only a few years. The Europeans may also be willing
to cooperate with the Bush administration on this subject, following the
crisis over the Iraq issue, and in order to help Bush succeed with his
diplomatic efforts against Iran and prevent him from taking the military
route again. In any case, members of the European Union informed Iran that
continued evasion of compliance with IAEA demands will harm their mutual
political and economic cooperation.

Internal Pressure

Along with external pressures, Iran is also experiencing internal pressures.
Beginning in early June 2003, a new wave of domestic unrest rocked the
country, lasting over a month. As in the past, the unrest was led by
students. Other than its simultaneous emergence, the recent agitation was
not directly related to the external pressures discussed above. However, it
is indeed related to two questions regarding Iran as a future nuclear
threat. The first is: to what degree will the Iranian nuclear threat be
affected by future internal changes within Iran? For instance, what impact
would the emergence of a more moderate leadership in Iran or the undermining
of Iran's central government have on the shaping of the nuclear threat? The
second is: to what degree might American military action be able to upset
Iran's radical regime, in order to check the Iranian threat?

Unrest in Iran is not a new phenomenon, and waves of protests and
disturbances have shaken the country at various intervals throughout the
past decade. They reflect real dissatisfaction and frustration with the
political and economic realities of the country since the Islamic
Revolution, primarily among the younger generation. The younger generation,
which makes up the majority of Iran's population, grew up under
revolutionary fundamentalist rule and therefore has no first-hand knowledge
of the realities of life under the shah. The younger generation regards the
present situation as unacceptable and wants to build a better future. Its
frustration stems from two main sources: the difficult socioeconomic
situation that has plagued Iran since the revolution, manifested, among
other indicators, in high unemployment rates, including among the highly
educated population; and its determination to expand freedoms of political
organization and expression, as well as human and civil rights in the
country.

This time, the disturbances were characterized by verbal attacks not only
against the regime's policies but against the leaders of the regime as well,
including personal attacks against spiritual leader Ali Khamenei. Moreover,
some of the attacks were also directed towards the leader of the moderate
camp, President Mohammed Khatami, stemming from disappointment with his
hesitant leadership style and his helplessness in advancing movement toward
reform. The regime adopted a mixture of a firm hand and pacifying efforts to
address the unrest. It also accused the United States of subversion and
incitement in bringing about the disturbances.

The disturbances subsided in mid-July without escalating out of control and
without destabilizing the hold of the radical elements in power. While the
majority of the Iranian people are apparently in favor of reform, the
general public did not join the students, perhaps because they did not
believe that the protest would produce results. The current wave of protest
proved once again that the reform movement still has no leadership, is not
united, and is insufficiently organized.

Implications

The regime in Iran now finds itself besieged by a combination of different
pressures, most of which stem from its weapons of mass destruction
ambitions, its involvement in terrorism, and its attempt to take advantage
of the vacuum created in Afghanistan and Iraq in order to build spheres of
influence in those countries. The external pressures on the regime are led,
like in the past, by the United States, which has been drawing increasing
attention to Iran and attempting to exploit the changes in its strategic
environment in order to cause it to change its policies on the central
issues.

The nuclear issue lies at the heart of the external pressures. Iran today is
under heavier international pressure than in the past to limit its nuclear
activities and accept much closer supervision, primarily by agreeing to the
conditions of the Additional Protocol. Iran has thus far refrained from
signing the Protocol, which has made it very difficult for the IAEA to
locate undeclared Iranian nuclear activity. At the same time, Iran has used
a tactic of evasion, by feigning a willingness to cooperate with the Agency
and to facilitate transparency of its nuclear program. Until 2003, this
tactic effectively hampered US attempts to consolidate international
cooperation to stop the Iranian nuclear program. However, the exposure of
crucial components of Iran's nuclear activity since the summer of 2002 has
raised questions that Iran is having trouble answering. Moreover, Iran's
behavior in response to the information that was uncovered - its attempts to
conceal facilities and activities and hinder the Agency's investigations,
and its partial and insufficient answers to the questions it was asked - has
made the regime's position on its nuclear program appear less reliable. For
this reason, Russia and certain European governments have joined the United
States in pressuring Iran, albeit in a more limited manner.

Under these pressures, Iran has two possible courses of action, neither of
them easy. If it continues to dodge full cooperation with the IAEA, the
American administration is likely to bring the issue to the Security Council
in order to apply sanctions. If Iran signs the Additional Protocol, it will
become more difficult for it to continue its secret nuclear activity without
detection. However, it should be pointed out that the Additional Protocol
does not endow the Agency with full capabilities to uncover undeclared
facilities. Therefore, even if Iran does sign the Protocol, it will retain
two possible ways of attempting to produce fissile material: by producing it
at an undeclared facility operating alongside a declared facility (in hopes
that it is not detected), thus violating the NPT, or by withdrawing from the
NPT with 90 days notice and working relatively quickly to enrich military
quality uranium or to produce plutonium and separate it.

Iran itself appears to not be taking the mounting pressure lightly.
Statements made by its leaders seem to indicate that they are taking into
consideration the possibility of American military action, especially the
scenario of an American and/or Israeli attack on nuclear facilities in Iran.
The degree to which Iran would be willing to yield on the issue of
supervision of its nuclear project is still unclear. However, it may be
willing to make additional concessions, as long as it retains an ability to
maneuver and to continue the program. In order to gain time, it appears that
Iran will follow developments in Iraq closely and hope that the American
administration becomes entangled in a difficult situation, expends most of
its resources there, and eventually is forced to withdraw its forces.

As long as Iran continues working to acquire nuclear weapons despite the
pressures and the difficulties involved, the Iranian issue will be a central
occupation of the American administration after Iraq. America has made it
clear that its focus is on stopping Iran's progress towards acquiring
nuclear weapons and on decreasing Iran's attempts to hinder American policy
through support of terrorism and involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq. The
American administration will have a number of possible ways of advancing its
interests. Clearly the currently preferred method is diplomatic. First of
all, now is a more opportune time than in the past to achieve results
through diplomatic action, with the possibility of exploiting the pressure
produced by the campaign in Iraq and the disclosure of important components
of Iran's nuclear program. The American administration is also interested in
exhausting the diplomatic track in order to provide the minimal legitimacy
required for a military strike in the event that it decides to undertake
one. Assuming that three to four years remain before Iran can acquire
nuclear weapons, there is still time for diplomatic activity. As far as can
be assessed, pressure on Iran can still be intensified, perhaps via the
Security Council. This pressure has already started making it more difficult
for Iran to proceed with its nuclear program, and the difficulty will be
heightened if it signs the Additional Protocol. However, it is doubtful that
such pressure will completely block Iran's nuclear track.

Another possible course of action is attempting to initiate a dialogue
between the leadership in Washington and the leadership in Tehran. The Bush
administration has not ruled out such a step, and theoretically the war in
Iraq might create new reasons for Iran to be interested in such a dialogue
as well. The destruction of Iraqi military power, which obviated the primary
motive for Iran's military buildup, may cause Iran's leadership to rethink
its military plans. In addition, the increasingly serious nature of the
American threat and the possibility of military action against Iran may
motivate the regime to try and minimize the danger by negotiating with the
American administration. The stationing of American troops in Iraq and
Afghanistan, which is especially significant for Iran's ruling regime, may
also increase its interest in a future-oriented dialogue with the United
States. Limited dialogue between the two parties on working levels took
place prior to the American operation in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq,
and the possibility of expanding these talks in the future cannot be ruled
out. In fact, some Iranian leaders recently signaled that such a step is
possible, although the radical leadership still discounts the possibility of
genuine dialogue with the American administration. As long as this remains
its position, and as long as there is no change in the internal balance of
power between radicals and moderates within Iran, any serious progress
towards dialogue between the sides is doubtful.

A third possible course of action, which was noted by sources in Washington,
is attempting to encourage internal change within Iran that would favor the
country's moderate elements. There is a small but real hope in Washington
that Iran's domestic unrest will lead to moderation of the Islamic regime in
Tehran, thereby reducing the Iranian threat. For this reason, some believe
that such internal change should be encouraged. Indeed, while at this stage
the radical establishment still controls the key positions within Iran and
has so far succeeded in subduing the internal unrest, the long-term may
witness an internal change based on the fact that the current domestic
unrest is coming from below - from the public at large - and reflects a
genuine desire for change. Since change may likely be slow, gradual, and
full of obstacles and relapses, it is difficult to estimate when it will
come about. Nonetheless, there is a good chance that, ultimately, it will
occur, eventually resulting in moderation of the regime. At the same time,
it should also be assumed that any movement towards the moderation of the
regime in Iran would be the result of internal processes, not external
influences. For this reason, attempting to influence the internal struggle
within Iran at the present is not a relevant course of action for the United
States.

All this means that at this stage, the main course of action open to the
American administration is to exhaust the new opportunities for exerting
pressure on Iran, perhaps in combination with another attempt at dialogue if
conditions permit. However, if these methods do not achieve results, the
United States might also examine the possibility of a military strike
against Iran. This is the most problematic option. The administration will
be faced with great difficulties if it attempts to move against Iran
militarily, and this will certainly remain the case until the situation in
Iraq is stabilized and the political success of the Iraqi campaign will be
evident. In any event, even if the American administration does consider the
possibility of a military strike against Iran at some point in the future,
it is difficult to assume that it would be a comprehensive operation. Such a
move would be much more difficult and complex than the operation in Iraq,
due to the fact that it would involve greater risks and lack sufficient
international legitimacy. Even Britain, the United State's primary ally in
its campaign against Iraq, made it clear that it would not support military
action against Iran. Still, if the American administration concludes that
Iran is coming very close to acquiring nuclear weapons, it may consider a
limited pinpoint military operation, for example against Iranian nuclear
sites. Such a decision will depend not only on military factors and regional
circumstances, but also on domestic developments within Iran, and the
possibility of starting a genuine dialogue with the Iranian regime.